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This thesis re-examines the part played by Churchill's peacet ime 
Administration in the settlement of the Indo-China war in 1954. Particular 
attention is paid to the Foreign Of t ice, 6S the government department 
responsible for Indo-China policy at the political level. The performance 
of Churchill's Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, is also scrutinised: his 
personal contribution to the negotiating process at the Geneva Conference 
of April-July 1954 has been universally acclaimed and has survived the 
negative impact of the Suez crisis on his reputation as an international 
statesman. Drawing extensively on the official British archives, the role 
of Eden and British diplomacy in 1954 has been analysed from two 
complementary angles; firstly, as the culmination of policies and 
objectives generated and developed from the return of Eden to the Foreign 
Office in October 1951; and secondly, within the context of British foreign 
policy as a whole in the 1951-54 period. The first approach reveals that 
Eden's Indo-China policy prior to April 1954 was an unmitigated failure. 
Although he and his officials thereafter pursued a prudent, intelligent and 
ultimately successful course in resisting American plans for military 
intervention in Viet-Nam and working for a negotiated solution at the 
Geneva Conference, it is contended that the real art of crisis management 
is to avoid the crisis in the first place. In this connection, 
opportunities arose in 1952-53 for Britain to decisively influence the 
course of events in Indo-China, but these either went unnoticed or were 
consciously overlooked. The second approach reveals the constraints 
imposed on British Indo-China pOlicy by ostensibly unconnected factors, 
most notably the problem of rearming West Germany within the framework of 
the European Defence Community (E. D.C.). By extension, it also reveals the 
reasons for the failure of British policy down to 1954. Until the April 
crisis, Indo-China was subordinated to the imperative of making West German 
rearmament operative. It is argued, for example, that Eden only agreed to 
include Indo-China on the agenda of the Geneva Conference out of concern 
that failure to do so would inflame anti-war feeling in France and lead to 
the downfall of what was believed to be the last pro-E. D.C. French 
government. Therefore, the convening of the Geneva Conference - the scene 
of one of Eden's most widely praised negotiating triumphs - had, in its 
Indo-China form, little to do with a preconceived commitment to bring peace 
to the area. It was instead a manifestation of the Cold War in Europe. 
Eden only came to see virtue in the Conference when the French were faced 
with military disaster at Dien Bien Phu and the United States threatened to 
internationalise the conflict. A negotiated settlement assumed importance 
in Bri Ush thinking as a means of denying the Americans a pretext for 
intervent ion. Eden concl uded that a poor peace, even one based on so 
distasteful a compromise as partition in Viet-Nam, was better than a major 
escalation of the war. The negative British reaction to American calls for 
'united action' in the spring of 1954 was based on a catalogue of evidence 
dating from 1951 which suggested that the United States might use a local 
crisis in Asia (a 'new' Korea) to launch a major war against China. The 
thesis also contains a number of sub-themes, the most important of which 
posits Indo-China as a case-study in terms of the efforts of Eden and 
British diplomacy to cope with the problem of sustaining a world role at a 
time of diminishing economic and military strength. Eden, contrary to 
traditional opinion, did not suffer from delusions of grandeur but had a 
considered programme for offsetting Britain's post-war decline. 
i 
PREFACE 
The part played by British diplomacy in securing a settlement of the Indo-
China war in 1954 continues to be viewed as one of the most notable 
achievements of Churchill's peacetime Administration in a year which also 
brought success in resol ving long-running disputes over Trieste, the Suez 
Canal zone, Iranian oil and a German contribution to Western defence. I On 
another level, 1954 has been singled out as a period of 'remarkable 
diplomatic achievement' for Anthony Eden personally. 2 His rdle in defusing 
all of these problems has survived the negative impact of the Suez crisis 
and, today, still generates widespread praise. It is argued that 1954 was 
Eden's 'most successful year as a diplomatist', even the 'high pOint' of 
his career as 'an international statesman'.3 Some observers go further and 
contend that it is the restoration of peace in Indo-China upon which the 
notion of Eden's annus mirabilis of 1954 principally rests. This was 
'[ulndoubtedly the greatest triumph of Eden's career' and one of the 'most 
remarkable diplomatic achievements of the post-war world'." 
Most historians draw a predictable if valid conclusion from the outcome 
of the Indo-China crisis, namely that Eden preferred a negotiated 
settlement rather than a military solution, involving American-led 
intervention, which risked a wider war with China and possibly the Soviet 
Union. The Geneva Conference of April-July 1954 provided Eden with a forum 
within which he successfully pursued this objective. This study has not 
set out to dispute this conclusion, only to trace how Eden himself reached 
it at the time. The results of this enquiry have been surprising. As a 
mathematician would admit, the answer to an equation Can often be reached 
by more than one route. By applying a variant of this approach to Eden'S 
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championing of negotiation over intervention - starting, that is, with the 
accepted view and working backwards a number of the traditional 
assumptions about British policy, its aims and determinants, have been 
called into question. Likewise the notion that the outcome of the Geneva 
Conference was a triumph, either for Eden personally or for British 
diplomacy in general. 
The 'route' pursued in this study is a dual one. Firstly, the 
Churchill Government's performance in 1954 has been re-examined in relation 
to the objectives of its Indo-China policy as they evolved from its return 
to power in October 1951. Hitherto most assessments have tended to begin 
and end with the year 1954. The crisis over 'united action' and allied 
intervention in April and the subsequent Conference at Geneva are often 
treated in isolation as elements in Eden's annus mirabilis. Few historians 
have looked beyond 1954 for the origins and determinants of British policy. 
Even the most detailed work produced since the opening ot the official 
British archives, James Cable's The Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina, 
takes as its starting point the admittedly arbitrary date of 28 June 1953.-
The following account will therefore attempt a somewhat longer-term 
analysis. Secondly, Indo-China policy has been placed within the context 
of British foreign policy as a whole. This, again, is a neglected method 
of inqUiry. However, without an appreCiation of the external factors 
influencing British thinking on Indo-China, or, indeed, without assessing 
the repercussions of the war in other ostensibly unconnected areas, the 
picture is only half-complete. Eden offered some advice to future 
historians of the 1951-55 Churchill Government's external policy when, in 
his memoirs, he pointed out that the events he described were ... 
i11 
never seen in isolation at the time, but were constantly entangled 
with a dozen other problems which were vexing us simultaneously. 
None of them can be understood in isolation from the others.-
This applies especially to Indo-China. If, for example, Cable had followed 
Eden's advice, he could never have written that '[wJithout perSistent 
British efforts the Geneva Conference would never have been held, allowed 
to continue or permi Hed to end in even the limited measure of agreement 
actually achieved'. The first of these contentions is open to serious 
question, and even the last two are disputable. However, in fairness to 
Cable, he never claimed to be writing a 'universal' study. 7 
Among the issues highlighted by the longer-term approach is the extent 
to which, from the onset of the crisis over intervention in March 1954, the 
actions of Eden and his officials were a clear reflection of the anxiety 
which the belligerent American policy towards the People's Republic of 
China <P. R. C.) had engendered in London since the outbreak of the Korean 
war. From late 1951, Eden sought to bring the United States into a formal 
defence structure for South-East Asia alongside France, Australia and New 
Zealand. This would cover Indo-China, widely acknowledged as the strategic 
key to the region's security and, by extension, the forward defence of the 
important British colony of Malaya. The object of defence co-ordination 
was the containment of Chinese expansionism. However, it would also ease 
British fears about the potentially disastrous consequences of American 
unilateralism in the region - provocation of the P.R.C., activation of the 
Sino-Soviet alliance, a conflagration throughout Asia spreading to Europe, 
and a third (nuclear) world war. The aim was to make Washington answerable 
to its allies rather than just itself for its actions. This, as much as 
the threat of Chinese aggreSSion, accounted for British enthusiasm for 
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defence co-operation in South-East Asia. Unfortunately, the crisis in 
Anglo-American relations over 'united action' in April 1954 testifies to 
the failure of British diplomacy in this respect. 
The contextual approach demonstrates the extent to which Indo-China 
was seen as an adjunct of the probleJllS posed by the emergence of the P.R.C. 
as a force in international relations. Indo-China was also a difficult and 
divisive issue in terms of Anglo-American relations: differences in this 
respect were symptomatic of wider Anglo-American disagreements over policy 
in Asia generally. But perhaps the most striking result of the contextual 
approach is the light it sheds on the intimate relationship between the 
Indo-China war and Western defence policy in Europe, in particular the plan 
to rearm West Germany within the framework of the European Defence 
Community <E. D.C. ) project. As will be seen, the fate of the E. D. C. was 
very much bound up with events in Indo-China, while British policy towards 
the latter was often framed with one eye on the former. As long as the 
Indo-China war continued to divert French troops and resources from Europe. 
the authorit ies in Paris could justify their refusal to bring the E. D. C. 
treaty (and with it the rearmament of Germany> before the National Assembly 
for ratification on the grounds that France would be left mil1 tarlly 
outnumbered in the E. D. C. by the new German armed forces. This was 
politically and emotionally unacceptable. However, French prevarication 
placed a tremendous strain on Anglo-French relations. contributed to the 
continued mil1 tary weakness of the Western Alliance in relation to the 
Soviet bloc in Europe, and sO antagonised the Americans that a reversion to 
isolation or 'peripheral defence' was threatened. At the same time, the 
French refused to allocate enough troops for Indo-China to force a decisive 
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victory for, ironically, the same reason which precluded ratification of 
the E. D. C., to wit the risk of Franco-German military disequilibrium. 
In London 1n 1952-53, there was a great deal of discussion about how 
best to unravel this tangled skein. One solution was for British forces to 
fill the gap left in European defence by French reinforcement of Indo-
China. In this way, the French fear of a rearmed Germany would be lessened 
and the situation in Viet-Nam restored. French forces could then return to 
Europe thus removing one of the main obstacles to E.D.C. ratification. A 
considerable body of official opinion in London - military, political and 
diplomatiC - regarded this as a realistic proposition. In the final 
analysiS, however, Eden refused to countenance a British troop commitment. 
Britain's still extensive overseas responsibilities militated against any 
additional obligations in Europe. Th1s, though, was the j ust1fication. 
The real objection was that a substantial troop comm1tment m1ght be 
miSinterpreted as a sign ot readiness to join the supranational E. D. C. , 
something which the Churchill Administration steadfastly opposed. The 
worry was that the Americans, passionate supporters of the project, might 
press London to make the commitment permanent if, in the process, E. D. C. 
ratification in France could be speeded up. Therefore, in refusing to draw 
closer to Europe, the British may have squandered an opportunity to alter 
the course of events in Indo-China. 
Other more general questions are raised during the course of this study. 
For example, can the Geneva Conference be seen as a success for British 
diplomacy H, in reality, it was the culmination of three years of 
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vacillation, indecision and contradiction on the part of the Foreign 
Secretary and his advisers? Although policy-makers acted intelligently and 
skilfully once the crisis broke in 1954, it will be argued that the real 
art of crisis management is to avoid the crisis in the first place. Should 
the earlier failure therefore detract from the later success? Furthermore, 
can the Geneva Conference be said to have been a personal triumph for Eden 
if, as was the case, he agreed to participate for reasons related as much 
to the requirements of his E. D. C. policy as British objectives in South-
East Asia and if, in addition, he had serious misgivings about the moral 
rectitude, as well as the durability, of an agreement for Viet-Nam based on 
partition? 
A number of sub-themes also permeate the narrative. The most important 
of these focuses on the constraints imposed on British foreign policy 
formulation by the reqUirements of the domestic economy. The British 
economy experienced severe difficulties during much of the period in 
question and, as a result, policy-makers were under pressure to make 
foreign policy' affordable'. This meant, inter alillt avoiding additional 
overseas comadtments and, where pOSSible, reducing existing ones. It also 
meant choosing between desired objectives rather than pursuing them all 
simul taneously. When the choice seemed impOSSible, there was always the 
option of using American resources and power to attain essentially British 
ends, a course which obviously required extremely careful handling. This 
approach is termed 'power-by-proxy'. While 'power-by-proxy' was regarded 
by Eden as having a general application, this thesis is to some extent a 
case-study of how successful it was in terms of Indo-China. Other sub-
themes include Churchill and Eden's competing and conflicting views on the 
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r61e of Britain within the Anglo-American I special relationship' in the 
early 1950s; British fears about the growing American nuclear arsenal; 
British attitudes towards European integration, to which end the E.D.C. was 
seen (especially in the United States) as a stepping-stone; and finally, 
with regard to 'power-by-proxy', how the Conservative Government attempted 
to preserve Britain's position and reputation in the world at a time of 
increasing military and economic enervation . 
• 
British Indo-China policy evolved in the early 1950s in such a way as to 
permit within an otherwise chronological account a certain degree of 
thematic analysis. Hence the division of the narrative into a number of 
sections or 'dimensions'. The first, the 'Chinese dimension', deals with 
Eden's efforts to encourage greater American involvement in the defence of 
South-East Asia against the designs of Communist China. The aggressive 
anti-Chinese posture adopted by the Truman Administration, and later 
embraced and intensified by its Republican successor, had a seminal 
influence on the formulation and conduct of British pOlicy in 1954. The 
'French dimension' deals with the growing realisation in London from mid-
1952 that a Chinese invasion of Viet-Nam (itself a rapidly diminishing 
prospect) was just one element in a multi-faceted problem. Of more 
immediate concern was the possibility of a collapse of political support 
for the war in Paris leading to peace talks with the Chinese or the Viet-
Minh resistance in Viet-Ham. To British minds, given the weakness of the 
French military position, such talks could only result in full control 
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passing to the communlsts with serlous consequences tor Sri tish interests 
in the reglon ~notably Malaya and Singapore) as well as the position ot the 
West in the delicately balanced Cold War. 
In London, policy-makers believed the best means of avoiding this 
situation was for France to take the offensive in Viet-Nam and obtain a 
decisive victory over the rebels. This would also offset 0 further donger: 
in 1951 the French Government had drawn up plans for the Viet-Namese 
themselves to assume the defence of their own country. This involved the 
creation of a Viet-Namese army to whom defence duties could be transferred. 
However, to the alarm of the Sri tish, the French appeared intent on 
completing this process and pulling out the bulk of their troops by the end 
of 1954. It seemed that in their anxiety to extricate themselves from 
their draining lndo-Chinese conunitment, the authorities in Paris placed 
undue faith in the native armed torces and their ability to cope unaided 
with the Viet-Minh. The British in contrast had no confidence in the Viet-
Namese. Consequently, from the autumn of 1952. the Chiefs of Staff began 
to advocate an offensive French strategy aimed at destroying the Viet-Minh 
before the process of evacuation was commenced. The key to success was 
French reinforcement from Europe. However, as already noted, Eden ignored 
the advice of the Hili tary and refused to approach the French on this 
subject for two related reasons: first, Paris would demand a qUi.d pro quo 
if it was to contemplate despatching more troops to South-East Asiaj 
second. this seemed certain to be a British promise to join the E.D.C. or 
at least to station add1 tional troops in Europe to counterbalance the 
reduction in French forces. Eden, however, subordinated Indo-China policy 
to the interests ot European policy and refused to consider compromising 
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his established policy on the E. D. C. This included non-membership and 
avoidance of additional military commitments on the continent. Therefore a 
chance, perhaps the last, for France to either win or, later, approach 
negotiations with the Viet-Minh from strength, may have been lost as a 
result of a decision taken in London. This section is accordingly termed 
the 'European Defence Dimension' and covers a period when British diplomacy 
is seen at its most impotent and myopic. 
By the autumn of 1953, and with the absence of any sUbstantial French 
reinforcements, British policy-makers began to fear the possibility of a 
French defeat at the hands of the Viet-Minh unaided by Chinese manpower. 
By then, however, the French had themselves taken a decision to negotiate 
their way out of the problem. All thought of pressing Paris to step-up the 
war effort was abandoned in London in the knowledge that the French, 
despite brave statements to the contrary, were preparing to wind-down their 
commitment. This section is entitled the 'Viet-Minh dimension'. All of 
which leads into the decisive year of 1954 which, inevitably, takes up the 
last third of the narrative. Though given the heading 'Anatomy of a 
Crisis', it might also be called the 'Anglo-American Dimension' for there 
were, in effect, two crises in 1954, one in Viet-Nam, the other in Anglo-
American relations. The thesis concludes by discussing the extent to which 
the traditional view of British policy in 1954 can be sustained when judged 
against the objectives and aspirations of Eden and British diplomacy as 
they had developed since October 1951 . 
• 
The nomenclature employed in this study reqUires some elaboration. The 
term 'Asia and the Far East', while sometimes used in the Foreign Office in 
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the 1950's, has been rejected in favour of the more compact 'Asia'. This 
is used when referring to the vast area stretching from India and Pakistan 
to China. Where appropriate, Asia is divided into regions, the principal 
focus of discussion being 'South-East Asia'. This, geo-politically-
speaking, comprises Indo-China (Laos, Cambodia and Viet-Nam), Siam, Burma, 
Malaya, Singapore and Indonesia. Siam is preferred to Thailand to avoid 
constant alteration to contemporary quotations. The same applies to 
discussion of the E.D.C., where 'German' rearmament was the usual 
contemporary application rather than the more technically correct 'West 
German' . 
Although a study of the Indo-China war, most attention is paid to Viet-
Nam which, until April 1953 when the Viet-Minh invaded Laos, was the main 
arena of conflict. Events in Laos and Cambodia are singled out when 
necessary. In discussing the war, the all-embracing term 'French' forces 
is used rather than the more accurate - but longer - 'French, French Union 
and Associate State forces'. When relevant, the Viet-Namese armed forces 
are discussed as a separate entity. Likewise, the 'French Expeditionary 
Corps' is broken into French metropolitan and French Union forces. 
Finally, all references (' Notes') are to documents held at the Public 
Record Office, Kew, London, unless otherwise stated. 
NOTES 
1. Peter Hennessey and Anthony Selden, eds., Ruling Performance: British 
Governments from Attlee to Thatcher (Oxford 1987), pp.89-90; David 
Dimbleby and David ReynOldS, An Ocean Apart: The Relationship Between 
Britain and America in the Twentieth Century (London 1988), p.202. 
2. Kenneth O. Morgan, The People's Peace: British History 1945-89 (Oxford 
1990), p. 132, hereafter People's Peace 
3. David ReynOldS, 'Eden the Diplomatist 1931-56: Suezide of a Statesman?' 
in Histor~ (April 1989), p.73; C.J.Bartlett, British Foreign Policy in 
xi 
the Twentieth Century (London 1989), p.95, hereafter British Foreisn 
Policy. also Anthony Selden, Churchill's Indian Summer: The Conserva-
tive Government 1951-55 (London 1981), pps. 41, 379, 409-15, hereafter 
Indian Summer, Robert Blake, The Decline of Power 1915-64 (London 1985) 
pp.349-52, hereafter Decline of Power, Robert Rhodes James, Anthony 
Eden (London 1986), pp.389-90, hereafter Edenj Avi Shlaim, Peter Jones 
& Keith Sainsbury, British Foreisn Secretaries since 1945 (Newton Abbot 
1977), p. 108, hereafter British Foreisn Secretarie~ Iveragh McDonald, 
A Man of 'The Times' (London 1976>, p.132. 
4. Richard Lamb, 'Was Eden's Premiership a Failure? The Eden Government 
1955-57' in Contemporary Record (Winter 1988)j Rhodes James, ibid, p. 
382j also Morgan, ibid, p.132; Blake, ibid, p.351j Richard Crockatt & 
Steve Smith, eds, The Cold War Past and Present (London 1987), p.97, 
hereafter Cold War, Elisabeth Barker, Britain in a Divided Europe 
(London, 1972 ed), p.114. Even Geoffrey McDermott, in his critical The 
Eden LeS8CY (London 1969), writes of 'Eden's good year of 1954', p.l03. 
David Carlton, Anthony Eden (London, 1986 ed), p.356 is a notable 
exception, hereafter Eden. 
5. James Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina (London 1986), 
hereafter Geneva Conference. 
6. Anthony Eden, Full Circle (London 1960), p. 12. 
7. Cable, Geneva Conference, p.2. 
xii 
Indo-China and South-East Asia 1951-55 






'" 13 0 R. N E 0 \\, N 
IND 0 CHINA. 
I f I 
" 100 Joo JOO 400 ~oo miles 
Reproduced from Anthony Eden, Full Circle (London 1960) 
xiii 
INTRODUCTION 
EDEN. THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE WAR 
IN INDO-CHINA 
October 1951 
When Winston Churchill came to form his only peacetime Administration on 26 
October 1951, the violent and bloody struggle in Viet-Nam between the 
forces of France and the French Union and the communist-led Viet-Minh 
resistance movement was about to enter its sixth year. During his time in 
opposition the war had undergone a disturbing metamorphosis. What had 
begun in 1946 as an at tempt by a European colonial power to restore it s 
former position in South-East Asia had been transformed by 1951 into a Cold 
War issue of considerable proportions. It was now a potential catalyst for 
conflict between, on one side, the United States and the other leading 
Western powers and, on the other, Communist China and possibly even the 
Soviet Union. Anthony Eden, Churchill's Foreign Secretary from 1951 to 
1955, later reflected that this volatile configuration made the 
'restoration of peace in Indo-China' the most 'dangerous and acute' of the 
problems confronting him in the international arena. 1 The transformation 
in the nature of the war waS due to a number of factors, but two over-
lapping developments in 1949 can be seen as possessing especially 
portentous implications. The first occurred in Viet-Nam and was the so-
called Bao Dai experiment. The second was the final triumph of Mao Tse-
tung's communist forces in the Chinese civil war. 
The Bao Dai experiment was the French Government's response to charges 
that, since 1946. it had been engaged in a colonial war of reconquest. 
Claims to the contrary - that it was playing an essential part in the 
global struggle to contain Communist expansion - lacked all credence so 
- 1 -
long as French colonial rule remained all-pervading. This sit uat ion 
greatly benefited the Viet-Minh, a national liberation movement comprising 
disaffected nationalists and communists and led by Ho Chi Minh, himself a 
long-time communist with links with Moscow. 2 Undiluted French authority so 
alienated Viet-Namese nationalists that many appeared willing to side with 
the Viet-Minh and, by extension, accept communist direction. It gradually 
became clear that if France was ever to defeat the rebels, Ho Chi Minh's 
popularity, based on his virtual monopoly of nationalist aspirations, had 
to be broken. The obvious solution was for France to bestow a meaningful 
measure of independence upon Viet-Nam which, in theory, would encourage 
those nationalists unhappy with the communist-orientation of the Viet-Minh 
to break away, thus weakening Ho Chi Minh's power base. 
This consideration stung Paris into action. In March 1949 Viet-Nam's 
independence was formally secured by the Elysee Agreement but, importantly, 
only wi thin the framework of the French Union, a highly centralised 
version of the Brit ish Commonwealth. In this way, France retained 
extensive control over foreign, defence and fiscal policy. Similar 
arrangements were extended to Laos and Cambodia shortly afterwards, the 
three countries being designated 'Associate States'. The ex-emperor of 
Annam, Bao Oai, became the Head of the new Associate State of Viet-Nam. In 
practice French rule, even at local government level, remained largely 
unimpaired and the experiment did little to dent the popular appeal of the 
Viet-Minh.:' In an effort to strengthen the illusion of Indo-Chines. 
freedo~ the French urged their allies to extend diplomatiC recognition to 
the new States.· The French it seemed were not engaged in a bloody 
struggle simply to relinquish their grip on Viet-Nam at its conclusion. 
The British Labour Government, unhappy with the limited level of lndo-
- 2 -
Chinese independence and doubtful whether Bao Dai could inspire mass 
support in Viet-Nam, nevertheless desired a French victory in the war and, 
in this respect, the Bao Dai experiment appeared to be a step in the right 
direction. With the additional motive of wishing to stay in line with the 
U. S Government which had already signalled its approval of the Associate 
States, Britain 'guardedly' extended diplomat ic recognition in February 
1950.& Twenty-four other countries did so too although India and the other 
leading non-aligned Asian nations refused to accept Bao Dai as anything but 
a front for continued French dominion. Late the previous month the 
Communist bloc countries had predictably recognised the Viet-Minh as the 
only legitimate government in Viet-Nam, an act which made Anglo-American 
acceptance of the Bao Dai regime 'easier'.& 
The second important, overlapping, event of 1949 was the communist 
Victory in the Chinese civil war. This had prompted the U.S. Government to 
look more favourably on French activities in Viet-Nam and, in approving the 
new Associate State system, to ignore for the time being the defiCiencies 
of the Bao Dai experiment. Partly for reasons of domestic politics, partly 
as a reaction to the loss of Japan's traditional export market and source 
of raw materials and the related fear that Japan would be drawn inexorably 
into the Chinese Communist orbit, officials in Washington came to view the 
preservation of South-East Asia as vital in terms of providing Japan with 
an alternative economic outlet. This, combined with its broader - global -
commitment to containing Communism, led the United States to regard the 
retention of Viet-Nam in the Western camp as pivotal to the preservation of 
South-East Asia generally. In short, Viet-Nam was the trigger-domino 1n 
what became known as the 'domino theory'. 7 While never happy about the 
imperfect nature ot Associate State independence, from May 1950 the United 
- 3 -
States began supplying aid to France to fight 'communism' in Indo-China 
until, by 1954, it was shouldering almost 80 per cent of the total 
financial and material cost of the war-effort.- With this kind of backing 
a French victory might have been assured if Communist China had not begun 
to supply the Viet-Minh with aid which virtually nullified that proffered 
to France. Chinese help manifested itself in sanctuary and training 
facilities for the Viet-Minh in China itself, as well as money, technical 
advice and weaponry. Recent research has confirmed the 'very substantial' 
quantity of Chinese assistance.' Direct Chinese involvement (combat troops 
rather than advisers) is still a topic of debate amongst scholars. What 
may be said is that if it occurred, it was either subtle enough or limited 
enough to be rejected by the British in the early 1950s as in any way 
comensurate with Chinese action in Korea and certainly not a casus belli. 
This completed the transformation of the Viet-Nam problem. The 
reluctance with which France would continue in the years 1951-54 to assuage 
nationalist demands ensured that the war never really lost its colonial 
character. But it was, simultaneously, a Cold War flashpoint. In Viet-Nam 
the French and the Viet-Minh confronted one another as of old; in the 
background, aiding their respective surrogates, were the United States and 
China; and waiting in the wings were Britain and the Soviet Union, the 
former a close ally of the United States and France as well as an Asian 
power in its own right, the latter tied to Peking by a Treaty of Friendship 
signed in February 1950. 
• 
What, then, was the importance of Indo-China in terms of British foreign 
policy in the early 1950's? To begin with, from a narrow pragmatiC point 
of view, Indo-China was the forward defence of Malaya and Singapore, a 
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strategic buffer between those economically important colonies (Malaya for 
its rubber and tin, Singapore as the principal seaport of South-East Asia) 
and a potentially expansionist People's Republic of China (P.R. C.) to the 
north. Should the French be defeated in Viet-Nam, it was feared in London 
that Laos, Cambodia and Siam would quickly succumb to communism either 
through external pressure or an internally-t omented coup d' etat. This 
would seriously threaten Malaya's security and necessitate significant 
reinforcement of the cOlony at a time when British military resources were 
stretched to breaking-point and, until 1954, almost the whole strategic 
reserve was tied down in Egypt. Thus reinforcement could only be at the 
expense of defence obligations in the Middle East or Western Europe and 
would involve a calculated gamble on Soviet intentions 1n those two vital 
areas. However, there could be no question of shirking responsibility for 
Malayan security in 'conditions short of general war' without causing 
immense damage to British prestige and greatly encouraging communism 
elsewhere in Asia. 10 The British Chiefs of Staff believed that the 
effective defence of Malaya could best be achieved by occupying the 
Songkhla position on the narrow Kra Isthmus that linked the colony to 
mainland Asia. This strategically crucial point was inside Siamese 
territory and was to be seized in a crisis with or without the consent of 
the Bangkok Government. II If the latter, the British would be guilty of 
invading a sovereign, neutral, State and, as such, the disapproval of the 
United Nations as well as the United States was anticipated. Nevertheless 
the Chiefs of Staff, supported by the Cabinet, continued to adhere to this 
strategy which, at root, envisaged a 'Horatius on the bridge' defence. 12 
Nor were these the only problems expected to flow from a Viet-Minh 
success in Viet-Nam. Since 1948 Britain had been engaged in queUing a 
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communist insurgency ot its own in Malaya and, in this respect, rebel 
activity was likely to be encouraged and intensified even if no direct 
external threat to the colony developed. It was also feared that civil 
disorder would be exacerbated if, following communist success in the rice 
surplus countries ot Indo-China, Siam and Burma, this essential foodstuff 
was witheld from Britain's South-East Asian dependencies (all of which were 
rice deficit countries) with a view to obtaining concessions in other 
fields. 13 A major communist success in Indo-China would also be viewed 
with alarm in Australia and New Zealand. Britain relied on both 
Commonwealth partners to augment its defence effort in the Middle East in 
time of war, but a French defeat was likely to lead to greater reluctance 
on the part of Canberra and Wellington to commdt their forces outside the 
Asian theatre and to perhaps a closer relationship with WaShington. This 
would take their estrangement from Britain, begun with the A. N. Z. U. S. 
Treaty of 1951, one stage further to the dismay of Churchill and his 
Government. 14 
The financial aspect of reinforcing Malaya also had to be borne in mind 
at a time of severe economic difficulty for Britain and when the Treasury 
was pressing hard for major reductions in Defence expenditure. 1 • Yet the 
consequences of losing Malaya were such that reinforcement would in the end 
have to be undertaken irrespective of its cost. These consequences were 
largely commercial. Malayan rubber was Britain's single greatest dollar 
earner in the early 1950s for, after a period of post-war stagnation, the 
industry had revived thanks to the decision of the U.S. Government to build 
a strategic stockpile of natural rubber in the wake of the Korean war. 1. 
As The Economist observed in April 1952 ... 
It is not always recognised that raj deterioration in Indo 
-China affects the British more adversely than any other 
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Western power. Any failure there ... would be likely to have 
serious repercussions on the S1amese, and on the war in Malaya. 
As it 1s, General Templer [High Commissioner in Malaya] is hard 
put to it to stop the slow decline in morale and economic 
resiliance of Malaya. Anything that tipped the scale enough to 
make his task impossible would have untold economic consequences 
for the whole sterling area. Compared to such possibilities, the 
French have less to lose. 17 
The Churchill Administration also had to take account of the wider Cold War 
implications of Indo-China's position as the 'strategic key', not just to 
the security of Malaya, but to the whole of South-East Asia.'· The domino 
theory had been aired in official British circles in one form or another 
for at least five years bet ore President Eisenhower publicly enunciated it 
in April 1954." As with the United States, in all British appreciations 
Indo-China was the lead-domino, the cornerstone whose removal would result 
in the collapse of the entire edifice of Western influence in South-East 
Asia as, one by one, the countries of the region fell to communism. ao A 
related Br1tish concern especially after 1953 and the advent of 
Eisenhower's Republican Administration was that if French fortunes 
seriously declined, the United States might be tempted to intervene 
militarily in Viet-Nam to prevent the trigger-domino from toppling. This 
risked provoking Chinese counter-intervention on the Korean model, 
precipitating a major conflagration from which Britain, with its still 
considerable interests in Asia, would be unable to stand aloof. Hong Kong, 
for example, was expected to be an early casualty in any general war with 
China. z , Added to this was the unknown quantity of the Sino-Soviet Pact. 
If Moscow chose to come to the aid of its Chinese partner this would raise 
the spectre of a third, nuclear, world war. Alarmist though this may now 
appear, to British policymakers in the 1950s it was a very real concern. 
As Churchill pOinted out during a speech in London on 9 November 1951 ... 
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It must not be forgotten that under the late Government we took 
peculiar risks in providing the principal atomic base for the 
United States 1n East Anglia, and that, in consequence, we placed 
ourselves at the forefront of Soviet antagonism. 
This concern was heightened by the fact that in the early 1950' s Soviet 
atomic bombers could reach London but not Washington. zz 
A final Cold War angle - and one that will assume prominence in later 
chapters - was the effect of the Indo-China war on the security of Western 
Europe. For as long as the contlict continued to sap French military and 
economic resources (American aid notwi thstanding>, France would be unable 
to fulfil its N.A.T.O. obligations in terms of force levels. Nor would the 
French National Assembly be willing to ratify the Treaty for the European 
Defence Community (E. D. C.). a scheme devised to permit the controlled 
rearmament of West Germany as an accretion of strength to N.A.T.O. German 
rearmament could not become operative until all the prospective Community 
members (France. West Germany. Holland. Italy. Belgium and Luxemburg> 
ratified the Treaty. By 1954 France was the only hardened dissenter. 
worried about being militarily outnumbered by its recent enemy in Europe as 
a direct result of its debilitating commitment in South-East Asia. z3 One 
might go so far as to contend that Indo-China was directly responsible 
between 1950 and 1954 for the continued vulnerability of Western Europe 
vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc forces and for the severe strain this imposed on 
relations between Washington and the European N. A. T. O. powers. To the 
alarm of the British, French hesitancy over German rearmament gave rise to 
threats from Washington about a withdrawal of its forces from Europe. 
Though certainly containing an an element of bluff. the British could not 
afford to ignore these warnings. 
For all these reasons the Churchill Administration desired a French 
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victory in Indo-China, indeed this was the only sure method of avoiding 
some if not all of these unpleasant, costly and potentially dangerous 
consequences. This said, it should be noted that Indo-China did not rate 
very highly on Eden's list of priorities on his return to the Foreign 
Office. It merited no mention, for example, in his statement in the first 
Foreign Affairs debate of the new Parliament on 19 November 1951. Matters 
singled out for particular attention included the Korean war, Western 
rearmament, Germany and the E.D.C., the re-structuring of N.A.T.O., Egypt 
and Persia. China and events in As1a beyond Korea received only cursory 
treatment.a. This, however, did not mean that Indo-China was of no concern 
to British policy-makers, merely that recent events allowed room for 
qualified optimism about the future. Militarily, France had emerged from 
its most testing year to date 1n a reasonably healthy state, 
psychologically if not strategically. To many in London, this was due to 
the efforts of one man, General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny . ...,· An outline 
of de Lattre's achievements will thus serve to establish the immediate 
backcloth against which Eden was obliged to view matters from October 1951. 
Da Lattre arrived in Viet-Nam on 19 December 1950 to take on the dual 
politico-military responsibility of High Commissioner and Commander-in-
Chief. During the previous twelve months the French had sustained heavy 
losses in men, equipment and, equally important in a war for the loyalty of 
the nati ve populat i on, prestige. Fighting had been concentrated near the 
Sino-Tonking border, with the Viet-Minh looking to secure supply routes to 
China by ousting the French who occupied the crucial frontier positions. 
The series of setbacks sustained in 1949-1950 constituted, in Bernard 
Fall's celebrated description, France's 'greatest colonial defeat since 
Montcalm had died at Quebec'.'- Yet within a fortnight of de Lattre's 
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arrival the atmosphere had been radically altered. By what the Foreign 
Office termed his • inspiring leadership', a major Viet-Minh offensive in 
Tonking was repulsed and all hint of defeatism in the French ranks 
removed.:z-r In mid-January 1951 the rebels made a renewed thrust towards 
Hanoi and the French, 'helped by the timely arrival of American aid', were 
able to 'inflict on the Viet-Minh an impressive defeat' at Vinh-Yen.-
During the first half of 1951 the French achieved two further noteworthy 
successes - at Mao-Khe in March and April, and in the south of the Red 
River Delta in late May and early June.:Z· In the international arena de 
Lattre fought tirelessly for greater recognition of the vital position 
Indo-China held in the world-wide struggle against communism, and 
maintained constant pressure on France's allies, especially the United 
States, for increased aid. 30 
But to de Lattre, his success in the field threatened to unleash an 
altogether greater danger. His 'constant fear' and 'nightmare' was direct 
Chinese intervention, a concern heightened by the precedent of Chinese 
intervention in Korea. 31 Although it was clearly in de Lattre's interest 
to exaggerate the likelihood of active Chinese involvement in order to 
secure even greater aid appropriations from Washington, recent research 
suggests that the autumn of 1951 was indeed a time of serious debate in 
Peking as to whether direct intervention should take place. In the event 
the Central People's Government (C.P.G.) declined to become involved beyond 
existing levels. As R. B. Smith has concluded, 'the Chinese probably took 
a firm decision in late 1951 or early 1952 against intervention in 
Indochina by [People's Liberation Army] combat units ... '32 But de Lattre 
was obviously unaware of this when he paid a visit to London at the start 
of October 1951, some three weeks before the British General Election. At 
- 10-
a meeting with the Chiefs of Staff the General repeated what he had 
recently told the Americans, namely that so long as China did not intervene 
he expected 'a settlement of the fighting in two years'. He added, 
however, that irrespective of their Korean commitment, the Chinese could 
assemble within a month a force of 150,000 to attack Tonking, a threat he 
could not counter. In such a situation 'immediate Allied assistance would 
be essential'. He could 'deal with Ho Chi Minh but not with Ho Chi Minh 
reinforced in this way'. De Lattre therefore urged the British to help 
create and contribute to a strategic reserve for South-East Asia from 
which, in an emergency, Indo-China could be reinforced. Neither the Chiefs 
of Staff nor the Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, were prepared to make 
any promises but Morrison did assure the General that the British 
Government regarded 'the defence of the Associate States as a matter of 
great importance to the whole Western position' 1n the Cold War. 33 
A strategic reserve had been one of the main recommendations of a 
conference held in Singapore the previous May of the British, French and 
American Commanders-in-Chief in Asia. 34 Little had been done thereafter to 
implement this proposal. Inaction on the British side was down in part to 
de Lattre's success which had robbed the issue of urgency. Morever, a 
promise to go to war with China for the sake of Viet-Nam was not to be 
gi ven lightly and should, if possible, be avoided, the more so since the 
United States appeared decidedly unenthusiastic about making a similar 
commi t ment. Finally, the Bri Ush Service Chiefs rated the chances of 
Chinese intervention considerably lower than de Lattre. 3 • Even so, if one 
of the main aims of the General's visit was to convince the British that 
the recent improvement in the military situation should not blind France's 
allies to the greater danger lurking to the north and that it was 
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imperative to be prepared for a Chinese invasion, he achieved some reward. 
On 25 October, Morrison sent a telegram to the British Embassies in 
Washington and Paris instructing them to obtain the agreement of the French 
and American Governments to hold tripartite Chiefs of Staff discussions on 
South-East Asian defence in Rome in mid-November during a scheduled meeting 
of the N. A. T. O. Council. 35 The following day Morrison's unhappy seven 
month spell as Foreign Secretary was brought to an end by the defeat of the 
Labour Government at the polls. 
British foreign policy. 
On 26 October Eden took up the reins of 
For the next nine months the Churchill Administration, mirroring the 
line adopted by its Labour predecessor, viewed the Indo-China problem 
almost exclusively in terms of a possible Chinese invasion of Tanking. 
Long after the point at which Professor Smith suggests that the C.P.G. had 
ruled this out the British were expending considerable time and energy in 
devising plans for deterring or, tailing that, halting a Chinese attack. 
In so doing, British diplomacy was guilty of down-grading the real threat 
to the French position, namely the Viet-Minh unassisted by Chinese 
manpower. But in fairness to Eden, this was far from clear in October 
1951, even to those in the Foreign Office whose sale occupation (unlike the 
Foreign Secretary> was monitoring events in South-East Asia. And until at 
least January-February 1952 British concern was, according to the Smith 
thesis, justifiable. Why the Chinese dimension continued to dominate 
British thinking thereafter is another question and one that will be 
addressed in due course. For the moment it is sufficient to say that 
Conservative and Labour policies differed little. 
Continuity was also to be found on policy towards Asia generally. A 
Foreign Office paper of 30 October 1951 setting out the objectives pursued 
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in the region by the previous Administration was accepted by Eden with 
minor modification. The paper specified a dual strategy of coming to terms 
with the revolutionary forces sweeping across Asia and of preventing 
further communist expansion. In precis, accommodation and containment. 
Relations with the P. R. C. were of towering importance, for it was an 
admixture of Peking's military aggression, material assistance, political 
propaganda or revolutionary example which linked all the trouble-spots in 
the area, from Indo-China and Malaya to Korea and the Philippines. British 
recognition of the P. R. C. notwithstanding, the Korean war meant that more 
effort was devoted to containment a1 though the goal of accommodation was 
not lost sight of. Indeed a modus vi vendi with the P. R. C. remained 
Britain's favoured means of restoring stability in Asia. This objective, 
however, led to conflict with Washington where it was ' generally accepted 
that no compromise with .•. China 1s possible ... [Blelieving also that a 
general war may break out, Americans consider that the wisest policy 
towards China is to contain and weaken her by all means short of war'. The 
fact that both countries accepted differing assumptions as the basis of 
their China policies meant I the resultant differences have been a major 
irritant in Anglo-American relatlons'.37 
Eden embraced these inherited precepts. Likewise the line taken in an 
early briefing paper devoted to Indo-China. This stated ... 
We approve French aims in Indo-China. Tongking is vital in 
the defence of South-East Asia. We admire the work of General 
de Lattre. Although we are anxious to help the French our 
resources are stretched and we cannot enter into any major 
commitments in respect of Indo-China except perhaps in the 
framework of an agreed Anglo-American-French policy for the 
defence of South-East Asia. The first step is agreement on 
military objectives at Chiefs of Staff level. Hence our sugg 
-estion for military talks ... at Rome, on which we are still 
awaiting the views of the French and American Governments. 3e 
- 13-
On 9 November Eden was informed by the French Foreign Minister, Robert 
Schuman, that his Government ' fully supported' Morrison's belated 
initiative. 39 No response had yet been received from Washington. 
This, then, was the form in which the Indo-China problem presented 
itself to Eden in October 1951. Militarily, the French position gave 
modest grounds tor 
remained limited. 
optimism but, politically, Indo-Chinese independence 
The Churchill Administration wished to see the French 
victorious in the war but the reality of Britain's poor economic position 
and its limited military resources imposed a severe handicap on the help it 
could offer in this connection. Under Eden, British diplomacy's goal in 
Indo-China - though never so bluntly stated - was French success with 
minimum British sacrifice. This meant, in the first instance, providing 
the French with verbal rather than material support. The United States 
could be expected and certainly encouraged to continue to provide the 
latter. Where it might be less easy for London to avoid a major commitment 
was in the event ot an escalation of the fighting through Chinese 
intervent ion. Primarily in terms of the security of British interests in 
South-East ASla, but also because 01 the adverse etfect on the East-West 
balance in the Cold War, such an attack could not go unchecked. After all, 
it was not as if it would end with Chinese absorbtion of Viet-Nam. The 
'ultimate aim of the Communists', the Chiefs of Staff believed, was to 
'eliminate Western influence from the whole of South-East Asia'. 40 
Implicit in this conclusion and in Indo-China's strategic importance in the 
region was the need to contain Communism within the borders of Viet-Nam. 
For, as the Foreign Office acknowledged, 'the key to the defence of Malaya 
lies in Indo-China'. 41 Eden'Ii' chief concern was for Malaya', he later 
wrote, 'I wanted to ensure an effective barrier as far to the north of that 
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country as possible' . .o&,2 No matter that the British, apart from some 
anxiety at the start of 1952, were far from convinced that China would 
enter the Indo-China arena, the possibility could not be dismissed out of 
hand and plans had to be made. 
However, 1 f Chinese intervention was to be successfully deterred or 
repulsed, the United States would have to add its military strength to that 
of France and Britain. Hence the Morrison initiative of 25 October 1951. 
American involvement in a co-ordinated defence for South-East Asia might 
even result in Britain avoiding active participation in a wider Indo-
Chinese conflict altogether. Churchill would later argue that Britain's 
anti-Communist operations in Malaya were, given its other world-wide 
responsibilities, an acceptable contribution to regional security and that 
Indo-China should be a Franco-American responsibility in the event of 
Chinese aggresion. 43 But the problem was how to get Washington to accept 
such an extensive commdtment. For if the United States could be brought to 
shoulder the burden of Indo-Chinese defence against an external (Chinese) 
threat in the same way that the French were presently combatting the 
internal (Viet-Minh) threat, it would be an extremely cost effective means 
of maintaining the security of Malaya and Singapore. 
NOTES 
1. Anthony Eden, Full Circle, p.77. 
2. See in general Jean Lacouture, Ho Chi ~nh (London 1969). 
3. CMD 2834, 'Documents relating to British Involvement in the Indo-China 
Conflict 1945-65' (HMSO 1965), p.11. See also Jean-Pierre Rioux, The 
Fourth Republic 1944-1958 (trans., Cambridge 1989), pps. 121, 148, here 
-after Fourth Republic; Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (London 
1983), p. 180, hereafter Vietnam. 
4. CMD 2834, pp.l0-11. 
5. CAB 128/17 CM(50)4th meeting, 7 Feb. 1950j Eden, Full Circl~ p.80j 
Geoffrey Warner in John W. Young, ed., The Foreign Policy of Church-
ill's Peacetime Administration 1951-55 (Leicester 1988), p.234-35, 
hereafter Churchill Administration. 
6. LLoyd C. Gardner, Approaching Vietnam: From World War II Through Dien-
- 15-
bienphu (London, 1989 ed), p.86, hereafter Approaching Vietnam For a 
general discussion of the Bao Oai 'experiment' and British policy see 
FO 370/2424, FO Library paper on 'History of Indo-China Conflict, 1945-
55'j FO 371/83592/1, Gibbs (Saigon) despatch 20 to Bevin, 28 Feb. 1950j 
CMD 2834, pp. 1O-11j Ritchie Ovendale, The English Speaking Alliance: 
Britain, the United State~ the Do~nions and the Cold War, 1945-51 
(London 1985), pp.171-73, hereafter English Speaking Alliance. See also 
Anthony Short, The Origins of the Vietnam War (Harlow 1989), pps.67-68, 
78-79, herea ft er Vi et nam War; Joseph But t1 nger, Vi etnam: A Dra80n 
Embattled <London 1967}, Vol. II, pp.667-734j. 
7. See Geoffrey Warner in Young, ed., Churchill Administration, p.233-35j 
in general on the factors underlying the American decision to supply 
aid to France, see Andrew J. Rotter, The Path to Vietnam: Ori8ins of 
the American Commitment to Southeast Asia (New York 1987>, hereafter 
Path to Vietna~ also Gardner, Approaching Vietnam, pps.84-87, 108-10. 
8. Eden, Full Circl~ M. Carlyle, ed., Documents on International Affairs 
1949-50 (Oxford 1953), Acheson statement, 8 May 1950, p.60, hereafter 
Documents 1949-50; John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Pel!tce: The History of 
the Col d War <oxf ord 19tH), pp. 89-94, hereafter Long Peace, Alfred 
Grosser, The Western Alliance: European-American Relations Since 1945 
(trans, London 1981), pp. 131-32, hereafter Western Alliance. 
9. R.B.Smith, 'China and Southeast Asia: The Revolutionary Perspective, 
1951', in Journal of Southeast Asian Studie~ Vol. XIX, No.1 <March 
1988), pp.l01-02, hereafter Vol. & No. 
10. CAB 1311 12 0 (52}5 & 8, 14 March & 16 April 1952; CAB 129/53 C (52}202, 
12 June 1952. Also Corelli Barnett, Britain and her Army 1509-1970: 
A ~litary, Political and Social Survey (London 1970), pp.483-85. 
11. See map. 
12. CAB 131/11 DO(51)16, 23 Feb. 1951; CAB 131/12 D(52)5 & D(52)2nd meeting 
14 & 19 March 1952; CAB 131/13 D(53)13, 26 April 1953j DEFE 6/23 
JP(53)l(Final), 12 Jan. 1953; DEFE 6124 JP(53)79(Final), 4 May 1953. 
13. CAB 134/898 FE(O) (53)4, 5 & 6, 6 June, 2 July and 13 June 1953 
14. CAB 134/898 FE(O} (53}3, 20 May 1953. Also FO 371/112050/163, High 
Commissioner Auckland tel. 195 to CRO, 8 April 1954; FO 371/112051/186G 
Menzies letter to Churchill, 6 April 1954; CAB 128/25 CC(52)81st 
meeting, 26 Sept. 1952; H.W.Brands Jnr, 'From ANZUS to SEATO: United 
States StrategiC Policy towards Australia and New Zealand 1952-54', in 
International History Review, Vol. IX, No.2, p.266, hereafter Vol. & No. 
15. CAB 129/55 C(52)330, 3 Oct. 1952; CAB 131/12 D(52)41 & 45, 29 Sept. & 21 
Oct. 1953j FO 371/1010611151, Head letter to Eden, 15 Dec. 1952. 
16. Rotter, Path to Vietnam, p.206. 
17. The Econo~st (' Indo-Chinese Dilemms'), 5 April 1952. 
18. Eden to House of Commons, 5 Feb. 1952 in Hansard, House of Commons 
Debates, 5th series, Vol. 510, col. 2066, hereafter HCDebs, Vol. & col. 
19. Ritchie Ovendale in Ovendale, ed., The Foreign Policy of the British 
Labour Governments 1945-51 (Leicester 198'), p. 125, hereafter Labour 
Government s. 
20. For example, FO 371/92065/37. FO brief for Eden, 1 Nov. 1951; FO 371/ 
101263/99G, Scott min., 30 Aug. 1952; FO 371/101265/142G, COS brief for 
Minister of Defence. 5 Dec. 1952; FO 371/106996/8G. FO brief for Eden, 
4 Feb. 1953; FO 371/106767/120G, Scott memo., 7 May 1953; FO 3711 
1067681 13'G, FO brief for ChurChill, 25 June 1953; FO 371/106750/17, 
Allen letter to Trevelyan, 8 Jan. 1954. 
21. Slessor Papers (Ministry of Defence Air Historical Branch), Box 1', 
- 16-
note for CIGS on defence of Hong Kong, 20 March 1952, citing COS(50)139 
Global Strategy paper for 1950. 
22. D. Foliot, ed., Documents on International Affairs 1951 (Oxford 1954), 
Churchill speech, London, 9 Nov. 1951j Carlton, Eden, p.3t7. 
23. On the E.D.C. see Edward Fursden, The European Defence Community: A 
History <London 1981), hereafter European Defence Community. Saki Dock 
-rill, Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament 1950-54 (Cambridge 
1991), hereafter West German Rearmament; Saki Dockrill in J.W. Young & 
M.L. Dockrill, eds, British Foreign Policy 1945-56 (London 1989>, pp. 
149-72, hereafter British Foreign Policy. R.B. Manderson-Jones, The 
SpeCial Relationship: Anglo-American Relations and Western European 
Unity 1947-56 (London 1972), pp.97-129j Young in Young, ed., Church-
ill Administration, pp.81-108. 
24. HCDebs, Vol. 494, cols. 34-53. Also Rhodes James, Eden, pp.346-47: 
Carlton, Eden, p.299. 
25. Eden, Full Circle, p.81. 
26. Bernard Fall, Street Without Joy (London, 1967 ed), pp.32-33; Eden, 
ibid; Rioux, Fourth Republic, p.149; Rotter, Path to Vietna~ p.211: 
Karnow, Vietnam, pp. 184-85. 
27. FO 371/101056/15, Graves despatch 18, 25 Jan. 1952, reviewing de 
Lattre's year in Indo-China; FO 371/92427158, FO brief for Morrison, 4 
Oct. 1951; P. Calvocoressi, ed., Survey of International Affairs 1951 
(Oxford 1954), p.453, hereafter Survey 1951 
28. FO 371/101045/1, Graves despatch 21, 4 Feb. 1952. 
29. Smith, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. XIX, No.1, p. 103. 
30. See Foreign Relations of the United States 1951, Vol. VI, Pt. 1 (Asia and 
the Pacific - Washington 1977>, pp.506-21, hereafter FRU~ Vol. & Pt. 
Also FO 3711101045/1, Graves despatch 21, 4 Feb. 1952. 
31. DEFE 4/47, COS(51)155th meeting, 4 Oct. 1951: FO 371/92427/59, FO 
record of Morrison-de Lattre meeting, 5 Oct. 1951. 
32. R.B.Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War: Volume I -
Revolution versus Containment 1955-61 (London, 1987 ed.), p.57, here-
after Smith, Vol. I. 
33. DEFE 4/47, COS(51)155th meeting, 4 Oct; FO 371/94247/59, FO record of 
Morrison-de Lattre meeting, 5 Oct. 1951. 
34. A full report of the Singapore conference is in DEFE 5/31, COS(51)318, 
29 May 1951, revised in DEFE 5/35, COS(51)676, 16 Nov. 1951. Also 
FO 371/93085/154G. 
35. FO 371/92428/65, Morrison despatch 138 to Saigon, 25 Oct. & Scott let-
ter to Graves, 11 Oct. 1951; DEFE 4/47, COS(51) 152nd meeting, 3 Oct. 
1951. 
36. FO 371/930841133G, Morrison tel. 5320, 25 Oct. 1951. 
37. FO 371/92065/34, 'British Policy in the Far East', 30 Oct. 1951, and 
comments by Eden (n.d. >. 
38. FO 371/92065/37, FO brief for Eden, 1 Nov. 1951. 
39. FO 800/780/2, Eden (Paris> tel. 532 to FO, 9 Nov. 1951. 
40. DEFE 5/35, COS(51)793 approved at DEFE 4/50, COS(51}209th meeting, 28 
Dec. 1951. 
41. FO 371/10126717G, FO brief for Macmillan, 25 Feb. 1952. 
42. Eden, Full Circle, p.87. 
43. PREM 11/1074, Churchill tel. 2883 to Eisenhower, 21 June 1954. Also 
FRUS 1952-54 (East Asia and the Pacific - Washington 1984), Vol. XII, 
Pt. 1, pp.569-70, hereafter FRUS, Vol. & Pt. 
- 17-
PART I: THE CHINESE DIMENSION 
CHAPTER ONE 
UNITING AGAINST CHINA 
Anglo-Franco-American Defence Planning for South-East Asia 
November 1951 to May 1952 
In a study of the South-East Asia policy of the 1945-1951 Labour 
Governments, the British historian Ritchie Ovendale has concluded that it 
was a 'considerable achievement' on the part of the Foreign Secretary for 
much of that period, Ernest Bevin, to have helped secure an American 
commitment to the defence of the region against communist encroachment. 
The view in London after 1945 was that 'nothing could be done in Asia 
without American participation' and that 'only the United States could stop 
Communist expansion'. Unfortunately, Washington tended to look on South-
East Asia as a British and French responsibility. By early 1950, however, 
the efforts of Bevin and British diplomacy (helped, admittedly, by the 
'loss' of China in 1949) had contributed to a growing awareness in 
Washington of the region's military, economic, political and strategic 
importance and, simultaneously, of its vulnerability to aggressive 
communist designs. The American commitment to South-East Asian defence 
sought by Bevin was, according to Ovendale, finally secured with the 
out break of the Korean war in June 1950. Washington's swift response to 
North Korea's aggression was accompanied by an increase in the military 
assistance programme t or the French in Indo-China unveiled the previous 
month. Together with a revival of support for the Nationalist Chinese 
Government on Formosa, this marked the assumption of significant defence 
obligations in Asia. The British Ambassador to Washington mused that the 
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Pax Britannica had been replaced by the Pax Americana. I 
Ovendale, however, possibly overstates the extent and nature of 
Washington's involvement. During 1951, British policy-makers came to the 
conclusion that American interest in the defence of South-East Asia was 
considerably less than the undertakings of 1950 implied. Two years into 
the Korean war, a leading Foreign Office official was still able to write 
of the need to 'commit the Americans to support us in South-East Asia, the 
importance of which to the Western world the Americans still do not seem to 
grasp'.z One of the objectives of Eden and British diplomacy in the 1951-
54 period was, in consequence, to encourage the United States to become 
still more involved in regional security. This was to be done by 
establishing a formal framework for defence consultation and co-ordination 
comprising Britain, the United States, France and possibly Australia and 
New Zealand. This might in turn form the nucleus of an Asian version of 
N. A. T. O. with an expanded memberShip. In the event, however, the Truman 
Administration displayed scant enthusiasm for extending its obligations and 
resisted all schemes for a multilateral security grouping on the grounds 
that it would limit its military freedom of manoeuvre. 
This was graphically demonstrated by Washington's tardy response to 
Morrison's initiative of 25 October 1951 (which soon after became Eden's) 
calling for Anglo-Franco-American military talks on South-East Asian 
security and on Indo-China in particular. The scheduled meeting of the 
N.A.T.O. Council in Rome at the end of November passed without any 
substantive discussion of this issue, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, General Omr Bradley, obdurately resisting French pleas for a 
formal eXChange of views. The situation in Viet-Nam was more 'serene' than 
for some time, the French explained, but the 'possibility of a Chinese 
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at tack had not disappeared' 
and British support might 
and 'ways and means of securing ... American 
be studied anew'.3 Bradley, however, was 
unmoved. Towards the middle of December, an official from the U.S. Embassy 
in London confided to R. H. ScottoI' the Foreign Office that the American 
Military 'did not wish to take on any more commitments in South East Asia 
and that was why they were reluctant to take part in talks'.- At the same 
time the British were being pressed by the French to use their influence 
with Washington to convene a three-power conference.· An earlier direct 
appeal by Pleven to Truman had achieved nothing.- Two developments added 
urgency to French entreaties. The first was depressing news about the 
state of de Lattre's health: the General had returned from Viet-Nam on 
sick-leave on 20 November and by December concern was mounting in Paris 
that he might be unable to resume his duties. 7 The second was evidence of 
a major build-up of Chinese forces on the Tonking frontier. Rumours of 
such manoeuvres were common and tended to be discounted in London for lack 
of concrete evidence. However, British intelligence suggested that there 
was rather more substance than usual to these latest reports and, on 
Christmas Eve. a nervous Foreign Office instructed the Ambassador to 
Washington, Sir Oliver Franks, to 'express to the United States Government 
as soon as possible our view that tripartite military talks should take 
place without delay'.-
At last. on 28 December. the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff relented and 
agreed in principle to hold a conference in Washington in January 1952.· 
Only the day before. Franks had reported Bradley's comment that he and his 
colleagues 'did not see where these conversations would lead and with their 
hands very full at the moment in Korea they did not wish to be drawn into 
any further commitments'. 10 Persistent Anglo-French pressure may have 
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caused a change ot heart. Equally, the determining factor may have been 
the evident seriousness of Chinese designs on Tonking. 11 The same day, 28 
December, the British Chiefs of Staff had approved a report which asserted 
that 'the Chinese could invade Indo-China now'. It cont inued ... 
While we still believe that the Chinese are unWilling, unless 
they feel themselves directly threatened, to engage deliberately 
in a campaign which might lead to all out war against the West, 
the number and quantity of the Chinese forces at present situated 
in the frontier area may indicate an intention to accord active 
support to the Viet Minh forces. 12 
Whatever the true intentions of the Central People's Government (and the 
Smith thesis suggests invasion was a serious option), and whatever the 
reasoning of the American Military, the worrying drift of American policy 
away from even discussing turther involvement in South-East Asia had been 
halted. 
The long-awaited security conference finally got down to business in 
Washington on 11-12 January 1952 with high-level military representation -
Field Marshal Sir William Slim, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
(C.I.O.S.) for Britain and General Juin, Head of the French General Staff, 
and General Bradley for the United States. Juin predictably drew attention 
to the latest reports of a Chinese threat to Viet-NaD and called for Anglo-
American air and naval support (though not ground forces) should an 
invasion materialise. Slim and Bradley preferred to reserve judgment on 
this, but did agree to recommend to their two governments that a 'statement 
should be given to the Chinese to the effect that further active aggression 
would result in retaliation not necessarily confined to to the area of 
aggression'. In other words, China itself would be the target. To follow 
up this recommendation, an ad hoc committee was to meet 1n Washington 'as a 
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matter of urgency' to consider the resources which Britain, France and the 
United States could make available for action against China, as well as the 
nature of the measures to be taken in the specific area of a new aggression 
and against its more distant source. Australia and New Zealand were also 
to sit on the commit tee, whilst its terms of reference assumed that a 
warning had been issued to Peking although a formal proposal to governments 
was deferred until the committee reported. 13 However, provisional 
agreement on a warning statement failed to conceal the lack of enthusiasm 
of the American Military. One British observer found them 'extremely 
cautious' and noted that they had studiously avoided any commitment to send 
'a man, a ship, or an aeroplance' to Indo-China. 14 Sir John Slessor, the 
Chief of Air Staff, felt that the Americans had still not grasped the fact 
that Indo-China was 'the key to the position in South-East Asia'. 1. 
The ad hoc commdttee met for the first time on 25 January and confined 
itself to discussing short-term measures if China ignored an allied warning 
and attacked Viet-Nam, 'the most likely Chinese objective'. Two distinct 
forms of action were considered - that limited to the scene of aggression 
(Viet-Nam) and that against the source of aggression (China). On local 
action, the report concluded that the presently available resources of the 
Western powers in the area would be insufficient to ensure the retention of 
Tanking. By resources 'presently available', the report evidently had in 
mind British and French contingents in Indo-China and Malaya which were, on 
any reading, too weak to resist a Chinese onslaught. As for the Americans, 
although they provided figures for total air and naval forces available in 
Asia as a whole, they were, to the British, 'patently loath to give a 
definite indication of what proportion of these could be spared to re-
inforce the French' and 'made it clear that no United States ground forces 
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would be committed'. The committee went on to focus on direct act ion 
against China. Though this might not help to save Tonking it was 
nevertheless felt to be the most effective method of relieving pressure on 
the French and very much favoured by the U.S. representatives. 1 -
A serious Anglo-American disagreement arose. however, concerning the 
shape, level and ultimate objective of such action. The essence of this 
dispute lay beyond South-East Asia and was in many ways a symptom of wider 
Anglo-American differences concerning how best to deal with the emergence 
of the P. R. C. as a force in international relations. The British argued 
that none of the retaliative options available - a naval blockade of the 
China coast tantamount to economic sanctions and widespread non-
discriminatory 'conventional' bombing of targets inside China - would be 
decisive and that 'the danger of this action resulting in general war was 
unacceptably serious'. The American view was that action against China 
'should be designed to reduce her capacity for further aggression in all 
areaSj the measures available would not be effective in the short-term but 
would have a long-term effectj (and] all retaliatory action carried an 
equal risk of extending the conflict which must be faced'. 17 
Therefore, while unable to make any specific recommendations, what the 
ad hoc committee's report clearly demonstrated was that. contrary to the 
impression the American Military had hitherto conveyed. the Truman 
Administration's commitment to the containment of communism in South-East 
Asia was not in question. Indeed the opposi t e. The real issue was the 
wisdom of the extreme methods it had 1n mind for effecting this policy. 
Also the fact that the Americans were determined to maintain a unilateral 
stance in the region and ignore moderate allied opinion. Unlimited 
retaliation against China disturbed the British because of the risk of a 
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conflagration across the whole of ASia, while the French were unhappy 
because American ideas placed little emphasis on defending Tonking (or 
indeed Indo-China generally) and appeared, rather, as an excuse for a show-
down with Peking. The U. S. Joint Chiefs, doubtless conscious of the 
unpopulari ty of their favoured course, may thus have resisted the co-
ordination of regional defence mainly on the grounds that this would make 
American action contingent upon allied approval. 
from the British standpoint, was remote. 
Such approval, certainly 
The position was summarised for the Prime Minister on 16 February by 
Sir William Elliot, the respected head of the British Joint Staff Mission 
(B. J. S. M.) in Washington, who made clear that the British military view 
was not simply a negative rejection of American plans. If some action was 
necessary inside China it should be confined to bombing of rail 
communications and airfields 'leading to the areas of aggression, not 
therefore widespread bombing allover China [emphasis added]'. A naval 
blockade would be ineffective 'unless we took action against Russian 
shipping and ports in the Far East'. Elliot concluded: 'We are opposed 
to general war against China or to action which we feel might <almost 
involuntarily) involve Soviet Russia and lead to global war'. 1. Therefore, 
as of mid-February 1952, tripartite defence planning for South-East Asia at 
the military level was badly stalled. Without agreement on the kind of 
action to be taken if China committed aggression there was little point 
and much danger in 1 ssuing a warning. One might go so far as to suggest 
that if China had invaded Tonking in February 1952, the Western response 
would have been confused, unco-ordinated and probably ineffective. Or else, 
led by the Americans, incendiary. 
The Foreign Office was generally sympathetic to the position adopted by 
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the British Service Chiefs. The revelation (for that it is what it was) 
that the American Military actually possessed a clearly defined set of far 
reaching objectives for dealing with Chinese aggression in South-East Asia 
made the need for a co-ordinated Western defence scheme more apparent than 
ever, not simply to contain China but to restrain the United States. As 
things stood, there was nothing to stop the Americans from putting their 
plans for widespread retaliatory action into practice. 'I have the 
impression', minuted Sir William Strang, the Permanent Under-Secretary, on 
21 January 
that as usual the Americans are trying to entangle us. In fact, 
it looks as though the tripartite talks as a whole have proved 
to be an entangling operation: objective: war with China. 
This highlighted the essential difference in the British and American 
approach to China. British policy continued to be a mixture of 
'containment and compromise' or 'the carrot and the stick'. American 
thinking seemed to have progressed little since it was depicted by a 
British diplomat in September 1951 as involving the use of the stick and 
nothing else. 1. 
There had been early doubts in the Foreign Office about the wisdom of 
an Anglo-American warning to China concerning the consequences which would 
flow from a new act of aggression as this might pre-define the form of 
punishment which, in the event, might not fit the Chinese crime and merely 
exacerbate the problem. 20 However, on 11 January 1952, pre-empting the 
conclusions of the tripartite Chiefs of Staff in WaShington and in defiance 
of the prevailing Foreign Office consensus, Eden issued a thinly-vei led 
warning of his own during a speech at Columbia University in New York. It 
should be understood, he said ... 
that an intervention by force by the Chinese Communists in 
South-East Asia - even if they were called "volunteers" - would 
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create a situation no less menacing than that which the United 
Nations met and faced in Korea. In such an event the United 
Nations, I trust, would be equally firm to resist . .al 
Eden had acted very much on his own initiative in making this statement, 
and there is no evidence of serious consultation with the Foreign Office. 
:t-
In consequence, he nai~y ignored the time-lag factor between a French 
appeal to and action by the United Nations, during which the pOSition in 
Viet-Nam might become wholly untenable. Z2 This indeed was the prinCipal 
French concern at the tripartite military conference. Eden also overlooked 
the Soviet veto in the United Nations Security Council (inoperative at the 
outbreak of the Korean war) and a likely groundswell of Afro-Asian 
opposition in the General Assembly unsympathetic to France's colonial 
record in Indo-China. However, Eden's view was that South Korea 'would 
probably never have been invaded if the Soviet's had understood the risks. 
French have told us & the world that they will go to U.N.O. & ask for help 
if invaded'.23 This was true, but at the same time the French had always 
recognised the need for immediate action to stem a Chinese attack, 
something which the United Nations was ill-designed to provide. Only 
British and American contingents already in Asia could provide instant 
help.a. In the months that followed, Eden's belief in the value of saving 
Indo-China came into conflict with his faith in a United Nations solution, 
something he no doubt favoured as a means of limiting British involvement 
in a wider war. Yet Eden also accepted that there would be 'serious 
consequences for France and the United Kingdom if the Chinese Communists 
made an incursion into Indo-China' and felt that 'the loss of Indo-China 
and subsequently Malaya would have grave consequences, both political and 
economic ... '2. As such, he was eventually forced to concede the value of 
some kind of immediate allied response in the event of a Chinese attack. 
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The question of a more explicit warning to Peking was shelved in the 
Foreign Office in late January and February 1952. Instead the dominant 
issue, as it was for the mil! tary experts, was agreement on the kind of 
action to be taken if a warning were ignored. Like the Chiefs of Staff, 
Eden and his officials opposed extensive retaliation. This would mean 'war 
wi th China, and the possible loss of Hong Kong'. It would also mean 
redirecting men and resources from Europe and the Middle East to engage the 
Chinese thereby leaving the latter 'hot war strategic priorities' 
vulnerable to attack from the Soviet Union, 'enemy No. 1'. It was to be 
hoped that 'native caution' would prevent the Soviets from 'taking 
advantage of our embarassment' although, in the end, war in Asia meant 
taking a 'calculated gamble' elsewhere. A related fear in the Foreign 
Office was that hostilities might not be confined to Asia. Echoing the 
Chiefs of Staff, the political and diplomatic experts maintained that 
'China is not very vulnerable to air action or naval blockade', that 'any 
attempt to carry out such measures on a scale big enough to be effective 
would significantly increase the risks of general war involving the Soviet 
Union' and that, consequently, 'hostilites should be limited to the theatre 
of attack'. Britain and the United States were both agreed that 'the 
action open to us would operate too slowly to be effective ... in saving 
Tonking', but the 'real difference of opinion is over the risks, which we 
rate higher than the Americans do, that direct retaliation may lead to 
general war'. 26 
These differences had to be reconciled if progress on defence planning 
was to be made and American power employed judiciously via a co-ordinated 
and pre-agreed Western strategy. With these considerations in mind, it was 
the Foreign Office that took a political initiative in an effort to break 
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the military deadlock. At a N. A. T. O. meeting in Lisbon at the end of 
February 1952, Eden approached Acheson about the unsatisfactory state of 
military discussions. The American Secretary of State revealed that the 
Administration's entire policy towards South-East Asia was under review, 
that this process would be complete in three-to-four weeks, and that Anglo-
Franco-American Ministerial discussions might then ensue. a7 But Acheson's 
prescribed time-scheme expired without any sign of the projected talks and, 
on 12 March, Eden instructed Franks to tell the U. S. Government that in 
view of the continuing vulnerability of Indo-China to external threat it 
was 'urgently necessary' to reach an agreed Anglo-American position. a • 
While the result of this demarche was awaited, the Cabinet's Defence 
Committee met to discuss a paper by the Chiefs of Staff on the action to be 
taken 'in the event of overt Chinese aggression in South-East Asia'. 
There was, the Military observed, no guarantee that American plans for 
reducing China's capacity for further aggression through massive 
retaliation would be successful. On the contrary, there was every risk of 
precipitating a general war. Even if this were avoided, the exercise 
would still be highly counter-productive in other ways ... 
Where we and the Americans are really far apart is ... on [the] 
effect in Asia and the Far East generally. We think that not 
only would it not have the effect of checking Chinese aggreSSion 
in Indo-China or elsewhere, but that its effect would merely be 
to make things worse and to invite further aggreSSion - for 
instance against Hong Kong. If there was the slightest chance 
of bombing and blockade bringing China quickly to terms, that 
would be a different matter. But neither of us think that, and 
even the Americans agree that any effect could only be long term. 
Our view is that in the meanwhile it would probably make things 
much worse in Korea, invite attack on Hong Kong, and go a long 
way to do what the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff have 
always agreed we should not do, i.e. throw China more and more, 
and perhaps irretrievably, into the Russian camp. In short we 
cannot see the object of it. We think the American attitude is 
inspired not by cool strategic reasoning but by vengeful petulance 
- backed by political pressure to do somethin& - without thinking 
out where it is going to lead. 
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In discussion, the Vetence Committee concurred with these views and largely 
shared Slim's contention that it action had to be taken it should be 
confined to 'naval and air support of the battle area, and conventional 
bombing of Chinese communications in areas immediately adjacent to the 
battle-tront, though this might, if necessary, include the bombing of 
Chinese territory'.2~ Given the make-up of the Committee (leading military 
and political representatives and chaired by ChurChill>, this represented 
an authoritative statement ot the British position and was a demonstration 
of considerable poli tico-mil1 tary unanlmlty.3u This contrasted strongly 
with the apparent discord within the l'ruman Administration. Un 22 March, 
1n response to Eden's enqUiry, Franks int ormed London that the Americans 
would not be ready for top-level discussions tor some time yet and ret erred 
to unresolved internal 'd1tterences' on South-East As1a. 31 What these 
were remained unclear, al though there had been signs f or some time of 
tension between the Military and the State Department with the latter 
unhappy at the way in which the former were dragging their feet. 3~ On 31 
March, Franks reported Acheson's generally approving attitude towards 
politico-military conversations but added the rider that 'he may run into 
trouble with the Pentagon'. 33 
Yet more delay ensued during April as the Truman Administration 
continued with its policy review.3~ Meanwhile in Viet-Nam the likelihood 
of a Chinese at tack had been greatly reduced by, ironical! y, a severe 
French setback. Un 2~ February, the important road and ral1 centre ot Hoa 
Binh, forty miles south-west ot HanOi, had been evacuated in the face of 
sustained Viet-Minh pressure. I'his success for the rebels may have finally 
dissuaded the f.R.C. against overt involvement. If so, there are grounds 
t·or viewing Hoa Binh rather than Dien Bien Phu as the decisive military 
- 29-
engagement of the war, certainly in terms of avoiding a wider conflict. 
From March 1952 the threat of Chinese intervention can be seen as receding 
although, at the time, the British continued to refine their response to 
such an eventuality. On 30 April, the Defence Committee approved a further 
paper by the Chiefs of Staff on South-East Asian security, the principal 
conclusions of which were the need for a co-ordinated and consistent Anglo-
American policy embracing Korea, Hong Kong and Indo-China 'to deter China 
from further aggression and if such aggreSSion occurs to resist it '; to 
ensure in the event of aggreSSion that I in addition to maximum pol1tical 
and economic action, appropriate military action should also be taken 
against China, limited initially at least to the locality of the 
aggression'i and, finally, that 'no further warning statement should be 
made at present'.3& 
It was only towards the end of May - that is some three months since 
the ad hoc committee concluded its work - that the TrUllll!n Administration 
appeared ready to recommence conversations. The British, French and 
American Foreign Ministers were due to meet in Paris for the signing of the 
European Defence Community (E. D. C.) Treaty and, reacting to signals that 
Acheson would use the occasion to discuss Indo-China, the Foreign Office 
drew up a brief for Eden's use. This noted 
There is at present an unresolved difference of view between 
ourselves and the Americans, both as regards the need for a 
coordinated policy for the containment of China (the United 
States attach major importance to Korea, an area of little 
real concern to us, but fight shy of cOlllllitments to defend 
South-East Asia in which we and the French are vitally interest 
-ed) and over the scope and effects of retaliation against 
China (the United States rate higher than we do the effective-
ness of widespread air action and a naval blockade ... and, in 
our view, under-estimate the risks of this leading to global war). 
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Eden was thus advised (pending formal tripartite talks> to avoid entering 
into any commitments should China attack Indo-China. a stance indicative of 
Britain's reluctance to avoid obligations which the United States did not 
share.- Whether Acheson's willingness to resume discussion meant that 
the State Department had triumphed over the Pentagon, and that internal 
Administration divisions had been resolved in a manner which would herald a 
more urgent approach to South-East Asian defence co-ordination. remained to 
be seen. Likewise whether the State Department attitude to retaliation was 
substantially different to that of the Joint Chiefs. But at least matters 
were moving again. 
In the six months since November 1951 the importance of a formalised 
American commitment to South-East Asian defence had never, from a British 
standpoint, 
multilateral 
been in doubt. 
(or, at the 
What had altered was the purpose of a 
least. tripartite Anglo-Franco-American) 
arrangement for consultation and planning. On his return to the Foreign 
Office, Eden had been faced with a U.S. Government outwardly reluctant to 
become more closely involved in regional security. However, the potential 
for greater participation was present in Washington's support for France in 
Indo-China and it was this that Eden and the Foreign Office sought to 
exploit. In so doing they were helped by the apparent seriousness of 
Chinese designs on Indo-China between December 1951 and February 1952. 
This, however, only served to show that the Truman Administration was not 
in the least complacent about regional defence. But the satisfaction which 
this should have produced in London was tempered by the extremity of 
American thinking with regard to retaliation and the manifest reluctance of 
the Pentagon to allow its military freedom of action to be compromised by 
too close a defence association with London and Paris. As a consequence, 
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from May 1952 British enthusiasm for a co-ordinated South-East Asian 
defence was sustained as much by the need to hold back the Americans as it 
was to hem in the Chinese and protect Malaya - perhaps more so. Notably 
absent from British assessments of the Indo-China problem after that point 
was any real belief in overt Chinese intervention. 
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PART I: THE CHINESE DIMENSION 
CHAPTER TWO 
DRIFTING APART 
Widening Anglo-American divisions on retaliation against 
Communist China 
May to September 1952 
The Foreign Office's three-month wait for a high-level meeting with the 
Americans on South-East Asia was finally ended in Paris on 26 May when Eden 
and Acheson found time for an informal exchange of views on the eve of the 
signing of the E. D. C. Treaty. As it turned out, this meeting was a poor 
substitute for the wide-ranging discussion& sought by officials in London 
and did little to bring the two sides closer together on the central issue 
of the scale and objective of retaliation against China. Discouragingly 
for the British, it transpired that the Truman Administration's protracted 
policy review had merely resulted in political endorsement of the 
established military view, namely that a warning statement should be issued 
to Peking to be followed, if aggression ensued, by air action inside China 
and a naval blockade of the Chinese coast. 1 Aware that this would be 
'distasteful' to the British, Acheson proceeded to offer Eden a number of 
assurances. The United States, he said, was 'determined to do nothing in 
that area which would provoke a third world war', there was 'no thought of 
an all-out attack on China', and the 'realistic situation' which had to be 
faced was that the Chinese would 'continue their present threat ... without 
direct intervention' thus allowing the war to continue on a Franco/V1et-
Minh footing. Eden 'agreed generally' with Acheson and had 'no objection 
in principle to considering whether some deterrent action ... might not be 
useful'. But he remained 'strongly opposed to any course of action in S.E. 
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Asia which would be likely to result in a war with China'. Eden personally 
thought it 'unlikely that the Chinese would attack' but conceded that 'we 
could not close our eyes to the danger of Chinese aggression'. 2 
This tentative sparring was followed on 28 May by a formal meeting with 
the French at the Quai d'Orsay during which Anglo-American disunity became 
more pronounced. Although tripartite agreement was quickly reached on the 
need to re-activate the stalled defence talks, Eden objected to Acheson's 
suggestion that a collective warning 'might be necessary at some stage'. 
He refused to be 'committed now to a warning statement, let alone its 
timing' or to 'agreement on the military measures which might be taken if a 
warning were ignored'. In other words, Eden would only countenance a 
warning if the British line on limited retaliation was first accepted by 
the Americans. Meanwhile, in the absence of a joint position, Eden still 
favoured placing Indo-China in the hands of the United Nations in the event 
of Chinese aggression even though this presaged a complete French defeat by 
the time any United Nations military action was approved. 3 
The Chinese dimension continued to dominate Western discussion of the 
Indo-China problem throughout the summer of 1952. In this Britain was a 
willi ng and acti ve part i c i pant even t hough, as seen, Eden was prone to 
discount the danger of Chinese intervention. I I personally thought it 
unlikely that China would enter the war', he later recalled. 'The present 
state of affairs suited China very well and she would have nothing to gain 
by internationalising the conflict'.· This raises two related questions. 
Firstly, why did British diplomacy expend so much time and effort in 
preparing to deter or counter a hypothetical contingency, one which grew 
less likely as the summer wore on? Secondly, why did a co-ordinated 
defence strategy with the French and Americans remain so important, 
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especially when, as will be later shown, there was growing unease in the 
Foreign Office at over-concentration on Chinese intentions and under-
estimation of the danger from the Viet-Minh unaided? The answers to these 
questions are important if Eden is to be defended from the charge of having 
wasted over a year in fruitless argument with the Americans about how best 
to secure Indo-China from the designs of the wrong enemy. 
In fact, a defence is not difficult to construct. To begin wi th, 
future Chinese aggression could not be dismissed out of hand. Furthermore, 
the French, for varying motives, continued to emphasise the potency of the 
threat from the P. R. C .. As one writer observes, Paris was concerned to 
'preserve the goodwill and stimulate the generosity of France's allies, 
especially the U.S.A.' and, in this regard, 'the intentions of China were 
of paramount importance'.s From a purely British standpoint a co-ordinated 
defence for South-East Asia was a well-established policy objective and one 
which could not be abandoned even if its basic raison d' t§tre, Chinese 
expansionism, appeared in temporary or tactical abeyance. 
Office briefing paper for Eden emphasised in June 
As a Foreign 
1952, '[Ut is 
inconceivable that we should do nothing in the event of Chinese aggression 
in Indo-China'.- The reason was Indo-China's position as the front-line of 
Malayan defence, for it was obviously preferable to contain communism as 
far to the north of that colony as possible rather than wait until it 
reached the Malayan frontier. Better still if the United States could be 
brought to underwrite Indo-China's external security thereby obviating the 
need for Britain to ever fight China in Indo-China. This, as seen, was one 
of the attractions of expanding and formalising Washington's commitment to 
South-East Asian defence. Importantly, an American commitment along these 
lines would, by reducing the danger of open communist aggression, also 
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reduce the likelihood of British reinforcement of Malaya, The prospect of 
avoiding the financial outlay which such an operation would necessitate had 
considerable allure at a time when the British economy was experiencing 
severe difficulties and when the Treasury was exerting strong pressure to 
cut def ence expendit ure, 7 Indeed in the final analysis the Churchill 
Government's Indo-China policy was shaped, and at times emasculated, by the 
over-riding reqUirements of the domestic economy, Britain, in short, could 
not pursue the policy it wanted. only the policy it could afford, 
To develop this theme, when the Conservatives were returned to power in 
October 1951 they inherited a parlous economic situation, the seriousness 
of which had been downplayed by the incumbent Labour Administration in the 
run up to the General Election, Five days into office, the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, R, A, Butler, informed Cabinet cOlleagues that '[w]e are in 
a balance of payments crisis, worse than 1949, and in many ways worse even 
than 1947',- A week later in a 'grave statement' on the national economic 
situation, Butler warned the House of Commons that Britain would be 
'bankrupt, idle and hungry' if immediate remedial action were not taken 'in 
putting our balance of payments right',' Although the Government wasted no 
time in addressing this problem, an improvement was slow to materialise, 
In the spring of 1952 the Paymaster General, Lord Cherwell, sent the Prime 
Minister a connected series of warnings dramatising the issue and 
emphasising that unless Britain cut its 'coat according to its cloth, 
economic and political disaster will be inevitable', Since the war Britain 
had been 'living far beyond its means, supported by foreign aid; the day of 
reckoning has now come', The reality of the country's economic decline had 
been obscured by 'the huge gifts and loans received from the United States 
and Canada, amounting in the years 1946 to 1950 to nearly £2,000 million -
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an average of £400 million a year'. This £2,000 million helped pay for 
over one-third of Britain's imports from outside the sterling area and more 
than one-fifth of its total imports. However, as Cherwell noted in June 
1952, '[ n] at only have these gifts and loans ceased, but we are now ... 
beginning to pay them back at a rate of £40 million a year (in addition to 
£40 million interest) ... And, as you (Churchill] have said, no one is 
going to keep the British lion as a pet'. 10 Reviewing the economic 
situation after a year in office, Butler told the Cabinet that there had 
been little improvement. In doing so he pinpointed another major reason 
for continued economic difficulty: the burden of sustaining the massive 
rearmament programme forced on Britain and the other N.A.T.O. allies by the 
United States in the wake of the Korean war in 1950 ... 
We were all agreed when we took office that the defence programme 
which we inherited was beyond the nation's means. It was based 
on assumptions about American aid and the strength of our economy 
which have since been proved false ,.. Anything more than the 
current level of expenditure means moving towards a war economy, 
with radical revision of our social and economic policies. II 
Britain's economic problems inevitably affected the way in which the 
country's foreign policy was framed and executed. In short, external 
policy had to be affordable. To the dismay of the Defence Ministry, the 
War Office and the three Services, this meant cutting defence spending, and 
a number of historians have passed comment on the 'seemingly paradoxical' 
sight of a Conservative Government reducing the scale of a defence 
programme introduced by a Labour Administration. 12 It also meant avoiding 
any new overseas commitments and reducing the cost of eXisting ones. On 18 
June 1952 Eden addressed this last question head-on in a lengthy and 
seminally important Cabinet memorandum on 'British Overseas Obligations'. 
This document provides the political counterpoise to the Chiefs of Staffs' 
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parallel and much discussed 1952 Global Strategy paper, the central 
conclusion of which - that British defence policy should henceforth rely 
principally on an independent nuclear deterrent rather than large 
conventional forces - was likewise reached with economic requirements very 
much in mind. 13 
Eden set himself the task of examining 'where if anywhere our 
responsibilities can be reduced so as to bring them more into line with our 
available resources'. He cont inued: 
The essence of a sound foreign policy is to ensure that a country's 
strength is equal to its obligations... It is becoming clear that 
rigorous maintenance of the presently-accepted policies of Her 
Majesty's Government at home and abroad is placing a burden on the 
country's economy which it is beyond the resources of the country to 
meet. A position has been reached where there is no reserve and 
therefore no margin for unforeseen additional obligations. 
Eden argued that, in consequence, existing commitments must be either 
reduced or shared with others but in such a way as to avoid damaging 
Britain's standing as a front-rank Power. If this failed to ease the 
economic situation then 'a choice of the utmost difficulty lies before the 
British people, for they must either give up, for a time, some of the 
advantages which a high standard of 11 ving confers upon them. or, by 
relaxing their grip in the outside world, see their country sink to the 
level of a second-class Power, with injury to their essential interests and 
way of life of which they can have little conception'. 
On reflection, Eden came out in favour of burden-sharing and suggested 
spreading responsibility for 'one or two major obligations'. Here he had 
in mind the defence of the Middle East, for which 8ri tain presently bore 
sole responSibility, and - of relevance to the present discussion - South-
East Asia, where it was informally shared with the French by dint of their 
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interest in Indo-China. 'The security and defence of South East Asia is of 
very great importance' ... 
In conditions short of general war any sign of weakness invol 
-ving even a partial reduction of effort there, would be most 
damaging to ourselves and an immense encouragement to the Comm 
-unists. The remedy here lies in commdtting the United States 
and Australia and New Zealand to the defence of Malaya and Indo-
China, perhaps by the establishment of a Far Eastern Regional 
Security Pact on N.A.T.O. lines. 
For the moment the ideal of a broad-based Asian N.A.T.O. was unrealisable, 
the greatest obstacle being the commitment of many Asian countries to a 
policy of non-alignment in the Cold War. This left the security of South-
East Asia in the immediate future primarily in the hands of the three major 
Western Powers plus Australia and New Zealand. And of over-riding 
importance in this respect was the active involvement of the United States: 
Our aim should be to persuade the United States to assume the 
real burdens in such organisations, while retaining for ourselves 
as much political control - and hence prestige and world influence 
- as we can. 1. 
This approach may be termed power-by-proxy - the desire to wield power and 
influence without possessing it or, more accurately, using the power of the 
United States to achieve essentially British ends. This, of course, was by 
no means a new departure in British external policy. What is interesting 
is that it belies a common view of Eden in the 1950s as 'out of touch with 
reaU ty He had never adjusted his thoughts to the altered status of 
Britain' . Also that he failed to appreciate the 'gulf between national 
resources and the multitude of political problems whose outcome the United 
Kingdom desired to influence' and that he made 'no attempt at a long term 
assessment' of the problems facing Britain. Or, in Anthony Verrier's 
trenchant phrase, he succumbed to 'the temptation of the illusion of 
power'.l. However, as Eden's June 1952 Cabinet paper demonstrates, this 
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was by no means the case. How successful Eden was in effecting power-by-
proxy is another matter. Indeed this study is in some ways an assessment 
of how this approach was applied to the specific issues of Indo-China and 
South-East Asian defence. 
From the start Eden foresaw problems. In his Cabinet paper he noted 
the Truman Administration's record of hesitancy when it came to discussing 
collective defence arrangements in the Middle East and mainland Asia. On 
the other hand, Eden felt that if Britain could no longer hold certain 
positions in the world, the Americans would not, in the final analysis, 
permit any ensuing power vacuums to be filled by hostile influences. In 
support of this he cited the Greek precedent of 1947. In South-East ASia, 
the Americans were doubtful about British motives and feared becoming 'an 
instrument to prop up a declining British Empire'. Eden ended his 
discourse by highlighting Britain's specific role ... 
a policy of this kind will only be successful with the United 
States in so far as we are able to demonstrate that we are 
making the maximum possible effort ourselves, and the more 
gradually and inconspicuously we can transfer the real burdens 
from our own to American shoulders, the less damage we shall do 
to our position and influence in the world. ,. 
In this sense, the pursuit of a collective defence for South-East Asia was 
a reflection of the Churchill Administration's attempt to solve what has 
been termed the 'fundamental problem of how to sustain a world role with 
diminishing resources in a hostile and swiftly changing environment'. 17 
Moreover, the general pOlicy outlined in Eden's Cabinet paper helps explain 
why this objective transcended the reduction of the Chinese threat to Indo-
China after February 1952. Prestige was an end in itself. 
There were however additional reasons. As seen, the first half of 1952 
had revealed the existence of far-reaching American plans for retaliative 
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action against the P.R.C. which the British felt carried an ominous risk of 
general war. 1\ related concern was that such a war might start, not 
through calculated Chinese aggression, but by American provocation of 
Peking. Within a collective det ence framework, however, Britain would be 
in a position to counsel caution or exercise restraint over American policy 
as necessary. There was little doubt by mid-1952 that the United States 
was at least informally and unilaterally commited to resist Chinese 
encroachment in South-East Asia. Ie 
commitment that could be controlled. 
But Eden wanted something more - a 
Even if other determinants had not 
been present, British alarm about unfettered, independent, United States 
retaliatory action against the P. R. C. would on its own have ensured that 
defence co-operation remained a live issue. Only by placing American power 
within a multilateral defence mechanism could limitations be placed on the 
scope of Washington's pOlicy. And the longer co-ordination was delayed, 
the greater the chance of a preCipitate unilateral response by the United 
States to a future criSis. But what made for continued Anglo-American 
disagreement was, ironically, precisely Washington's marked reluctance to 
have its freedom of action circumscribed by allegiance to the diktats of 
what it deemed its over-cautious allies. 
The British were given a vivid reminder of why the exercise of American 
power needed to be checked when, on 23 June 1952, the United States bombed, 
for the first time in the context of the Korean war, power stations on the 
Yalu river. 19 Though not actually on Chinese soil, these power stations 
did supply their airfields and came, in the British view, perilously close 
to an unprovoked extension of the Korean war to China proper, a course of 
action to which the Churchill Administration was solidly opposed. To make 
matters worse, the bombing occurred less than a month after Acheson had 
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assured Eden that the United States was determined to do nothing to provoke 
a war with China. Worse still, the British had not been consulted prior 
to the incident. 20 Only four days before, Eden had argued in Cabinet that 
Britain, by its contribution to the common cause in Korea, had acquired a 
'right to American consideration in mat ters affecting .. , the Far East 
generally'.21 Although Eden was obliged to water-down his criticism of 
the United States following a plea from the Prime Minister to avoid a 
public display of disunity, the episode underlined the need for collective 
defence planning in South-East Asia. 22 The French shared this view, 
Schuman telling the British Ambassdor in Paris, Sir Oliver Harvey, that the 
American action 'proved the need for some kind of permanent body for 
consultation on South East Asian affairs'. 23 When Eden eventually spoke to 
Acheson it was, as the latter recalled, to plead for 'no more surprises,.zA 
If these were all sound reasons for continuing to strive for a co-
ordinated defence despite diminishing evidence of aggressive Chinese 
intentions, at the same time there was little sign in the weeks following 
the Paris E.D.C. conference that Anglo-American differences had narrowed on 
the question of retaliation. This was the principal hindrance to detailed 
defence planning and the attainment of British desiderata. Z. On 18 June, 
Acheson gave Ambassador Franks the clearest espousal yet of the Truman 
Administration's post-policy review position on Indo-China, the substance 
of which, when juxtaposed with British thinking, highlights the extent of 
the Anglo-American divergence. Acheson favoured a warning to China which, 
if ignored and an invasion of Tonking ensued, should be followed by stern 
counter-measures. However, to confine these to Viet-Nam 'would not hurt 
the Chinese very much' when, in actual fact, their primary object should be 
to hurt the Chinese 'as much as we COUld'. Accordingly, 'air forces should 
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strike widely and generally in China and there should be a general sea 
blockade which would interrupt the very considerable volume of trade 
entering China', Acheson was at pains to stress that it was not his 
Government's intention 'to unseat the Communist Government in Peking' and 
that they had taken into account the Sino-Soviet Treaty 'and the threat of 
world war'. Though a risk remained it was not sufficiently large to make 
such action 'unwise', This, the American concluded, represented 'the best 
views the United States Government had been able to form so far about a 
very difficult position',Z& 
In the Foreign Office, the Head of the South-East Asia Department 
thought Acheson's remarks showed that 'the American view is now very much 
closer to our own',Z7 In truth this was far from the case. For one thing, 
Eden had come out firmly against an open warning, both because of the 
absence of an agreed policy on retaliation and because it might provoke 
that which it was designed to deter,z. Instead, cleverly dove-tailing this 
position with the on-going necessity of placing American participation in 
regional defence on a mul tllateral footing. Eden hoped to see the early 
establishment of 'a joint allied machinery to plan a coordinated defence of 
the region', By the simple fact of its existence. this grouping would act 
as a deterrent. Eden's plan was to convince Peking of the West's 
determination to resist further aggression 'by tangible evidence' rather 
than open warnings.:ztt Acheson was duly informed of this on 19 June, 30 
Eden's advisers, however. were inclined (as they would be in 1954) to play 
down differences with the Americans and to recommend against pressing 
opposition to a warning too strongly. 31 This attitude is not difficult to 
explain, Mirroring Churchill's outlook. there was clearly some concern in 
the Foreign Office that continued disunity might sour Anglo-American 
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relations in other areas. More specifically, Eden's officials were aware 
that the impasse on retaliative action was holding up defence co-ordination 
per se and judged that it might be better to formalise the American 
commitment to South-East Asia first, then seek to modify Washington's views 
wi thin a planning agency. Eden, though, was disinclined to lend even 
implicit support to Washington's plans for massive retaliation. 
Acquiescence in this was too high a price to pay for British ambitions. 
Eden and Acheson had a further opportunity to discuss South-East Asia 
on 26 June when the two met in London prior to talks with the French the 
following day. At first sight, this meeting seemed to pave the way for a 
rapprochement, Acheson proposing a new military conference on regional 
defence to take up where the Washington talks in January and February had 
left off. Australia and New Zealand should also participate. The American 
hoped that the military experts might be provided with a series of 
'political' guidelines to help them overcome their differences, a 
conclusion which the Foreign Office had already reached. 32 By eliminating 
those forms of action which, militarily, made good sense but were, 
politically, impracticable, the Chiefs of Staff of the five powers would in 
theory have less scope for disagreement. Left on their own, the Service 
Chiefs were liable to waste time arguing about what should be done whereas 
it was the task of the politicians to decide what could be done - a subtle 
but important difference. At the expanded meeting the next day the 
proposal for talks with political gUidance was accepted. Schuman, 
interestingly, showed himself closer to Eden's position than Acheson'S by 
opposing a direct warning to China as unduly antagonistic and in expressing 
the hope that a 'permanent military organisation' might be created covering 
not only Indo-China but all of South-East Asia. Acheson raised no serious 
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objection. Thus the London talks held out some prospect of progress 
although the central and near-irreconcilable Anglo-American difference 
concerning the scale of military action against China remained. 33 
However, the idea of 'pol1 tical guidance' seemed to provide Eden wi th an 
opportunity to move forward on his terms by ensuring that it was the 
British and not the American thesis on retaliation which was accepted as 
the basis for discussion at the projected military talks. 
The Foreign Office wasted little time. On 28 June, at meeting of 
senior British, French and American officials - convened at the behest of 
the Foreign Ministers the previous day to establish a provisional political 
platform - it was the British who seized the initiative by tabling a draft 
basis of discussion. Neither the French nor the Americans had undertaken 
similar extensive preparation. The principal features of the draft were 
that if China committed aggression in South-East Asia 'joint action would 
be taken [emphasis added]'; that this should not be designed to overthrow 
the Peking Government only to cause it to desist from aggreSSion; the 
action should reduce 'to the minimum' the risk of 'provoking armed Soviet 
support to China'; counter-measures, 'at any rate to begin with, should if 
possible be confined to the area of aggreSSion and support areas of Chinese 
territory'; and lastly, it would be necessary to demonstrate in advance to 
Peking that 'aggression will not pay'. The next military conference should 
frame its recommendations with these guidelines in mind. The British also 
called for the setting up of a formal military organisation to co-ordinate 
planning, the course favoured by Eden as less openly provocative to the 
Chinese than a stiff and direct warning. At the heart of the British draft 
was an appreciation of Indo-China, particularly Tonking, as 'one of the 
positions of 'paramount military importance to the Free World 1n Asia. 3. 
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The French and the Americans left London to ponder the British 
proposals but, from the outset, political gUidance was a non-starter. Why 
the Foreign Office should have thought otherwise is surprising. After all, 
if the Truman Administration accepted the British draft it would be 
rejecting the views of its own Military. Likewise any modification of the 
draft by the Foreign Office would be to undercut their own Chiefs of Staff. 
The problem was that both the Foreign Office and State Department largely 
shared the outlook of their respective Military establishments. This meant 
perforce that each would propose guidelines which were pol1 tical mirror-
images of the military positions adhered to by their Chiefs of Staff. 'The 
last thing we any of us want to do is to get further tied up in China', 
minuted Eden on 11 July, succinctly summarising the attitude of the British 
Military.3. Acheson, conversely, felt it 'important to hurt the Chinese as 
much as we could' and that 'air forces should strike widely and generally 
in China and there should be a general sea blockade'. 35 Moreover, while 
Acheson was in London the State Department had drawn up a report for the 
National Security Council which argued that if Anglo-French support for 
such action was not forthCOming, 'the United States should consider taking 
unilateral action'.37 
Over the next two months, the Foreign Office persisted in a myopic 
belief that the U.S. Government would simply drop its support for unlimited 
retaliation and accept progress on South-East Asian defence on the basis of 
British political precepts. Officials may have been encouraged by swift 
French acceptance of their draft basis of discussion, but it was American 
adherance that mattered. - This was made less likely still when Eden 
actually stiffened the British draft by removing the words 'if possible' 
from the sentence 'action, at any rate to begin with, should if possible be 
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confined to the area of aggression'. This was consistent with his 
determination to limit the exercise of American power in South-East Asia. 
When an official suggested reinstating the words if the Americans pressed 
the issue, the Foreign Secretary was adamant: 'No', he retorted. 'This 
gives the Americans a freer hand than I am prepared to endure'.a. 
Gradually the Foreign Office's political agenda was endorsed in London by 
the Chiefs of Staff, Minister of Defence, Commonwealth Relations Office 
and, finally, the Prime Minister.·o In winning the latter's approval, Eden 
was careful to emphasise that 'the last thing we want to do is to be 
involved in fighting China' and that it was 'important that we should not 
appear to weaken in our desire to avoid further entanglements in the Far 
East' . This was necessary to allay Prime Ministerial qualms about 'being 
sprawled about in China' at the cost of the Western defence effort 
elsewhere. Eden accepted this, but also the obverse reality: ' ... we must 
play our part in collective resistance if China erupts again' and this 
could only be done effectively 'if there is advance consideration'.·' 
In the end this entire debate was academic. On 5 August, Franks 
informed London that the U.S. Government was poised to reject not only the 
British proposals but the whole concept of political gUidance, the Pentagon 
leading the forces of opposition in WaShington. Franks, after discussion 
with Elliot and Slessor (then in the United States), concluded that it was 
better to appease the Americans and accept military talks without political 
direction. Speaking for all three, the Ambassador counselled ... 
It seems to us important to get these [military] talks going 
not only because we want to do all we can to ensure the defence 
of South East Asia but because it is most desirable to influence 
American thinking and planning before an emergency happens. As 
things are at present, if Chinese aggression occurred the Amer-
icans would very likely rush into action which we would feel ill 
-advised.·:a 
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Ironically, it had been precisely in order to secure both ot these 
objectives that Eden 
However, 
and his staH had placed such faith in political 
pressure quickly mounted to accept the Franks guidance. 
expedient. The Service Chiefs soon endorsed the revised format as did the 
Minister of Defence and, finally, Churchill. 43 The French also complied. 44 
On 21 August. the Truman Administration formally proposed 'a purely 
military analysis of all military courses of action which the military 
capabllit ies of the powers concerned would make possible, in the event of 
Chinese armed aggression, to cause the Chinese to cease their 
aggression'. 45 The Foreign Otfice capitulated, agreed on a straight 
military conte)-ence in Washington at the end of September, but insisted 
that its established poli tical criteria should be accepted by the British 
cepresentatlves as the yar"dstick against which the feasibility of any form 
of military action should be judged. 46 
On 9 September the Cabinet I s Far East Wf f icial) Committee was 
acquainted by the Foreign Office of the saga surrounding political gUidance 
and how the U. S. Government had I demurred, stating their preference for a 
purely military meeting. as they felt that any form of political guidance 
would tend to inhibit the talks'. 47 It would also, by extension, inhibit 
American freedom to indulge in massive retaliation. What the Americans 
had come to realise was that the very idea ot political direct ion, let 
alone the Foreign Otfice precepts, was weighted on the side of circumspect 
military action and the British thesis on retaliation. Acheson, in 
proposing the idea in the first place, may not have discerned this. But 
when he did, it was inevitable that he and his Government should revert to 
the principle of straight mil1 tary discussion. From the American 
perspecti ve this vol te-iace is understandable. What 1s less so is that 
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Eden or his advisers should ever have thought it would be otherwise. 
The forced abandonment of pol it ical guidance meant that Eden and the 
Foreign Office had to confront square-on the virtual certainty that the 
Washington military conference would again end in deadlock. That would 
complete 8 year of unrelieved failure 8S far as establishing a co-ordinated 
Western defence for South-East Asia was concerned. A year, moreover, of 
repeated British initiatives and American rebuttals. 
this stalemate might have been greater, however, 
Disappointment with 
if the P. R.C. was 
perceived in London as posing a real and immediate threat to Indo-China. 
But this was no longer so. Eden and his officials had continued to pursue 
a collective defence for the subsidiary reasons already outlined, but by 
September 1952 there was growing concern in London - a corollary of the 
stagnation of regional defence planning - that the Chinese dimension was a 
distraction. Unease had been mounting since January that there was a 
crisis brewing in Viet-Nam irrespective of Peking's intentions. In August 
a Foreign Office memorandum had warned of the danger of a 'victory for 
communism in Indo-China, sa1ned by local forces without large scale Chinese 
intervention [emphasis added]'. This would do 'far more than offset their 
partial defeat in Korea: it will have far reaching results elsewhere'. 
Most notably, because of its dependence on the region as both a source of 
vital raW materials and a market for its exports, 'Japan could not afford 
to stay in the western camp if South-East Asia were communist-controlled." 
Viet-Minh success in the field, when combined with war weariness and 
disillusion in France, the unpopularity of the Bao Dai regime in Viet-Nam 
and continued French failure to grant the ASSOCiate States full 
independence, was increasingly viewed in London as the real problem in 
Indo-China. Regional defence planning continued to be important for those 
- 50-
reasons which sustained British interest even when Chinese aggression 
ceased to be an immediate concern. But in the last months of 1952 it came 
to be seen as merely one element in a multi-faceted problem and, if 
anything, the least serious. The Chinese dimension was supersaded by what 
may be termed the French dimension and British diplomacy had to react 
accordingly. 
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PART II: THE FRENCH DIMENSION 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE GROWTH OF FRENCH DEFEATISM 
January to May 1952 
During the course of 1952 war-weariness in France became a far more potent 
threat to Viet-Nam's non-Communist future than a hypothetical Chinese 
invasion. The Indo-China war had never been popular in France but, in the 
last months of 1951 and coinciding with General de Lattre's illness. public 
disillusionment reached new heights of 'weariness and disgust' while in the 
National Assembly opposition to the war from the usual quarters (the 
Communists, Socialists and some Radicals) intensified. 1 In the Foreign 
Office, the first signs of disquiet at this turn of events is detectable at 
departmental level from January 1952 when leading figures in the Centre-
Right Governments of. first. Rene Pleven and. after 17 January. Edgar 
Faure. tentatively raised the possibility of a negotiated peace and a 
military withdrawal. Hitherto successive French Governments had been firm 
in their determination to see the war through to a successful conclusion. 
As recently as October 1951 a senior official at the British Embassy in 
Paris expressed confidence that • the present Government will certainly not 
agree to withdrawal, and the same is true of any right-Wing government 
which might take its place'.:z Now. however. it appeared that the French 
authorities were beginning to think in terms of liquidating their 
commi tment in South-East Asia for reasons entirely unconnected with the 
'threat' to Viet-Nam from the P.R.C. But to British observers. given the 
present military balance. negotiations with Ho Chi Minh could only be 
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conducted from a position of weakness. This might produce in the short-
term a face-saving compact allowing the French to disengage their forces 
with some semblance of honour. but in the long-term the feeling was that it 
would lead to the complete communisation of Indo-China by, as it were, 
default. And the consequences for Britain and the West of such a 
development were at least as great as those impended by Chinese absorbtion. 
The factors which underlay French • weariness and disgust' were examined 
on 23 December 1951 in a letter to Strang from Sir Oliver Harvey in Paris. 
Harvey noted that many people in France were now beginning to question why. 
and for what possible advantage, the war was being fought. With the 
creation of the Associate State system in 1949-1950 the French had agreed 
to 'convert their colonial position into a sort of Commonwealth one in 
which full autonomy and virtual independence were promised the local 
states' and, accordingly, French officials and soldiers would be expected 
to leave Indo-China 'as soon as the war is over'. In other words, despite 
the continued limitations of Associate State freedom, the war was no longer 
considered a war for French territory and increasingly unpopular for that 
reason. French public opinion was also unhappy wi th the amount of 'blood 
and treasure' expended on Indo-China and, related to this, the 'heavy 
handicap' the war imposed on the build-up of the French Army in Europe as 
part of N.A.T.O. 's rearmament programme. Opposition to the war in 
Parliament was based partly on this consideration and partly on the strain 
on the country's domestic economy. Finally, there was a widespread feeling 
that if, as repeatedly claimed by the French authorities, Indo-China was 
integral to the security of the whole free world community, France's allies 
should take on more of the material burden. 3 
However, in a despatch on 2 January 1952, Harvey observed that 
- 55-
regardless of this disaffection, the existing policy of maintaining the 
position continued to receive majority support in Parliament because the 
'disastrous effects' of withdrawal in terms of French prestige, and the 
'impossibility of negotiating with the Vietminh' and so appeasing 
communism, were both widely accepted. Instead, the Government looked to a 
'general Far Eastern settlement' between the West and the P.R. C., 
commencing with agreement on a Korean armistice and, later, including a 
Chinese promise on non-interference 1n Indo-China. Negotiations with the 
P.R.C. could be portrayed in France as Great Power Diplomacy and so avoid 
the humiliation of talking to Ho Chi Minh. Moreover, deprived of Chinese 
aid, the threat from the Viet-Minh would be greatly reduced and the chances 
of French success enhanced. But unt il this fanciful panacea materialised, 
France had no choice but to continue the war. Indeed Government spokesmen 
insisted that victory remained the objective. To Harvey, however, this 
'outward optimism' was based on some questionable premises: that American 
aid would increase and its delivery be speeded up; that a military solution 
was possi ble relatively qUickly; that China would not intervene; and that 
de Lattre would return. In many ways de Lattre was the key. The 'delicate 
balance of opinion which at present tilts towards a continuance of the 
war', Harvey averred, 'has ... one weighty piece in the right tray: General 
de Lat tre ... He is the man who has worked the miracle of French recovery 
in Indo-China, and he is probably the only man who can go on working it'.· 
Nine days later de Lattre was dead, a victim not of the Viet-Minh but 
of cancer. Although Eden later reflected that France's 'slender' chances 
of winning the war were 'further diminished' as a consequence, in truth it 
had little impact on the military situation.· Admittedly, a deterioration 
had set in soon after de Lattre's return to Paris, but Graves, assessing 
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matters from Saigon, believed this would 'almost certainly have been the 
case even if de Lattre had been personally directing operations' for he had 
been less of a geniUS in the field of military strategy than in 
, leadership' . Even the morale of the French forces remained remarkably 
good in the wake of the General's passing.- The same, however, could not 
be said of the politicians in Paris. Arguably the most important 
consequence of de Lattre's death wes the crisis of confidence it 
precipitated in metropol1 tan France. Prior to the onset of his illness 
there had been no hint that the Pleven Administration had any thought of a 
political solution to the war. 7 Yet as soon as it became clear that de 
Lattre would not return, both the French Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister declared separately and in public that no opportunity would be 
neglected to bring the war to a peaceful conclusion. So close were 
Schuman's remarks in a speech on 6 January 1952 to a statement of France's 
intention to pull out of Indo-China forthwith that the Quai d' Orsay wes 
obliged to issue an official disclaimer.· Perhaps most revealingly, a 
State Department offiCial, returning from Paris to WaShington via the 
Foreign Office in mid-January, depicted the French Government's reaction to 
de Lattre's death as 'a mixture of dismay and relief, dismay at the loss of 
a brilliant French soldier tempered by relief that Paris would now be free 
from the constant pressure he exerted'.' 
It would appear, therefore, that only de Lattre's towering reputation 
and his rather bullying personality had kept Government irresolution in 
check, and with his departure French Ministers found themselves free to 
consider cheaper and quicker solutions. Graves for one believed 'it needs 
the leadership of a personality as strong as de Lattre's to give the French 
the heart to carryon with the sacrifices they are making with so little 
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apparent effect'. 10 In the Foreign Office there was some concern that with 
de Lattre gone so too had the determination to pursue military victory and 
that France was instead preparing for compromise and ultimate evacuation. 11 
There are any number of dates in the early 1950' s which may be singled out 
as a turning-point, the moment at which the French position became hopeless 
and humiliation only a matter of time. One such is certainly 11 January 
1952 and the death of de Lattre for thereafter the spine of pol1 tical 
support for the war in Paris was fatally fractured. 
During February reports began to reach the Foreign Office referring to 
the damaging effect on French and native morale in Viet-Nam caused not by 
de Lattre's passing but by indications that the Government in Paris was 
seeking to detach itself from its responsibilities. The related inference 
was that the war would not now be won or lost solely on the battlefield but 
to a large extent in the Chamber of Deputies. la Jean Let ourneau, the 
Minister for the Associate States, spent a month in Viet-Nam attempting to 
dispel local 'alarm and despondency' by emphasising his Government's 
determination to complete Indo-China's independence, to continue the fight 
and not to parley with the enemy.la Yet even he, at a press conference 
towards the end of his visit, advanced the view that France could not 'on 
principle reject the slightest opportunity of ending hostilities'. A 
further pointer to the future was Letourneau's announcement that the French 
Expeditionary Corps would no longer be reinforced, the Government's policy 
being to pass responsibl1 ty for Viet-Nam's defence to the native Army, 
currently in process of formation. 1. 
On top of these public statements the Foreign Office gave credence to 
secret intelligence which suggested that Letourneau had been in contact 
with the Viet-Minh while he was in Viet-Nam, that France sought Soviet 
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mediation to arrange a truce, and that French officials had spoken to 
representatives of the P.R.C. with a view to opening an alternative channel 
for negotiation. 15 At the same time, military developments were also 
causing concern, notably the evacuation of Hoa Binh at the end of 
February. 1&. Although de Lattre's successor, General Salan, claimed it 
was a tactical retreat, the French High Command in Indo-China had earlier 
described the fate of Hoa Binh as 'materially affecting' the outcome of the 
war, and the eventual withdrawal of some 20,000 troops was 'widely regarded 
as a major defeat and a great blow to French prestige, was nationally 
distressing and strengthened the currents of French pessimism and 
defeatism'. 17 
By March a disturbed Foreign Office began to consider ways and means of 
arresting the apparent drift of French policy towards wholesale withdrawal 
for, as one leading official put it, in present circumstances 'negotiations 
for an armistice would be negotiation from weakness, and it is difficult to 
see how they would result in anything but a Communist victory'. 1. Matters 
were deemed sufficiently serious to set in train a jOint Foreign Office-
Chiefs of Staff study which was eventually put to the Cabinet's Defence 
Committee on 19 March. Referring to 'disturbing indications that French 
determination to continue the fight in Indo-China may be weakening', the 
paper argued that a French withdrawal would be 'a major victory for 
Communism' and would have 'grave consequences in Hong Kong and Malaya'. 
With the inevitable capitulation of Burma and Siam, communism would be 
brought to the borders of Malaya where the resulting reinforcement would be 
a considerable - and risky - undertaking since it would be 'at the expense 
of our promised contribution to [N.A.T.O.l in the opening phases of the hot 
war, and ... will thus imply a major revision of our global strategy'. 
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Yet, having laid out these cogent reasons why the French should be 
encouraged to maintain their present effort, the authors of the study could 
suggest no means by which Britain might contribute to this end. They 
rather lamely observed that the limited assistance which might be offered 
from over-stretched military reserves would not materially affect the 
situation unless accompanied by a substantial American contribution 
including ground forces. But apart from the fact that internationalising 
the war in this way might provoke Chinese intervention, Washington was 
expected to be I very reluctant I to shoulder so extensive a commitment. 
Nor was Britain in a position to offer any financial, material or even 
logistic support (and hence encouragement) to France. 
United States possessed this capacity. 1. 
Again only the 
These negative conclusions highlight the severe constraints which 
economic factors - particularly the imperative of avoiding additional 
commitments - placed on Britain's Indo-China policy. On one level, it was 
undoubtedly important to see the French win through. On another, Britain 
had nothing to offer its ally but verbal support. Yet, paradoxically, 
should the French position collapse Britain would have no option but to 
reinforce Malaya and accept the unwelcome and debilitating economic 
consequences of that undertaking. One would imagine, therefore, that there 
was something to be said for avoiding the need for so major a sacrifice in 
the fut ure by summoning up in the present some means of assist ing the 
French and underpinning their morale. The scale of this commitment would 
be considerably less than that required should Indo-China fall to communism 
and Malaya reqUire reinforcement for, if France maintained its position, 
French troops, by defending Viet-Nam, would in effect be defending 
Malaya. 
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With hindsight there appears to have been a clear choice facing the 
Churchill Administration: an immediate financial or material gesture to 
prop up the French or, if that were not forthcoming, a potentially daunting 
outlay in men, money and equipment if the French will to continue the fight 
crumbled and general evacuation ensued. At the time a third course was 
favoured - vacillation. Even with so influential a figure as Montgomery, 
Deputy Supreme Commander of N.A.T.O. forces in Europe, insisting that 'we 
cannot allow the British Army to be sucked into Malaya', the idea of 
investing in Viet-Nam to avoid this danger does not appear to have been 
seriously entertained. 20 In the end, one is struck by the short-
sightedness with which the British Government epproeched the problem of 
shoring-up French morele in March 1952 when, as most agreed, the 'key to 
the defence of Maleya lies in Indo-China'. 21 The mi Ugating fector was, 
agein, the economic plight of the country. Even so, British ceution knew 
no bounds. This wes demonstrated by the refusal of the Defence Committee 
to agree on an approach to the United Stetes about upping its essistance to 
France (held by the British Service Chiefs to be 'one of the most effective 
means of buttressing the French will to continue the struggle') on the 
grounds that if Washington assented it might be et the expense of the 
'small amount of aid' currently given to Britain. 22 
A fUrther consequence of Britein's economic difficulties was e 
readiness to wait on events rather than emberk upon immediete and 
potentially costly ection. Hence Churchill's edvice to the Defence 
Committee that it was 'too early to assume the worst' end thet there might 
be 'many developments in the world situation before e real threet to Maleya 
developed' although it would be 'prudent' to make plans. TeUingly, this 
wes to be done 'without expenditure of money or resources'.23 Churchill, 
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as ever, wished to bring 'local events in the Far East into their proper 
relationship to our predominating danger 1n Europe'. a... Inevitably, the 
Defence Committee's deliberations must be looked at in the context of 
power- by-proxy. And here one is struck by the contrast between the two 
main elements of that principle as it was applied to Indo-China. Firstly, 
British efforts to bring the Americans into a defence grouping for South-
fc, 
East Asia in orderrcontinue to exert an influence in the region above that 
which its diminishing power would otherwise allow, is an example of 
positive diplomacy. Secondly, the related imperative of avoiding 
additional commitments and of making foreign policy affordable produced an 
entirely negative and ineffective policy when it came to dealing with the 
prevailing situation in Viet-Nam and the problem of French morale. 
In the event, Churchill's wait-and-see approach was partially 
vindicated. By the end of March the French Government (now under the 
leadership of Antoine Pinay) seemed to have recovered its nerve. For this 
Letourneau was primarily responsible. In firm public statements during 
March, and in private talks at the Foreign Office, he succeeded in quashing 
rumours of an imminent French withdrawal, a development which Eden found 
'heartening' .2. Strang concluded that the French did not intend to pull 
out 'at present' although they 'might be forced to do so by a future 
internal crisis'.2& It also emerged that the Foreign Office had read too 
much into its 'secret' information about French contacts with the Viet-Minh 
and Chinese. Eden was angry that these unsubstantiated reports had been 
passed on to the Americans who, privately, considered them unduly alarmist. 
As he made clear in a minute on 6 April, such rumour-mongering could only 
undermine rather than enhance the object of British policy: ' we must be 
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careful not to spread alarm & despondency ourselves about the French 
position in Indo-China ... 
It is a British interest that the French should stay in Indo-
China and we should try to encourage them to do so and the 
Americans too. 27 
To be fair to Eden's staff, they had not invented a deterioration in French 
resolution since the death of de Lattre, they had merely over-stated it.a. 
Moreover, the danger still remained that a sudden disintegration of 
government and parliamentary support for the war would presage an 
ignominous exit from Indo-China, or that a serious military reverse might 
occur should the morale of the French forces be undermined by the knowledge 
that their efforts were no longer appreCiated in France itself. The extent 
of this last danger was underlined in a report from Harvey on 25 March in 
which he stated that it was no longer just the Communists and Socialists in 
the National Assembly that wanted an end to the war, rather the desire was 
'almost uni versal' . ;a, There was also a rumour that the French General 
Staff had recommended the evacuation of Tonking and thought complete 
evacuation inevitable. Though denied by the Pinay Administration, a 
Foreign Office submission for Eden in April warned that 'further internal 
difficulties in France might greatly increase the pressure for this, and 
the general French will to continue the struggle may, in any case, be 
questionable' .30 
The unease which recent events in France and Viet-Nam had caused in the 
Foreign Office served a positive and unexpected end in that it revealed 
clearly, and for the first time, the dual1 ty of the problem which Indo-
China posed for British diplomacy. As outlined by Assistant Under-
Secretary R.H. Scott on 27 March, this was (i) what 'can and should be done 
in the event of open Chinese intervention' and (ii) what 'can and should be 
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done if, without open Chinese intervention, the French suffer serious 
reverses in Indo-China or for reosons of domestic ond Europeon policy are 
compelled to withdraw, at any rate from the North'.31 Over the next few 
months the latter problem would come to outstrip the former in importance. 
For the moment, though, both considerations tended to converge as on Anglo-
Americon commitment to come to the aid of France in the event of Chinese 
aggression ossumed additional significance as a means of bolstering morale 
in PariS, Saigon and Hanoi in terms of the immediate struggle ogainst the 
Viet-Minh. A Foreign Office brief for Eden in February had argued that 
unless Anglo-American disagreements on retaliation against China were 
resolved 'within a reasonably short time', the French 'may lose heart in 
Indo-China with incalculoble effects on the whole situation in South East 
Asia'.aa Later in the month a China Department paper made the same pOint, 
adding that without prior Anglo-American pledges French resistance might 
crumble immediately upon a Chinese incursion or, importantly, 'even in the 
face of intensified Vietminh activity, unsupported by overt Chinese 
intervention'.33 Even the lacklustre politico-military memorandum put to 
the Defence Committee on 19 March accepted that the 'firm knowledge' that 
Britain and the United States would come to France's aid would be a 'direct 
contribution to French morale in Indo-China'.a~ 
The French, however, were unlikely to be granted succour from that 
quarter given the Anglo-American impasse on retaliatory policy and the 
consequent stagnation of defence planning for South-East Asia. The Foreign 
Office was thus compelled to consider what could be done in the short-term 
to shore-up morale in Paris and ensure that enthusiasm for negotiations did 
not get out of hand. But, as ever, there was little that could be done 
since Britain 'could not offer practical help ... and it was not desirable 
- 64-
to urge the Americans to increase the scale of their financial aid to 
France'.3& It transpired, however, that the Americans were themselves 
fully alive to the importance of further assistance. On 30 Msrch, Acheson 
told Franks that he thought the French 'would stay in Indo-China and see it 
out' provided three conditions were met: that enough military assistance 
continued to reach them, that enough of the budget deficit in France caused 
by the war was covered by American dollars, and that enough progress was 
made in building up the native Viet-Namese Army so as to relieve the strain 
on French manpower through the gradual transfer of defence 
responsibility. a. 
For the remainder of April, and for much of Msy, British policy-makers 
were obliged to wait on events, unable themselves to offer help or even 
advice to the French for fear of inviting counter-demands, and speculating 
as to what moves the Truman Administration would make once its policy 
review was completed, the prolongation of which, as seen, also held up 
progress on regional defence planning. 3'7 This inertia might have been a 
cause for concern in London if the onset of the rains had not brought the 
campaigning season in Viet-Ham to a close until October and if the Pinay 
Administration had not continued to emit positive noises about its 
commitment to the Associate States. On 10 April, Letourneau reiterated in 
the National Assembly his Government's determination to stay in Indo-China 
until its task was complete and that there was no question of an appeal to 
Ho Chi Minh.:'8 A week later Harvey reported that, barring any dramatic 
turn of events, 'the French will continue to hold their present line ... 
and to devote the necessary men and resources to this end'. 3' Welcome as 
this reconstitution of French purpose was, there was some speculation in 
London about what had really lain behind its recent fluctuations. On a 
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cynical reading, talk of negotiation and rumours of evacuation might have 
been deliberately cultivated by the French so as to frighten the Americans 
(and the British for that matter) into furbishing them with whatever level 
of assistance they subsequently asked for.-o Harvey denounced the French 
as 'past masters in this tactic'. while statements from military and 
political sources leant substance to the theory that France was 'priming' 
its allies for a new request for aid.- 1 
On 16 March. for example. the Observer newspaper reported General Juin 
as saying that unless more help could be obtained from the United States. 
France would have to withdraw all but a small garrison from Indo-China to 
meet its commitments in Europe.-z In his address to the National Assembly 
on 10 April, Letourneau 'indulged in the usual veiled reproaches for the 
insufficient gratitude shown by France's allies'."s If this was really 
the intention of the French Government it now appears to have comprised an 
element of self-deception. as concerned reporting by Graves underlined. 
'Wending its way through this country like a trail of saltpetre', he 
informed Eden on 18 April, 'is the suggestion that "a military solution is 
no longer possible"', the corollary of which was a 'feeling' that the 
French Government was preparing the way 'for some alternative - though 
unprescribed - solution'. Graves concluded: 
spreads we will find ourselves in great 
, if the present despondency 
difficulties, not because of 
military reverses. but because the determination to hold off the aggressor 
will have been allowed to weaken'..... Therefore. irrespective of whether 
French irresolution had been genuine or manufactured for an ulterior, 
financial, purpose, the damage to morale and the prospects of success in 
Viet-Nam discerned by Graves was the unwelcome and real outcome. 
At last, on 19 May, the Truman Administration emerged from its drawn-
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out policy review and Acheson was instructed by the President to take 
advantage of the presence of the British and French Foreign Ministers in 
Paris the following week for the signing of the European Defence Community 
<E.D.C.) Treaty in order to discuss Indo-China.~· As already seen, in the 
context of planning to resist Chinese aggression the American policy review 
contributed little to narrowing differences with Britain on the question of 
retaliation. This, though, was not the only aspect of the Indo-China 
problem on which Eden was briefed by his officials. He was also made aware 
that the issue of greater aid to France to combat the immediate problem 
posed by the Viet-Minh was likely to come up in discussion. However, the 
advice offered in his brief was astonishing. On the one hand, the Foreign 
Office favoured increased supplies of American material aid for Indo-China 
'provided this were not at the expense of ... defence assistance of higher 
priori ty elsewhere', but on the other, a substantial increase in American 
financial aid to France to underwrite the cost of the war (and which London 
had previously viewed as an essential antidote to French defeatism and 
early withdrawal~·) was 'likely to be partly at least at our expense and we 
do not therefore favour it'. The brief concluded: 'The Secretary of State 
will doubtless prefer not to take any active part in any discussion of 
these points with M. Schuman and Mr. Acheson'. ~'7 Nothing demonstrates so 
vividly the confused and contradictory British perception of the Indo-China 
war at this time. Although it was a clear Bri Ush interest that France 
stayed in Indo-China, the Churchill Government could not or would not offer 
any money or equipment to help achieve that end, nor would it press the 
United States to do so, and, when the latter was prepared to increase 
assistance of its own volition, the British felt unable to approve the 
action for fear that it would be at their expense. If Indo-China was 
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important to Britain, this position, based on a suffocatingly narrow 
evaluation of national self-interest, was quite extraordinary. 
When the Paris talks got underway on 26 May with an informal Anglo-
American exchange at the Sri tish Embassy, 
were immediately rendered academic when 
the provisions of Eden's brief 
Acheson revealed that his 
Government had already taken a firm decision on the question of further aid 
to France. In line with recent British conclusions, the American 
Secretary of State considered that a French withdrawal from Indo-China 
would be 'a disaster of such magnitude' affecting their other interests and 
national prestige that 'provided they were assisted, there was a fair 
prospect of their (the French] being able to continue to hold on'. In this 
connection, Letourneau had been invited to Washington the following month 
to discuss the matter ... • The British could only wait and see what this 
meeting produced, doubtless hoping that France would obtain what was 
necessary for her to prosecute the war more vigorously - hoping, too, that 
extra help would not be matched by a comensurate reduction in American 
assistance to Europe in general. 
Two days later at a formal tripartite meeting in the Quai d' Orsay 
Acheson's sympathy for French requirements was severely tested by their 
aggressive and forceful diplomacy. Confident that the Americans were now 
committed to providing greater help, Defence Minister Pleven decided he had 
little to lose by making a case for as large an appropriation as possible. 
His tactic was to dwell on the unfortunate Eurocentric consequences of 
France' 6 present effort in South-East Asia. A' rapid and considerable 
increase in the military power of France was essential' in terms of 
enhancing West European security, he argued. But the 'main obstacle' to 
this was the Indo-China war which absorbed a third of the country's defence 
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expenditure and immobilised 26 per cent of its officers. France was not 
fighting for itself but for the free world and was doing as much as it 
could with the aid currently available, thus France 'must have further aid 
if Europe is not to suffer'. Pleven followed up these remarks with a 
declaration that was destined to complicate British thinking about Indo-
China as well as West European defence for the next two years: 
French forces in Europe must be at least equal to the German 
forces [in the European Defence Community], and should be somewhat 
greater in the interests of peace. Indo-China ... was the heart 
of European defence.·' 
According to the American record, Pinay added that the French Government 
was 'unanimously behind Mr. Pleven in this statement' . .o 
As will bee one clear, from the moment that the E.D.C. Treaty was signed 
the problems of German rearmament and the Indo-China conflict became 
inextricably entwined, the solution of one dependent upon the solution of 
the other, until their respective d~nouements within a month of each other 
in the summer of 1954. As Eden himself conceded, the 'implications of the 
Indo-China problem now extended far beyond South-East Asia' for in view of 
'French anxiety to maintain mil1 tary parity with Germany, the fate of 
E. D. C. was in part dependent upon its solution'.·' This was in fact an 
understatement. As events unfolded it became clear that Indo-China was one 
- possibly the major - justification or excuse by which successive French 
governments avoided putting the E.D.C. Treaty before the National Assembly 
for ratification. The Sri Ush could never make their minds up whether 
Indo-China was a legitimate reason for delaying a vote on the Treaty or a 
useful device for postponing indefinitely that which few Frenchmen had any 
great love for, namely German rearmament. Moreover, because France 
insisted on the E. D. C. <and by extension German rearmament) only becoming 
- 69-
operative once the Treaty was ratified in the national parliaments of ~ll 
signitories,·2 and because French ratification was continually deferred, 
one may contend that Indo-China contributed directly to Western Europe's 
continued vulnerability vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc during the 1951-1954 
period. From May 1952 Indo-China superceded Korea as the bridge that 
linked the Cold War in Europe with the Cold War in Asia. 
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May to September 1952 
WAR 
Pleven's explicit linkage of the E.D.C. and Indo-China problems in May 1952 
surprised and angered the British and Americans. Acheson, while accepting 
that there was 'no question that France's effort [in Indo-China] was in the 
general interest', observed that his Government was already bearing about a 
third of the cost of the war effort yet 'to hear the French speak, one 
would think they were only supplying them with an odd revolver or two'. 
Pleven returned to the charge at the end of the E.D.C. Conference. If more 
help were not provided for Indo-China the detrimental impact the war was 
having on French military capacity in Europe could lead to 'great 
parliamentary difficulties ... (and] might well prejudice the ratification 
of the E.D.C.·, not to mention the 'continuation of French efforts in Indo-
China'. 1 The message was plain: the Indo-China war had to be ended before 
German rearmament could be made acceptable to a majority of French opinion. 
The war was by no means the only cause of French unhappiness - foremost was 
a strong distaste for rearming Germany at all, compounded by misgivings, 
particularly on the right, at surrendering sovereignty over the French army 
to make this possible. Indo-China, however, provided opponents of the 
E. D. C. with a tangible rather than emotional excuse for deferring German 
rearmament. When the war was concluded, they argued, the bulk of the 
French cadres in the Expeditionary Corps would be free to return to Europe 
where their presence would ensure a preponderance of French forces over 
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German within the E.D.C. And the key to victory in Viet-Nam, as Pinay and 
Pleven pOinted out, was more American financial and material help. If this 
were not forthcoming, either the E. D. C. would never be ratified or, 
alternati vely, it would be sanctioned but only at the cost of abandoning 
Indo-China. 
Eden was particularly aggrieved by French behaviour, accusing Pinay and 
Pleven of adopting • a thoroughly defeatist attitude' and • virtually trying 
to blackmail the Americans. and to a lesser extent ourselves,.:a He was 
angry that the French, so soon after the completion of difficult and drawn-
out treat y negot iations, had re-opened the vexed quest ion of a German 
contribution to Western defence. But in fairness to the French Government 
it should be noted that three months earlier the National Assembly had 
passed a resolution stating that the treaty would only be endorsed if the 
pre-dominance of French forces in the E. O. C. was assured. a Indeed it was 
accepted as 'an act of national faith that French forces in Europe always 
had to be greater than or at least equal to those of Germany', something 
which the steady drain of Indo-China made impOSSible.· The Bonn Government 
had initially promised a contribution of twelve groupements (about l~O,OOO 
troops) to the European Army while, in February 1952, France was forced to 
reduce its original target from 14 to 10 groupement~· This prompted the 
then French Premier. Faure. to declare: 'France would not enter the EOC 
unless freed from the special burden of the Indo-China affair'.- However, 
this argument found little favour with Eden who admonished both Pinay and 
Pleven, telling them that they should 'understand that the only effect of 
these repeated ... conditions for any joint endeavour was to exasperate 
their best friends'. 7 
In attempting to account for Eden's irritation it is necessary to look 
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beyond simple frustration with the shortcomings of French policy in Indo-
China and alight instead on the juxtaposition of E.D.C. ratification with 
further allied <principally American) aid. In the seven months since his 
return to the Foreign Office the question of a German contribution to 
Western defence (the 'greatest problem' facing the Churchill Administration 
in Western Europe according to a recent study·) had taken up more time and 
effort than any other single issue. The idea of rearming West Germany had 
been under serious discussion in London and Washington since 1949 and had 
been informally mooted as early as 1944.' With the outbreak of the Korean 
war in June 1950 Anglo-American deliberations assumed a new urgency. In 
the ensuing crisis atmosphere, with fears that events in Asia presaged a 
communist move in Europe, the Truman Administration pressed its N. A. T. O. 
partners to embark upon a massive rearmament programme. Even then, and 
counting a large American military contribution, N.A.T.O. was still 
considered no match for the Soviet bloc. Consequently and controversially, 
the Americans called for the creation of 10 West German divisions as an 
accretion of strength to N.A.T.O. Coming only five years after the end of 
the Second World War, 'the proposal stunned many Europeans, especially the 
French, with their bitter memories of three German invasions since 1870'.10 
The need to shore up Western defence against Soviet encroachment was not 
considered a sufficient justification in France for what many saw as the 
rebirth of German militarism. 'The French feared the threat present in such 
a revival more than they did the Russians', the French Minister of Defence 
confided to the British in September 1950. His views were not subjective, 
he said, but were shared by 'the vast maj ori t y of Frenchmen'. 11 For a 
nation trying to break free of the recent past through 'the healing power 
of a collective amnesia', German rearmament released 'powerful emotive 
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images' of 1940-44. 12 
If the French were ultimately unable to resist American pressure, they 
were successful in insisting that German rearmament be strictly controlled. 
On 24 October 1950, Pleven unveiled the scheme for a European Army which 
evolved into the E. D. C. 13 This called on member countries to renounce 
sovereignty over most of their armed forces and to commit to a general 
military 'pool' contingents of the smallest practicable military unit. 
Under the aegis of the E.D.C there was to be no independent German army nor 
a German High Command, just German battalions operating alongside 
battalions from the other member states under the direction of an 
integrated European Command. 14 This clearly did little for the military 
efficacy or cohesion of the European Army, but that was never a French 
priority. It Was however consistent with their determination to prevent at 
all costs the establishment of an autonomous German Army. 
The E.D.C. was also widely regarded - particularly in the United States -
as a stepping-stone to the greater unity of Western Europe and marked an 
extension of the supranational principle first expressed in the Schuman 
Plan for a European coal and steel community. However, the French 
commitment to supranationalism as embodied in the E.D.C. had little to do 
with idealism about a united Europe and everything to do with preventing 
German revanchi SID. As Saki Dockrill has recent! y observed, in 1950 the 
French were unconcerned about 'the theoretical loss of mili tary 
sovereignty as a result of their partiCipation in such a supranational 
body, since they intended the European Army to become virtually a French 
Army under a French Supreme Commander'. 1. By May 1952 the Indo-China war 
had turned these calculations upside down. In between, in February 1951, 
representatives from France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and, 
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later, Holland began negotiations towards an E. D. C. Treaty with the full 
support of the United States. This was the state of play when, six months 
later, the Conservatives triumphed at the polls in Britain. 
The attitude of the Churchill Administration towards the E. D. C. was 
essentially that of its Labour predecessor. It was governed by two sets of 
considerations. Because of its world-wide responsibilities, its important 
political and economic relationship with the Commonwealth, doubts about the 
stability of Western Europe, an acute aversion to supranational European 
bodies, misgivings about the practicality of the plan, and a determination 
to preserve the Anglo-American special relationship (to which end it was 
necessary for Britain to be seen to be strong and independent, not merely a 
part of Europe), the Conservative Government was unalterably opposed to 
British membership of the E.D.C. On the other hand, it also wished to see 
N.A.T.O. given some teeth, regarded German rearmament as both necessary and 
inevitable, and perhaps most important of all it believed the 
maintenance of Washington's commitment to Western Europe rested on the 
Europeans being seen to do more for themselves in terms of defence. The 
Churchill Administration consequently sought the closest possible 
association with, rather than membership of, the E. D. C. It was to be 
supported from without, not from within. 
personally favouring a ' more modest 
As Foreign Secretary, Eden, while 
scheme without elaborate 
superstructure', never deviated from this fundamental premise.'-
From the outset the French, while reluctantly resigned to British non-
participation, sought to make British association as intimate as possible. 
This was largely to minimise the possibility that at some point in the 
future Britain (and the United States) might decide to pull its forces out 
of Europe leaving France to deal on its own with a revitalised Germany. 
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Unrealistic as this might now see~ at the time it impelled the French to 
seek cast-iron pledges about Britain's future relationship with the 
E.D.C. , ... In this connection, in November 1951 Britain and the Uni ted 
States agreed to a French request tor jOint guarantees between N.A.T.O. and 
the E. D. C. so that an at tack on one body was considered an attack on the 
other. During early 1952 Britain also proposed a series of technical 
arrangements linking British and E.D.C. torces, but by then the French were 
thinking more in terms of a formal Anglo-E. D. C. Treaty comprising an 
automatic commitment by both parties to resist an aggression. A compromise 
was reached in February: there would be a joint N. A. T. O. -E. O. C. (not an 
Anglo-E. D. C.) Treat y, an Anglo-American guarantee of the E. D. C. ' s 
'integrity (which covered any internal threat from Germany> and a separate 
British undertaking emphasising its special links with Europe. ,. Therefore 
by the time that the E. D. C. Treaty was finally signed in Paris two months 
later Eden doubtless telt that Britain had gone a long way towards ensuring 
its ultimate success. He may also have felt some relief, for there was 
always a danger of the Truman Administration bullying or cajoling Britain 
into joining the E. D. C. if this appeared to be the only way of making 
German rearmament palatable not just to France but to the smaller N.A.T.O. 
allies 6S well. Though sympathetic to Eden's pOSition, the Americans were 
'always liable to press him hard on EOC'. 1. 
For these reasons, then, Eden's exasperation with the French when they 
linked ratification with more help for Indo-China is understandable. And, 
as mentioned elsewhere, until all E. D. C. signitories ratified the Treaty, 
German rearmament could not become operative. 'All was signed, but not 
delivered', Eden later wrote. The French, 'their confidence sapped by the 
steady drain of the Indo-China war were tempted to postpone a final 
-77-
decision'.20 This was all the more frustrating because until the spring of 
1954 the success of the E.D.C. was considered by Eden to be more important 
than what was happening in the Indo-Chinese arena. Indeed one of the 
consistent features of this period is the extent to which the Churchill 
Administration's Indo-China policy was subservient to, restricted by, and 
constructed with deference to, the requirements of E.D.C. policy. This set 
of priorities is certainly defensible, but it will later be argued that it 
was also symptomatic of Britain's economic, political and military 
weakness, the reality of which became more apparent the harder that British 
diplomacy attempted to disguise it by creating a multi-tiered system of 
policy objectives. 
But to return to matters as they stood in May 1952, it is clear that 
Eden had difficulty in accepting that events in Viet-Nam could or should 
have a bearing on the attitude of France to an ostensibly unconnected 
problem which was proving hard enough to resolve without additional 
complications. 21 From the French perspective, their aggressive diplomacy 
reflected a realisation that their two closest allies wished to see a non-
Communist Indo-China and a German contribution to European defence. In each 
sphere Paris played the pivotal role, a situation it was not slow to 
exploit. Indeed a further constancy in the period 1952-1954 was the French 
reaction to allied pressure to ratify the E.D.C., namely vague mutterings 
about having to abandon Indo-China. Likewise pressure to increase their 
effort in Viet-Nom to bring the war to a successful conclusion was often 
met with veiled threats to destroy the E.D.C. The cumulative effect was a 
drift towards crisis in both South-East Asia and Western Europe in the 
spring and summer of 1954. 
Leaving Paris, Eden reflected that if the French 'really wanted 
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American aid, they were going about it in the worst possible way'.22 But 
he had to think again three weeks later when, at the conclusion of 
Letourneau's visit to Washington, the Truman Administration announced that 
within the limitations set by Congress its help to the French would after 
all be expanded and that 'this increased assistance over and above present 
U.S. aid for Indo-China, which now approximates one-third of the total cost 
of Indo-China operations, would be especially devoted to assisting the 
French in the building of the National Armies of the Associate States,.aa 
Eden adJllitted that he had been 'wrong in doubting the French method'.-
This announcement, coming fast upon French linkage of E. D. C. ratification 
with aid for Indo-China, suggests that Washington's attitude towards the 
war was at this stage conditioned almost as much by its enthusiasm for 
German rearmament and European unity as it was by anti-Communist 
determinants in South-East Asia. If so, this would bear out the recent 
contention of an American scholar that the Truman Administration's initial 
decision in May 1950 to extend aid to France for Indo-China was made for 
much the same dual Euro-Asian motives. a • Interestingly, a Foreign Office 
memorandum of April 1954 reached a similar conclusion. 2. But whatever the 
reason, the fact remained that in June 1952 the French obtained the 
susbstantial increase in American assistance they craved. As Acheson 
revealed, this ammounted to an additional $150 million during the coming 
fiscal year and was, Eden calculated, 'generous by any standards'. 27 
As we have already seen, the rest of the summer of 1952 was dominated 
by fruitless efforts to reconcile Anglo-American differences concerning 
action to deter or resist Chinese aggreSSion in South-East Asia and to 
establish a regional defence mechanism. Unease in London that this might 
be the wrong angle from which to approach the more specific problem of 
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Indo-China was kept within bounds by, firstly, the various extra-Indo 
Chinese factors which made collective security and American participation 
worthwhile objectives even when the threat of Chinese aggression was 
receding, and secondly, by the cessation of major mil1 tary operations by 
both sides in Viet-Nam for the duration of the rainy season. However, from 
the autumn of 1952 onwards the emphasis in London came to be placed more 
and more on what could be done to ensure success for France in its struggle 
with Ho Chi Minh and, in this connection, how best to steel the French 
Government to resist the growing 
opinion to bring the war to an 
clamour of public and 
end, possibly through 
parliamentary 
a negotiated 
settlement on disadvantageous terms. The Chinese dimension ceased to be a 
major consideration in British analyses. But before it was finally 
superceded there was a period in September and October 1952 when the issues 
of defence planning against Chinese expansionism and, in Viet-Nam, the 
Franco-Viet Minh conflict, overlapped. An examination of this convergence 
provides a number of pointers to the way in which British policy was to 
develop during 1953, not least the form in which the E.D.C.-factor would 
again intrude on Foreign Office calculations. 
With the collapse of British hopes that the next round of tripartite 
military talks on South-East Asia (now scheduled for Washington in mid-
October) would be conducted with • political guidance', officials conceded 
that there was faint hope of an Anglo-American agreement on retaliative 
action against China. 28 This gloomy prognosis was confirmed when, in mid-
September, the Service Chiefs' Joint Planning Staff produced a number of 
briefs for the Washington meeting. One such, on action in the event of 
Chinese aggression anywhere in Asia, flatly rejected the American thesis on 
retaliation, arguing that there was 'no form of general action which is 
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both militarily acceptable and fully effective', be it atomic bombing of 
China, naval blockade of the Chinese coast, conventional bombing of ports, 
administraU ve centres, communications and military targets inside China, 
or the seizure of China's offshore islands. In the case of Viet-Nam, none 
of these options could prevent the immediate loss of Tonking. Therefore, 
'the widespread action favoured by the Americans might involve an effort 
and risk out of all proportion to the results obtained'. The brief 
concluded by reiterating the Military's established view that 'retaliation 
should be confined to the areas adjecent to the bettIe-front though not 
necessarily on our side of the Chinese frontier'. Conceding that this was 
'unlikely to satisfy the Americans who may well wish to take some intensive 
form of retaliation', the Mili tery Planners nevertheless maintained their 
position for, importantly, 'it involved little risk of starting global 
war'. Since neither British nor American plans could actuelly save Tonking, 
the peper concluded thet it made sense to pursue that course least likely 
to produce a dangerous escalation of the problem. The Chiefs of Staff 
formally approved this approach on 19 September and, in 60 doing, confirmed 
that there was still no basis for agreement with the Americans. a • 
Beceuse of this negative assessment a second briefing paper went on to 
exemine what could be done to deter Chinese eggression in the first place, 
thereby obViating the need for Western retaliation altogether. Of the 
ideas put forward the one considered most effective wes an increased effort 
in Viet-Na~ the keystone of South-East Asian defence, in order to destroy 
the communist rebels ... 
Clearly one of the most effective means of checking Chinese 
Expansion to the South would be the infliction of a decisive 
defeat on the Viet Minh forces ... This could be achieved 
only by French forces as the employment of those of other Allied 
nations would create a new Situation in Indo-China and involve 
a risk of violent Chinese reaction. 
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To this end, the Joint Planning Staff estimated that the French would need 
to transfer some three-to-four divisions with supporting aircraft from 
Europe to Viet-Nam. They warned, however, that there were a number of 
obstacles: the 'United States appreciation that global war is more imminent 
than we consider to be the case' meant that Washington would probably baulk 
at the idea of weakening Europe to 'win' the Cold War in South-East Asia. 
There was also the 'bad effect of such a redeployment upon other N.A.T.O. 
countries unless the divisions were to be replaced'. But if so, from where 
and by whom? It would, moreover, be 'unfortunate' if Britain were to 
suggest greater French sacrifices at a time when for economic reasons it 
might be obUged to reduce its own overseas commitments. Finally and 
portentously, there was the French 'fear of German predominance in the 
European Defence Community if they weaken their own contribution'. But in 
spite of these difficulties, the Planners recommended (and the Chiefs of 
Staff concurred) that the proposal, together with French views on it, 
should be explored at the Washington conference. ao Thus an increased 
effort by France in Viet-Nam had become a means of disguising allied -
mainly Anglo-American - differences on defence policy for South-East Asia 
as a whole. 
The Military's basic contention that 'French reinforcement from Europe 
for Indo-China should certainly be considered at the Washington talks' 31 
cannot have come as a complete surprise to the Foreign Office. It was 
after all only a slight modification of the view expressed by the Chiefs of 
Staff in January 1952 that it might be in 'the long term interests of 
N. A. T. O. [for the] Western Powers to strengthen South East Asia at the 
expense of the immediate N.A.T.O. build up'. As long as the 'cold' war in 
South-East Asia sapped French (and British) resources they would be unable 
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to contribute fully to the security of Western Europe, a 'hot' war 
priority.ao2 When this idea resurfaced in September the only difference was 
that it was French rather than Western forces in general that were to be 
redeployed on account of the risk of provoking a Chinese riposte. The 
object was, of course, to deter precisely that. A further reason why the 
Service Chiefs prescription cannot have caught the Foreign Office entirely 
off guard was that officials had themselves been weighing up the merits of 
a more vigorous French military strategy for Viet-Nam. But diplomatic and 
political interest had been triggered for reasons other than the damaging, 
indirect, repercussions of the war on N. A. T. O. strategy, although these 
were fully acknowledged. Instead, the catalyst was a series of reports 
from British representatives in South-East Asia lambasting the negativity 
of French military thinking and positing a number of long-term and 
unwelcome consequences if this situation persisted. As a result the 
Foreign Office concluded that there were undeniable attractions in a policy 
of French reinforcement for different though complementary reasons to those 
which inspired the Chiefs of Staff. 
Leading the attack on French strategy was Hubert Graves in Saigon who, 
from the middle of June, began to express deep misgivings about the 
defensive, holding-on, approach to the war favoured by the authorities in 
Paris. He was also disturbed by the view radiating from French Ministers 
since the start of the year that a military solution was no longer 
possible. 33 The French instead seemed content to hold a Une pending a 
negotiated settlement, preferably with or through Peking rather than the 
Viet-Minh. This suggested that the defeatism released by de Lattre's death 
ran far deeper than the British had originally thought and was, as of mid-
summer 1952, only in temporary abeyance. Graves was especially alarmed by 
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contemporaneous French plans to begin withdrawing their troops from Viet-
Nam to Europe pari passu with the build-up of the Viet-Namese Army to whom 
defence responsibility would be transfered. According to the French 
themselves this process was to be completed by late 1954. 3 • Although this 
now appears as a hopelessly unrealistic time-table, the British took the 
French at their word. Moreover, the prospect of the Viet-Namese assuming a 
greater share of the war-effort provided opinion in France with hope that 
there was an end in sight to French involvement if not to the war itself. 
What troubled Graves, however, was that Paris, in its anXiety to be rid of 
its debilitating South-East Asian commitment, might hand-over and pull-out 
too soon. It was hard to enVisage a point when the embryonic native armed 
forces would be able to cope with the Viet-Minh on their own. Unless, that 
was, the French crushed the rebels before they left thereby bestOWing upon 
the Viet-Namese a defence problem of manageable proportions. 3. But as the 
British Military Attache in Saigon observed, the French would doubtless 
object to this course on the grounds that it 'calls in the first place for 
an increased French effort instead of a steadily decreasing one'. - In 
other words, a complete reversal of current French policy. Graves, though, 
was undeterred. By September his thinking had gravitated to bluntness. 
'Our efforts must be directed towards persuading the French to smash Ho chi 
Minh before they quit'. To do this, 'aggressive action must be started in 
1953'. Graves hoped that the impending military conference in Washington 
'will gi ve some serious thought to this problem'. 37 By this time, too, 
Malcolm MacDonald, the British Commissioner-General for South-East Asia, 
was in open agreement with Graves.--
In the Foreign Office there was much symapthy with this diagnosis and 
prescription. 3_ Even Eden had implicitly stated his support for a 
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decisive military solution when telling Acheson in June that the French 
should be dissuaded from their view that a 'general' Far Eastern settlement 
was their best hope of salvation. Pers1stence 1n this would cause them to 
'lose the psychological approach required to achieve victory'. co According 
to the U.S. record, he spoke of 'divorcing' the French from their 
'defeatist attitude'.Cl However, while the action advocated by Graves had 
much to commend it, there was in the end a tacit acceptance in the Foreign 
Office that the obstacles preventing it (denuding N. A. T. 0., complicating 
still further the E. D. C. equation, a basic shortage of French manpower, 
above all a concern that pressing France to step-up its effort might be met 
with demands that Britain itself make a greater contribution in Indo-China 
in money and material) meant that a demarche to Paris was initially ruled 
out .• 2 When, however, the Chiefs of Staff reached the same conclusion as 
Graves from a different starting-paint in September, the Foreign Office was 
forced to re-examine the issue in the light of the near-certainty of 
another abortive military conference on South-East Asian defence. 
The emergent consensus was that the consequences of this were so 
serious that some measure of agreement, particularly at the Anglo-American 
level, had to be achieved. Continued stalemate might even discourage what 
little interest the Truman Administration had so far displayed in regional 
defence co-ordination which, as the Head of the South-East Asia Department 
warned on 19 September, would leave 'hanging over all our heads the danger 
that the Americans may, by unilateral action, drag the western world into a 
full-scale war with China - or worse'.·3 Therefore to avoid the appearance 
if not the reality of total disunity it was considered prudent to attempt 
to effect Anglo-Amer1can agreement on the need for 'an all-out effort by 
the French in Indo-China' wh1ch, if the Viet-Minh were defeated, would be a 
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strong deterrent to Chinese intervent ion and would render Anglo-American 
disunity over retaliation academic. Eden's suppox-t was duly sought for 
consideration at the Washington talks of the 'possibility of transferring 
three to four French divisions from Europe'....... The focus was thus firmly 
on French reinforcement, be it to achieve a decisive and satisfactory end 
to the six-year war and so dam the flood of N.A.T.O. resources to South-
East Asia, to deter Chinese aggression, or maintain American interest in 
regional security in its widest sense. 
In the Foreign Office there was support for this solution up to and 
including Assistant Under-Secretary level. 4& But, crucially, not from the 
Foreign Secretary. Eden was unreservedly hostile to the idea. 'Surely not' 
was his initial, disbelieving, reaction, which he later developed: 'I 
cannot conceive that the transfer of four French divisions to Indo China in 
present circumstances is discussable' .... & The Foreign Secretary had strong 
support from Deputy Under-Secretary Makins who thought the idea 'the 
greatest political nonsense and is really not worth discussing even at the 
military level in present circumstances' .... 7 Churchill's opposition was 
also to be anticipated if the dismissive manner in which he greeted the 
idea when first aired by the Military in January was any guide .... • At the 
start of October, Eden clashed with Lord Alexander, the Minister of 
Defence, on the issue. Eden hoped that Alexander would intercede with the 
Chiefs of Staff to ensure that French reinforcement was omitted from the 
Washington agenda, but Alexander was firmly of the opinion that 'as an 
increased French effort in Indo-China is, in present circumstances, the 
only solution to the problem there. the matter should be discussed at the 
talks' . In deference to the Foreign Secretary's protestations, Alexander 
did agree to instruct the Brit ish representative, Elliot. 'not to raise 
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this issue direct but rather to obtain from the French Delegation their 
assessment of the forces required to re-establish their position in Indo-
China ... '49 
Interestingly yet paradoxically, Eden had quickly gone from supporting 
one formula, pol! tical guidance, as a means of helping the military talks 
succeed, to rejecting another, French reinforcement, which many of his 
officials hoped would prevent that same conference ending in failure. 
Eden's attitude seems to have been based primarily on the complicating 
effect which the transfer of French troops from Europe to South-East Asia 
would have on the E.D.C. problem. Pleven had made it clear in Paris in May 
that the drain on the French Army resulting from Indo-China as it then 
stood was causing public and parliamentary unhappiness at the prospect of 
German domination of the E. D. C., and Eden was doubtless reluctant to lend 
impetus to this negative drift by sanctioning a cOUrse of action which 
would further accentuate Franco-German disequilibrium. But if Eden had 
reason to hope that the reinforcement issue would burn itself out he was to 
be disappointed. Having given their considered opinion as to what was 
needed to win the war in Indo-China, the British Chiefs of Staff proceeded 
to delegate to the Foreign Office the responsibility for overcoming the 
political difficulties inherent in persuading the French to take the 
necessary but unpalatable action. 
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PART III: THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE 
DIMENSION 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE FRENCH REINFORCEMENT DEBATE 
October to December 1952 
The last three months of 1952 were crucial in terms of the evolution of 
British policy towards the Indo-China war. For it was only then that 
policy-makers faced-up to the fact that the leading Western powers, in 
devoting so much time to planning against Chinese intervention, had been 
focusing their attention in the wrong direction. Thereafter it was the 
Viet-Minh that was recognised as posing the immediate and hence the real 
threat to the French position. British thinking about the war duly entered 
a period of re-orientation. The result was that from the beginning of 1953 
until the Indo-China problem came to a head in the spring of 1954, the 
Chinese dimension was considered a secondary factor. This is not to say 
that regional defence planning ceased - it did not - only that British 
policy-makers invested it with a new and additional utility. As a senior 
member of the Foreign Office observed, the inclusion of Indo-China under 
the umbrella of a collective security system for South-East Asia 'might not 
help the French directly in their fight against the Viet Minh unaided by 
China', but it would give them 'a strong moral stimulus by proving that the 
free world as a whole is behind them in the struggle to keep Indo-China out 
of the orbit of Peking'. 1 Thus defence co-ordination came to be seen in 
London 8S a device to bolster French morale in the continuing battle 
against Ho Chi Minh's rebel forces. 
The autumn of 1952 was a watershed in British thinking for another 
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reason. It was only then that the true depth and complexity of the 
relationship between the Indo-China war and German rearmament was fully 
recognised. The Foreign Office was forced to concede that as long as the 
war consumed the bulk and the best of the French army in Europe, the Pinay 
Administration, concerned to avoid a negative vote in the National 
Assembly, would continue to postpone a debate on E. D. C. ratification. As 
Deputy-Under Secretary Pierson Dixon remarked in November 1952, 'Indo-China 
is the clue to a solution of the difficult French attitude in Europe'.:2 
If, because of the war, France rejected and so destroyed the E. D. C., the 
impUcations for the future of the Western Alliance appeared grave. In 
December, Eden told the Cabinet that in such circumstances it would be 
'difficult to avoid the admission of a national German army [to N.A.T.O.] 
This alternative, though it might well be preferable militarily, would 
not be politically agreeable to the French'.3 Ambassador Harvey in Paris 
went further, warning that 'France's endemic anti-Americanism might combine 
with the permanent fear of Germany to create an irresistable force not only 
among the deputies but also in the country at large, and the influential 
old gentleman whose neutral tendencies lie this way might then lead a 
movement out of the American camp'.· The 'influential old gentleman' was, 
of course, General de Gaulle. 
More worrying still from a British perspective, with the demise of the 
E.D.C. American governmental and public opinion might - in 51essor's 
graphic phrase - 'say a plague on all your houses and leave us and Europe 
to stew in our own juice, militarily and economically'.· It was this 
concern more than any other factor which ensured fulsome Sri Ush support 
for the E. D. C. despite private doubts and misgivings about the project. 
For this reason, too, Dixon was prepared to advocate a 'political' solution 
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in Viet-Nam. This would 'from every pOint of view be preferable to the 
wreck of the EDC with its incalculable effects on the whole W[ estern] 
defence effort'. & However, though Dixon's concern about the fate of the 
E.D.C. was widely shared, the idea of a negotiated settlement of the Indo-
China war was not. On the contrary, the autumn of 1952 is notable for the 
emergence of a powerful consensus within the British poli Uco-mil! tary 
establishment in favour of urging France on to final and complete victory. 
This contention is at variance with Eden's later account of events in which 
he maintained that a more vigorous French military policy was necessary in 
order to commence negotiations with the Communists from a position of 
strength. "7 In fact apart from Dixon's trial balloon, the word 
'negotiation' is conspicuous by its absence from discussion in the Foreign 
Office. The problem, however, was that a decisive military solution was 
far from the minds of French Ministers who instead looked forward to a 
speedy termination of their country's military commitment. The British in 
contrast wholly rejected the idea of compromise inherent in this approach, 
and would continue to do so far longer than Eden's memoirs suggest. 
Two developments in particular caused British policy-makers to finally 
break free of the constraints of the Chinese dimension. Or, as one 
official put it, to stop pursuing 'this will-o'the-wisp whils shutting our 
eyes to the present real1 ty of the mounting danger of the war against the 
Viet-Minh' . IIit The first was the predicted failure of the WaShington 
military conference on South-East Asian defence (6-17 October). Equally 
predictably, it foundered on the rocks of unresolved Anglo-American 
differences on retaliatory policy against China and the absence of 
political guidance. This, in turn, was a reflection of continuing American 
determination to 'retain freedom of military action in the Far East'.' The 
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principal British representative at the talks reflected: 'The Americans 
seemed to have decided, before the discussions took place, that there would 
be no basic change in the attitude which they had adopted at the conference 
held in February ... (that] they must be left free to pursue their own 
mil1 tary policies in the Far East without any international 
intervention' . 10 It was, as seen, fears about where American unilateral ism 
might lead as much as Chinese expansionism which accounted for British 
enthusiasm for collective defence in South-East Asia. This, together with 
the application of power-by-pr'oxy, would ensure that defence co-ordination 
remained an important long-term British objective. For the moment, though, 
in terms of Indo-China the collapse of the Washington talks served to focus 
attention on the real threat from the Viet-Minh. 
The second catalyst in this respect was the onset of the Viet-Minh's 
autumn offensive in the Thai country of northern Tonking from 15 October. 
A number of French outposts were taken and, on 11 November, Graves informed 
the Foreign Office that it was becoming • increasingly clear that the Viet 
Minh operations in the Thai country represent a major effort'. 11 At the 
same time, the French Government sought to play down the signi ficance of 
the of f ensi ve, arguing that Viet-Minh advances were strategically 
unimportant, a view which found some support in London. 1:Z Then, towards 
the middle of December, the Viet-Minh began to systemat ically relinquish 
most of its gains and withdraw to its pre-October positions.1 3 Its 
objective had been achieved, namely 'to raise the morale of [its] 
supporters by a startling Victory and correspondingly to lower French 
prestige and spirits'. ,.. Military developments certainly had a 
significance far beyond simple calculations of profit-and-Ioss on the 
battlefield. Viet-Minh strategy appears to have been devised with at 
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least one eye on the impact it would have on public opinion in France. 
Even with Chinese material and technical assistance, Ho Chi Minh's forces 
were probably incapable of the outright defeat of the French at this time, 
hence the addition of a political dimension to their strategy. Whereas to 
the trained observer the Viet-Minh's offensive might have had little effect 
on the over-all strategic balance in Viet-Nam, to the French public recent 
events looked extremely ominous in newspaper sketch maps and. in 
consequence. accentuated the mood of disillusion across the country. In 
the National Assembly Pinay's coalition found itself under pressure from 
many quarters to bring the war to an end by negotiation. If, therefore, 
Viet-Minh operations were calculated to sow political discord in France, it 
was a ploy which, by December 1952, had achieved some success. The Paris 
correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, for example, thought the position was 
'grave' and that there was 'little doubt now that the Viet-Minh, by 
maintaining their offensive, will precipitate a complete French 
withdrawal'. 18 This underscored a report from Harvey a month earlier that 
'Deputies of all Parties including the Gaullists [hitherto die-hards on 
Indo-China] are talking freely, though not yet publicly, of the need for an 
early French withdrawal'. 1. The spectre of a d~b~cle in Viet-Nam caused by 
a collapse of morale on the metropolitan front loomed once more. 
These disturbing developments served to place the Chinese dimenSion in 
perspective as the lesser of several threats to the French position in 
Viet-Nam, a realisation which demanded a fresh Sri tish approach. Leading 
the way in the Foreign Office was R.H.Scott, a highly respected Orientalist 
and supervising Under-Secretary for South-East Asian affairs. 17 On 25 
October he suggested: 'instead of postulating a Chinese attack, consider 
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only how the present situation in Indo China is to be resolved assuming 
that there is no open Chinese aggression', He went on: 
The loss of Tongking would be a major disaster in the cold war, 
opening the way to communist control of the rice lands of South 
East Asia (and so giving them a powerful lever against Japan and 
India)j it would have repercussions in North Africa and probably 
reduce France to the status of a third class powerj it would 
frighten Australia away from helping in the Middle East and draw 
her even more closely into the American orbitj and it would 
result in a reduction or perhaps loss of over half the net dollar 
earnings of the whole sterling area [by endangering Malaya's 
security, .. ]18 
These were all sound reasons for wishing to see the French emerge 
victorious, a theme Scott returned to regUlarly in the following weeks 
while emphasising that the 'immediate and pressing problem is ... how to 
cope with the present situation in Indo-China' and that 'there seemed no 
pressing hurry to plan for action in the event of a hypothetical Chinese 
attack'. 1. By December the turn-around in Foreign Office thinking which 
had been building-up since the start of the year was complete, Eden telling 
the Cabinet that Chinese intervention in Viet-Nam could not be discounted 
but was 'on the whole unlikely',ZO On 9 December, the Cabinet's Far East 
Committee were told that the 'main concern' of the Foreign Office was now 
the 'situation in Indo-China' and, two days later, an official was able to 
declare that there was 'general agreement that something drastic must be 
done to save Indo-China', not from the designs of Peking but from the 
altogether more pervasive threat of Viet-Minh military strength and 
political popularity in Viet-Nam. z1 Eden and his staff were not to suffer 
from a shortage of advice on what exactly this 'something drastic' should 
be. Invariably it was French reinforcement from Europe, 
To British diplomatic and military representatives on the spot in 
South-East Asia the matter was straightforward. The war had to be won and 
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the French had to provide whatever extra troops were necessary to achieve 
this end. Reinforcement and victory appeared all the more urgent because 
of French plans to withdraw their Expeditionary Force pari passu with the 
expansion and training of the Viet-Namese army. The target-date for the 
dissolution of the French High Command was the end of 1954.22 But because 
of the slow progress in developing the indigenous armed forces - the 
process had only begun in July 1951 23 - British observers regarded this 
time-table as naj've and reckless. Yet the French appeared determined to 
follow it through. On 1 October. Letourneau announced plans to withdraw 
two battalions by the end of the year: these would not be replaced. 24 Nor 
did subsequent events in the Thai country appear to affect calculations. a 
leading French Minister telling Bao Oai in November that France's military 
commitment would not continue on its present scale after 1953.28 
For Graves in Saigon, the Viet-Minh's autWlUl offensive provided an 
opportunity to renew his call for a more forward French policy aimed at 
defeating the Viet-Minh before evacuation commenced. To do otherwise would 
be tantamount to acquiescing in the communisation of all of Indo-China. 
The French would leave behind in the shape of the Viet-Namese army a 
'facade of military strength but not much substance behind it'. Paris's 
approach was based on the 'fundamental fallacy' that 'no military solution 
in Indochina is possible'. Writing to Scott on 14 November, Graves 
declared that 'unless something is done between now and 1955, the drift 
towards eventual Communist control of the country appears likely'. The 
'something' he had in mind was the 'crushing of Vietminh before the French 
withdraw and I think we ought to ponder over how to bring this about'. 2. A 
little later he argued that 1953 would be 'the vital year, and that, if we 
are to crush the Viet-Minh, we must make the major effort then'. 27 The key 
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to this effort was twofold: reinforcement, and convincing a French 
Government intent on reducing its involvement that this was necessary. In 
Graves's opinion recent French military reverses were not entirely the 
fault of the High Command in Indo-China: 
Inhibited in their military freedom of action by political 
caveats from Paris, directed to plan for the withdrawal of 
French forces when their crying present need is reinforcements, 
they have been reduced to wait1ng to be hit. When they are hit, 
French opinion at home takes another plunge into despondency 
and pessimism and so the vicious circle continues. 2. 
Negative military tactics which prevented morale-boosting successes against 
the enemy, the Economist noted on 29 November, added to the 'constant 
danger that public opinion in France may one day refuse to bear this grim 
and costly burden any longer'.~ 
Towards the end of 1952 Graves, a lone voice for much of the year, 
found his views given the widest possible endorsement when the Sri Ush 
Commanders-in-Chief in the Far East, together with Ambassadors, Heads of 
Missions and Colonial officials in Asia, met for their annual conference on 
regional issues at Sukit Serene in Singapore. Their collective conclusion 
was embodied in a telegram from MacDonald to London on 8 December. With 
the French intending to complete their military withdrawal from Viet-Nam 
within 12 months the Viet-Namese would soon be left to 'deal with the Viet 
Minh forces by themselves'. There was 'little reason to suppose that they 
will be able to do this effectively, unless in the meantime the Viet Minh 
have received such a military defeat as will permanently weaken the1r 
forces'. It was therefore 
evident that both in the short and the long term the 
urgent need is for reinforcements. In present circumstances 
these can only be French. We are only too fully conscious of 
the great difficulties and more particularly those arising 
from French preoccupations in Europe. Out here we are concern 
-ed with the security of South East Asia and of the British 
territories within this regime [sic] and, therefore, with the 
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vital necessity that Indo-China should be held against the 
Communists. From that point of view, we feel bound to rep-
resent that it is of the highest importance that the French 
should reinforce their forces in Indo-China and that every 
thing possible to remove the obstacles to this should be done. ao 
This course of action was also being pressed for by the British Chiefs of 
Staff whose reasoning, as previously noted, had as much to do with N.A.T.O. 
strategy in Europe as it did with South-East Asia. As Slim's successor as 
C.I.G.S., General Sir John Harding, observed on 18 November, 'there was a 
real danger that unless there was some foreseeable end to this damaging 
French commdtment in Indo-China, French co-operation with her Western 
Allies and French participation in the defence of Western Europe would be 
seriously undermined'. The solution was for France to step-up its 
involvement in the short-term 1n order to be able to safely wind it down in 
the long-run. '[Wlhat we wished to see in Indo-China', Harding explained 
... was that, as a result of a major military operation by the 
French and Vietnamese forces, a sound military position would 
be established which could, in the main, be held by the Viet 
-namese forces themselves, thus allowing the French to withdraw 
the bulk of their forces without the Communists being in a 
position to take over control again. 31 
The attitude of the British Military was codified at the start of December 
in a series of memoranda which combined to form a brief for the Minister of 
Defence for a meeting of the N.A.T.O. Council in Paris. If the French were 
compelled to withdraw from Viet-Nam (either through military pressure from 
the Viet-Minh or political pressure from Paris - the Chinese dimenSion was 
largely ignored) 'we consider that the whole country will fall eventually 
under Communist domination'. This in turn would mean 'Siam and Burma 
eventually falling under Communist domination and a grave deterioration of 
our position in Malaya'. Thereafter ... 
[allong with a great reduction of confidence in the West and 
the denial of rice imports from Burma and Sia~ we could expect 
that the bandit campaign [in Malaya] would be so intensified 
- 98-
that it would become beyond the capacity of our existing forces 
to contain. To deal with it, drastic measures would be required 
including the reinforcement of the garrison and the occupation 
of the Songkhla position in order to seal off Malaya from Commr 
unist penetration. 
The Songkhla position was on the narrow Kra Isthmus which linked Malaya to 
the mainland of Asia and was, importantly, inside Siamese territory. Its 
seizure was contemplated with or without the consent of the Bangkok 
Governemnt. If the latter, it would be technically an invasion of a 
sovereign net ural state and the disapproval of the United Nations and 
possibly the United States was to be anticipated. Nevertheless plans 
(drawn up as early as 1950) continued to be developed and refined. =-
Alexander'S brief, in addition to commenting on 'political difficulties' 
inherent in the Songkhla strategy, also conceded that 'some degree of U.K. 
mobilisation would be necessary'. 33 In actual fact the implications of 
Malayan reinforcement went far deeper. With no strategic reserve it could 
only take place by weakening Britain's defence commitments in Europe or the 
Middle East which, though in-depth analyses of Soviet objectives concluded 
that a 'general' war was not imminent, would still be a calculated 
gamble. 3 • Nor could the financial cost of the enterprise be ignored when 
the Treasury was demanding savings in defence expenditure and the Military 
establishment was complaining that current appropriations were barely 
sufficient.- In December, Anthony Head, Secretary of State for War, 
cautioned that 'serious economic difficulties' must flow from 'an increase 
in trouble in Malaya, a situation which would inevitably follow a reverse 
1n Indo-Ch1na'.a. 
Given the potentially disastrous consequences of French abandonment of 
the struggle in Indo-China, the Chiefs of Staff, in briefing Alexander, 
logically turned to preventative action. The French, they pOinted out, 
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were 'barely holding their own in Indo-China and the drain on French 
manpower and resources is critical'. The solution, as ever, was 
reinforcement 
The only completely effective methid [sic] of restoring the 
situation ... would be for the French to destroy the Viet 
Minh forces (i.e. prevent their escape into China) and then 
to build-up Viet Nam confidence by increased political stablilty. 
Any other course might have initial success, but results would 
be short-lived. Given additional forces, however, estimated 
at three divisions, the French should be able to re-establish 
their frontier posts and stop the passage of arms, eqUipment 
and reinforcement from China. 
The reinforcements had to be French - the 'Viet Naro forces are not good 
enough' and 'the employment of troops from other nations would probably 
result in immediate Chinese intervention'. The brief concluded: 'Despite 
the difficulties in removing French divisions from Europe, we consider that 
this is the only means by which the Viet Minh could be defeated'. 37 
Support for the reinforcement thesis was provided by other influential 
figures at this time. Head, for example, maintained that I [a] lmost 
everyone who has studied the matter closely is in agreement that Indo-China 
is probably the most important single place in the cold war' and that 'if 
things went wrong there it might well substantially increase our 
commitments either by being forced to reinforce the French or, should they 
pull out, by our being forced to increase the strengh of the troops in 
Malaya' . ae General Sir Gerald Templer, High Commissioner in Malaya, was 
convinced that 'provided the French did not crack in Indo-China', South-
East Asia could be 'saved from Communism'. On the other hand, if Indo-
China were lost 'Siam would collapse at once, and Burma probably not long 
after' . Templer 'could not possibly defend Malaya if Siam went ... '-
Even the Paris Embassy, previously unenthusiastic about reinforcement on 
the groundS that the French authorities would never agree to it, had by 
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January 1953 come out strongly in favour. Citing the Bukit Serene 
conference conclusion that 'in the short and the long term the urgent need 
is for reinforcements', Hayter, the First Minister, declared: '50 far as we 
can judge from here this is an absolutely correct estimate·.-o 
The Foreign Office reacted with sympathy to this increasing volume of 
support for a more forward French policy in Viet-Nam.- 1 But in addition to 
the advantages of victory-through-reinforcement already cited, officials 
were impressed by a further, Eurocentric, benefit - the removal of one of 
the biggest stumbling-blocks to French ratification of the E. D. C. Treaty. 
As Harvey had made clear to Eden in November 1951, it was concern about a 
revival of German militarism more than the • new' threat from the Soviet 
Union which preoccupied the French. The 'position beyond France's eastern 
factor in her foreign policy' and frontier is the deciding 
'[tlraditionally the eastern frontier means Germany·.-2 A year on, there 
were few in the Foreign Office who doubted that French ratification of the 
E.D.C. was dependent on an end to the war in Indo-China. Until a solution 
was found, minuted one official, the French • will not willingly agree to 
German rearmament, even if they do then'. Another called Indo-China a 
'running sore that is spreading over to Europe·.~ A future French Prime 
Minister, Pierre Mendes-France, put it more starkly in November:' until 
the French people see the light at the end of the Indo-Chinese tunnel the 
[Nationall Assembly will never ratify the Treaty for the European Defence 
Co~unity·. Officials were forced to accept that disagreeable as this view 
was, it was 'shared by a large number of responsible Frenchmen·.·· 
Thus it seemed that only the return of French forces from Indo-China 
and the creation of, at worst, a Franco-German balance and, preferably, 
superiority of French forces in Europe, could assuage doubts and misgivings 
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about the Bonn Government's future intentions and so ease the passage of 
the E. D. C. through Parliament. As Harvey put it in a despatch to Eden on 
19 November 1952 
Politically Indo-China i6 now in the heart of Europe. None of 
the major problems which beset Europe can be solved in isolation 
from what happens in South-East Asia. French doubts about the 
ratification of the Treaty of the European Defence Community 
stem largely ... from their fear that the drain of Indo-China 
will prevent them from providing forces equivalent in strength 
to the German forces, and as long as these doubts persist the 
problems of Europe will never be settled.·· 
There was thus no doubting the extent of support in London for a military 
solution to the Indo-China proble~ nor the widespread recognition of the 
considerable benefits (in Europe as much as South-East Asia) which would 
accrue from French victory. However, the difficulty was in convincing a 
reluctant French Government, a task which fell squarely to Eden and his 
staff. On 28 November, Scott was asked by the Chiefs of Staff to remind 
the Foreign Secretary that 'the defence of Indo-China is one of the key 
points of our cold war strategy' and to 'express most strongly the 
disastrous consequences which would follow from Indo-China falling into the 
hands of the Communists'. As for reinforcement ... 
In view of the delicate political, econoBic and military situ 
-at ion in Western Europe, the Chiefs of Staff appreciate that the 
suggestion that the French should themselves find three additional 
divisions ... is one which will require the most careful handling. 
We do, however, feel that the issue must not be shirked and that 
1t is a political matter with which you 1n the Foreign Office must 
deal. -
'I do not think that the Chiefs of Staff over-rate the importance of 
helping the French in Indo-China', minuted Dixon on 1 December. Eden 
replied, rather despairingly, three days later: 'Yes. But even the Chiefs 
of Staff firmly "pass the buck" to us. What do we do?'47 Eden, recently 
returned from a month immersed in Korean discussions at the United Nations, 
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thus found himself presented with a forceful body of opinion, including a 
significant number of his own advisers, in favour of a course of action 
which he had vigorously opposed in August and September when the Military 
had first raised it in relation to the Washington conference.·· Now, as 
then, it was not the end (French Victory> but the means (the transfer of 
French forces from Europe) that worried Eden and, ultimately, compelled him 
to reject the entire reinforcement thesis. Moreover, those officials in 
the Foreign Office originally in favour of a new aggressive French approach 
concluded, on closer consideration, that it was an unrealisable aim. 
This negative decision resulted from the sheer scale of the political 
and military obstacles strewn across the path of French reinforcement. 
Obstacles, morJ~er, which the Chiefs of Staff expected the Foreign Office 
to remove. Despite the positive benefits of French victory-through-
reinforcement, British diplomacy was not equal to the task. This left only 
the deeply unsatisfactory alternative of doing nothing. As Graves warned 
on 23 December ... 
I do not think that either the forces now available, or likely 
to be available by 1955 on present planning, will be able to 
destroy the rebel movement. If we are to save Indochina from 
slow strangulation we shall have to do something in the next 
six months or so, and that something will have to include an 
exorcisation of the French fortress mentality and an infusion 
of the offensive spirit'.·' 
What, then, were the obstacles that militated so strongly against French 
reinforcment? To begin with, there was the frustration and war-weariness 
of the French people. The failure over six years to obtain a conclusive 
Victory, the strain which the war placed on the domestic economy and the 
weakening of the French army in Europe at a time when Germany stood on the 
brink of taking up arms again, all contributed to this mood. Disaffection 
was exacerbated by the seemingly endless waste of life in Viet-Nam. This 
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loss wes, in turn, compounded by two factors. Firstly, the knowledge that 
whatever happened, France's influence in Indo-China was at an end for the 
Associate States could not be denied true independence for ever, nor the 
right to secede from the French Union. Thus France stood to gain little by 
way of economic or commercial benefit from its on-going sacrifice of blood 
and treasure. 50 Secondly, successive French Governments stressed, and most 
Frenchmen evidently accepted, that the war was not being waged for reasons 
of national self-interest but on behalf of the 'free world'. 51 Such 
apparent altruism tended to harden an already substantial public consensus 
against further loss of life for a cause that, in more ways than one, wes 
no longer France's. Already, in the wake of the latest Viet-Minh 
offensive, the country was becoming restive. The reason, noted the 
Spect8tor on 21 October, was that nearly '200,000 French troops [colonial 
and Indo-Chinese as well as metropOlitan French], including a very high 
proportion of officers, N. C. O. s and specialists ... are locked up in an 
outwardly thankless and intermittently bloody struggle, whose object is to 
deny the Communists control of a huge area of South-East Asia which France 
does not love and which does not love France'.&2 In monetary terms 
(American financial help since 1950 notWithstanding> The Economist 
calculated that ' the defence of Indo-China has already cost France more 
than twice the amount received under the entire Marshall Plan'. As for the 
human cost, 'the losses have been appallingi before the start of the most 
recent campaigns, well over 30,000 French soldiers and some 1,500 officers 
had died'. This latter figure meant that the graduating classes of 
France's military academy at St.Cyr were sent directly to Indo-China 'and 
that few survive to grow into future officers and generals'. 5:1t Nor did 
this estimate take into account the large numbers of Viet-Namese casualties 
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or those of the French Union (mostly North Africans) who fought alongside 
their metropolitan French colleagues. 
A second obstacle (and, ironically, one which the British argued 
justified the need for more troops in Viet-Nam) was France's evident 
intention to withdraw its Expeditionary Corps by the end of 1954, a policy 
obviously framed with a view to appeasing a peace-hungry metropolitan 
population. Short of the chimeric 'general Far Eastern settlement', this 
was the only obvious means of disengagement without a major loss of 
prestige and serious repercussions on the French position elsewhere in the 
French Union. notably North Africa. But as British observers consistently 
pOinted out. the success of this policy rested on the capacity of the 
indigenous anti-Communist forces to cope unaided with the threat from the 
Viet-Minh. something which was open to serious question. The authorities 
in PariS, however. appeared oblivious to the need to 'seriously weaken the 
Vietminh before they left·.·.. In terms of the acceptance or otherwise of 
British views on reinforcement, French policy was conditioning - and being 
conditioned by - public opinion to anticipate at a fixed pOint in the 
future a diminishing rather than increasing involvement in Indo-China. As 
Eden accepted, 'a respectable departure would have been welcomed by every 
shade of opinion'.·· When, in September. the Foreign Office had enquired 
of the Paris Embassy what it thought of the Military's ideas on 
reinforcement, the response was that many in France would be unable 'to 
forget the numerous public statements of French leaders ... implying that 
the time is not far off when it will be possible gradually to reduce the 
strength of the French forces'.·· 
Assuming for present purposes that public, parliamentary and 
governmental opinion could be massaged into accepting the sagacity of 
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reinforcement, a whole new series of problems would still have to be 
circumvented. The most fundamental of these was a shortage of milt tary 
manpower. The French army in the 1950s, like its British counterpart, was 
severely overstretched. The bulk of its troops were stationed in Germany 
and Indo-China but significant numbers were also tied down policing other 
areas of the French Union.-7 Because the China-factor dictated that 
reinforcements had to be French, this, in practice, meant drawing on two 
,.. 
possible resJvoirs, neither of which offered much prospect of meeting 
projected needs. Firstly, French colonial forces. Here, apart from what 
was seen as their inferior quality when judged against the metropolitan 
French army, unrest in Morocco and Senegal (major recruiting grounds) 
produced the conclusion that Paris could 'probably do little in the way of 
drawing for additional troops on other parts of the French Union'. 
Secondly, the French army in Europe. The problem in this respect was that 
as recently as 12 June, Pleven had announced that there were only five full 
strength French divisions in existence on the continent, five in process of 
formation and two still to be created." Clearly. any suggestion that 
three to four of these divisions be transfered forthwith to Viet-Nam would 
receive a frosty reception. Also, while a speedy end to the Indo-China war 
was seen in London as a means of facilitating French approval of the 
E.D.C., it waS precisely French fears about the E.D.C. which seemed bound 
to form the basis of their objections to reinforcement. 
It is worth pausing to reflect that French concerns about German 
domination of the E. D. C. were grounded in something more than paranoia. 
For example, Article '3 of the E. D. C. Treaty defined the relative voting 
strengths of the member states within the proposed E.D.C. Council according 
to their national contribution to the general military pool. Therefore, as 
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a direct result of the war in Indo-China. German military predominance 
could lead to political primecy in Europe as welL·· Nor should it be 
assumed that France took its responsibi11ties as a member of N. A. T. o. 
lightly. or that it was impervious to the dangers of Soviet expansion. In 
1951-1952 France was the only N. A. T. O. power to exceed the figure for 
defence expenditure required of it by the Temporary Control Committee. 
Britain. in contrast, spent 3.4 per cent less. 80 Moreover, a part at least 
of the French Military establishment was 'concerned to ensure that further 
troops were not diverted from the defence of Western Europe'.8. Therefore, 
for these extra-E. D. C. reasons, a further diminution of French mi11 tary 
strength in Europe would be viewed with serious misgivings in Paris. In 
the end, though, the French desire to maintain their N.A.T.O. contribution 
and to ensure against German domination of the E.D.C. amounted to much the 
same thing. a point brought out by Harvey in November when observing that 
no French Government would take the • risk' of reinforcing Indo-China in 
present circumstances 'not only because of the resulting weakening of the 
defences of Western Europe but because of the increased disequilibrium 
between France and Germany that would result'.82 
There did remain one as yet untapped source of manpower which might 
conceivably be utilised - French National Servicemen. It was a matter of 
considerable irritation to the Bri Ush that France had only an eighteen 
month period of National Service and refused to send conscripts to zones of 
active operations. When Pleven had argued in May that Indo-China made it 
impossible for France to build an army in Europe, Eden responded angrily 
that this 'would carry no conviction in the United Kingdom'. When France 
'had two years' service ... and called up their reserves for training, we 
should be more impressed'.53 Eden's irritation was doubtless heightened 
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by the fact that British conscripts were fighting in Malaya. In November, 
in the midst of the debate about French reinforcement, the Western and 
Southern Department of the Foreign Office concluded that 'if an increase in 
the period of French national service is capable technically of providing 
the extra troops now wanted, it might represent the course we should press 
for'. Britain could 'justifiably press the French on this because we have 
a 2 years' service' which was 'the N. A. T. O. ideal'.·· However, similar 
probings in the past had met with strong French objections and their 
revival now seemed likely to be equally poorly received. No French 
Government was prepared to accept the domestic criticism which extending 
conscription would produce. Further, the despatch of concsripts would mean 
rescinding a law of 1950 which stated that 'in time of peace' they were not 
to be sent to any 'theatre of active military operations'. As far as the 
French were concerned, the situation in Viet-Nam was juridically a civil 
war, thus the present moment was a 'time of peace' and the law operative." 
Its amendment would be a controversial and domestically divisive move at a 
time when, as noted, many 1n France envisaged winding down operations. It 
has been suggested that public 'horror and resentment' at the level of 
French casualties in the war never became as strong a political force as 
the American reaction to loss of life in Korea because 'the French victims 
were not conscripted civilians but profeSSional or volunteer soldiers'." 
For this reason, and because of the endemic instabUity of all French 
governments following the collapse of the N.R. P. ISocialist 'Third Force' in 
1951, sending conscripts to Indo-China would have been pol1 tical suicide 
for whatever Administration took the decision. a7 
Clearly, then, the task confronting British diplomacy in making 
reinforcement acceptable in France was considerable. But these difficulties 
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were in themselves insufficient reason for not making some effort. After 
all, there were manifold advantages to be derived from a swift and 
favourable result in Viet-Nam, and equally serious disadvantages if matters 
were left to drift. Yet, in spite of this, Eden and the Foreign Office 
chose to reject the reinforcement thesis. Eden had made his own doubt s 
clear in September. Then, on 11 November, a more formal statement of 
Foreign Office thinking was given to the Cabinet's For East Committee: it 
would be 'politically undesirable to bring pressure on the French 
Government to send more troops or to increase its present effort·.·· This 
negative attitude was only partly based on the apparently intractable 
nature of the difficulties for France in adopting a policy of 
reinforcement. The determining factor was the certainty that, precisely 
because of these difficulties, Paris would demand a price - some form of 
British concession - if it were to take the offensive in Viet-Nam. It was 
the knowledge that it would have to provide something in return for its 
advice which produced in the Foreign Office a policy of inact ion when 
events in Viet-Nam seemed to demand immediate and decisive measures. What 
this 'price' was, and why it was so unacceptable to Eden and his officials, 
will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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PART III: THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE 
DIMENSION 
CHAPTER SIX 
--REFUSING TO PAY THE PRICE-· 
British diplomacy and French reinforcement 
December 1952 to February 1953 
British policy-makers anticipated that any approach to Paris on the subject 
of reinforcement for Viet-Nam would be met with French calls for a quid pro 
quo. The' price' to be paid for French acceptance of British advice waS 
expected to take three forms. First, an increase in the Churchill 
Government's financial and material contribution to the war effort. 
Second, an undertaking to station extra British troops in Western Europe to 
ensure that the transfer of French forces to Viet-Nam did not undermine the 
efficacy of N. A. T. O. As Hayter of the Paris Embassy had observed in 
September, the 'only condition on which I can imagine the French agreeing 
to [reinforcement] would be that we and/or the Americans would be prepared 
to make good the gap thus caused in Europe'. If a guarantee were 
forthcoming, the authorities in Paris could explain to public opinion that 
reinforcement was 'in accordance with their pledges about reduction of the 
forces in Indo-China since the temporary increase would be followed by a 
aajor reduction once the situation was restored'. This, however, 'would 
not get round the difficulty about the balance of power within the E.D.C.' 1 
The third possible price was linked to this last consideration. As the 
Chiefs of Staff acknowledged in November, any suggestion that France 
redeploy significant numbers of troops to Viet-Nam 'might well be used as a 
lever to force the United Kingdom to commit forces to the European Defence 
Community' given the resultant military superiority of Germany. a 
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Despite the obvious advantages of a French victory, to Eden and the 
Foreign Office none of these potential pre-requisites were acceptable. A 
demand for greater assistance in prosecuting the war was regarded as beyond 
the country's means to provide. The Conservative Government's first year 
in office had seen only a marginal improvement in the economic situation. 
At the start of October 1952, Butler cautioned the Cabinet that '[w]e are 
trying to do far more than our resources permit' and that 'if, as regards 
defence, we go partly over to a war effort, then, on the rest of the field, 
we must go partly over to a war economy'.=- Among over things this would 
necessitate a major revision of the Government's housing policy upon which 
so much of its domestic popularity, existing and potential, rested.· In 
July Churchill had lamented to the House of Commons: 'Tragic indeed is the 
spectacle of the might, majesty, dom1nion and power of the once magnificent 
and still considerable British Empire having to worry how we can pay our 
monthly bUls'. & Thus the simple inescapable facts of economic life 
partially account for the Foreign Office's refusal to sanction the 
reinforcement thesis. 'Vital United Kingdom interests in South-East Asia 
are at stake but as the United Kingdom is not playing a major part in 
supplying or fighting the Indo-China war, she has little real locus standi 
to advise', concluded the South-East Asia Department, its Head, Tahourdin, 
adding that the British Government 'is not in a position to add to their 
existing commitments either military or financial'.-
The other probable French demands were equally unacceptable for reasons 
relating to Britain's established position on the E. D. C. Indeed other 
factors apart, it is clear that the Government's Indo-China policy was 
greatly circumscribed by the principles upon which its E.D.C. policy 
rested. For instance, a request that Britain should commit forces to the 
-113-
E.D.C. comensurate with those French forces re-directed to Indo-China was 
likely to be viewed by Eden - in spite of its temporary nature - as a 
disingenuous French ploy to secure British membership of the E.D.C. through 
the back door. As already seen, Eden had quickly embraced the previous 
Labour Government's policy of associat ion wi th rather than membership of 
the E. D. C. It is not without relevance that Eden chose to reaffirm this 
position in unequivocal terms at just the pOint, in December 1952, when the 
issue of French reinforcement was being debated in the Foreign Office. 
Britain 'cannot join the Community nor merge any part of its forces in the 
Community', he told the Cabinet, a view he repeated during a meeting with 
the French President at the end of the month. 7 
As for the idea of British troops filling the 'hole' in Western defence 
caused by French reinforcement, this was, at first sight, a more realistic 
proposition if only because it did not involve joining the E.D.C. Instead, 
the risk of German domination could be reduced by an increased Brit ish 
presence on the Continent within N.A.T.O. but outside of the E.D.C. 
However, even if a dearth of military manpower had not ruled this 
impracticable, Eden was already in the process of rejecting a similar 
commitment in relation to the E. D. C. The French, consistent with their 
desire for the most intimate Sri tish relationship with the European Army, 
had been angling for a firm undertaking on the part of the Churchill 
Government to maintain its forces in Europe at their existing level for the 
foreseeable future. Such a pledge would, in theory, make the E.D.C. more 
palatable to the French National Assembly wherein there was a 'profound 
fear, largely based on a lack of self-confidence, of being left alone in 
the EDC to deal directly with the Germans on day-to-day political, economic 
and military problems' without the supporting presence (or in this case 
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proximity> of Britain.s Eden, though, vigorously opposed any such promise, 
telling the Cabinet on 4 December that 'we had already gone as far as we 
could short of full membership'.' A week later he again insisted that 
Britain should 'refrain from entering any commitment to maintain any fixed 
quantity of British forces on the Continent for a specific number of years' 
and, on 30 December, made clear to the French Ambassador to London that 
there could never be any 'irrevocable guarantees' about British troop 
levels. 10 The furthest that Eden would go was to 'consult' with the French 
and the other E.D.C. powers before withdrawing British contingents. 11 
This inflexible attitude had a three-layered foundation: limited 
manpower and the absence of a strategic reserve; the need for freedom of 
manoeuvre given Britain's still considerable world-wide interests; and 
Eden's personal belief that the E. D. C. should be encouraged by means which 
'do not involve any real sacrifice on our part'. 1:Z Clearly any French 
request for extra troops in Europe to facilitate reinforcement of Indo-
China would have been effectively rejected a pr:J.or:J. in the context of 
Britain's E. D. C. policy. To have accepted such a price would have stood 
this policy on its head. Eden, in short, would not do for France in Indo-
China more than he had already refused to do for France in terms of the 
E. D. C. 
Discounting these objections, there may also have been some reluctance 
to meet French requirements based on a mild but pervasive contempt in the 
Foreign Office for the way in which France wallowed in its post-war 
economic and mil1 tary weakness. 'Everyone recognises that Indo-China is a 
frightful drain on France', observed Scott on 25 November 1952 ... 
Yet in a sense it is a symptom rather than a cause of French 
impotence. Since Turkey recovered twenty years ago France has 
taken her place as the sick man of Europe. She exploits her 
feebleness and the debt which others owe to her to secure pall-
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iatives from abroad, when the only hope of a cure lies in a more 
robust policy at home. '3 
Churchill, too, seems to have regarded French problems in Indo-China as a 
prelude to the relegation of France to the level of a third-rank power. 1. 
On the other hand, the debate about the value of France as an ally was not 
new in official British circles. 1. In the end officials tended to reach 
much the same conclusion: 'France is necessary to us for geographical and 
other reasons ... and we shall have to make the best of a bad job'. 1. 
All these factors combined to ensure a decision in the Foreign Office 
against raising the reinforcement issue with the French despite ample 
opportunity for doing so. The Pi nay Administration, disappointed with the 
inconclusive outcome of the Washington military conference in October, 
planned to use the presence of Eden and Acheson at the next session of the 
N. A. T. O. Council in Paris in mid-December to resume discussions. 17 This 
provided the British with an ideal forum in which to discuss reinforcement 
as well as its implications for Europe and the E. D. C. However, no such 
positive initiative was contemplated. As Eden's brief for the meeting made 
clear, Britain 'cannot assist the French either with money or troops'. On 
the central question of reinforcement 
it is not politically possible to suggest this to the French 
because they would not only fear the consequent weakening of 
their position vis-a-vis Germany but might well propose unaccept 
-able terms. They might for example stipulate that any force 
sent to Indo-China should be replaced by additional British or 
American forces in Europe. 
If, however, Schuman happened to mention the impossibility of his country 
despatching more men to Viet-Nail of his own accord, Eden was to ignore the 
well-chronicled reasons why this was so and instead brow-beat the French on 
conscription, the limitations of which 'seriously reduce French ability to 
discharge its military commitments 1n Europe and in Indo-China'. Ie 
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However justified this attitude, Eden's N. A. T. O. brief was still, at 
root, a contradictory document. Convinced that something 'drastic' had to 
be done to arrest the drift towards premature French withdrawal, the 
architects of British diplomacy decided on a something that amounted to 
nothing. On one side, there were serious doubts about the abil1 ty of the 
Viet-Hamese army to deal effecti vely with the Viet-Minh on its own. On the 
other hand, though the British believed they had the answer to the problem 
they felt unable to tell the French what it was. But if Indo-China was 
worth saving - and there were few who did not think so - a do nothing 
approach was deeply unsatisfactory. Indeed to maintain such a position 
given London's acute appreciation of the situation in Viet-Na~ the 
failings of French strategy and the repercussions of French capitulation, 
would amount to witting acquiesence in what threatened to be the loss of 
the whole of Indo-China. " 
The inertia which enveloped British policy in December 1952 was plainly 
incompatible with the urgency of re-directing French policy away from its 
self-constructed precipice in Viet-Nam. This was underlined when the 
N. A. T. O. Council convened in Paris on 16 December. At first sight, the 
meeting seemed to produce a number of constructive results, certainly from 
the French standpOint. One such was the most uneqUivocal public statement 
yet from their allies that Indo-China was not just a colonial issue but a 
vital front in the world struggle against international Communism. London 
had hitherto held back in this regard in order to maintain pressure on 
PariS to perfect Indo-Chinese independence, and because fulsome expressions 
of solidarity might be met with French demands to convert words into 
assistance. However, the need to shore up morale in France in the wake of 
the Viet-Minh's autumn offensive produced, on 17 December, a N.A.T.O. 
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resolution expressing 'wholehearted admiration for the valiant and long 
continued struggle of the French forces' and agreeing that 'the campaign 
deserves continuing support from the N.A.T.O. Governments'.ao The 
resolution broke new ground for another reason: it was 'the first time that 
Nato has formally stretched an arm outside the European theatre [and] 
emphasises in an unprecedented way the identity of the problems of defence 
in Europe and the Far East'.21 
The French had also hoped to break the deadlock on South-East Asian 
defence planning and. in this connection. to secure a firm assurance of 
immediate Anglo-American help in the event of a Chinese invasion of Viet-
Nam. To this end, agreement was reached in Paris on the establishment of a 
Five Power Staff Agency for the region to 'maintain contacts and continue 
studies for effective military action against aggression'.a2 Eden had 
favoured for some time a mul Ulateral defence mechanism as an end in 
itself. a shackle on American adventurism, and as a less provocative 
deterrent to Chinese aggression than an open warning statement. However, 
the Staff Agency plan fell a good way short of this ideal and was in 
reality little more than a platform upon which the previously ltd hoc 
meetings of British. French. American. New Zealand and Australian military 
experts could be conducted more formally and regularly. 23 In line with the 
evolution of British thinking since September 1952, it was also viewed as a 
boost to French morale in their struggle against the real enemy. the Viet-
The French. though they later tried to extend the Agency's scope, 
were pleased with this measure of progress. =- It may also have tempered 
their disappointment at not obtaining a further increase in American aid to 
expedite the training of the Viet-Namese army.a. 
Predictably. the British had ignored the issue of reinforcement in 
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Paris. While Eden and the Foreign Office may have had good reasons for 
following such a tepid line and, by extension, accepting optimistic French 
forecasts about the future, the advocates of decisive action were dismayed. 
Nowhere was disappointment more keenly felt than in the Paris Embassy. 
Prior to the N. A. T. O. Council, Harvey had argued that if France required 
'compensatory guarantees in respect of the E.D.C. and German y to 
counterbalance the resultant French inferiority' and so make reinforcement 
of Indo-China possible, it would be 'in our own interests to go as far as 
we cen to supply it'. 27 Now, 1n the wake of the Paris meeting, such 
exhortations gained intensity as the Embassy took the lead in ensuring that 
the Foreign Office did not persist in sidestepping the question of 
rein f orcement . On 2 January 1953, Hayter wrote to Scott warning that the 
French were in a 'thoroughly bad position', that the Viet-Minh had 
'complete liberty of action' in Tonking and that accordingly 'there is no 
prospect whatsoever of the Vietnamese being able to deal with the Viet Minh 
by themselves in the future, though the French in theory intend to start 
withdrawing their troops this year'. Speaking for the Embassy as a whole, 
Hayter asserted that '[i1f the war is not to end in disaster 
substantial reinforcements have got to be sent from somewhere soon, say 
within a year from now'. He followed this up with a strong indictment of 
the passivity of the British delegation at the Paris N.A.T.O. Council 
We have so far all been proceeding on the assumption that there 
are no reinforcements which can be sent. There are no British 
troops available, all the available Americen troops are engaged 
in Korea, and even if there were eny spare British or American 
troops it is argued that to send them to Indo-China would result 
in bringing in the Chinese and making another Korea. And it is 
also assumed, et least by the French, that there are no French 
reinforcements available unless they had two years military service 
and altered their law about sending conscripts abroad. They would 
also need to have the extra cost underwritten by the Americans and 
receive some additional guarantee against German preponderAnce in 
Europe. It has so far been taken for granted that these require-
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ments were all of them too difficult to fulfill, given the polit 
-ical situation in France and British and American reluctance to 
commit ourselves any more deeply in Europe militarily or finan-
cially. And so we go on drifting hoping that something will turn 
up and using such devices as the establishment of a "five power 
staff agency" to give ourselves the false but comfortable feeling 
that everything possible is being done. That at any rate is how 
it looks to us here in Paris. 
Hayter's forthright analysis served to put reinforcement at the forefront 
of Foreign Office thinking once more. 'If we, the French and the Americans 
can collectively face the facts of the situation in Indo-China', he 
concluded, • the French might feel obliged to put themselves in a position 
to send further reinforcements and we might find it possible to pay the 
price which they would demand of us in Europe,.ae 
It was obvious, not just from the stance taken by the Paris Embassy, 
that the reinforcement lobby was as strong and vocal as ever. Hayter's 
assessment, for example, echoed that of the 1952 Bukit Serene conference, 
while on 11 December the Cabinet's Defence Committee were told by the 
Chiefs of Staff of the importance of French reinforcement and that • the 
political difficulties inherent in this must be faced, and that if 
necessary the Far East should be strengthened temporarily at the expense of 
the N.A.T.O. bUild-up 1n Europe'. 29 'Our Chiefs of Staff are very worr~d 
about the effect of French failures on Malaya, Burma and Siam', noted 
Eden's Private Secretary five days later. 30 A paper drawn up by the Joint 
Planning Staff on 22 January 1953 argued that it was 'essentially 1n our 
interests ... [tJo assist to our utmost in resolving the situation in Indo-
China while the opportunity still remains'. At the end of the month, the 
influential British Defence Co-ordination Committee for the Far East 
declared that it was of 'the greatest importance that every effort be made 
to persuade the French to provide the necessary reinforcement without 
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delay, and to make it politically possible for them to do so, in order that 
they may be deployed in Indo-China by next September at the latest'.31 The 
High Commissoner in Singapore counselled similarly that 'the best help we 
can give the French is to assist in overcoming the political difficulties 
in Europe to prOViding more French troops for Indo-China'. 32 
Eden and the Foreign Office were also subjected to indirect pressure to 
reconsider their decision on reinforcement. This first mani fested i tsel f 
in statements by leading figures in the new French Government of Ren~ Mayer 
(formed on 7 January 1953) that the policy of the previous Administration 
would continue. 33 Letourneau, who retained his portfolio, told Harvey on 
27 January that the only possible course for France was 'to build up the 
Vietnamese army so that the French could withdraw their forces'. Yet it 
was this very same policy which the British maintained necessitated prior 
reinforcement. Letourneau, however, rejected the suggestion on the grounds 
that it 'depended entirely on the policy of the Chinese Government, and 
that they were perfectly capable of reinforcing the Viet Minh up to any 
amount which the French might send out and would probably in fact do so'. 
PreviOUS British assessments of French opposition to reinforcement had 
dwelt on its domestic unpopularity and the E. D. C. factor, but this was a 
new argument. 'From what M. Letourneau said', Harvey reflected, I I am 
fairly certain that the present French Government will not contemplate this 
course of action'.34 Interestingly, the Chinese dimension was now almost 
entirely absent from British calculations, though clearly not from French 
ones. Meanwhile, The Economist, in an editorial widely discussed in the 
Foreign Office, demonstrated that the reinforcement thesis was not just the 
preoccupation of Whl tehall officials. In advocating the despatch of more 
French troops to Viet-Nam, it noted the need to 'give some further 
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guarantee that Germany will not be allowed to dominate the western 
partnership', something which was within Anglo-American power to grant 
There will be no effective German force for at least two years, 
and by that time Indo-China should be won or lost: it would 
cost the Americans and the British little to give an undertaking 
to maintain on the Continent of Europe for this period a force at 
least equivalent to that of the new German army.·· 
Whether Eden liked it or not, the problem of reinforcement was not going to 
disappear. At the same time, though, the probable compensatory demands 
which Paris would make if its policy of staged disengagement was to be 
reversed were no more affordable or acceptable in January and February 1953 
than they had been in November and December 1952, a point highlighted in a 
stock-taking paper drawn up by the South-East Asia Department ... 
Large-scale reinforcement bristles with difficulties. France 
has at present only five effective divisions in Western Europe. 
Opinion in France is greatly exercised at the prospect of the 
embodiment of the French forces within the EOC and of plans 
for rearming Germany within EOC. Even present EOC plans present 
a considerable threat to the French Government. As things 
stand it would be most difficult to put forward a proposal for 
reinforcing Indo-China. There seems little doubt that France 
would insist upon a considerable Quid pro QUo in the form of UK 
and US guarantees to Europe. In order to raise the necessary 
forces the French conscription period might well have to be 
lengthened and French conscripts sent overseas. This would 
require legislation and the debate would be most difficult for 
the French Government ... The resources of the UK are fully 
strained and further commitments as regards EDC would present 
great difficulties.~ 
Guided and at the same time restricted by the imperative of no concessions 
or new commitments, British diplomacy entered 1953 in search of a means of 
placing pressure on the French without leaving itself prey to embarassing 
entreaties for help. 
In the end there was only one way round this difficulty. Gradually but 
percepti bl Y and in terms of power-by-proxy logically and even 
inevitably, British eyes turned to Washington. The United States already 
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seemed to possess a leverage over French pOlicy far in excess of Britain's 
by dint of its massive assistance programme for Indo-China. As a Foreign 
Office official had predicted some six months earlier in response to the 
opening salvoes in Graves's offensive for a more forward French strategy. 
Washington was 'in a much better position to exercise some influence on the 
way the campaign develops ... I suspect that our only possible line of 
approach will be through the Americans'. 37 
Why did it take so long for this expedient to be adopted? Arguably. it 
was not until the end of 1952 that the inability of British diplomacy to 
pursue its objectives in Indo-China was fully revealed. There was also 
general acceptance that in a Presidential election year the Truman 
Administration was unlikely to take far-reaching policy decisions. the more 
so after 5 November when the Republicans triumphed at the polls.3e 
However. by the turn of the year. and with Eisenhower's inauguration 
looming large. this period of indecision was about to end. Indeed the 
change of Administration occurred at what seemed to British policy-makers a 
particularly propitious moment for effecting what amounted a refinement of 
power-by-proxy. namely pressure-by-proxy on the French. There was much 
talk in the Foreign Office of an • opportunity' to influence the final shape 
of the new U.S. Government's necessarily embryonic and hopefully malleable 
views on Indo-China. With Eisenhower's Secretary of State. John Foster 
Dulles. planning to visit London at the start of February 1953, the South-
East Asia Department, reflecting the Foreign Office consensus, recommended 
that Eden should 'voice his concern over the existing policy of drift in 
Indo-China' when they met, and to try and elicit the views of the 
Republican Administration 'at their formative stage'. Crucially, such an 
approach might be made 'without the danger of laying ourselves open to any 
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further commitment'. 3' 
The concept of pressure-by-proxy implied that Britain's want of power 
did not equal powerlessness if the resources of the United States could be 
used to achieve those objectives which were otherwise out of reach. Though 
given no official congnlzance at the time, the course pursued by pol1cy-
makers with regard to Indo-China and French reinforcement in the first 
months of 1953 was consistent with what Eden, in his June 1952 Cabinet 
paper on overseas obligations, had described as the over-riding aim of 
British foreign policy - 'to persuade the United States to assume the real 
burdens ... while retaining for ourselves as much political control - and 
hence prestige and world influence - as we can'.40 However, if pressure-
by-proxy was to have any chance of success certain pre-conditions had to 
exist. Firstly. a close Anglo-American symmetry of outlook on the 
importance of safeguarding Indo-China and on the steps France needed to 
take to restore its position. to wit reinforcement. Second. should there 
be no such symmetry, British diplomacy had to be given an opportunity to 
bring Washington's thinking round through close consultation and liaison. 
Down to January 1953 neither pre-condition really existed. The Truman 
Administration. while agreeing that Indo-China was of vital concern to the 
West. evidently failed to view current French policy in the foreboding 
light that many British observers did. Hence it had no reason to urge a 
more forward strategy on Paris and seemed satisfied with plans for passing 
the burden of defence in Viet-Nam to native forces. 
As for the second pre-condition. there had been little opportunity for 
putting across contrary Sri tish views on account of the Truman 
Administration's predilection for unilateral decision-making even on 
matters of general concern. In spite of the close Acheson-Franks 
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relationship there were 'endless complaints by the British at every level 
over lack of consultation',41 The advent of the Republican Administration 
was therefore seen as a chance to start afresh, In terms of Indo-China, 
there was broad agreement in the Foreign Office on the importance of making 
known Bri Ush views 'before United States policy crystallises',·2 This 
approach was not confined to South-East Asia for Eden was also anxious to 
put across British views on economic issues 'so that we may influence [the 
Eisenhower Administration's] thinking in their early days',·~ 
What signs were there, if any, that in either respect things would be 
better under the Republicans"? On the first pre-condition, unanimity on the 
importance of Indo-China and the failings of the French, the early 
indicators were encouraging, Dulles, for example, left few doubts in the 
run up to the Presidential election that he personally viewed South-Eest 
Asia as 'a key region in the conflict with communist "imperialism", and 
that it wes important to drew the line of conteinment north of the Rice 
Bowl of Asia - the Indochine peninsule',·· Following the election, Dulles 
told Selwyn Lloyd in New York that he was 'more worried about Indochines 
thesn about Korea',·· His reesoning, as privately explained to the 
President-elect in December, wes geo-political '" 
Korea is important", but the really important spot is Indo-
Chine, because we could lose Korea and insulate ourselves 
against the consequences of that lOSSi but if Indo-China goes, 
and South Asia goes, it is extremely hard to insulete ourselves 
against the consequences of that,·· 
On 13 January 1953, the Cabinet's Far East Committee were informed of 
, [i) ndications that the new Un1 ted States Administration were very much 
alive to the political end strategic importance '" of preventing Indo-
Chine from becoming Communist' end, two days later, a Foreign Office 
official minuted optimistically that Eisenhower and Dulles were 'likely to 
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share the view that if things are allowed to drift in Indo-China we 
shall end up by fatally undermining NATO in Europe'.·7 But irrespective of 
these declarations, by the start of February there had been no firm 
pointers as to what Republican policy would actually be: whether it would 
accept, like the Truman Administration, French reassurances and merely seek 
to extend aid for the training of the Viet-Namese army or, alternatively, 
whether it would share London's anxiety and press for a more offensive 
strategy via reinforcement. A third line could not be totally discounted 
- that the new Administration, in accordance with its election pledges to 
regain the initiative in the Cold War, might be tempted to actively 
participate in the fighting. This would have 'dangerous repercussions on 
Hong Kong and Malaya, quite apart from any risk that by precipitating 
Chinese intervention in Indo-China they might ultimately involve us in 
direct commitments there'... Churchill, during a visit to the United 
States in January 1953, warned Eden that there could be 'rough weather' 
ahead in 'dealing with the Republican Party who have been twenty years out 
of office'.·' Moreover, though on Indo-Chi na what 11 t tie was known of 
Republican thinking seemed reasonable, indications of the shape of general 
strategy in Asia <.pressurising the Chinese to take negotiations for a 
Korean armistice more seriously, a more vigorous strategy in Korea if this 
failed. de-recognition of the P. R. C. by Britain. the use of Nationalist 
Chinese forces in a pinprick war against the Peking regime. all of which 
Churchill objected to) were much more disturbing.·o To Eden and his 
advisers the correct policy was to avoid internationalising the war while 
maintaining (in practice, American) assistance to the French and ensuring 
that a more robust politico-military approach was adopted in Viet-Nam.· 1 
This in turn reflected British policy towards Asia in general, namely 'to 
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maintain a firm and united front aga1nst Communist aggress10n and at the 
same t1me to search for a modus vivendi [with Peking],.-;;r 
Uncertainty about the final form of Republican policy on Indo-China 
underlined the importance of the second pre-condition to pressure-by-proxy, 
IS close medium of consultation through which British views could be 
transmitted. Here, though, the signs were less pleasing. To begin with, 
John Colville, Churchill's Private Secretary, observed during the Premier's 
visit to the United States in January, that Eisenhower had 'a bee in his 
bonnet about "collusion" with us: is all in favour of it clandestinely but 
not overtly', something which seemed to preclude the type of intimate 
relationship required.-~ Churchill found the Republican politiCians 
preoccupied with taking 'a different line to their predecessors' and, 
consequently, the tendency was to be 'less friendly in action, if not in 
feeling' . ... This, however, amounted to much the same thing in practice. 
Eisenhower wished to avoid London and Washington projecting 'the appearance 
of attempting to dominate the Councils ot the free world'. The President 
was particularly keen not to upset or exclude the French from major 
discussions (to the annoyance of Churchill) because 'their willingness to 
go along with us is tremendously important; not only because of their 
responsibility in the Indo-China war but because of their central position 
in Western Europe'. - Accordingly, officials in London harboured few 
illusions, one minuting on 24 January that although the new Administration 
was 'cooperative, communicative and ready to listen', it would 'not 
necessarily refrain from action if they cannot get our consent'. - The 
prospects for the success of pressure-by-proxy were thus mixed at best. 
When Eisenhower made his first public pronouncement on foreign policy on 2 
February these prospects visibly receded. 
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February to April 1953 
In the course of his first State of the Union address to Congress on 2 
February 1953, President Eisenhower declared that the mission of the U. S. 
Seventh Fleet to patrol the straits between Formosa and the mainland of 
China was to end forthwith. 1 The Fleet had been despatched by Truman in 
June 1950 to 'neutralise' the straits, preventing a Communist attack on 
Formosa and, equally, preventing Nationalist sorties against the mainland. 3 
In practice, though, neutralisation quickly became a one-way policy. Its 
object, as Truman later admitted, was to stop 'crooked old Chiang Kai-shek 
from being mopped Up'.3 However, to many 1n the United States the 
ostensible even-handedness of the policy meant that the Fleet was in effect 
defending the P.R.C. at a time when American soldiers were being killed by 
Chinese Communists in Korea. Eisenhower duly acted to end this seeming 
anomaly. The United States intended 'nothing aggressive', he told 
Churchill, 'we are just tired of being dupes'.- The new British Ambassador 
to Washington, Sir Roger Makins, agreed that the issue could not be taken 
out of the context of American domestic politics for, at heart, it was a 
sop to the right-wing of the Republican party frustrated with the stalemate 
in Korea. What it did not imply was support for a Nationalist attempt to 
re-conquer China. Chiang's grandiose dreams were dependent on massive 
American assistance which there was never any intention of providing.-
Eden, however, was incensed at the way in which the new Administration 
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had by-passed British opinion. As recently as 7 January, Secretary of 
State-elect Dulles had declared his 'whole-hearted intention' to consult 
closely with the Churchill Administration 'in every issue and in every 
quarter'. At the end of the month Makins, acting on Eden's instructions, 
told the Americans that the British wished to be 'fully consulted in 
advance' if a change in the neutralisation policy was afoot.- In the event 
London was only brought into the picture the day before Eisenhower's 
announcement and at a point when the lines of pOlicy had been clearly 
drawn. There was certainly a case for earlier British involvement. If, as 
Washington intimated, the move was an adjunct of Korean strategy in that it 
would obUge China to re-direct men and eqUipment from that theatre to 
reinforce is coastal defences opposite Formosa, Britain (along with the 
other members of the U.N. Command in Korea) had a right to consultation. 7 
On 3 February, Eden argued in Cabinet that the decision was a mistake which 
threatened 'unfortunate poli tical repercussions' for the negotiations at 
Panmunjom without any 'compensating military advantages'.-
In spite of Makins's conviction that the issue was not 'good ground on 
which to make a test case with the new administration", Eden refused to 
acquiesce in the establishment of so disturbing a precedent. He was given 
an early opportunity to express his unhappiness when the American Secretary 
of State arrived in London on 4 February for his scheduled visit. The next 
day Eden confidently asserted in the House of Commons that, as a result of 
his talks with Dulles, it would now be 'impossible for any step which could 
have far reaching international reactions to be taken without our having an 
opportunity to express our views beforehand'. 10 But in private Eden was 
less certain, telegraphing to Makins on 7 February that any repetition of 
unilateral American deciSion-making would be 'disastrous'. He went on: 
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I am sure you will do everything you can to ensure that the new 
Administration understands that the future of Anglo-American 
relations depends on their readiness to treat us reasonably as 
a partner ... My anxiety arises from fear that the new Admin-
istration, from inexperience as much as from anything else, will 
show themselves cavalier in their treatment of allies. Every 
time they do this they will give ammunition to their enemies 
and embarass their friends. 11 
It therefore seems unlikely that Eden received any firm promise from Dulles 
about future consultation and his confident performance in the Commons on 5 
February was probably aimed at allaying speculation about an early rift 
with the Eisenhower Administration. Subsequent remarks by Dulles at a 
private dinner in Washington (the import of which was passed to the 
British) are illuminating. If the Eisenhower Administration was bound to 
consultation with its allies it would also be 'exposed to veto by those 
consulted, with consequent handicaps on freedom of action'. This tended to 
bring action down to 'the lowest common denomination of boldness and 
capacity among the consulting nations'. There had to be a 'balance', 
Dulles said, 'between allied unity and American freedom of action'. 12 
Looking back a year later, Makins felt this belief stemmed from Dulles's 
determination 'not to be accused (as Mr Acheson repeatedly was) of being in 
the British pocket'. 13 But whatever the well-springs of American 
unilateralism, their allies still had to deal with the sometimes 
disconcerting end-product. And the way to do that, Dulles explained, was 
to display 'faith 1n the United States and show trust in the fundamental 
decency and moderation of American objectives'. 1~ 
The decision to de-neutralise the Formosa straits and the gO-it-alone 
attitude adopted by the Eisenhower Administration in general can only have 
strengthened Eden's conviction that a formal collective defence arrangement 
for South-East Asia was a necessary channel through which Britain could 
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curb the more minatory aspects of American strategy. The French still 
suspected that if the Chinese moved on Viet-Nam 'the Americans will 
immediately react of their own bat by sea and air' while, early in April, 
the State Department confirmed that in such circumstances the inclinat ion 
would be to 'throw the book at China'.'· However, the co-ordination of 
regional defence was rendered less urgent by the continuing absence of any 
serious intention on the part of the P.R.C. to intervene in Viet-Nam where 
the Viet-Minh were proving more than a match for the French. Indeed it was 
the problems encountered by the French in their struggle with Ho Chi Minh's 
rebels that aroused the most persistent concern in London. In this 
connection, the diplomatic fall-out from the unleashing of Chiang clearly 
demonstrated that one of the pre-requisites to successfully effecting 
pressure-by-proxy - American readiness to listen and preferably act on 
British advice - could not be relied on. 
Success therefore rested on the compatability of Anglo-American thinking 
on Indo-China. The first chance to assess this came with Dulles's visit to 
London. During talks at the Foreign Office on 4 February it transpired 
that the Administration had yet to come to any firm policy decisions but 
there was a general willingness to find 'ways and means' of giving extra 
help to the French. To this end, Dulles hoped to have 'concrete proposals' 
ready in time for a visit to Washington by French Ministers in mid-March. 
Encouragingly, there were hints that these might include pressing for a 
more forward military policy, Dulles avowing that 'provided a really well 
directed effort were made, the Indo-China problem could be resolved or at 
least reduced to manageable proportions within eighteen months'. Dulles's 
inference, however, was that this effort should be centred on expanding the 
Viet-Hamese army and granting full pol1 tical liberty to the Associate 
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States rather than French reinforcement. On the other hand he did believe 
that decisive action was necessary if only because of the 'grave 
repercussions' of the war in Europe. In contrast, Eden's performance at 
this meeting was desultory and he ignored several openings to argue the 
case for reinforcement. While 'improved training and use of native forces' 
might be the 'key' to the proble~ he mused, the French 'must in any case 
have more troops if they were to clear up the situation'. However, 'the 
difficulty of financing this necessary increase ... might be troubling 
them' . Beyond this Eden merely restated the need for overhauling the 
French system of National Service. 1. 
To judge from his approach to this meeting, Eden was still far from 
happy about French reinforcement. Indeed three days earlier he had 
attempted to kill the issue completely when ordering the removal of the 
entire section of his brief dealing with the Service Chiefs' views on the 
urgency of an aggressive French pOlicy in Viet-Nam even at the expense of 
their contribution to N.A.T.O. Eden's justification was that 
reinforcements 'must be local' and, given money, 'they can be found on the 
spot'.17 This was virtually the scenario outlined by Dulles when the two 
men finally met. Furthermore, having on 1 February approved a Foreign 
Office proposal for Anglo-American military talks aimed at reaching jOint 
agreement on the nature of the problem in Viet-Nam and possible remedies, 
Eden, to the surprise and dismay of his officials, refused to raise it with 
Dulles. 1. In so doing he leant tacit support to existing French plans to 
hold-on in Viet-Nam pending the transfer of defence duties to the native 
army. More importantly, on another reading Eden had ensured that pressure-
by-proxy was still-born. How, then, can Eden's extraordinary resistance to 
the reinforcement thesis be explained, particularly in view of the wide 
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consensus in military and political circles in favour of acting upon it? 
Concern to avoid additional commitments must, as ever, feature highly 
in any answer. As already seen, a direct appeal to the French was ruled 
out for fear that it would produce unwelcome and unaffordable requests for 
compensation. Even an indirect approach through the Americans seemed to 
run a risk of damaging consequences. As the Mutual Aid Department in the 
Foreign Office warned in December 1952 
the giving of extra U.S. financial aid to France in order to 
help her in Indo-China cannot fail to make it more di fficult 
for the other European countries, including ourselves, to 
obtain the economic aid which many of them need if they are 
to sustain their own defence efforts '" [IJt is inevitable 
that the more that France gets, the less there will be for 
the rest of the world. 
With a new fiscally conservative Administration in Washington pubUcly 
committed to cutting defence expenditure it was doubtful whether the 
Americans would 'increase the total of aid, in order to provide more for 
France', l' In January 1953, a submission for Strang concluded that if the 
total figure for United States assistance was maintained Britain 'might be 
justified in acquiescing 1n increased .,' military and economic aid to 
France for the furtherance of the war in Indo-China at the temporary 
diminution of aid to Europe'. But if the total was reduced for 1953, 'the 
consequences as regards the NATO effort in Europe of giving priority to 
Indo-China might be serious',2o Eden may therefore have judged it unwise 
to discuss with Dulles a new and expensive method of resolving the Indo-
China problem when even financing the existing one threatened adverse 
repercussions for the British economy, 
In seeking to explain Eden's negative stance one is also drawn towards 
the E.D.C. factor. The Eisenhower Administration's undisguised enthusiasm 
for German rearmament must have had a seminal influence on Eden's thinking 
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about Indo-China in general and French reinforcement in part icular. The 
creation of a United States of Europe was one of the major objectives of 
Eisenhower's Presidency and the successful launch of the E.D.C was viewed 
as a stepping-stone to that end. In his State of the Union message he had 
called for a 'more closely integrated economic and political system' in 
Europe. This was one of the six 'fixed ideas' that would govern his 
foreign poliCY, and he even hinted that American aid to Europe would be 
conditional on 'real progress' towards unity.2t By the same token. 
Dulles's subsequent visit to London and other N.A.T.O. capitals was widely 
interpreted as an exercise in pressurising the Europeans, especially the 
French. into speedy ratification of the E.D.C. Dulles himself had fuelled 
such speculation before his departure when warning in a widely broadcast 
speech that 'if it appeared there were no chance of getting effective unity 
... then it would be necessary to give a little rethinking to America's own 
foreign policy in relation to Western Europe'. 22 This was a forerunner to 
his more celebrated reference at the end of the year to an 'agonizing 
reappraisal' of American policy, 
Given the ardour of the U.S. Government for the E.D.C. there was, from 
the British standpOint, no guarantee of immunity from pressure to move 
closer to or even join the project. Eisenhower's acceptance of Eden's 
position in December 1951 when the former was Supreme Commander of 
N. A. T. 0., and his view that British participation in the E. D. C. at that 
time would complicate and delay its formation, could not be taken as an 
immutable policy position from 1953. 23 In terms of French reinforcement 
for Viet-Nam. the Foreign Office was convinced that this could only be 
attempted if Britain first promised to place extra forces on the continent 
or place contingents within the E.D.C. But to do so might encourage 
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Washington to press for this concession - made in the context of Indo-China 
- to be made permanent in the context of the E.D.C., something which the 
Churchill Government had no intention of agreeing to. 
The Times had already discussed the possibility of American 'pressure 
on Britain to join the European Defence Community in order to further allay 
French fears of German military supremacy while their soldiers are engaged 
in the Far East '.2. Moreover, the accession to power of the Mayer 
Government in France had led to increased calls for a British guarantee on 
troop levels in Europe to appease critics of the E. D. C. in the National 
Assembly. 25 These were formally tabled by the French Prime Minister in 
London in mid-February and, predictably, rejected by Eden at the start of 
March. Britain had 'gone to the limit of association', he asserted.~ As 
had been the case in December 1952, this refusal to entertain any 
'irrevocable guarantees' meant, perforce, the prior rejection of that which 
was most likely to win the French over to reinforcement, namely the 
deployment of even greater British forces on the continent. Thus Eden's 
E.D.C. policy effectively tied his hands when it came to Indo-China. 
Though this was doubtless frustrating for those in the Foreign Office whose 
professional concern was South-East Asia (those involved with European 
affairs must have been similarly resentful of Viet-Naro's intrusion into 
their cogitations), it was down to Eden to marry both considerations 
together. Because of the realities of Britain's economic situation this 
meant choosing between desired objectives rather than striving to attain 
all of them simultaneously. 
rearmament and the E.D.C. 
In accordance with this reasoning, 
figured higher than Indo-China in 
calculations until at least the start of 1954. 
German 
Eden's 
A simpler though ultimately unsatisfying explanation is that Eden had 
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little time to devote to the Indo-China problem on account of the other 
more urgent issues of the day, not to mention his preoccupation with 
succeeding Churchill as Prime Minister, and he was consequently unaware of 
the brewing crisis. Warnings from officials about potential problems in 
South-East Asia had to compete with existing problems in Europe and the 
Middle East. One member of the Foreign Office has recalled that Eden had 
no Indo-China policy 'until the crisis loomed' in 1954, and that his 
advisers had 'an uphill task alerting [him] to the grave threat to British 
interests and world peace'. 27 Yet, as we have already seen, Eden was 
clearly more aware than this assessment suggests. It has also been said 
that it is 'often forgetten how low Indochina ranked in the list of British 
priorities, Malaya notwithstanding'.2e But this, too, is far from the 
case. Indo-China's security was, according to Eden, of 'vital concern to 
the whole free world'. 29 Furthermore, as he confided to hiB diary in 
February 1953, '[ wli th our limited resources we must concentrate on those 
areas where our first interests lie', in which connection Malaya and South-
East Asia and 'playing our part in Germany' were singled out for special 
emphasis. 3O Rather than its lack of importance, therefore, it was the 
inability of British diplomacy to attain its Indo-Chinese desiderat~ at a 
reasonable cost which sometimes led to a tendency to dismiss it as a 
priority. In ideal circumstances, Britain should have been able to 
negotiate a price with the French for reinforcement. As it was, the wider 
advantages - economic, military, strategiC - of French victory were lost 
sight of as narrow short-term considerations of national self-interest held 
sway. As noted elsewhere, the idea of investing in Indo-China in the 
present to reap dividends in Malaya and Europe in the future was too far-
sighted a concept for Eden and the Foreign Office to grasp at a time when 
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economic constraints dictated that British diplomocy be conducted on a day-
to-day basis and developments r'eacted to rather than initiated or directed. 
To return to matters as they stood in February 1953, the result of 
Eden's indifference was that pressure-by-proxy was shelved along with the 
reinforcement thesis. Its adherents in the Foreign Office, unable to move 
the Foreign Secretory, adopted a wait-and-see approach. Though some 
officials continued to emphasise the benefits of putting the British case 
for reinforcement to the Americans before the lat ter' s thinking hardened 
(and with Dulles talking of 'concrete' ideas by mid-March there was now a 
time factor involved31 ), Eden had by February virtually smothered the issue 
and eschewed the chance to help mould American policy. 
Eden was undoubtedly helped by an important shift in French policy. On 
27 January, Letourneau had told Harvey that although • good progress' was 
being made in training and expanding the Viet-Namese army, the process was 
likely to be a longer one than first thought and it was 'improbable that 
the French would be able to pullout entirely in the foreseeable future'.a2 
The significance of Letourneau's remark WaS not lost in London. The plans 
hitherto in contemplation had envisaged commencing the run-down of French 
forces in 1953 and the completion of the process within two years. Now, as 
Graves reported on 19 February, 'it was evident that there had been a 
change of poliCy' and that there would be 'a delay in the programme of 
withdrawal and it seems likely that the main force will remain until the 
end of 1954'. This would give time for the recruitment of another 40,000 
Viet-Namese. 33 As the South-East Asia Department of the Foreign Office 
noted: 
Estimates that drastic action to reinforce Indo-China waS 
needed this year were based on the belief that the bulk of 
the French forces would be out by 1955. It seems increasingly 
clear that the french now have no intention of pulling out 
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before the Vietnamese forces are ready, and this first urgency 
now seems to have receded 34 
The following month Letourneau admitted to the British that the decision to 
increase the native forces still further and to put off withdrawal was an 
'alternative to the provision of more French troops from Europe'. 3. With 
this the reinforcement debate initially engendered by Graves in mid-1952 
appeared to have been brought to an end. 
Hindsight makes clear that Letourneau's faith in the ability of the 
embryonic Viet-Namese army was misplaced. If a decisive victory over the 
Viet-Minh was still possible (a debateable proposition) it was certainly 
not going to be achieved by expanding the native anti-Communist forces. 
There was in fact no satisfactory alternative to reinforcements from the 
professional, skilled and experienced French metropolitan army. One must 
therefore ask whether the impotence of British diplomacy in the period 
between June 1952 and March 1953 meant that a chance was missed for France 
to win the Indo-China war. For as Letourneau implied, the authorities in 
Paris were never going to consider the despatch of reinfoJiments of their 
own volition, preferring instead to believe that the Viet-Namese, given 
time, could solve the problem largely on their own. It required a more 
distanced and dispassionate analysis of the situation to bring into focus 
the flaws in this policy. This was possessed by the British. So too was 
the answer to the problem. Positive diplomacy in late 1952 at the time of 
the Paris N.A.T.O. Council might have brought home to the French the true 
value of reinforcement. It may of course be argued that an extra three or 
four French divisions would not have altered the outcome of the war - the 
American experience 1n the 1960' s certainly demonstrated the futility of 
simply throwing ever-increasing numbers of ground troops into the arena -
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but this was by no means clear in 1952-1953. On the contrary, expert 
British military opinion repeatedly stressed that victory through 
reinforcement was possible, an assessment which pOlitical and diplomatic 
opinion did not seriously question. It is in terms of this contemporary 
judgement that the failure of British diplomacy must be viewed. 
There were, of course, considerable obstacles precluding a British 
demarche on reinforcement in 1952-1953 and it is difficult to see what 
could have been done to surmount them given the imperative of limiting 
existing financial and military commitments overseas and avoiding 
additional ones. The reinforcement debate does, however, focus attention 
on the flaws of power-by-proxy. The worry that the French would react to 
British advice by demanding compensation either in Europe or for Indo-China 
inevitably impelled the Foreign Office to look to Washington to offer the 
advice ~md so face the demands. Yet pressure-by-proxy (a corOllary of 
power-by-proxy) failed to get off the ground because it was based on two 
false premises: that Washington shared London's assessment of the problem 
and its prescription for solving it; and, if not, that Washington could be 
persuaded to think in British terms. Thus the linch-pin of Eden's strategy 
(using American power for British ends) was instantly removed. The problem 
thereafter was that Eden had no contingency plan. And what applied in 
terms of Indo-China applied in most areas of Anglo-American relations in 
the early 1950' s. :a. The Church1ll Government was not just struggling to 
overcome its want of power to attain its foreign policy goals, it was also 
struggling to overcome the contradictions in the formula drawn up by Eden 
for negating, or disguising, this handicap . 
• 
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During March 1953 the Eisenhower Administration's Indo-China policy began 
to solidify. At the start of the month Eden and Butler visited Washington 
for high-level pOlitico-economic discussions. At a meeting on 5 March 
Dulles argued that the main advantage gained by Moscow from the Korean war 
was the tying down of large numbers of American troops and the exposure of 
Western defence vulnerability in other areas. Indo-China produced 
similarly unwelcome consequences. Accordingly, the United States was 
thinking in terms of a 'policy of disengagement which would mean 
substituting indigenous forces for the bulk of the United States and French 
forces now tied down in Asia'. There was, Dulles said, 'no question of 
relying exclusively on local troops' and there would have to be 'stiffening 
from the outside'. He added that in the case of Indo-China it was vi tal 
that France completed the independence of the Associate States. This would 
encourage the local anti-Communist forces that they were fighting for 
themselves rather than a continuation of French dominion. The long-term 
objective behind disengagement was the expectation that 'the Russians might 
tire of supplying equipment for a war in Asia which instead of engaging 
United States and French troops Was being mainly waged against locally 
raised forces'.:117 Eden had been given a foretaste of this when he met 
Dulles in New York in November 1952, the latter declaring that Korea was a 
'strategic mistake which would have to be corrected as soon as possible'. 
There was no point 'in our first eleven being held down on a barren 
peninsula by the enemy's second eleven'. - As for Indo-China, Dulles 
argued that if the French disengaged, • the "profit" would ... disappear 
from the Indo-Chinese operation for the Communists', an indication that he 
believed the Viet-Minh to be acting in accordance with direct1 ves from 
Peking and, ultimately, Moscow.-- British policy-makers made no such 
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sweeping reductionist assumption. Nor, one feels, would Ho Chi Minh have 
been amused to see his struggle depicted in so demeaning a manner. For him 
the complete evacuation of the French would have been profit indeed. 
Eden made little recorded response to Dulles's first formal exposition 
of disengagement and concentrated instead on securing an assurance that if 
an intensification of Korean operations was envisaged Britain would be 
consulted and not simply informed after the event. Dulles cooly replied 
that he 'would assume so,.·o In general, however, Eden's stay in the 
United States seemed to go some way to repairing the damage to Anglo-
American relations caused by the unleashing of Chiang in February.·l 
Despite Dulles's less than fulsome support for close consultation, Eden 
returned to London sure that he could 'discount any possibility of rash or 
adventurous policies' on the part of the United States.·z 
Disengagement was further developed at the end of the month during the 
scheduled visit of Mayer and his party to WaShington. The French agreed to 
increase the effectiveness of the indigenous forces in Viet-Nam and the 
Americans in turn responded sympathetically to requests for more aid to 
expedite this process.·3 They were not however ready to authorise an 
immediate appropriation as the budgetary position was unclear and, 
moreover, Eisenhower wished to relate it to a 'strategic and political plan 
for Indo-China' rather than a promise of action.·· Both the Administration 
and public opinion had to be satisfied that there was a 'reasonable 
prospect of a successful end to the war within a fairly short time'.·· Or, 
from the French standpoint, in order to obtain additional help they had to 
tell the Americans that the war was winnable and back this up with a 
politico-military blueprint for action.·· This Letourneau attempted to do 
on the spot in 'a clever piece of improvisation': France would create 54 
-143-
new 'light' battalions of the Viet-Namese army and. within two years. it 
would be possible to 'break the back of Viet-Minh resistance'.~7 Despite 
reservations about the time it would take to achieve this end, the 
Americans were impressed. The U.S. Military considered French thinking to 
be 'about as good as possible'. while Dulles argued that 'we ought to back 
those plans'. The French left Washington with instructions to work out 
their strategy in more detail." 
The British reaction to these developments was a mixture of 
bewilderment and concern. Bewilderment was caused by the ready acceptance 
in Washington of optimistic French assessments of the military situation. 
Letourneau's remark about breaking the back of rebel resistance within two 
years contrasted sharply with a statement he made three weeks earlier to 
the effect that there was 'no possibility of France winning the war' and 
that in the end there must be a 'political settlement'.~· In London, 
officials thought that the latter assessment <made in private during a 
visit to Australia) 'may be nearer to Letourneau's real views' and that on 
arrival in Washington he 'considered it necessary to paint a rosy picture 
of the future in order to secure a maximum of American assistance'.'" 
British concern stemmed from the time it would take disengagement to 
fructi fy and. in relation to this. the fragility of political support in 
France for the prolongation of the Expeditionary Force's mission and where 
the 'outcry for ending the war was [now] louder than ever'.·' Thus 
disengagement resurrected the prospect of a collapse of morale in France 
precipitating disaster in Viet-Nam. The probability was that the Viet-Minh 
would gain in strength and popularity and that the French, intent on simply 
holding the position while the Viet-Namese army was trained, would continue 
to suffer military reverses. This defensive strategy when coupled with a 
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lack of manpower meant, as Graves had recognised at the start of 1952, that 
the Expeditionary Force was 'reduced to being hit', and when that happened 
public opinion in France 'takes another plunge into despondency and 
pessim1sm'.52 The danger as perceived by the Paris Embassy was that each 
'successive setback releases a flood of defeatist talk in Paris, and at 
such moments there is probably a majority in the Assembly, as yet 
inarticulate, for the immediate opening of negotiations with Ho Chi 
Minh'.·=-
As conceived of in relation to Indo-China, disengagement amounted to a 
no-change policy, Because of the length of time it would take to produce 
results it was constructed on the shakiest of foundations, namely the 
readiness of the French public and parliament to continue the war. 
Moreover, though the British did not put it so bluntly, disengagement was 
built on a lie - the lie, expounded by the French in WaShington to secure 
greater aid, that the war could be won in a relatively short time and by no 
other device than the build-up of the Viet-Namese army. This was a 
prescription willingly accepted in Washington where, by April 1953, it was 
clear that a decision had been taken 'not to press the French to reinforce 
their existing troops in Indo-China' although this remained the only 
conceivably effective panacea.·· Astonishingly, '1953 was the year in 
which French and Americans exchanged visions of Victory'.·· On the other 
hand the architects of British policy could hardly complain about Franco-
American myopia given their own refusal to even attempt to affect the 
course of events in a more positive manner. For this Eden is mainly to 
blame albeit because of his immersion in the troubled waters of the E.D.C. 
The reinforcement issue was not, however, as dead as it appeared. For 
one thing, the Chiefs of Staff still adhered to the view that 'the policy 
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of expanding the Vietnamese army is not a satisfactory substitute to 
providing more French troops from elsewhere· ... For another. pressure on 
the Foreign Office to act on the reinforcement thesis was always liable to 
mount again if the lie upon which Franco-American pOlicy rested was 
exposed. And so it proved when, towards the middle of April, the Viet-Minh 
took the French by surprise and invaded Laos. thus extending major 
operations in the Indo-China war beyond Viet-Nam for the first time. In 
London, the shock-waves generated by the invasion breathed new life into 
the reinforcement issue. Significantly, Eden was by then absent from his 
post through ill health (as he would be until October-7 ) and Churchill was 
in charge of British diplomacy. Under his stewardship, not only did 
reinforcement rise phoenix-like to perplex the Foreign Office, but its 
objective was transformed. From mid-1953 it was seen not just in terms of 
bequeathing the Viet-Namese a defence burden they could handle but. 
increasingly, as a means of staving off what threatened to be a major, even 
a decisive, military defeat for France at the hands of the Viet-Minh. 
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PART IV: THE VIET-MINH DIMENSION 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
A NEW DIRECTION 
Churchill at the Foreign Office 
April to June 1953 
On 14 April 1953 Viet-Minh forces swept into Laos and quickly over-ran some 
20,000 square miles of territory. By the start of May the rebels were 
before the Royal capital, Luang Prabang. The capture of the city would 
have been an important propaganda Victory for the Viet-Minh but, with this 
object apparently within reach, their Commander, General Giap, suddenly 
ordered his forces to withdraw to their bases in Tonking and Annam. By 8 
May, reports reaching London suggested that the threat to Luang Prabang was 
'rapidly diminishing'. 1 The Viet-Minh did not in fact pull back completely 
from Laos but retained control of the province of Sam Neua where it 
installed the Resistance Government of Pathet Lao which later claimed to be 
the legal government of the country.:2 Even so, by mid-May the immediate 
crisis was over. 3 The Viet-Minh invasion had several possible aims: to sow 
political discord amongst the Laotian people, to extend control up to the 
Mekong river thereby threatening Cambodia from the rear and possibly Siam, 
to gain international prestige, to dismay public opinion in France, or more 
simply to seize the area's rice and opium crop. The French in turn 
advanced several theories for the rebel withdrawal - supply difficulties, 
fear of being trapped in Laos by the rains, and rapid French strengthening 
of key positions. Paris also claimed that the attack was part of the 
'general communist campaign against the West' and that Ho Chi Minh had been 
acting 'on the orders of international Communism'.-
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In London events were viewed less in terms of a sinister Kremlin design 
and more as a reflection of growing Viet-Minh strength and French military 
incapac1 ty. & The invasion also demonstrated the speciousness of French 
claims in Washington the previous month that the war would be 'virtually' 
won within two years, while from a pragmatic British standpoint a rebel 
conquest of Laos would have serious repercussions for its neighbour Siam, 
the essential strategic buffer between a potentially communist Indo-China 
and the British territories of Malaya and Singapore.- Policy-makers feared 
that Siam would not remain neutral or anti-communist for very long in the 
event of a French defeat, succumbing either to a Chinese-backed Viet-Minh 
invasion or, more likely, a pro-communist regime taking power as a result 
of an externally incited or internally fomented coup d' ~t~t. This would 
bring communism to the threshold of Malaya. 7 
The Viet-Minh attack on Laos had an energising effect on British 
thinking about Indo-China. The uncomfortable realisation that the French 
grip was even looser than previously thought meant that by June the 
Churchill Government possessed for the first time what may be accurately 
termed an Indo-China polic~ The timidity and reticence which had 
characterised earlier assessments of the problem was replaced by a new 
positive attitude, and the contradiction between desiring a non-communist 
Indo-China and watching impassi vIy as France pursued a strategy which 
seemed at times to be working against this objective was fully revealed. 
As the Sri Ush charge d' affaires in Saigon warned, 'I think I should say 
qUite bluntly that, as seen from this post, in supporting the French effort 
as presently conceived, we are now backing an almost certain loser'.- If 
Indo-China was to be saved, Britain would have to play a more prominent 
role. 
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There were. however. few initial signs that a more vigorous approach 
was in the offing. Heightened concern over events in Laos was not mirrored 
by greater readiness to provide the French with assistance.- But as the 
threat to Luang Prabang mounted. leading Government officials began to 
question the wisdom of this decision. 'We seem to give a flat rejection to 
everything the French ask', lamented the Minister of State at the Foreign 
Office, Selwyn Lloyd, 'cannot we be more positive?' 10 Anthony Head was 
even more dissatisfied, making known to Churchill on 30 April his 'very 
grave concern' at 'our decision that nothing whatsoever can be done to 
help'. Head maintained that because of the far reaching consequences of a 
French defeat, a greater level of British involvement was necessary: 'I 
cannot escape the conviction that a Communist triumph in Indo-China will in 
the long term lead to the loss of the whole of South-East Asia [with an] 
extremely serious effect not only on our British economy but on Western 
Europe'. He was 'more than aware of the intense difficulties with which we 
are confronted but the longer term consequences seem to be so serious as to 
justify the most strenuous efforts to avoid them'. 11 
Head and Lloyd expressed very clearly the wider issue which ths Viet-
Minh's invasion engendered in London - that the importance to Britain and 
the West of safeguarding Indo-China had to be reflected in the degree of 
help given to France. Also, on a practical day-to-day baSis, British 
diplomacy had to be more assertive if the drift towards a d4b~cle was to be 
reversed. A decisive policy was required, not one which continually 
reacted to changing circumstances or was completely emasculated by the 
over-riding but self-defeating imperative of avoiding additional 
commitments. That within two months of the Laotian crisis the Churchill 
Administration possessed such a policy is remarkable, the more so when 
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juxtaposed with the indecision of the previous 20 months. What made it 
more remarkable still was that it evolved while Churchill was master of 
British foreign policy. Indeed at first sight Head would appear to have 
addressed his misgivings to the most unsympathetic person in the 
Government. 
As we have seen, events in Asia held little fascination for Churchill 
at this time. The most important post-war event in the region, the advent 
of the People's Republic of China, had failed to impress him· 2 , as did the 
P.R.C. 's intervention in the Korean war in November 1950. 'I do not regard 
Communist China as a formidable adversary', he told Selwyn Lloyd in August 
1952 ... 
Anyhow you can take it that for the next four or five years 400 
million Chinese will be living where they are now. They cannot 
swim, they are not much good at flying and the Trans-Siberian rail 
-way is already overloaded. '3 
As for the Sino-Soviet Treaty, Churchill refused to accept that it had made 
the world a more dangerous place. 'Russia would start World War III when 
she wanted', he declared in 1951: 'she would certainly not do so merely to 
honour her pledge to China'. ,. Yet there was one, indirect, sense in 
which Asia was important. In July 1953, with an armistice in the offing, 
Churchill confessed to Montgomery that ' Korea does not really matter now 
. .. (itsl importance lies in the fact that it has led to the rearming of 
America' which, he felt, 'may have saved the peace of the world'. ,. This 
is the essence of Churchill's outlook in the early 1950's. Events in Asia 
had little significance in their own right but did acqUire a relevance once 
they began to impinge on Europe or the Middle East, areas of more vi tal 
concern to Britain. 
For Churchill, Korea had served a useful purpose as the catalyst which 
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prompted the rearmament of the West. It was the fact of the war rather 
than its course or even outcome that mattered. When in 1954 Churchill was 
reminded of the theory that if Communist China had been represented at the 
United Nations at the start of 1950, 'the North Korean aggression might 
never have occurred at all', his reaction was very much to the pOint: 'We 
were lucky. America rearmed'. 1. The corOllary of this was a deep 
reluctance to take issue with the United States in Asia. A dispute over 
policy towards China might cause tension in unrelated but more important 
spheres. Eden, conversely, was much less inclined to follow an American 
lead, not because he disputed Churchill's estimate of defence priorit ies 
but because he recognised the danger that Washington's sometimes clumsy and 
belligerent poliCies might lead to a general war with China from which 
Sri tain would be unable to stand aloof. Hence Eden's concern about 
American unllateral1sm in Asia and his determination to establish some 
basic ground-rules about consultation with the Eisenhower Administration. 
This also underpinned his pursuit of a South-East Asian defence 
organisation. Churchill, though, rejected the notion that the region was 
important to Britain because it was important to the United States and 
that, as Eden maintained, American actions must have repercussions for 
British interests and even Bri Ush security if they culminated in an 
unlimited conflagration, Instead the Prime Minister's theme-song remained: 
'Do not let us be too hard on the Americans in this part of the world', and 
'don't let us fallout with U.S. for the sake of Communist China', 17 
As one might expect, Indo-China held 11 tt Ie interest for Churchill. 
When the invasion of Laos forced him in his capacity as acting-Foreign 
Secretary to take notice of what was happening he reacted with irritation 
and complained, privately, that he had been able to 'remain ignorent about 
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these outlandish areas all his life; it was hard that they had come to 
tease him 1n his old a8e'. ,. Nor was it a surprise when Churchill replied 
on 2 May to Head's call for greater help for France by pointing out that 
there were 'a lot of thin8s happenin8 which we ri8htly view with anxiety' 
but this would not be diminished 'by our becoming involved in the immense 
re8ions concerned'. l' A little later he remarked that Indo-China 'does not 
really matter'. Britain had given up India, '[ w] hy shouldn't France give 
up Indo-China?20 
Thus with Churchill steerin8 British forei8n policy one might assume 
that the prospects were slim indeed for the new and decisive approach to 
the Indo-China problem called for by concerned Ministers in Whitehall. 
Yet, ironically, it was Churchill who, far from hampering progress in this 
direction, actually led from the front with a sustained attack on French 
policy, first 1n private and later in public. In spite of what he himself 
said, Indo-China did matter for one good reason - the detrimental impact it 
was having on the security of Western Europe. Churchill gradually came to 
realise this. If Korea had been the justification for general Western 
rearmament, Indo-China was hampering the attainment of this objective in 
two ways. First, by making it difficult for France to meet its N. A. T. O. 
obligations and, second, because it was providing Paris with an excuse to 
defer E.D.C. ratification thereby preventing a German contribution to 
defence. In January 1952, Churchill had declared that if it were not for 
the 'strain' of Indo-China, 'the French could become stronger in Europe and 
therefore be willing to permit the Germans to become stronger. As it is, 
we could well lose both France's and Germany's contribution ... '.a1 By May 
1953 sympathy had been replaced by frustration. In his response to Head on 
2 May Churchill argued that ... 
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The root of all evil in Europe and in Indo-China is the French 
refusal to adopt two years' national service, and send conscripts 
abroad as we do. Their political infirmities have prevented 
them from doing this and they have so weak an army that they 
can neither defend their own country nor their Empire overseas. 
They have however been successful in delaying the formation of 
a German army for three or four years, thus weakening NATO and 
all it stands for. 22 
It is perhaps inevitable that someone who takes only a tangental interest 
in a problem will produce simplistic solutions. So it was with Churchill 
who overlooked the many complexities with which the Foreign Office had been 
contending, notably the fact that the conscription solution 'would be an 
invitation to commit political suicide which no French Government would 
accept'.~ Even so, Churchill's approach had the merits of being decisive 
and coherent, something which could not always be said of Bri Ush policy 
since 1951. Throughout the spring of 1953 he continued to castigate the 
French system of National Service and to bemoan the effect which the war 
was having on Europe: France 'cannot be a great nation, still less an 
overseas Empire, wi thout a good French Army' but, he argued, because of 
Indo-China, '[alii they have done in the last five years is to delay the 
formation of a German Army because they are not able to form one of their 
own. Western Europe gets neither'.2. Hitherto these criticisms had been 
voiced in private, but on 11 May they spilled over in public. During the 
course of a speech in Parliament best remembered for his dramatic call for 
an East-West summit to explore detente in the post-Stalin world (the Soviet 
leader had died two months earlier), Churchill also warned that if France 
wished to 'preserve the authority and life of the French Union' it would 
have to take 'more effective steps'. In particular, if the French 
possessed the same system of National Service as Britain and sent their 
conscripts abroad they would have had 'much less difficulty in maintaining 
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their positions in Indo-China and could also have developed a far stronger 
army in defence of their own soU in line with their allies'. 2. Ren~ 
Massigli, the French Ambassador, was so distressed by these remarks that he 
requested a private message from Churchill to Premier Mayer saying that 
there had been 'no wish to hurt French feelings'. The Foreign Office 
objected: 'It must be assumed that the strictures made by the Prime 
Minister were intentional and that he would not now wish to water them 
dowo',::za 
French sensitivity about conscription indicated that Churchill's 
aggressive one-theme approach had its limitations. At the same time the 
Prime Minister's positive attitude, when combined with the image of French 
military incapacity revealed during the Laotian crisis, had a galvanising 
effect in the Foreign Office. From May 1953, officials set out to break 
the negative mould of British policy. The consequences of eventual French 
defeat (for that was the uncomfortable spectacle foreshadowed by the Viet-
Minh offensive) suddenly appeared very real rather than hypothetical. So 
much so that preparations for effecting the Songkhla strategy were stepped 
up. To date, matters had not been considered serious enough to contemplate 
finalising plans although in February a special Cabinet Committee had been 
set up to monitor the situation in Indo-China. a7 However, on 26 April, 
wi th the Viet-Minh advancing deep into Laos, Churchill ordered that the 
Songkhla position be occupied 'immediately if the security of Malaya on the 
landward side was in danger as a result of events in Indo-China or Siam'. a. 
Unfortunately, the Foreign Office suspected that the acquiesence of the 
Bangkok Government was unlikely in 'any plan which is designed, as this is, 
to defend only a few square miles of Siamese territory, particularly as the 
Siamese traditionally suspect the British of wishing to incorporate the 
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southernmost provinces of Siam in Malaya'.a. 
A British 'invasion' of southern Siam was therefore likely to provoke 
outrage in the United Nations irrespective of its defensive nature. Also, 
because the predominant foreign influence in Siam was American, Washington 
might take a dim view of British actions. The Bangkok regime was supplied 
with substantial military and economic aid by the Americans who, in return, 
maintained a Military Assistance Advisory Group and a Special Technical Aid 
Mission in the country. 30 The British welcomed this and had no wish to 
dispute Washington's increasing predominance. However, the American 
reaction to the Songkhla strategy was difficult to predict, and officials 
were torn between giving Washington prior notice (and inviting a veto of 
the action) or presenting it with a fait accompli (thus risking a rift in 
relations>. Following his directive of 26 April, Churchill was inclined 
to inform the Eisenhower Administration but, with the easing of the 
pressure on Laos, he changed his mind. 31 Templer, whose professional 
preoccupation was Malayan defence by the most effective means, and fearing 
a hostile American reaction, was particularly relieved at this. 32 On 2 
May, Churchill ordered that the Songkhla strategy be kept 'in the planning 
stage' for the time being. aa 
Nevertheless a new sense of urgency was discernable in London, a belief 
that the true art of crisis management was to avoid the crisis in the first 
place. And that meant solving the Indo-China problem. As the Colonhl 
Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton, put it in July, 'it should not be assumed 
that, if the whole of Indochina came under Communist control, we should be 
able to prevent a deterioration in the situation in Malaya'. It was 'vital 
to the security of Malaya that the French should achieve victory in 
Indochina' . :..- This would, simultaneously, obviate the necessity of the 
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Songkhla strategy with its unpredictable political reperCUSSions and 
military and financial outlay. Somehow the French had to be made to face 
up to the failings of their present policy. Churchill may not have 
possessed any realistic ideas as to how this might be achieved, but his 
aggressive demeanour towards the French created an atmosphere in the 
Foreign Office conducive to constructive and positive thought. 
As so often in the past, the dynamo of new thinking on South-East Asia 
was R. H. Scot t, remembered by Eden as 'one of the ablest members of our 
Foreign Service'. 3& At the start of May, Scott tabled a discussion paper 
which argued that the war could still be won if four conditions were met: 
strong and inspiring military leadership in Viet-Nam and an offensive 
strategy; unstinting support from Paris; an imaginative approach to the 
political problems of Indo-China; and reinforcement of between two and 
three divisions from Europe. Scott called for an assertive British 
initiative to convince the French of the wisdom of such a course because 
'important British, Commonwealth, and Western interests are at stake', a 
rebel victory would 'spur communist efforts everywhere, not least in France 
itself' and, lastly, because 'the defence of Malaya <unless we are prepared 
to abandon it) would involve heavier commitments ... than those resulting 
from efforts to save Indo-China'. This was the first time a senior Foreign 
Office official had looked at the problem from this perspective and taken 
account of the future military and economic difficulties for Britain of 
doing nothing to avert a catastrophe in Viet-Nam in the present. Scott 
suggested another radical departure: if the only way of persuading the 
French to adopt a more forward policy was for Britain to pay a 'price', 
then this should be accepted. The situation was not 'hopeless ... 
But it can be restored only if very strong pressure is brought 
to bear on the French Government to take effective steps to 
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suppress the rebellion . " and thereafter to reduce the French 
... commitment ... I urge that we should bring this pressure to 
bear on the French, accepting the consequences for ourselves of 
this advice. 36 
Scott's paper received a sympathetic but cautious hearing in the Foreign 
Office. Its main flaw, however, was that the likeliest French 'price' for 
reinforcing its Expeditionary Corps was still unaffordable even if the 
willingness to meet it had increased.~7 Scott himself conceded this at a 
meeting of the Cabinet's Far East Committee on 13 May. The French, he 
said, might send reinforcements to Indo-China provided they were 
replaced by us in Europe, but this would be a condition which we 
in the United Kingdom could not accept. With the world situation 
as it was, and particularly in view of developments in the Middle 
East, we could not enter into any agreement at this juncture which 
might lead to a fresh commitment of British troops.:.· 
Nevertheless Scott's views struck a chord in the Foreign Office, for there 
was general agreement that something had to be done to stave off disaster 
in Indo-China even if the course he recommended was not to everyone's 
liking. 
On 21 May a meeting was held of senior Foreign Office officials and 
devoted entirely to Indo-China, the first of its kind since October 1951 
and a sign of mounting unease. It concl uded that although pressure on 
Paris to take the offensive in Viet-Nam 'would lay us open to French 
counter-demands' which might include 'asking us to station more troops in 
Europe, or possibly a demand that we should join the European Defence 
Community', Bri tain should be prepared to 'answer such a riposte'. This 
did not mean, as Scott had originally intended, that French requests should 
be met. Instead officials decided that the French case against sending 
further troops should be nullified by force of reasoned argument. It was 
to be made clear that none of the obstacles were insurmountable, and that 
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France had within itself the power to take the requisite action without the 
help of others. The one problem with this latest variation on the theme of 
words-not-assistance was the 'presentation of the problem as we see it to 
the French'. Should it be at Ministerial or Ambassador level, or even 
Once again it was Churchill who helped clear the path to progress. On 
20 May, the French Prime Minister, worried that ChurchUl's call for an 
East-West Heads of State summit would produce a meeting from which France 
was excluded. called for a conference of Anglo-Franco-American leaders to 
discuss the issue in greater detail. Eisenhower quickly agreed, as did 
Churchill, and a meeting was arranged for Bermuda at the start of July.·o 
To the Foreign Office, the Bermuda Conference provided a perfect 
opportunity to tackle the French at the very highest level. At their 
meeting on 21 May officials agreed that ChurchUI, on recent evidence, 
would probably wish to raise Indo-China at Bermuda and that a detailed 
brief should be prepared to embody the Foreign Office's new-found 
assertiveness.'- 1 
The brief took a month to compile. When it finally emerged it had the 
approval of all Foreign Office departments concerned with Indo-China as 
well as the Chiefs of Staff and thus constituted the most authoritative 
statement of official British thinking since Churchill's return to power. 
The paper began by summarising the importance of Indo-China in familiar 
terms ... 
Strategically, Indo-China is the key to the defence of South-
East Asia and hence of the Indian Ocean. Economically, a threat 
to South-East Asia is a threat to Malaya, the most important 
single source of surplus dollars in the sterling bloc. Politic 
-ally, the loss of Indo-China would not only be a victory for 
world communism, but a catastrophe which would gravely affect 
France's world position and in particular in North Africa. More-
over, events in Indo-China are being increaSingly watched by 
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Australia and New Zealand; a worsening of the situation might 
make them more reluctant to commit their forces outside the Far 
Eastern theatre and more inclined to look to the U.S. for support. 
In other words ... 
The threat to United Kingdom and other Commonwealth interests 
in South-East Asia, notably Malaya, increases as the position 
in Indo-China deteriorates. With their present policy the French 
are drifting towards an eventual defeat. The situation can only 
be saved by France and this year may be the last chance. A new 
lead from Paris and resolute decisions by the French Government 
are indispensible. 
The problem in Indo-China was two-fold. Politically, disaffection with the 
existing degree of independence was widespread and the concessions granted 
to date had failed to convince 'even France's friends of the real 
independence of the Associate States'. This gave Ho Chi Minh a dangerous 
monopoly over Viet-Namese nationalist aspirations. Militarily, ' the 
initiative rests squarely with the Vietminh' and French claims that the 
withdrawal of their troops and the transfer of defence duties to the Viet-
Namese army was a workable sta~gy were 'entirely fallacious' in the view 
of the Chiefs of Staff. It could only succeed if the threat from the Viet-
Minh was first reduced to guerilla proportions, otherwise there would be 'a 
more rapid deterioration'. In working to avoid that situation there had to 
be a dual approach. Pol1 tically, France had to concede the Associate 
States an independent status equivalent to that of British Commonwealth 
countries including the right to secede from the French Union. Militarily, 
there had to be an offensive strategy via reinforcement. 
The brief went on to chronicle the likely French objections. On the 
political front, Paris would probably maintain that it was 'impossible to 
justify the continued expenditure of French blood and treasure' on behalf 
of countries which could, at will, sever their links with France as soon as 
the war was over; the right of secession would undermine the French 
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posi tion in North Africaj and finally, the Associate States were unready 
for independence. As British policy-makers had agreed on 21 May, these 
complaints were to be met with impregnable counter-arguments: independence 
for Indo-China would strengthen the French Union as a unity based on 
consent not coercion; if the present policy continued and the French 
suffered a decisive military reverse. the effect on national prest ige 
'would be at least as serious as that of loosening the bonds of the French 
Union' j and lastly. only the granting of greater autonomy 'can rally all 
non-Communist elements of the local population wholeheartedly behind the 
war' and so weaken the Viet-Minh's power-base. 
On the military front, when confronted with the reinforcement thesis 
Paris would doubtless contend that there were no troops to spare from the 
regular French Army and that it was politically impossible to increase 
National Service and despatch conscripts to Viet-Na~ if the professional 
French Army in Europe were tapped it would upset the balance of power 
in relation to the Soviet blocj the transfer of troops from the Continent 
was equally impossible • in the face of a nascent German army. particularly 
so long as the United Kingdom declines to enter into more binding 
commitments 1n Europe'j and that if the French appeared to gain the upper 
hand in Viet-Nam 'this would provoke Chinese intervention'. Again the 
Foreign Office had a ready response - French willingness to make a greater 
effort, including amending the rules of National Service, 'would be the 
test of her claim to continued recognition as a Great Power'j as for the 
balance of power in Europe, 'two or three French divisions more or less 
would make no decisive difference' and 'French diVisions would be serving 
the same cause in Indo-China as in Europe'; France 'has at least a clear 18 
months grace before German rearmament would become effective' while 
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successive British pledges 'from the Dunkirk Treaty onwards' should have 
made it plain that 'we are already fully committed' to European security; 
finally, Chinese intervention was remote, but 'in any case this risk must 
be faced'.·:Z 
How the French would have responded to these proposals will never be 
known. On 23 June, Churchill suffered a serious stroke and the Bermuda 
Conference waS postponed.·3 The Foreign Office was thus deprived of an 
opportunity to put its case to the French and the new positivism of British 
diplomacy found itself without 8 means of expression. Although a 'Lit tle 
Bermuda' was hastily arranged for WaShington at Foreign Minister level, 
Britain's representative, Lord Salisbury, had little time to prepare and 
concentrated inevitably on the domdnant issues of the moment, Korea, 
Moscow's post-Stalin 'peace offensive', a German peace treaty and the 
possibility of an East-West summit ... • As Salisbury privately conceded, 
though he had kept 'generally in touch' with international developments in 
recent years, 'it is a very different thing when one has to come to 
decisions for oneself, and especially when one has to go and negotiate at 
Washington over a number of horribly complicated problems only after a week 
in the Office'.·· Through no fault of his own, Salisbury was not the man 
to confront the French on Indo-China. But would Churchill have been? It 
is certainly hard to imagine him, at seventy-eight, mastering so detailed a 
brief on a subject of limited interest, and he may have simply renewed his 
cri tlcisms of the French system of National Service while ignoring the 
other arguments in favour of reinforcement from the profeSSional French 
army. On the other hand, as Churchill mused on 6 July: 'Today we should 
have been at Bermuda I should have said things to the French no one 
else could say'.·6 Here, though, he was probably thinking more of the 
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E.D.C. than Indo-China. And even if not, there was still no certainty that 
the French would have responded favourably to the British prescription. 
If the opinion of the Paris Embassy is accepted, Churchill's brief 
actually understated the likely scale of French opposition. 'You can safely 
dismiss any idea of its being possible to prevail on the French to put more 
resources into the war in Indo-China', the First Minister, Rumbold, 
informed a colleague in London on 30 May. 'Any idea of an increase in the 
French eff ort could be ruled out some time ago. Now public and 
parliamentary opinion is hardening against even the maintenance of the 
French effort on its existing scale'. Rumbold consequently advised that in 
drawing up a brief for Bermuda it should be assumed that • the French will 
reduce rather than increase their effort in Indo-China in the months to 
come' and that they 'will sooner or later seek to end the war by 
negotiation ... We do not believe that any amount of cajolery or bribery 
will make much difference'.·7 Churchill's brief duly acknowledged the 
Embassy's view without giving it any great prominence.·· A despatch from 
Harvey on 26 June arrived too late to be incorporated but was even blunter, 
arguing that the idea of reinforcing Indo-China • can be ruled right out'. 
On the contrary, the Ambassador expected the 'French party at Bermuda to be 
more interested in discussing the possi bili ties of reaching a peaceful 
concl usion of the conflict than of considering whether fresh resources 
might be assembled in order to win a miU tary victory'. Churchill and 
Eisenhower's task would be • much more that of keeping the French up to 
their present mark than of persuading them to go beyond it·.·· 
The policy enshrined in Churchill's Bermuda brief was undoubtedly 
decisive when compared with official thinking since October 1951. But it 
still stopped short of advocating perhaps the one gesture which might have 
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persuaded the French to take the initiative, namely a British pledge to 
station sufficient troops on the Continent to make good the gap caused by 
any transfer of French forces to South-East Asia. Not only would this have 
eased French fears about a rearmed Germany, 1t would also have been a 
psychological boost, a clear expression of solidarity and understanding 
which might have d1ssipated the growing pressure in France for a negotiated 
settlement, even one reached from a position of weakness. But this was 
going too far for Britain whose want of manpower and position on the E.D.C. 
would have miH tated against such an undertaking even if the inclination 
had been present. Assertive as British thinking had become since April, 
advice without assistance was never going to impress the French. Moreover, 
as Rumbold and Harvey made clear, the French Government had just about 
given up any thought of a military solution to the war. Officials in 
London sensed this but were loath to accept it just yet. On 4 June, Dixon 
had minuted that 'Bermuda should be used for a supreme effort to rally the 
French to their respons1b1li ties' . But if this failed (as it did through 
Churchill's misfort une) Sri tain should perhaps move towards 'a pOlicy of 
salvaging what can be saved from the wreck',ao 
The abortive Bermuda Conference of July 1953 may therefore be seen as a 
'lost' opportunity for Britain to tell the French what ought to be done and 
for the French to act accordingly. It may also have been a 'last' 
opportunity in the sense that 1f France did not take a decision about firm 
action before the Viet-Minh renewed their campaign in October there were 
mounting fears in London that the miH tary position in Viet-Nem would 
become wholly untenable. From the autumn of 1952 until February-March 
1953, the British had considered French reinforcement essential if the 
Viet-Namese were to be presented with a going concern when, according to 
-165-
the French time-table, the Expeditionary Corps withdrew at the end of 1954. 
But from April 1953, reinforcement assumed a more fundamental utility: the 
avoidance of defeat. The events of April 'can only make one most 
apprehensive as to the outcome should the Viet-Minh attack again', 
Tahourdin wrote to M.G.L. Joy in Saigon at the end of May. 'It mey be that 
the French now have their last big chance'.-l On 5 June, Assistant Under-
Secretary W. D. Allen spoke to the Chiefs of Staff about the Foreign 
Office's concern that the 'steadily deteriorating situation' in Viet-Nam 
'must again become critical in October after the monsoon'. The 'only 
solution' lay in the provision of 'further French forces, which would in 
practice have to come from Europe'. The Military agreed, Harding remarking 
that the French 'seemed to be adopting a policy of sitting still and hoping 
for some miracle to up the balance in their favour and save the 
situation'.8z Ultimately, however, Bermuda was an 'illusory' opportunity 
in that the French had almost certainly taken a decision to negotiate their 
way out of Indo-China. The determining factor was the imminent Korean 
armistice and the sight of the United Nations and the rigidly anti-
communist Eisenhower Administration coming to terms with the Chinese. And 
if the French were no longer thinking of a military solution, there was no 
point in the British doing so. Although a clear break with past 
vacillation, the policy laid down in Churchill's brief was out of date 
before it was written. It was a policy for war at a time when the French 
were beginning to think of peace, the right solution to the problem as it 
had stood six months earlier. For the French it was no longer a question 
of how to win but how to end the war. 
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PART IV: THE VIET-MINH DIMENSION 
CHAPTER NINE 
THE NAVARRE PLAN 
A Strategy for War or Peace? 
July to October 1953 
The postponement of the Bermuda Conference deprived British diplomacy of 
what was increasingly thought of as a last chance to 'rally the French to 
their responsibilities 6S a Great Power'. 1 Time was running out if 
positive action was to be taken to forestall the Viet-MInh's autumn 
offensive. Whatever the ultimate French objective - outright victory, 
transfer of defence duties to the Viet-Namese and withdrawal, or a 
negotiated settlement - the immediate need was more troops. To British 
observers the war appeared to be entering its decisive phase. a Al though 
the Viet-Minh might still be incapable of totally destroying the French in 
the field, the ease with which they had penetrated Laos in April suggested 
that the time might not be far off when they would be able to inflict a 
telling defeat and, by so doing, finally extinguish all political support 
in metropolitan France and pave the way for a negotiated settlement on 
Viet-Minh terms. To the chagrin of the British, the French seemed 
incapable of viewing matters in this serious light. And, because of 
Churchill's stroke, there was no foreseeable opportunity to approach the 
authorities in Paris at the highest level. However, just as a pall of 
fatalism was set to envelop the Foreign Office. the French suddenly and 
dramatically launched two initiatives within a fortnight of each other. 
Their combined objective was the complete defeat of the rebel forces. This 
was 60 remarkable a break with the past that one commentator has labelled 
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it a 'New Look' French policy. 3 In London. officials initially shared this 
sense of wonderment but concluded. after deeper reflection. that the 'New 
Look' promised rather more than it could deliver. The view gained currency 
that while ostensibly a strategy for victory. it was in reality a strategy 
for peace. 
The first initiative came 1n the political sphere. In the years following 
the inception of the Bao Dai experiment the British had repeatedly urged 
the French to make Viet-Namese independence a reality or. at the very 
least, to make an unequivocal declaration of their commitment to complete 
the process once the war was over. Failure to do so was playing into the 
hands of the Viet-Minh who were able to draw on a wider core of indigenous 
support than might otherwise have been the case. After the Viet-Minh 
invasion of Laos the importance of an imaginative French political approach 
seemed greater than ever. During a visit to Viet-Naro in May. MacDonald 
found that the population was 'readily responsive to Vietminh subversion 
largely non-co-operative towards the French Union authorities. and that 
Bao Dai's troops lack the political inspiration necessary to light in them 
the flame of martial ardour as marks Ho Chi Minh's fighting men'. The 
principal reason was the French failure to convince the Viet-Namese they 
were fighting for themselves. This meant that 'Ho Chi Minh. the Moscow 
Communist, is enabled to grow strong not on the comparatively small 
Communist sentiment but on the widespread Nationalist sentiment of the 
population'.· MacDonald's strictures were echoed in Churchill's Bermuda 
brief which argued in favour of unfettered freedom for the Associate 
States.- Although events conspired to deny the British a chance to press 
the French on this. there were a number of encouraging signs that the new 
-170-
French Administration of Joseph Laniel (formed on 26 June) was fully 
conscious of the intimate co-relation between political freedom in Viet-Nam 
and the fighting potential of the native army.- These signals were 
portentous. On 3 July, Laniel issued a 'solemn declaration' of France's 
intention to complete the 'independence and sovereignty of the Associated 
States' . Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia were invited to send delegations to 
Paris to commence negotiations immediately. 7 
As officials in London were attempting to digest the significance of 
this announcement, a speech by General Henri Navarre on 16 July suggested 
that it was merely the political face of a much broader French initiative. 
Navarre had replaced Salan as Commander-in-Chief in Indo-China following 
the invasion of Laos and, upon completion of a tour of inspection, had 
presented the French Government with his ideas for the future prosecution 
of the war.- Although these had yet to be formally approved, Navarre felt 
confident enough to outline their essence in public. The forces of France 
and the French Union had been '1n retreat for too long', he declared, and 
the Viet-Minh could attack virtually where they pleased at the end of the 
rainy season. Thus his first task was to forestall the enemy's autumn 
offensive. Later, after a period of consolidation, the French would 
themselves take the offensive. Integral to this aim was the further 
expansion of the Viet-Namese army so as to 8i ve it greater operational 
responSibility. Navarre was also alert to the politico-military nature of 
the problem. insisting that the independence foreshadowed in Laniel's 
declaration should be 'total'.-
At first sight the so-called Navarre Plan appeared to tally closely 
with the British estimate of what was required to restore the position in 
Viet-Nam and, for that reason, early discussion in the Foreign Office 
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centred on the likelihood of the Plan being accepted by the French 
Government. 10 To put it into effect Navarre had requested sUbstantial 
reinforcements from Europe, both to meet the Viet-Minh's autumn onslaught 
and later provide the basis of a flexible reserve for offensive operations. 
The factors which had prohibited such a course in the past remained as 
formidable as ever. 11 It was with scarcely concealed surprise, therefore, 
that the Foreign Office learnt on 30 July that the French Committee of 
National Defence had agreed to provide Navarre with nearly all the extra 
troops he had asked for - nine infantry bat talions (he had requested 
twelve> and an engineer battalion, as well as an increase in transport 
aircraft, naval support and artillery. The French Government informed 
London of this decision on 5 August, but added that there were no immediate 
plans to make it public on account of the likely outcry in France at the 
despatch of reinf orcements. An incredulous Head of the South-East Asia 
Department concluded that • (tJ he moral of all this is never say die!' 12 
The Paris Embassy, its earlier assessments turned upside down, was forced 
to admit that the Laniel Administration had been 'far more forthcoming 
towards General Navarre than we and the Americans thought possible', but 
agreed that there would be 'an uproar when the news comes out'. 13 
A further reason why the French authorities were reticent about 
revealing details was that the implementation of the Plan was still 
dependent on American financial backing, particularly for the recruitment, 
training and arming of some 135,000 new Viet-Namese troops.1. Indeed the 
'solemn declaration' and Navarre's military blueprint were quite obviously 
the French response to the Eisenhower Administration's decision in March to 
make further assistance contingent upon a 'strategic and political plan' 
which held out a 'reasonable prospect of a successful end to the war within 
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a fairly short time' . 1. Both initiatives evidently fitted American 
requirements. On 9 September, the National Security Council recommended 
providing France with a further $385 million specifically for the 
implementation of the Navarre Plan. 16 The following day, Laniel made this 
news public without mentioning the despatch of reinforcements. The British 
estimated that this new appropriation, coming on top of the $400 million 
already allocated for Indo-China for 1953-54-, would relieve the French 
Exchequer of almost the entire burden of training and equipping the native 
forces, leaving only the Expeditionary Corps to support. 17 Finally, on 30 
September, the objective of the Navarre Plan was revealed (including the 
decision to reinforce) in a joint Franco-American communiqu~ issued 
simultaneously in New York and Paris. The French, it stated, would make 
every effort to 'disrupt and destroy the regular forces of the enemy', to 
bring to a 'successful conclusion the increase of the armed forces of the 
Associated States', and to adapt its own 'effective troops to the 
conditions necessary to the success of its military plans'. The purpose of 
the supplentary $385 million was to 'permit these objectives to be reached 
as rapidly and efficiently as possible'. 18 The approval of the French 
Government (and, by extension, the United States) for Navarre's military 
programme, as well as its more sympathetic appreciation of the political 
aspirations of the Associate States, suggested that at almost the last 
moment (the fighting season was only six weeks away> France had re-
discovered the determination to succeed in Viet-Nam. Its politico-military 
initiative was presented as a departure from the negative and defensive 
policy of recent years. Now, with its new-found offensive spirit, France 
was preparing to turn the tables on the enemy. 
Or so it seemed. In the Foreign Office, officials reflected that the 
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'New Look' stopped some way short of the measures necessary to stem the 
pending rebel offensive, let alone reverse the tide of Viet-Minh political 
and mil1 tary success. For example, while Laniel's declaration of 3 July 
had been publicly welcomed by the Churchill Administration, in private 
serious reservations had been expressed. I' Crucially, Laniel had implied 
in his announcement and subsequently made clear in conversation with Harvey 
that Indo-Chinese independence would only be discussed within the framework 
of the French Union. 20 This restriction virtually ensured the failure of 
the projected Franco-Associate States negotiations for, as Churchill's 
Bermuda brief observed, the right of secession from the Union was 'probably 
the minimum demand even of moderate nationalists'.21 Yet from the French 
perspective Laniel's position had a certain logic. On the one hand, total 
freedom for" Viet-Nam would do little to 'compensate Frenchmen for the 
sacrifices they are making on behalf of a country which they will 
ultimately have to leave'.22 On the other, independence within the French 
Union held out at least some pl-ospect of continuing French influence and 
possibly commercial gain. For example, according to the Union's 
Constitution, Viet-Nam would have to continue giving preference to 
manufactured goods from France which it could import more cheaply from 
elsewhere. 23 Predictably, therefore, Laniel's 'solemn declaration' 
received a cool reception in Indo-China. 24 The Foreign Office concluded 
that the Associate States were not going to be 'fobbed off with a liberal 
interpretation of existing agreements'. Though a step in the right 
direction, it was not likely to produce I the necessary change of political 
atmosphere' unless energetically followed Up.2& In the event the opposite 
proved the case. While the scheduled talks got under way in Paris in the 
late summer, they quickly became bogged down and, by October, with the 
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Viet-Minh preparing to renew hostilities, little progress had been made. a. 
As for the Navarre Plan, the British had great difficulty in accepting 
it as a strategy for victory. Doubts were expressed as to whether the 
projected reinforcements would be sufficient to hold the present position 
never mind take the offensive, and their numbers were significantly less 
than the three-to-four divisons thought necessary by the British Chiefs of 
Staff . In the end, though Navarre requested twelve battalions and was 
promised nine, he only received seven. 27 Moreover, their quality was also 
open to question the vast majority were North African and not 
metropolitan French as Navarre had wanted, a fact which diluted the 
expected 'uproar' in France when the details of the Plan were revealed. 
The professional French army in Europe went largely untapped. a. For these 
reasons, officials in London sensed a confidence trick, a re-packaging of 
the old policy of holding the line in Viet-Nam pending the transfer of 
defence responsibility to the indigenous armed forces and the return of 
French troops to Europe. The rhetoric accompanying the Plan implied that 
the Viet-Minh would be defeated, or at least rendered militarily impotent, 
before French forces departed the scene. But to British policy-makers the 
limited manpower at Navarre's disposal, even after augmentation, was 
insufficient to achieve this objective. The probability remained that when 
the French finally withdrew in 1954- or 1955 the 'well organised, trained 
and equipped modern force' that was the Viet-Minh would rout the Viet-
Namese army. 2' Tahourd1n, voicing the consensus in the Foreign Office, 
minuted on 6 August that nothing had occurred in recent weeks to ... 
invalidate the thesis on which we have hitherto been working, 
namely that to make a proper job in Indo-China the French 
reqUire, inter alia, substantial reinforcements to defeat the 
regular Vietminh formations and hand over a going concern to 
the local armies ... The effort envisaged under the Navarre 
Plan falls considerably short of this. Thus, provided all goes 
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well, the most that we can hope for ... is the avoidance of what 
previously looked like almost certain military disaster next Oct 
-ober ... The overall situation may look better than it did two 
months ago, but clearly much has to be done if the dangers which 
threaten are to be not merely averted but eventually surmounted. ao 
SUbsequent insights tend to confirm this estimate of the limited scope of 
the Plan. Navarre himself, recalling his tour d'horizon in Viet-Nam, wrote 
that 'it struck me immediately that there was no possibility of winning the 
war'.:!IIl As for the reinforcements granted him at the end of July, he had 
been forewarned that they were nothing more than 'early replacements for 
his projected 1953 losses'. 32 At the time, too, leading French figures 
were prone to express their private doubts to British listeners. General 
Ganeval, a senior adviser to Pleven at the Ministry of Defence, confided 
that 'optimistic ideas on the complete defeat of the Viet Minh were 
unreal' , a view echoed by the new Commissioner-General in Indo-China, 
Maurice Dejean, who remarked to Graves on 11 September that the Plan was 
'subject to the need for avoiding operations which might involve heavy 
casualties'.33 This caveat hardly suggested that the French were steeling 
themselves for an intensification of the war effort. Even Navarre accepted 
that his strategy had 'still to be put to the test of battle' 3., all of 
which sustained the Foreign Office in its belief that the means available 
under the Plan did not warrant its grandiose end. 
How then did the British make sense of this gap between rhetoric and 
reality? Had the French Government badly miscalculated the number of 
troops necessary to restore the pOSition, or had it allotted the maximum 
number an increasingly restive public and parliament would stand for? The 
answer to both questions might well have been 'yes' had the Foreign Office 
truly believed that the Navarre Plan was what it purported to be, namely a 
springboard to victory. But so inadequate were its prOVisions that the 
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British came to suspect that the French Government privately and 
consciously saw it as a stop-gap expedient, a means to a rather different 
end. By September, the Foreign Office had concluded that the Navarre Plan 
was nothing more than a stabilising operation pending the commencement of 
negotiations with, initially, Peking and, inevitably, Ho Chi Minh. As we 
have seen, the Paris Embassy had gone on record in June to argue that this 
was the likely objective of French diplomacy.3. The accuracy of this 
assessment was demonstrated the following month during the 'Little Bermuda' 
conference in WaShington. French imagination was greatly exercised by the 
imminent negotiated end to the fighting in Korea, Georges Bidault, Laniel's 
Foreign Minister, argUing that 'it would not be possible for French opinion 
to accept a situation in which there was an armistice in Korea and a 
continuance of the war in Indo-China'. Specifically, Bidault wanted to 
extend the agenda of the Political Conference which was to follow the 
armistice to include discussion of Indo-China. This proposal was resisted 
by Salisbury who was determined that nothing should be done to complicate 
or endanger a lasting settlement in Korea. Bidault's idea, if accepted, 
might be 'fatal' in this respect. On the other hand, Britain had long been 
committed to a modus vivendi with Peking and to reducing tension throughout 
Asia as a whole once the fighting in Korea had ended. Salisbury therefore 
agreed that if good progress were made on Korea at the Political Conference 
and the Chinese then raised Indo-China of their own accord 'we should keep 
an open mind and be prepared to seize such opportunities as might offer'. 
This was also Dulles's opinion. a. 
Despi te this half-concession, in private the Anglo-Americans were 
inclined to dismisS Bidault' s suggestion on the grounds that meaningful 
discussions with China could only. and should only, be conducted from a 
-177-
position of French military superiority, a pre-requisite conspiciously 
absent in Viet-Nam despite the Frenchman's protestation that the situation 
was 'not so unfavourable as was sometimes suggested'. 37 It is certainly 
not true that, following the Korean armist ice, 'the notion swiftly spread 
among the big powers that the Indochina conflict should be settled 
[diplomatically] as well'.38 On the Western side this was a solely French 
preoccupation. Moreoever, the French case was weakened by their inability 
to say exactly what they hoped to achieve through talks with the P. R. C. 
Indeed, if Paris was serious about negotiations, it was surely the Viet-
Minh and not the Chinese who should be addressed. But this was something 
which successive French Governments had refused to countenance. Direct 
discussions with Ho Chi Minh could be interpreted as an admission of defeat 
and might encourage nationalists elsewhere in the French Union to pursue 
their aspirations through force of arms. Talks with the Chinese on, as it 
were, a Great Power baSiS, would avoid what was essentially an issue of 
prestige.31I' Therefore, as Harvey had informed Eden at the end of 1952, 
'[m]uch vague hope rests on some turn of the diplomatic wheel which would 
result in a detente in Indo-China'. There was, he said, 'a good deal of 
wishful thinking to the effect that a general settlement in the Far East 
would result in a general slackening of Viet-Minh pressure'. 40 This 
'wishful thinking' increased significantly when an armistice was finally 
signed in Korea on 27 July 1953, but so too did French vagueness as to what 
this should mean for Indo-China. 
However, on 1 August matters began to clarify a little when Massigli 
called on Salisbury at the Foreign Office to tell him that 'the first 
object of French policy was to obtain a cessation of Chinese help to the 
Viet Minh, to be followed by a cessation of hostilities'. The problem was 
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how to bring Indo-China 'within the general ambit of the [Korean] Political 
Conference'.~l A week later Joy was told by Dejean in Saigon that it was 
'essential that the Chinese should be induced to disinterest themselves in 
Indo-China' . When Joy expressed scepticism, Dej ean 'exclaimed that if 
China could not be brought to stop aid to the Vietminh he saw no hope'.·z 
Collating and interpreting these and other signals, the Foreign Office 
concluded that what the French had earlier referred to as a sign of Chinese 
'good will' was, in practice, a curtailment of the supply of eqUipment, 
money, refuge, training facilities and technical advice to the Viet-Minh, 
all of which Peking had made available in steadily increasing quant it ies 
since 1950. If successful in this, the French believed that the potency of 
the threat posed by the Viet-Minh would be greatly reduced. ~3 In these 
altered circumstances the forces at Navarre's disposal might indeed prove 
adequate to launch a successful counter-offensive against a weakened 
adversary. On this reading, there was no contradiction between the Laniel 
Government's rhetoric of victory and its pursuit of negotiations with 
China. However, the British had reason to question whether the French, 
even if successful in regaining the initiative, would necessarily strive 
towards the complete destruction of the Viet-Minh. This was suggested in 
the first place by Navarre during a press conference in Hanoi on 6 August 
when he spoke of inflicting 'serious defeats on the Vietminh such as will 
create favourable conditions for negotiat ion' . •• The following day Marc 
Jacquet, the new Minister for the Associate States, told Reilly in Paris 
that the denial of Chinese aid would be a 'severe blow for the Vietminh, 
with whom negotiations might [then] be possible'.·· Reilly himself 
concluded on 10 August that 'nobody here seems to believe any longer in a 
complete defeat of the Viet Minh', and that the 'basic aims' of the French 
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Government were to 'find some diplomatic means of persuading the Chinese 
Government to withdraw their support from the Viet Minh', to 'regain the 
military initiative' and, if successful in these first two aims, 'to 
negotiate with the Viet Minh from strength'.·· 
Throughout August and September the French continued to complicate 
preparations for the Korean Political Conference by insisting on 
simultaneous discussion of Indo-China.·7 This, in turn, hardened the 
growing conviction in London that a negotiated settlement was at the 
forefront of French thinking. Further confirmatory evidence followed. On 
25 September, Maurice Schumann, Minister of State at the Quai d' Orsay, 
revealed in public for the first time the French Government's hope that 
'diplomatic negotiations might be opened either during or after the Korean 
Political Conference with a view to ending the aggression in Indo-China'. 
The next day Laniel declared that there was 'no dishonour in a strong 
people entering into negotiation'. Taken together, the Paris Embassy 
believed that these speeches underlined what it and the Foreign Office had 
suspected since June, namely 'that they [the French] no longer look for a 
complete military Victory over the Viet Minh and that their hopes are 
pinned on the possibility of an honourable peace by negotiation at some 
time in the immediate future'. This objective had 'never before been so 
openly declared'.·· 
This, then, was the Foreign Office interpretation of the 'New Look'. 
However, it is important to draw a distinction between British 
understanding of, and agreement with, the apparent aims of French policy. 
In general, the Foreign Office considered the 'New Look' to be i11-
conceived and fraught with risks. As early as 10 August, the Paris Embassy 
had cautioned that it was 'hardly possible to put very high the chances of 
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this policy's success' for it was 'certainly not backed by the majority of 
Frenchmen', there was a 'real danger' that the reinforcements would prove 
too few and the Viet-Namese army develop too slowly 'to prevent the long-
threatened collapse of the French will to continue the war', there was too 
much reliance placed on China deserting the Viet-Minh and, lastly, the 
'possibility of any acceptable compromise with such dyed-in-the-wool 
Coaununists as Ho Chi Minh and his main associates seems very remote' .•• 
In the Foreign Office there was broad agreement with this forecast, most 
doubts focusing on the wisdom of basing a pOlicy on Chinese compliance. 
Peking would undoubtedly demand a qUid pro quo for terminating aid to the 
Viet-Minh (assuming it even countenanced the idea), but the French had 
11 ttle or nothing to offer. The China and Korea Department concluded that 
it was 'most improbable that short of offering a complete withdrawal from 
Indo-China the French could by bilateral negotiations persuade the Chinese 
to stop aid to the Viet-Minh', a view echoed by Makins in WaShington. In 
London, the talk was of a 'Micawber-ish attitude' on the part of the Laniel 
Administration. so 
The virtual certainty that the French would achieve little in talks 
with the Chinese gave rise to a fear in official Sri Ush circles that 
public opinion in France, encouraged to think that Indo-China would be 
covered by a general post-Korean settlement, might react angrily when 
confront.ed with the opposite reaH t y and force Laniel to coaunence direct 
negotiations with the Viet-Minh. Given that these would be conducted from 
a position of rebel military superiority, the outcome seemed all too 
obvious. From Saigon Joy warned that almost any compact reached under such 
circumstances 'would result, in a short space of time, in Communist control 
of Indochina just as inevitably as would a Vietminh military victory ... ' 
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In London, too, Franco-Viet Minh talks were considered • tantamount to 
giving Indo-China away'.51 
• 
The three months following the cancellation of the Bermuda Conference saw 
the nature of the problem which Viet-Nam posed for British diplomacy 
complete its transformation from an issue of war to an issue of peace. 
Ironically, having only in June perfected a policy aimed at encouraging the 
French to press on to victory, the Foreign Office had by October to re-work 
this policy to accommodate the growing inevitability of a negotiated 
settlement. The period was characterised by confusion, with victory and 
compromise often uttered in the same - invariably French - breath. For 
this the 'New Look' itself was responSible, mirroring as it did the 
uncertaint y and tensions wi thin the French body pol1 tic as to the wisest 
way forward in, or way out of, Indo-China. But by the late summer of 1953 
the Foreign Office believed it had a fairly clear idea of what the French 
were trying to do. The problem was how to deter Paris from embarking on 
precipitate negotiations and to persuade the Laniel Administration of the 
wisdom of prior military success. 52 
The period in question raises several interesting issues. Why did the 
French maintain that the Navarre Plan heralded Victory when, as was 
increasingly obvious, the real emphasis was on a political solution? The 
reason seems to have been to extract further aid from the United States. 
To obtain this, the French simply told the Americans what they wanted to 
hear - that the war was still winnable. Paris may have reasoned that this 
was a small price to pay if most of the cost of its more limited objectives 
could be met by the American taxpayer. Without the trappings of Victory, 
Washington' 8 financial backing could not be assured. This might help to 
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explain the aggressive tone of the Franco-American communique of 30 
September. As officials at the Quai d' Orsay admitted, because it was a 
joint communique, 'the reactions of the American public had to be taken 
into account' and they would expect 'the emphasis to be placed on French 
determination to fight hard'. In reality it remained 'the policy of the 
French Government to negotiate a peace in Indo-China as soon as their 
position is sufficiently favourable'.·3 There is also some evidence that 
Navarre was actually pressured by American advisers in Viet-Nam into making 
his recommendations rather more far-reaching than he himself desired.-
Thus the ironic possibility exists that the Americans themselves may have 
primed Navarre to tell them - the Americans - what they wanted to hear. 
This in turn raises a related issue: why did a budget-conscious U.S. 
Administration invest another $385 million in a project which, from the 
British standpoint, had little chance of succeeding in its declared aims"? 
If the British could see the flaws in the Navarre Plan, why not the 
Americans? The answer seems to be that, far from blindly accepting French 
assurances of victory, the Eisenhower Administration endorsed the Navarre 
Plan fully conscious of its shortcomings. They did so, however, because 
there appeared to be no practicable alternative. The French had gone about 
as far as they could by way of reinforcement given the unpopularity of the 
conflict at home where the 'tide of opinion was running so strongly against 
the war' that the new American assistance in carrying it on 'aroused 
resentment rather than gratitude'.·· Most importantly, the Americans (and 
the British for that matter) were by now convinced that Laniel's 
Administration was the last 
concl usion. Any successor, 
that would even contemplate a victorious 
the State Department concluded, would almost 
certainly be 'committed to seek a settlement on terms dangerous to the 
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security of the United States and the Free World'.·· This consideration 
alone ensured support for the French Government's policy on a 'lesser of 
two evils' basis. 
A subtle but decisive psychological factor may also have been at work 
in Washington. Because the Eisenhower Administration believed that there 
was no acceptable substitute to miH tary Victory, and because ensuring a 
non-communist future for the Associate States was now a foreign policy 
priori ty, to have admitted that the Navarre Plan could attain neither of 
these goals would have meant facing the unpalatable truth that only large-
scale American intervention with air, sea and probably land forces could 
save the situation. But the Administration was unwilling, and the country 
at large unready. to accept another costly commitment on the Asian mainland 
so soon after the termination of the unhappy Korean experience. In August, 
a State Department paper urged support for the Navarre Plan, one main 
reason being that if the French 'act uaUy decided to withdraw, the U. S. 
would have to consider most seriously whether to take over in this area'.·? 
The problem with this line of thought, however, was posited by a leading 
U. S. General: 'If we go into Indo-China with American forces, we will be 
there for the long pull. Militarily and politically we would be in up to 
our necks'.·· WaShington may therefore have sought to convince itself that 
the Navarre Plan did hold (as the French for their own reasons said it did) 
a 'reasonable prospect of success' and that Victory, as one commentator has 
written, 'was something that the French could have if the US paid' .• ' 
When a State Department stUdy cast doubt on this assumption and assessed 
the alternative courses of action open to the Administration should the 
Navarre Plan fail, a senior official insisted: I We cannot let the Navarre 
Plan fail,.eo 
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A final and more cynical motive for French optimism was that American 
financial aid for Indo-China was helping to alleviate the problems of 
France's domestic economy, American appropriations, observes one scholar, 
, al though earmarked "Indo-China", could, in agreement wi th the USA, be 
transferred to France's account with the European Payments Union'.·l A 
French historian has concluded that American assistance 'served largely as 
a means to balance the general finances of France at a time when Marshall 
Plan aid was running out, and this was a solid though unavowable reason for 
not ending the war', &2 Jacques Dalloz also notes that some in France 
'could talk of the war in Indo-China which fed the flow of American manna 
as the best French export',·~ But in the end, whatever the reasons, the 
nett result was that the United States accepted the Navarre Plan, As 
Dulles put it, 'if the French acted resolutely they had the resources to 
defeat the Viet-Minh regular formations', Thereafter, 'there would no 
doubt be a long drawn out guerilla war but it would be a guerilla war',6C 
Clearly, then, Britain and the United States differed significantly in 
their approach to the Navarre Plan. The Americans seem to have convinced 
themselves that it was a positive step towards an acceptable long-term 
military solution and hoped that its flaws would go unexposed, The 
British, conversely, doubted whether it would even be sufficient to 
maintain the present position after October and was, at best, a holding-
operation with a view to commencing negotiations in the near future, 
Focusing for a moment on the more realistic British assessment, what 
stands out is the absence of any attempt by the Foreign Office to convey to 
the French its doubts and concerns about the 'New Look' either as Paris 
projected it or as officials in London perceived it. Likewise, there was 
no effort to disabuse the Americans of their misguided faith in the 
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Navarre Plan. This passi vit y may be explained in terms of the reasons 
which had prevented positive British diplomacy since October 1951, notably 
the avoidance of additional commitments. It is, however, difficult to 
equate with the growing seriousness of the situation in Viet-Nam and with 
the more forthright attitude adopted prior to the aborted Bermuda 
Conference. Therefore, what additional constraints were operating at this 
time which might explain, though not excuse, diplomatic inertia? To begin 
with, the period witnessed a great many developments and it was perhaps 
inevitable that the Foreign Office should revert to observation and 
evaluation. It was only in September that officials began to form a clear 
picture of what the French were attempting to do. This also helps account 
for the lack of any considered position on negotiations other than reflex 
opposition to talking to the communists from weakness, politically and 
militarily, or jeopordising a Korean settlement. Indeed it is clear that 
the Foreign Office held on to visions of total military Victory in Viet-Nam 
far longer than Eden has suggested in his memoirs. The only reference in 
Churchill's Bermuda brief (25 June 1953) to negotiations is a very general 
one. •• Yet Eden claimed that he was personally working for a negotiated 
settlement from early-to-mid 1952.·· In fact it was only in the late 
summer of 1953 that British diplomacy began to seriously consider this 
option, and then only in response to firm signals that the French 
themselves were no longer thinking of outright Victory. Prior to this the 
British had perceived no pressing need for a fully thought out position on 
negot i at ions. 
Another reason for Brit ish inaction was that foreign policy was in the 
hands of someone who can be forgiven for not investing Indo-China with any 
great importance given the myriad of other difficult and more immediately 
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pressing issues with which he had to deal. 
provoke French counter-demands by urging 
Salisbury was not the man to 
them to make even greater 
exertions in Viet-Na~ Such delicate matters could best be left for Eden 
to deal with on his return. The British had also to tread very carefully 
with the Americans on Asian issues in general following a serious 
disagreement concerning London's sponsorship of India for membership of the 
Korean Political Conference. A rejuvenated Churchill argued in Cabinet on 
8 September that '[ w) e should be well-advised to go to great lengths to 
avoid any further cause of Anglo-American misunderstanding at the present 
time'. &7 Salisbury, too, felt it was of the' highest importance' to avoid 
immediately subjecting relations with Washington to such a 'strain'.-
This in itself would have precluded an attempt, had London desired to make 
one, to question the wisdom of the Eisenhower Administration's Indo-China 
policy and its commitment to the Navarre Plan. 
By October, however, British diplomacy faced a choice between continued 
silence, which would imply support for the 'New Look' in spite of deep 
misgivings about its workability and objectives, or to make known to the 
French and Americans 1 ts concern. To adopt the former position would be 
difficult to reconcile with the importance to Britain of sustaining a non-
communist Indo-China. It would also do little to narrow the divergent 
approach of the British and the Americans to the Navarre Plan. As the 
Pentagon Papers make clear, the belief that the Plan was capable of 
'turning the tide' and would lead to 'a decisive Victory over the Viet 
Minh' had 'contributed to Washington's agreement to substantially raise the 
level of assistance' to France. More generally, the 'temptation to "go 
along" with the French until the Viet Minh was defeated was all the more 
attractive because of the expectation (original emphasis] of Victory which 
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pervaded Washington'. 69 Britain on the other hand saw the main aim of 
French policy much as Navarre did: 'an honourable ex1 t from the war' 
through the creation of a 'military situation that would allow an 
honourable political solution'. 70 One might even go so far as to suggest 
that the serious Anglo-American differences in 1954 before and during the 
Geneva Conference were rooted in their differing interpretations of the 
Navarre Plan in the autumn of 1953. 
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PART IV: THE VIET-MINH DIMENSION 
CHAPTER TEN 
NO EASY WAY OUT 
Britain, France and a negotiated settlement for Viet-Nem 
October 1953 to January 195~ 
Faced with a choice between supporting the 'New Look' French policy for 
Indo-China or making its misgivings known to the French and U.S. 
Governments, British diplomacy ultimately adopted the former course. Why 
Eden and his officials did so given their doubts about the efficacy of the 
Navarre Plan and disappointment at the level of Indo-Chinese independence 
foreshadowed in Laniel's 'solemn declaration' demands some attempt at 
ex pI anat ion. The first point to make is that Indo-China did not rate as a 
matter of pr"iority for Eden when he resumed charge of the Foreign Office in 
October 1953. Even when it did assume a measure of importance towards the 
end of November, it was due mainly to its complicating effect on other 
related matters - a Korean Political Conference, Anglo-American differences 
over China, a meeting with the Russians to discuss Germany, and, once 
again, the fate of the E.D.C. As an issue in its own right Indo-China did 
not command the at tent ion of the British Foreign Secretary. The relative 
but misleading stability of the military situation in Viet-Nam was a 
contributory factor in this connection: the expected Viet-Minh oHensi ve 
had failed to materialise by the start of December owing to the fact that 
its probable target, the Tonking Delta, had remained flooded longer than 
usual after the rains. Navarre had also been able to disrupt Viet-Minh 
preparations by attacks on enemy lines of communication and sources of 
supply. 1 However, by the end of the year there were ominous signs that 
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the Viet-Minh, instead of concentrating on the Delta, would seek to divert 
French attention and resources from that vital area by renewing operations 
in Laos. One major obstacle stood in their way: the French fortress of 
Dien Bien Phu which straddled the natural invasion route. The French, far 
from viewing this development with suspicion, actually seemed to relish the 
prospect of engaging the enemy in a conventional set-piece battle on terms 
and terrain of their own choosing.z 
The incipient crisis in Viet-Nam had also to vie with other more 
immediately pressing problems. Egypt, Iran, Trieste, the E. D. C., df§tente 
with the Soviet Union, even a squabble with Saudi Arabia over Buraimi, all 
had prior claims on Eden's attention.:a In Asia it was the failure to 
convene a Korean Political Conference which caused most anXiety. This was 
mainly the result of communist prevarication and gave rise to uncertainty 
about future Chinese intentions. Was the armistice, after all, a tactical 
retreat allowing Peking to renew its strength before launching a new 
aggression? Consequently, when Eden spoke in Parliament on 5 November, it 
was to say that Asia was the 'theatre which causes us all most immediate 
concern' and that it was 'still the most dangerous of all the spheres with 
which we have to deal'. 4 As ever, it was the region's potential as a 
source of conflict between the West and China (and possibly the Soviet 
Union) which was the principal worry. Although Eden, as seen, was 
personally disinclined to believe that Peking would mount a second Korea, 
the danger could not be ruled out.· This 1n turn led Eden to focus his 
attention on the continued absence of a collective defence organisation for 
the region, the first time this issue had been examined with any 
seriousness for nearly a year. The main obstacle to progress was still 
the aloof American attitude - as apparent during the first ten months of 
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Republican rule as it had been under the Democrats. More so in fact when 
the Eisenhower Administration's aversion to consultation with allies and 
Dulles's fixation with freedom of manoeuvre was taken into account.· A 
Foreign Office memorandum in October concluded that there was 'still a long 
way to go before we can expect to see the United States committed to 
participation in any ... formal piece of defence machinery [in South-East 
Asia] with political strings attached, on the lines of NATO in Europe'. 7 
Spurred on by the tense post-armistice s1 tuation in Korea, Eden 
produced a memorandum for the Cabinet on 24 November 1n which he berated 
the American attitude. London and Washington saw a regional defence 
grouping as a means to quite d1 ffering ends, the former containment and 
compromise and the latter confl1ct with China. American pOlicy was the 
product of domestic 'emotional, political and military pressures' which 
made it difficult for the Administration to frame a 'realistic policy 
towards China'. Eden feared that these pressures might 'push' WaShington 
into 'ill-considered courses'. British policy was based on (and American 
policy opposed to) 'acceptance of the facts of the s1tuation, the avoidance 
of provocation, gradual progress towards more normal trading and diplomatiC 
relations, and the need to keep a toe in the door 1n case divergencies 
between China and Russia develop and can be exploited'. Britain should 
therefore seek to 'convince the United States Government, and encourage 
them to convince American opinion, of the rightness of our approach'. In 
other words, to construct a defence grouping on British terms. An Asian 
N.A.T.O. involving both Western and Asian nations remained Eden's long-term 
goal, but adherence to the doctrine of non-alignment meant that 'important 
Asian countries such as India and Indonesia are not yet ready to 
participate' . Moreover, Washington's support for militant anti-communists 
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like Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek, and the upholding of 'puppet' pro-
Western regimes in Siam, the Philippines and to a lesser extent Pakistan, 
did little to persuade moderate Asian opinion of the merits of 
participation in a pact alongside either the United States or its so-called 
allies. For the time being, therefore, responsiblity for regional defence 
in an emergency remained with the five leading Western Powers and, in this 
respect, Eden called for the scope of the Five Power Staff Agency to be 
extended.-
For these reasons, therefore, Indo-China and the failings of French 
policy were not at the forefront of Eden's mind. Yet, paradoxically, in 
the Foreign Office itself there was as we have seen a sharp appreciation of 
the inadequacies of the Navarre Plan and the problems likely to stem from 
its failure.' Why then did Eden's advisers not bring this to his attention 
more forcibly? One answer is a lack of alternatives. The French had 
probably gone as far as they could in reinforcing Viet-Nam in terms of 
available manpower and what public opinion would accept. If they were to 
go further, Britain, in advocating a greater effort, would be vulnerable to 
French counter-demands for help. And there could be little doubt of the 
Foreign Secretary's response to any suggestion in favour of British 
sacrifices in Europe or South-East Asia. Yet if the picture had been 
painted in the black terms it deserved it might at least have encouraged 
Eden to approach the Eisenhower Administration in an effort to disabuse it 
of its belief in victory through the Navarre Plan. This in turn might have 
seen Washington link aid for Indo-China to a more Vigorous and realistic 
French strategy. On the other hand, American pressure in this respect was 
always likely to have adverse repercussions so far as the French attitude 
towards the E.D.C. was concerned. 
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Another answer is that a degree of personal and professional rivalry 
amongst officials in the Foreign Office department responsible for Indo-
China, the South-East Asia department, may have prevented Eden receiving 
reports about the situation which might have stirred him into action. 
According to later testimony, the Head of the department, J. G. Tahourdin, 
took a conscious decison not to be too alarmist and ensured that the more 
gloomy prognostications of officials under his jurisdiction did not filter 
upwards in the Foreign Office pyramid. A careerist apparently intent on 
self-advancement, Tahourdin is said to have preferred not to have papers 
leave his department expressing views which he knew to be unwelcome to the 
Foreign Secretary. In Tahourdin's opinion the department's duty was not to 
advise but to reflect Eden's personal judgments which meant, at this stage, 
accepting the optimistic French rhetoric accompanying the Navarre Plan. 
Junior officials - a number with experience of war in South-East Asia 
between 1942 and 1945 - were left to fret in silence. Their sense of 
frustration increased once the French chose Dien Bien Phu for a show-down 
with the Viet-Mlnh, for the inappropriateness of transposing military 
tactics designed for the European battlefield to South-East Asia was 
apparent to all with first-hand knowledge of conditions in the latter. 10 
How much store should be placed on the foregoing is a matter for debate 
for, irrespective of the determinent, the end result was the same: British 
diplomacy did nothing to encourage the French to take greater stock of 
their position, nor the Americans to look anew at the Navarre Plan. 
Bri Ush policy thus rested on a hope - that the worst fears of 
officials would prove unfounded, that France would survive the next round 
of major military operations, and that somehow the elusive position of 
strength would be achieved from which negotiations might be undertaken. 
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Above all it was essential that the French did not negotiate too soon. As 
of October 1953 the Laniel Administrat ion appeared to fully accept this 
fundamental premise, a situation which no doubt encouraged those who 
thought like Tahourdin. Additional factors suggested that the French 
would not rush headlong into negotiations. One was the continuing 
impossibility of talking directly with the Viet-Minh, for the French would 
have the greatest difficulty in presenting a meeting as anything but a 
tacit admission of defeat. The appearance of humiliation as much as the 
reality would have serious consequences for France's world position. 
Moreover, Bao Dai and his followers. aware that their mandate to rule 
stemmed directly from French support, were predictably 'dead against' 
parleying with Ho Chi Minh. 11 
This in turn presented Paris with a further problem. Because it had 
always maintained that it was fighting communism in Viet-Nam 1n order to 
preserve that country's present and future freedom to choose its own 
destiny, France could hardly make peace against the express wishes of the 
Bao Dai regime without conceding the colonial nature of the conflict. 
This, too, would have adverse repercussions for France beyond Viet-Nam - in 
North Africa, in its relations with its al11es, particularly the United 
States, and in the United Nations. The Laniel Administration therefore 
tried to reconcile the unreconcilable: its commitment to a negotiated 
solution with its commitment to the Associate States. On 5 October, 
Schumann publicly declared that if it was down to France alone discussions 
with the rebels would already be in motion. But a8 things stood, these 
could only be 'conceived with the agreement and partiCipation of the 
Associated States'. 12 Welcome as this statement was to British observers, 
the contradiction which it papered over was inescapable. This was quickly 
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shown as, first, France's commdtment to involve the Associate States in the 
negotiating process and, second, its adherence to peace-through-strength 
was severely tested. 
The first trial came in the context of Laniel's 'solemn declaration'. 
While negotiations with Laos had proceeded amicably, with Cambodia and 
Viet-Ham there had been only acrimony and scant progress. 131 In Viet-Nam 
the disparate anti-communist nationalist groupings, concerned that the 
Paris talks would yield nothing more than paper assurances, convened a 
Congress 1n Saigon. On 16 October it issued a resolution rejecting 
participation in the French Union. Although quickly amended to include the 
words 'in its present form', the sense of betrayal in France was acute and 
public bewilderment intensified as to what exactly their soliders were 
dying for in Viet-Ham. ,. In the National Assembly there was an 'outburst 
of bad temper in every political party'. 1. Bidault, in London for talks 
with Eden and Dulles, said that it would be difficult 'to convince French 
public opinion of the need for continued French military effort in Indo-
China if the framework of the French Union were to disappear'. ,. During a 
full-scale debate in parliament at the end of October, Premier Laniel, 
while denouncing the resolution, also emphasised that France was not 
engaged in 
proposals 
a 'crusade or 
would receive 
a war of extermination', 
'every consideration'. 
and that Viet-Minh 
Respect for the 
sensibilities of the Viet-Hamese was becoming a diminishing inhibition in 
Paris so far as talking peace was concerned. The debate ended, however, 
with general endorsement of Laniel's policy of negotiation from strength 
and not, as some in London expected, the fall of his Government. The unity 
of Right and Left born of 'irritation with the Vietnamese' was only a 
'transitory phenomenon' in Paris. There was still no majority for an 
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alternative policy. 17 
These events were followed on 29 November by the publication of Ho Chi 
Minh's celebrated interview with the Swedish magazine Expressen. Breaking 
with previous policy, he declared himself ready to discuss a peaceful 
solution to the war if the French Government made the first move. Ho even 
argued that a negotiated end to the war and the return of French troops to 
Europe would make German rearmament unnecessary.'· Coming so soon after 
the Saigon Congress and with disenchantment with the war mounting in PariS, 
the Foreign Office wondered whether Laniel would be able to resist domestic 
pressure to explore this opening. The timing of Ho's statement was surely 
no coincidence, nor his by-passing of the Associate States in post t ing 
purely Franco-Viet Minh talks. Officials in London questioned the 
sincerity of Viet-Minh motives and speculated to what extent the interview 
represented Chinese and/or Soviet policy. Concern was also expressed about 
the adverse impact Ho's demarche would have on morale amongst the fighting 
forces in Viet-Nam as well as the confUSion it would sow in France." 
Eden took a different view. regarding it as IS psychologically weakening 
preliminary to the expected but delayed rebel offensive. zo There was even 
some suggestion that the EXpressen interview had been arranged after secret 
contacts between the Swedish journalist concerned and French pol1 ticians 
from the peace lobby in Paris.z1 But whatever lay behind Ho's words, the 
worry in London was that Laniel would jump or be pushed into untimely 
negotiations. In the event the French response was as cautious as the 
British could reasonably have hoped for. Laniel himself thought the 
interview '98 per cent propaganda' and, on 2 December, the French 
Government called on the Viet-Minh to renew its proposals through formal 
channels. They would then be examined 'in consultation with the Associated 
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States' . Whether this would suffice to satisfy a 'peace-hungry people' 
angered by recent demonstrations of Viet-Namese ingratitude remained to be 
seen. 22 In Saigon, meanwhile, Ho's statement was greeted with dismay, and 
those same nationalists so recently critical of France now feared being 
left 'in the lurch to be supplanted and massacred by the Viet-Minh'.2a 
The fact that the Laniel Administration emerged from this trial with 
its loyalty to peace-through-strength intact was due to three main factors. 
The first was the uneasy mil1 tary stand-off in Viet-Nam. Secondly, there 
was still a grudging but nonetheless widespread acknowledgement in the 
National Assembly of the disastrous consequences of negotiating with the 
Viet-Minh in present circumstances. 24 Finally, the French Cabinet 
continued to propagate the theory that a solution to the whole problem 
could be found through top-level discussions with the Chinese. Unlike a 
meeting with the Viet-Minh, Laniel believed that this course 'could not be 
considered as making a pact with the devil'. 2. Its ostensible purpose 
remained an end to Chinese help for the Viet-Minh and the pursuit of 
outright victory over a much weakened enemy.2e But British pOlicy-makers 
had long considered this a wildl y opt imistic appreciation based on the 
tenuous premise that Peking would play the part allotted it by the French 
scriptwriters. The extent of Chinese influence over the Viet-Minh was also 
unknown. Unlike Korea, Chinese involvement 1n Viet-Nam was indirect and 
there was no escaping the fact that it was 'the Vietminh and not the 
Chinese whom the French are fighting' and, by extension, the Viet-Minh to 
whom the French must eventually talk. 27 For the moment, though, Franco-
Chinese discussions were not open to the same objections as Franco-Viet 
Minh talks and their purSUit, moreover, provided public opinion in France 
with a tangible sign of the Laniel Administration's professed determination 
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to give peace a chance. 
This, then, was the situation prevailing in Paris and Viet-Nam in 
October-November 1953, observed closely by British officials but of little 
consequence as yet to the Foreign Secretary. However, from late November 
Indo-China did begin to intrude on Eden's thoughts by dint of its 
relationship to other issues. To begin with, French enthusiasm for 
negotiations with the P.R.C. irritated the British and Americans because of 
its linkage with the Korean Political Conference. Furthermore, by December 
Indo-China was having a complicating effect on efforts to arrange a meeting 
with the Soviets about the German problem and the E. D. C. Although the 
crisis which was to engulf the French in Viet-Nam in 1954 resulted from 
factors already present in Viet-Nam at the end of 1953 (an unsound 
politico-military policy compounded by shortage of manpower and increasing 
Viet-Minh strength), a number of the elements which combined to produce the 
parallel crisis in Anglo-American relations had their roots in this Wider 
discussion of Korea, Germany and the E.D.C. Thus an examination of Anglo-
Franco-American relations at this time is of considerable relevance. 
Indeed without such an exploration the British r61e in the Indo-China drama 
of 1954 is not fully understandable. 
By November 1953 the logical forum for Franco-Chinese discussions, the 
Korean Poli tical Conference, still showed few signs of material1sing. 28 
The Laniel Administration duly sought an alternative and, thanks to the 
Russians, it found one. Following Stalin's death the previous March the 
new Soviet leadership had launched a dt§tente initiative calling for the 
signature of a peace treaty guaranteeing Germany's neutrality and providing 
for its reunification. The Western Alliance was thrown into confusion. In 
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Eisenhower's vulgar phraseology, it was a question of whether the Soviet 
'woman of the streets' was, in her post-Stalinist change of dress, • still 
the same whore underneath'. 2' At the official level the leading Western 
Powers were prone to caut ion. Public opinion in Britain and Western 
Europe, however, was greatly excited by the prospect of peaceful co-
existence, a situation which Churchill took advantage of in May 1953 when 
calling for an East-West Heads of State summit. 30 Impelled by rising 
public expectations, Britain, France and the United States entered into 
what has been described as an 'elephantine minuet' with the Soviets in an 
effort to establish a date, time and agenda for a conference on the German 
problem. 31 Common ground was hard to find. On 4 August, Moscow, in 
rejecting the most recent Western proposal, complicated matters still more 
by insisting that it would now 'only agree to a conference that would 
include Communist China and discuss the problems of the world at large'.32 
This was predictably turned down by the Eisenhower Administration. 
When the Soviets repeated their suggestion on 3 November, Churchill, 
keen to preserve the prospect of a summit and anxious for American support, 
telegraphed Eisenhower: 'Why not try Bermuda again?' Such a meeting might 
also be used to discuss other problematical issues like the E.D.C., Korea 
and Indo-China. Following French agreement, the Bermuda Conference was 
re-arranged for 4-8 December. 33 Then, qUite unexpectedly, on 26 November 
the Soviets agreed to revert to a four-power meeting and, in consequence, 
the opening sessions at Bermuda were taken up with co-ordinating a 
tripartite response to this latest twist. 3 • The French, with the prospect 
of meeting the Chinese aCrOSS the Korean negotiating table receding, were 
attracted by the idea of five-power talks. 3. There was, however, little 
doubt that persistence in this view would damage Franco-American 
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relations.-
At Bermuda the three Western allies eventually agreed to invite the 
Russians to a Foreign Ministers conference at Berlin in January 1954, but 
the contentious issue of five-power talks remained. ~7 The problem, as 
summed up by a Foreign Office official, was that it would be 'most 
difficult for the French to resist any attempt on the part of the Communist 
world, whether at Berlin or elsewhere, to propose five power talks on Far 
Eastern affairs, special mention being made of Indo-China'.~· The 
Americans took a diametrically opposite view, and had no intention of 
admitting 'the bloody Chinese aggressor into the councils of peaceful 
nations' . At Bermuda, Eisenhower found Bidault's allusions to five-power 
talks a 'little cryptic': it was a phrase, he said, which had 'unpleasant 
connotations in the United States'. ~ For Britain the unwelcome dilemma 
which all of this posed was wh~to side with - France or the United States 
- if the problem of f1 ve-power talks flared up at Berlin. Suddenly, 
because of Indo-China, the maintenance of Western unity was in jeopardy in 
the face of what appeared a co-ordinated Sino-Soviet manoeuvre. 
Britain's position was made even more difficult by a natural loyalty to 
its long-established commitment to reaching a modus vi vendi with China. 
Although sceptical as to what France could achieve in terms of Indo-China, 
Eden retained hopes of resolving other Asian problems through the inclusion 
of China in a major conference, an approach which at first sight implied 
support for France. On the other hand, the British had no desire to 
antagonise the Americans. Eden had confronted this thorny issue in a 
minute to Churchill on 25 November. Five-power talks had 'obvious 
attractions', he asserted, but the ... 
main obstacle at present is that in the existing state of American 
opinion the U.S. Administration would find it politcally impossible 
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to sit down at a high level meeting with the Chinese Communist lead 
-ers and to recognise Communist China as one of the big Five 
The Americans need to accustom themselves by slow degrees to the idea 
of working with the Chinese Communists, 
Eden maintained that the first step to wider discussions must be progress 
on a Korean Political Conference, To press 'prematurely' for five-power 
talks would 'increase our differences with the Americans over the Far East 
and thus play into Russia's hands' ,40 
All in all, then, Eden faced a thoroughly unpleasant choice at Berlin, 
Should Britain side with France in support of a f1 ve-power meeting at the 
risk of gravely damaging already brittle Anglo-American relations in Asia? 
Or should it side with the United States on the grounds that a break with 
Paris, though unfortunate, would not be as serious as a break with 
Washington? In the end the Foreign Office opted to try and avoid the 
choice altogether by ensuring that the French did not break rank at Berlin, 
an implicit acceptance of the American position on talks with China, 
However, as Harvey warned Eden on 12 January 1954, this would be no easy 
task for the Indo-China war was now 'exceedingly unpopUlar in France and 
the great majority of the French people would certainly be in favour of 
ending it on any tolerable terms',41 In the Foreign Office, Allen 
reflected that 'a Communist offer of Five-Power Talks baited with the 
promise of an Indo-China settlement would be difficult for any French 
Government to resist', The Berlin Conference would be 'worth watching from 
this point of view',42 When Jacquet dropped a heavy hint that his 
Government would indeed be receptive to a Soviet offer, Burrows of the 
South-East Asia Department warned that if 'many people in the French 
Government share his attitude, Berlin may prove a trial for Western 
solidarit y' , 43 
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In briefing Eden for Berlin. his advisers therefore warned that the 
Soviets might well try to exploit the weakness of the French position 
regarding Indo-China in order to • drive a wedge between France and the 
Western policy both in Europe and the Far East'. Accordingly.' every 
effort should be made to sustain the French Government in its present 
policy of refusing to negotiate except on conditions which would safeguard 
the independence of the Associate States·.·· In other words, France must 
fight on to a position of strength. Sir James Cable has dismissed this 
advice as unrealistic given the military situation in Viet-Nam··. but in 
doing so he overlooks the need to judge it in the context of the five power 
meeting with China as well as the E. D. C. problem. To maintain a united 
front on both these issues it was necessary to argue against logic on Viet-
Nam. 
The prospect of Indo-China causing a breach in the Western front at Berlin 
was not the only example at this time of the war having an importance that 
extended beyond South-East Asia. This was again most clearly revealed at 
Bermuda where the eXChanges on Indo-China were less significant than those 
on the E.D.C. and Korea in which Indo-China came up in a secondary sense. 
Direct references to the problem in Viet-Nam were anOdyne in the extreme. 
Churchill, for example, was lavish in his praise for the effort France was 
making in the common cause, and there was little sign of his earlier 
annoyance at French reluctance to extend their period of conscription.-
As Anthony Short has observed. Bermuda could have been an occasion when. 
I instead of Churchill'S extravagant comments. French prospects in Indo-
China might realistically have been examined'.·7 But the British made no 
real effort to stiffen what was quite clearly a fragile French commitment 
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to peace-through-strength, nor to discuss with the Americans the 
shortcomings of the Navarre Plan. In holding back in this manner, Eden, in 
the absence of a brief stating in unequivocal terms the deficiences of the 
Navarre Plan, may have been seduced by Bidault's assurances that the 
situation in Viet-Nam was under control and improving. Laniel, who had 
never hidden his sympathy for the negotiation lobby in Paris, fell ill 
early on and Bidaul t, a 'notorious die-hard'·· on Indo-China, spoke in 
subsequent meetings of the 'success to date of Navarre's tactics' and that 
talks with Ho Chi Minh alone would be 'useless'.·' 
Of far greater relevance to later events were Anglo-Franca-American 
exchanges on Korea and the E.D.C. The Korean phase at Bermuda was 
dominated by revelations about American plans for retaliation against China 
in the event of a communist breach of the armistice. Eisenhower and Dulles 
made it plain, Eden noted, that they would 'hit back with full power' and 
would 'go for China with all the weapons at [their] command', including 
atomic bombs. 80 Indeed the most worrying aspect of the Conference from 
the British standpOint was American insistence that atomic weapons had, by 
process of natural evolution, assumed the status of conventional weapons. 81 
Eisenhower argued that 'the American public no longer distinguished between 
atomic and other weapons ... Why should they confine themselves to high 
explosives requiring thousands of aircraft in attacking Chinese bases when 
they can do it more cheaply and easily with atoms' .82 As Colville noted in 
his diary on 5 December: 'Everybody greatly perturbed by the American 
attitude This question has such deep implications that it is 
undoubtedly the foremost ID8t ter at the conference' .8:' Eden was 
particularly worried, confiding to his wife his 'fear' that 'we shall end 
up commit ted to new perils without any advantage to peace anywhere'. He 
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was 'sad & tired' and concerned about the 'free world & what I fear lies 
ahead'.·· 
The focus of Eden's fears, as revealed in a series of minutes to 
Churchill during the Conference, was an American-engendered third world war 
with Soviet atomic at tacks against American bases in East Anglia.·· In 
su~ he told Shuckburgh, the prospect was 'too horrible for the human mind 
to contemplate'. 55 Al though the Churchill Administration had accepted 
that British defence policy should in future be based on posseSSion of an 
independent nuclear deterrent, this did not imply a greater readiness to 
see nuclear weapons employed. In coming to accept the basic tenets of the 
Service Chiefs much-discussed 1952 Global Strategy Paper, the Government 
was motivated by the relative cost effectiveness of nuclear deterrence over 
conventional defence, the need to maintain the country's standing in the 
world and to command attention in Washington. Considerations of military 
efficacy, though important, did not predominate. As a report by a Cabinet 
Commit tee on defence policy observed in July 1954, one of Britain's main 
objectives was to 'possess the most modern means of waging war, so that we 
may hold our place in the world councils on the issue of peace or war and 
play our part in deterring aggression'.&7 At Bermuda, while the Americans 
confined discussion of atomic warfare to Korea, there could be little doubt 
that they were also thinking of Indo-China. The U.S. Government had lately 
made no secret of its determination to resist Chinese intervention in Viet-
Na~ most explicitly in a speech by Dulles in St. Louis on 2 September in 
which he warned that if 'Red China ... sends its own Army into Indo-China' 
there would be 'grave consequences which might not be confined to Indo-
China'.·· At Bermuda, Eisenhower and Dulles made plain that these 
consequences would be of an atomic variety. Thus Viet-Ham, as the 
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likeliest target of renewed Chinese aggression, assumed additional 
significance as a catalyst for nuclear as well as conventional war in Asia. 
Looking ahead, Eden's experience at Bermuda undoubtedly influenced his 
negative reaction to American calls for allied intervention in Viet-Nam in 
the spring of 1954. Although a Chinese military response to Western 
involvement could not, strictly speaking, be termed 'aggression', the 
British had learned enough of American thinking to suspect that Eisenhower 
and Dulles would not be deterred from action against China by such a 
technicali ty. Once American and Chinese forces were in opposition in 
Viet-Nam, and regardless of which side precipitated the collison, there was 
little confidence in London that the American Government or public opinion 
would be content to keep the fighting on a limited basis as in Korea. 
Another important discussion at Bermuda concerned the E. D. C., the 
relevance of which for Indo-China was only revealed after the Conference. 
Despite Bidault's protestations that it was a 'jump into the abyss' for his 
country,8' the British and Americans subjected the French to unremitting 
pressure to ratify the E. D. C. treaty without further delay. Churchill was 
particularly aroused by this debate. not from any great love of the E.D.C. 
but out of concern that a final French rejection might encourage the United 
States to radically revise it commitment to European defence. The British 
had arrived at Bermuda assuming that if the E. D. C. were to collapse the 
Americans would support direct German membership of N.A.T.O.cO They were 
quickly disabused of this belief, Dixon noting in his diary that '( tl he 
view of the Eisenhower Admin. from the beginning has been that if EDC 
fails, Germany in NATO is not a practicable solution' and that they would 
instead 'fall back on a "perimeter defence", ie. abandonment of Europe 
between the Rhine & the Pyranees'. c. Eisenhower explained to the N. A. T. O. 
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Secretary-General, Lord Ismay, that 'in his judgment, E. D. C. was not only 
the best, but also the only hope of a solution to the problem of a German 
contribution, without which NATO would fall down'.&a Dulles, too, 
emphasised that a 'new arrangement in Europe' would not lead to American 
disassociation, but this might happen if 'old Europe went on'. It was 
'precisely because US wishes to associate that U. S. welcomes E. D. C. ,-
This prompted Churchill to tell Bidault 'plainly' that 'if American troops 
were withdrawn from Europe British troops would leave toO'.&4 
A week after Bermuda Dulles re-stated this position at a meeting of the 
N.A.T.O. Council in Paris and, at a press conference on 15 December, 
uttered his now infamous warning about an 'agonizing reappraisal' of 
American policy towards Western Europe if France repudiated the E. D. C." 
Taking Washington's threats seriously, Churchill publicly supported 
Dulles'S strong-arm tactics.-- So too did Eden - privately - despite the 
suggestion in his memoirs that he had miKed feelings about the American 
approach. 67 Eden's support for the E.D.C. was more than ever a product of 
concern that the Americans meant what they said about leaving Europe. 'I am 
convinced that we are moving towards a real turning pOint in the whole 
relationship of the United States to Europe', he wrote to Alexander on 12 
December; 'we must have recourse to all our imagination and ingenuity to 
help E.D.C. through'.·· Thus at the point when the problem of Indo-China 
was on the verge of exploding, it was the E. D. C. which continued to 
dominate Eden's mind. This was to be of considerable Significance at the 
Berlin Conference when the question of a further, five-power, meeting on 
Korea and Indo-China was discussed. 
In France meanwhile Dulles's clumsy warning, far from having the 
desired effect, only exacerbated anti-American feeling, did 11 ttle to help 
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the cause of E. D. C., and threatened for a time to unseat the Laniel 
Government. Moreover, there was some concern in London that American 
pressure over the E. D. C. might lead to a speedy French capitulation in 
Indo-China. Linking the two problems in this respect was the French 
Socialist Party. In a despatch on the eve of Bermuda, Harvey offered the 
opinion that the E. D. C. could yet be 'revived' in France under a centre-
left Government that included the Socialists who, he argued, were not 
whole-heartedly against the E. D. C. although they would continue to vote 
against Laniel's 'reactionary majority' on ideological grounds. But a new 
coalition which incorporated the considerable voting strength of the 
Socialists might just tip the scales in favour of ratification. With the 
Laniel Government in trouble at the end of December, a new centre-left 
majority became one of a number of very real possibilities. 'I should 
however sound one note of warning', Harvey had added: 
The Socialist price for participation ... will include a real effort 
to end the war in Indo-China by negotiations, if necessary with Ho 
Chi Minh ... The price of the E.D.C. may well be a surrender in Indo 
-China in which nothing is saved except appearances.·' 
By 12 January Harvey had modified his opinion to affirm that the Socialists 
'would like to end [the war) on any terms, so that a Left Centre Government 
including them would be much more likely than the present one to give up 
the struggle'. 70 Therefore, Dulles's bludgeoning tactics might conceivably 
have produced a majority in the French parliament in favour of E.D.C. but 
against maintaining the effort in Indo-China, an obviously unsatisfactory 
dichotomy from Washington's standpOint and one which illustrates again the 
basic contradiction of the American position at this time. 
Essentially, the Eisenhower Administration was in pursuit of two 
mutually exclusive objectives, the success of the E.D.C and the security of 
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Indo-China. The key player in both games, the French, were prone to 
respond to pressure regarding the E. D. C. by threatening to pull out of 
Indo-China, and to pressure over Indo-China by threatening to destroy the 
E.D.C. As a prominent American official later reflected, we tried to 
hit two birds with one stone and missed both'. 71 Or, as Dulles put it, 
there was 'no point in slapping the French in the face [over Indo-China] 
and losing out on EDC'. 72 Dulles actually told Eden in Paris in December 
that 'it might be necessary to work for a French Government which would 
take office solely for the purpose of putting through E. D. C. ',73 which 
raises the possibility that the Americans might have been consciously 
seeking to undermine Laniel and pave the way for a centre-left coalition. 
If so, it is a mark of Dulles's lack of understanding of the French 
political scene that he did not foresee, as the British did, that any pro-
E.D.C. Government was also likely to favour immediate negotiations or even 
surrender in Indo-China. He was, however, conscious of the obverse danger, 
warning Eisenhower that 'we must be on guard lest Indochina also carry the 
European Defense Community down the drain'. 74 
Laniel, whose hold on power was at one stage calculated 1n terms of 
days7a, was ultimately saved by the Kremlin. In a rare display of 
collective wisdom the National Assembly reasoned that it was ridiculous for 
France to have no Government at a time when major discussions with the 
Soviets about the fut ure of Germany were in the offing. In short, the 
Berlin Conference breathed new life into Laniel's majority. 7& Britain, 
too, was saved from having to decide whether a communist Indo-China was an 
acceptable price for the E.D.C. But as we have seen, salvation was short-
lived for, at Berlin, Britain faced the prospect of an equally unpleasant 
choice when the Russians again broached the subject of five-power talks and 
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if the French could not be restrained from supporting a meeting with China. 
By the end of 1953 the factors which were to shape the crisis both in 
Viet-Nam and in Anglo-American relations in 1954 stood revealed: the 
inadequacy of French military strength and plans to deal with a concerted 
Viet-Minh offensive; British acceptance and U.S. rejection of the 
inevitability of a negotiated settlement which, in turn, reflected their 
differing estimates of the workability of the Navarre Plan; the extent to 
which French and American policy was linked to the vagaries of domestic 
opinion; the absence of a collective defence grouping for dealing with a 
major upheaval in South-East Asia; and competing Anglo-American views on 
the purpose of such a grouping which, at heart, were a manifestation of 
deeper differences over how best to handle the problem of Communist China 
per se There was also the disturbing American attitude towards the use of 
atomic weapons, a result of Eisenhower's determination to cut defence 
spending. 77 Apparent, too, was the complex and confusing relationship 
between the war in Viet-Nam and the German/E.D.C. problem in Europe. But 
what was not so clearly defined was a British policy for dealing with this 
dangerous, fast-moving and fluid situation. 
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PART V: 1954 ANATOMY OF A CRISIS 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
BERLIN AND AFTER 
January to March 1954 
The British Conservative Government entered the new year with an Indo-China 
policy composed of nothing more sophisticated than a strong aversion to the 
French negotiating with the Chinese or Viet-Minh from a position of 
military weakness. This, however, is not the impression one gains from 
Anthony Eden's memoirs. On the contrary, these suggest that his actions in 
the Indo-Chinese arena in 1954 were the culmination of a carefully 
considered strategy pursued for over two years with single-minded 
determination. He maintains, for example, that as early as June 1952 a 
military solution to the war had been rejected in London as unrealistic and 
that a negotiated settlement 'seemed to me to be the outcome to work for, 
distasteful as it must be to French feelings. Two years were to pass before 
it could be realised'. 1 In actual fact the British retained visions of 
complete French victory far beyond this point. It was only with the 
formation of the Laniel Administration in France in June 1953 and, 
thereafter, its insistence that peace was the • supreme objective', that the 
Foreign Office began to contemplate the implications of a political 
solution to the war. In this connection Eden has further maintained that 
'at the beginning of 1954 my thoughts began to turn to the possibility of 
some form of partition [of Viet-Nam] as a solution which might bring 
hostilities to an end and effect a settlement that would hold'. He was 
also • convinced that the longer negotiation was delayed, the more difficult 
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the situation would become for the French' and, accordingly, the Berlin 
Conference 'provided me with an opportunity to develop this idea'. a None 
of these assertions stand up to close scrutiny. Why Eden's account should 
be at such variance with what really transpired will be considered in due 
course. For now, it is necessary to try and define the British attitude 
towards negotiations as 1954 opened. 
Turning first to the position in the weeks leading up to the Berlin 
Conference, it is clear that Eden and his advisers strongly opposed a 
negotiated settlement. The most obvious reason was the absence in Viet-Nam 
of the sine qua non of French military superiority. On 2 December 1953, 
the South-East Asia Department, mindful of Ho Chi Minh's recent Expressen 
peace offer, argued that 'the essential point 1s that negotiations should 
only take place from a position of real strength', a view echoed in Eden's 
brief for the Bermuda Conference. 3 Early in January 1954, Assistant Under-
Secretary Allen sought to codify Foreign Office thinking in a letter to the 
Bri Ush char~e d' a ffai res in Peking. The ideal solution remained the 
'decisive defeat of the regular Viet Minh forces' although this was now a 
remote possibility. The less satisfactory alternative was a negotiated end 
to the war. This would only be 'tolerable if the outcome was such as to 
safeguard the independence of the Associate States'. Admitting to the 
existence of a 'vicious circle', Allen added that this kind of result was 
only attainable if negotiations were 'carried out from a pOSition of 
political and military strengh, and we do not consider that such a position 
has yet been reached'.-
Negotiations were resisted in the Foreign Office for a second, 
indirect, reason which centred on the probability that the Soviets would 
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renew their call for a five-power meeting when the Berlin Conference got 
underway.- In a Cabinet paper on 11 January Eden explained that whereas 
Britain and France were flexible about such a meeting the Americans were 
adamantly opposed to bestowing even limited leg1 timacy on the Chinese 
Communists by appearing with them at a high-profile international 
conference. Eden thought that the Soviets, conscious of this and 
anticipating a firm tripartite Western front on the question of Germany and 
the E. D. C., might indulge in wedge-driving tactics. These, he argued, 
could not be permitted to succeed for '[ a] bove all, Western unity must 
survive the Conference unimpaired'.- Because of the strength of American 
opinion the plain import of this statement was that Eden and Bidualt would 
side with Dulles in opposing a meeting with China. However, if the Soviets 
hinted that Indo-China might be an issue ripe for discussion with the 
P.R.C., the British feared that Bidault would be under tremendous pressure 
from French domestic opinion to agree to a five-power meeting. This would 
place France at odds with the United States. Britain, in the middle, would 
be forced to take sides. Eden therefore chose to avoid this uncomfortable 
dilemma and maintain Western unity by ensuring that Bidault resisted SOViet 
designs. This was to be done by emphasiSing the absence of conditions in 
Viet-Ham under which an honourable settlement might be arrived at.7 In 
other words, Eden approached Berlin determined to hinder, not further, the 
cause of a negotiated solution. Taking his cue from Eden's memoirs, a 
British historian has recently argued that Berlin was 'an opportunity to 
get the ball of negotiation rolling, and not a dangerous temptation for the 
war-weary French'.- In fact the opposite was the case. 
It may of course be said that the outcome of the Berlin Conference 
belies this contention for, as the final communiqu4 specified on 18 
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February, the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France, the United States and 
the Soviet Union agreed that 'the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China' 
would be discussed at a further conference at Geneva beginning on 26 April 
at which the P.R.C. and 'other interested States' would also be present.-
However, the fact that Berlin led directly to Geneva does not affect the 
argument that Eden opposed a negotiated settlement. Indeed his eventual 
support at Berlin for a five-power meeting must be seen in the context of 
Anglo-American tensions and differences over China policy. Likewise his 
agreement to place Indo-China on the Geneva agenda had more to do with 
Britain's attitude towards the E. D. C. than any acknowledgement of the 
inevitability of a political solution to the war. Thus we may now turn to 
consider the course and results of the Berlin Conference. 
Proceedings commenced on 25 January 1954 when Molotov tabled a three-
point agenda: Germany, Austria and, predictably, '[ m] easures for reducing 
international tension and convening a five-power conference'. 10 What was 
less predictable was Eden's response. As Churchill informed the Cabinet 
on 26 January, the Foreign Secretary now felt that 'the French would be 
embarassed if their Western allies adopted a wholly unconstructive 
attitude' and he was consequently inclined to 'accept the proposal [for 
five-power talks], if the Americans could be persuaded to agree to it'. 11 
Importantly, there was no mention of Indo-China as an agenda item for the 
projected talks though the French might have reasonably expected it to be 
raised in back-channel discussions with the Chinese. With the full backing 
of Churchill and the Cabinet, and by an admixture of perserverance and 
adept manoeuvering. Eden obtained Dulles's tentative approval to raise with 
Molotov the possibility of limiting the agenda of any five-power conference 
to Asian rather than global problems and. within this framework. to Korea 
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in particular - an issue which Dulles conceded might be 'appropriate' for 
the United States to talk to the Chinese about. Molotov proved amenable 
and the foundations of what became the Geneva Conference were duly laid. 12 
Why did Eden abandon his Berlin brief so quickly and with it his pre-
determined opposition to Soviet proposals for five-power talks? In 
considering this question it is important to keep in mind his well-
chronicled unhappiness at Britain's junior r~le within the Anglo-American 
partnership in the 1950' s. According to one of his recent biographers., 
although Eden 'realized intellectually that Britain was a poor country 
which was grossly overstretched as a major colon1al power and must face 
harsh realities, he could not accept that she had become a satellite of the 
United States ... ' 13 Another has written that Churchill was 'more willing' 
than Eden 'to face the realities of the reduced British role in the world 
and hence when the Americans showed sufficient signs of having made a firm 
choice on a policy question, he was usually more prepared than Eden to 
subordinate Sri tish views to theirs'. 1. It is wi thin this context that 
Eden's vol te-face at Berlin is explicable. To start with, it is possible 
that it was only when the Conference opened that Eden was able to guage 
just how badly Bidault desired a meeting with the Chinese. Though 
personally opposed to compromise on Viet-Na~ Bidault was clearly in need 
of a sop to appease the growing peace lobby 1n the National Assembly. 
This, in turn. reflected the mood of France where. according to an opinion 
poll 1n February 1954. only 7 per cent of the population were in favour of 
fighting to keep Indo-China. 1. Eden thus found himself in a position to 
dictate to the Americans - to orchestrate matters so that Western unity 
could onl y be maintained if Dulles adopt ed the Anglo-French posi t ion and 
not vice versa Dulles himself reported to Washington that the French were 
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, insistent', and that the British were pressing him 'strongly', on the 
issue of five-power talks. 16 The U.S. Secretary of State was, in addition, 
no less keen than Eden to maintain a united front. 17 Therefore, by the end 
of the Berlin Conference, Eden, as a result of the French predicament in 
Indo-China, had scored a rare but worthwhile Victory for Britain's policy 
of accommodation and dialogue with China over the American one of hostility 
and diplomatic ostracism. 
There was, however, some disquiet amongst the British delegation at 
this outcome, with Shuckburgh questioning Eden's motives. 'I am worried 
about [Eden's] attitude towards the Far East business', he confided to his 
diary on 17 February. 'He is so keen to get a conference, so as to have 
some "success" to go home with [there had been total deadlock on Germany 
and Austria], that he seems to forget how terribly dangerous this topic is 
for Dulles'. On an earlier occasion Shuckburgh observed that 'American 
public opinion might easily turn on [Dulles] for agreeing too readily to 
sit down with the Chinese Communists', while even Eden himself accepted 
that Dulles had taken 'a considerable political risk' in agreeing to five-
power talks. 18 Despite the inclusion 1n the Berlin cOllJlDuniquf! of the 
water-tight caveat that the holding of the Geneva Conference should not 'be 
deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already 
been accorded'l', Dulles still faced considerable criticism on his return 
to the United States, with rumours at one point that he might be replaced 
by someone 'more rigid on the China issue'. 20 Therefore, while Dulles's 
later unhelpful attitude towards the Geneva Conference can be attributed to 
domestic political pressures and to a dogmatic anti-communist personality, 
it may have been aggravated by resentment at the way in which Eden had 
manoeuvred him into agreeing to the Conference 1n the first place. It is 
-219-
interesting to note that in Full Circle many of Eden's criticisms of Dulles 
- a 'preacher- in a world of politics' - are to be found in the chapter 
dealing with Berlin. Eden's comment that the 'lesson' to be learnt from 
dealing with Washington 'may be that allies should subordinate their 
interests more closely to the opinions of their stronger partner, but an 
alliance does not gather strength that way', is leant added piquancy when 
considered in conjunction with what Harold Macmillan later referred to as 
Eden's 'success' over Dulles. 21 
It will be apparent that Indo-China played only a secondary role in 
Eden's diplomacy at Berlin in that it ensured Bidault' s support on the 
question of five-power talks. Perhaps it was a sense of debt which finally 
persuaded Eden to bow to the Frenchman's pleas to have the issue considered 
alongside Korea at Geneva. What may be said with more certainty is that 
the Churchill Administration felt Bidault deserved a reward for his strong 
defence of the E.D.C. in the face of Soviet threats and cajolary to 
renounce it once and for all. On 10 February, Selwyn Lloyd relayed to Eden 
the Cabinet's appreciation of 'how important it was to meet Bidault's point 
of view on Indo-China in order to strengthen his hand over E.D.C. when the 
conference is finished'. 22 Bidault's performance at Berlin seemed destined 
to go down badly in France where opinion was hardening fast against the 
project. As Macmillan told the Cabinet, Bidault would need 'all the help 
we could give him in persuading the French Parliament to proceed to its 
ratification'.23 An obvious way to do this was to permit him a success in 
relation to Indo-China, for if Bidault fell from power due to his attitude 
on the latter issue so too would the Laniel Administration, viewed in 
London as probably the last pro-E.D.C. French coalition. But whatever the 
decisive motive, it is plain that Eden's agreement to have Indo-China 
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discussed at Geneva was not born of an Wlequi vocal commi tment to bring 
peace to that troubled area. 
The American attitude also deserves some attention in this respect. It 
was one thing for Dulles to agree to meet the Chinese to discuss Korea 
(there had after all been contacts for some time at PanmWljom) but qUite 
another for him to consent to tackle Indo-China. As the Pentagon Papers 
make clear, Dulles 'did not want to negotiate on Indochina until there was 
a marked improvement in the military situation'.a. Why then did he agree 
rather than simply settle for talks on Korea? The likeliest answer is to 
be found once lIore in the incompatabil1 ty of what were the 'two main 
planks' of the Eisenhower Administration's foreign policy, a non-communist 
Indo-China and the successful launch of the E. D. C. aa As seen elsewhere, 
the French played the key r61e in both spheres, a fact they were prone to 
exploit. Thus the Pentagon Papers observe that at Berlin Bidault warned 
Dulles that if Indo-China was not discussed at Geneva the E. D. C. would 
'doubtlessly be scuttled'.25 Against this a French historian has suggested 
that Bidault prolllised that the E. D. C. would be ratified as opposed to 
scuttled if Dulles was compliant on Indo-China. z7 A third account observes 
that Dulles only agreed on 'condition' that the E.D.C. would be put up for 
ratification in the French parliament 'by Easter'. 2Ie Dulles, like the 
British, appreCiated the need to help Bidault counter domestic criticism in 
France, for he was 'our main reliance both for EDC and Indochina'. In 
reporting to the National Security COWlctl on the results of Berlin, Dulles 
said that it was 
apparent that if Bidault had not gone back to Paris with something 
to show on Indochina, the Laniel Government would have fallen at 
once and would have been replaced by a government which would not 
only have a mandate to end the war in Indochina on any terms, but 
also to oppose French ratification of EDC.a. 
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The reality, later obscured by Eden, was that British (and American) 
acquiesence in Indo-Chine's inclusion on the Genevs egende owed more to 
considerations arising out of the Cold War in Europe than in South-East 
Asia. Nor did it necessarily illply British support for e negotiated 
settlement. It is worth remembering that the Geneva Conference, as 
conceived at Berlin, was seen in the Foreign Office as the much-delayed 
Korean Political Conference and was not intended to provide for more than a 
tentative sounding-out of the Chinese attitude to the Indo-China problem. 30 
As a senior official explained, so far as Viet-Nam was concerned, the West 
was 'not necessarily committed to working out a final settlement by 
negotiation but rsther to discussing where and how the first steps towards 
a negotiated settlement might be taken'.:'l The French likewise saw its 
primary object as being to 'define appropriate means' of ending the Wtlr.aa 
At the end of January, Ambassador Harvey reported that although few in 
France still thought in terll6 of complete victory 'and a settlement by 
negotiation was the Government's declared policy', there was no obvious 
means of achieving this 'without capitulating and betraying the Associated 
States. No French Government was yet ready to contemplate such a 
surrender'.-
This account of the origins and purpose of the Geneva Conference 
seriously underllines Eden's contention that he actively sought a negotiated 
settlement from the start of 1954 based on partition. Further evidence of 
the misleading neture of Eden's memoirs is to be found, in the weeks after 
Serlin, in negative and generally gloomy Foreign Office assessllents of the 
likely coaprollise solutions for Viet-Nam. One such was a cessation of 
Chinese assistance to the Viet-Minh, a French objective since at least the 
conclusion of the Korean armistice and, to begin with, their goal at 
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Geneva. This was obvious frail their early preference for restricting 
participation to the five main powers and, ignoring the Berlin co .. uniqu~ 
to exclude 'other interested States' including the Associate States. a • The 
principal flaw in what became known as the Markos hypothosis (Markos was 
the Greek communist leader 'dropped' by Stalin in 1946-473a) was that 
France had little or nothing to offer Peking by way of inducement. 36 Aware 
of thiS, the French leadership tended to look to the United States to 
provide the necessary concessions on their behalf whether in the shape of 
diplomatic recognition, support for China's admission to the United 
Nations, a solution to the Formosa question or a normalisation of trading 
relations. This, however, was asking the U.S. Government to turn its China 
policy on its head and was, in consequence, utterly unrealistic. The 
French nevertheless believed they had some leverage in this connection due 
to Washington's undisguised enthusiasm for the E. D. C., the final fate of 
which would be decided in Paris. Yet again the Eisenhower Administration's 
comadtment to the European Army was perceived by the French as a diplomatic 
crowbar for prising additional concessions in relation to Indo-China. a7 
On 16 March, in a detailed exposition of current French thinking, 
Rumbold of the Paris Embassy declared that Laniel's Cabinet were 
'overwhelmingly in favour' of the Markos hypothosis and hoped that 
Washington 'lI1ght think it worth making concessions [to China] if they 
thought that in return the French would ratify the E. D. C. Treaty'. 'It 
II1rrors the hopeles6 instability of French thought - no principles and no 
idea even of where expediency lies', was the testy reaction of the new 
Per.anent Under-Secretary, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, while Eden lamented that 
the French 'becolle daily more hopeless and contemptible'.ae The Americans 
evidently felt the same wey. On 27 March, Dulles firmly rejected the idea 
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that the United States should support Coaaunist China's admission to the 
United Nations in return for a cessation of hostilities in Viet-Na~ 
telling Matins that his Government planned to 'stop the spread of such 
II1.sconceptions' . =- A week later the Eisenhower Administration presented 
the British with a foraal statement of its position. This maintained that 
there was 'no possibility whatsoever' of concessions to China and that the 
'exchange of performance for COIDllWlist promises is a swindle' ... o The 
French Government, however, continued to keep faith with the Markos 
hypothosis. Unwilling to yet countenance direct negotiations with the 
Viet-Minh, this at least allowed it to convey to the French public the 
impression that it was seriously interested in peace. The corollary of 
which - much resented by the British - was that Laniel refused to place the 
E.D.C. before the National Assembly for ratification before Geneva opened. 
A decisive vote either for or agalnst would have deprived Paris of what 
leverage it might stll1 have over the AIIericans.'" 
The conviction of British pOlicy-makers that nothing could possibly 
come of the Markos hypothosis was accompanied by concern about the reaction 
of French opinion once this was fully revealed. Even before Berlin, the 
Laniel Administration had encouraged the belief that some form of 
compromise with China was likely. 
that public disappointment would 
British officials reluctantly concluded 
probably manifest itself in near-
irresistible pressure for direct negotiations with the Viet-Minh. These 
seemed destined to produce one of two outcomes, neither of which found 
favour in London. The first. a coali t ion Government in Viet -Nam, was 
originally raised by Graves who reported on 23 February that nationalist 
sources claimed to have learned that Ho Chi Minh would 'readily agree' to 
an armistice 'proyided that he and one or two colleagues were guaranteed 
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key positions in a reforJDed governJDent'. The Viet-Namese. Graves said. 
were worried that the French would 'fall for an arrangement of this kind, 
since the basis for the armistice could be made to appear favourable to 
French interests'. When Graves put this to Pleven, then touring Indo-
China, the latter was 'much disturbed' and agreed that 'a move of this kind 
would be very difficult for the French Government to counter'. Dejean, 
too, felt that the 'political climate in Paris was such that the French 
GovernlDBnt would alDOst certainly be forced to flirt seriously with a 
proposition of this nature'. Graves suspected that the Viet-Minh might 
make such an offer just prior to Geneva and could 'depend on defeatists in 
Paris taking the bait' thereby converting the Conference from an 
opportunity to discuss the problem with the Chinese to one in which a 
French evacuation and the future political configuration of Viet-Nam might 
be aaree~·2 In a later communication Graves declared that 'if Ho Chi Minh 
got into Viet Nam Government he would have the country under his thumb in 
about six months. Negotiat1ons with Ho Chi Minh would not be a solution: 
it would be a capitulation. '.3 In the Fore1gn Office these fears were 
reCiprocated, with talk of a 'Trojan Horse', the swift subversion of an 
all-Viet Nam Government froa with1n. and parallels with the Prague coup of 
1948." The degree of official cognizance in London may be measured by the 
fact that Graves's reporting received two separate personal commendations 
froa Eden at this time.·· 
The other likely outcome of Franco-Viet Minh discussions, a partition 
of Viet-N~ was equally unwelcome in London. Here, again, Eden's memoirs 
are a false guide to the evolution of British thinking. As already noted, 
there is no evidence that Eden or his advisers were thinking in terms of 
parti tion before or during the Berlin Conference or that their general 
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approach was any more developed than opposition to negotiat1on from 
weakness. When partition was first discussed at any length in mid-March it 
was largely in response to a series of reports which suggested that this 
was the solution favoured by the Soviet Government - one might even argue 
that the Kremlin, not Eden, was the progenitor of partition.·· The first 
detailed analysis came in a paper produced by Professor Pearn of the 
Foreign Office Research Department which, though dated 26 February, was 
only discussed outside the Research Department some four weeks later. 
Pearn's initial premise was that 'a termination of the struggle by military 
Victory on the part of the French Union and Associate States forces is not 
be be expected' and that, in seeking a compromise solution, the 'key' was 
the attitude of the Peking Government for whom Viet-Minh control of Indo-
China was an 'essential' goal of its foreign policy. As the Chinese saw 
things: 
the collapse of the Viet Minh would involve the establishment, 
indirectly, of American power on the very frontier of China, and 
they can accept such a situation no more in the case of Vietnam 
than they could in the case of Korea. The Chinese, surely, will 
continue to give the Viet Minh their support and will be satisfied 
with nothing less than the perpetuation of a satellite regime on 
their southern border. 
Pearn went on to discuss whether there was any solution which would satisfy 
the Chinese while saving something from 'the wreck of the Associate State 
system', eventually submitting that if these competing objectives were to 
be reconciled there was 'no recourse but a partition of Vietnam'. However, 
he was quick to point out that this might only prove a temporary solution, 
that the urge for reunification would be strong, and that the greater 
dynamism of the communist leaders, in contrast to the uninspiring Bao Dai 
regime, 'will in the upshot result in a reunion under Viet Minh auspices'. 
Ultimately all that partition could do was buy time to strengthen southern 
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Viet-Nam. Laos. Cambodia and Siam in preparation for a renewed communist 
assault once the Viet-Minh had consolidated its hold on the north. But 
even if short-lived. partition would 'at least gain time and would at least 
enable the French to escape, without excessive discredit, from the burden 
which is having such grave consequences elsewhere than in Indo-China'. 
Pearn concluded: 'The poliCY of partition is far from attractive' and 
'its justification would be that the only probable alternative is a 
surrender of all Indo-China instead of only a part'.-7 
This memorandum established the tone of ensuing deliberations. While 
unsatisfactory. partition's saving grace was that it was better than a 
coalition and a slower route to the CODlDlunisation of the rest of Indo-
China. a point made by the Chiefs of Staff on 31 March when otherwise 
decrying part! tion as 'a Victory for Communism' and a 'serious strategic 
defeat' in the Cold War.-- Graves, whose views clearly had some impact on 
Eden at this time, was 'very flJr from beins confident [emphasis in 
original] that partition would result in anything other than defeat by 
instalments and the creation of a Communist Vietnam'.-' MacDonald, too, in 
a telegram from Singapore on 19 March referring to the coalition-partition 
debate, spoke of '8 choice between two evils, both so evil that I hope that 
neither of them will be seriously pursued' although, if a choice had to be 
made, partition 'strikes me as the lesser evil'.-O MacDonald's conclusion 
was quickly endorsed by the British Defence Co-ordination Committee for the 
Far East.·' The Foreign Office, and Eden himself, generally agreed with 
the opinions radiating from posts in South-East Asia. When Allen warned a 
member of the Soviet Embassy that 'any solution which left Communism in a 
position of influence in Indochina was unsatisfactory to us', Eden's 
approving comment was 'Good'.-a 
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To recapitulate, Eden had no intention of utilising the Berlin 
Conference to propagate his ideas for a political solution to the Indo-
China war for the simple reason that he had no ideas. Moreover, the fact 
that Indo-China was to be discussed at Geneva at all was due to several 
factors the least decisive being a preconceived commitment to a negotiated 
peace. This in turn was a reflection of anxiety in London at the 
precariousness of the French military position and the linked realisation 
that any compromise engineered under such unpropitious conditions would 
lead sooner or later to communist control of all of Indo-China. 
Interestingly, this conclusion also applied to partHian, the long-term 
implications of which were omitted from Eden's 1960 account of events. 
Why, then, did Eden paint so different a picture? One reason may have been 
personal vanity and a desire to remove the 'retrospective blight' aa that 
Suez had cast on his earlier achievements. His 'success' at Geneva in July 
1954 becomes all the more meritorious if it is depicted as the CUlmination 
of a far-sighted grand design for bringing peace to war-torn Viet-Nam. It 
also implies that Eden was fully in control of events all along which, 
though untrue, still bolsters the' scale' of his accomplishment. 
The truth is that Eden neither welcomed the Geneva Conference in its 
Indo-China form nor regarded with favour any of the solutions likely to be 
on offer there. This included partition which, as all who expressed an 
opinion in London, Saigon and Singapore agreed, was a postponement not a 
prevention of communist hegemony. On 9 March, a Foreign Office brief for 
Eden defined British policy as 'peace in Indo-China but only on terms 
that do not expose the whole of the country to Communist domination'.- No 
compromise then under contemplation in London fulfilled this fundamental 
condition. Yet, ironically, it is on Geneva and partition that Eden's 
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reputation as a peacemaker in Indo-China is founded: on, that is, a 
Conference which, in terms of Indo-China, he did not really want, and on a 
solution he knew to be a temporary expedient. What, then, caused Eden and 
the Foreign Office, if not exactly to embrace, certainly to look more 
favourably on partition by the time the Geneva Conference opened? Two 
catalysts stand out: a serious deterioration in the French military 
pOSition in Viet-Nam from mid-March and, most importantly, far-reaching 
American ideas for dealing with this situation. 
Focusing first on military developments, Viet-Minh operations during 
the 1953-54 campaigning season appear to have been conceived and conducted 
with political objectives very much in mind." Short of a complete victory 
over the French, the aim seems to have been to so demoralise metropolitan 
French opinion that Laniel, faced with a complete erosion of aupport for 
the war effort, would be forced to sue for peace from the weakest of 
bargaining positions and, in the process, transform the function of the 
Geneva Conference. As Graves had cautioned in October, '[tlhis war can be 
lost very easily by a spate of defeatism in Paris'.·· The timing of Viet-
Minh operations is interesting. Giap's first major offensive came in early 
December 1953, within days of the publication of Ho Chi Minh' 8 interview 
with Expresse~ This was followed up towards the end of the month by a new 
incursion into Laos. The Viet-Minh quickly reached the Mekong river, the 
border with Siam, thus splitting Laos, Annam and hence Indo-China in half. 
Militarily, this move had Uttle strategic value.·7 Its real importance 
was 'the depressing effect on those in France who lean towards escaping 
from the Indo-China commitment' and where public opinion was more impressed 
by the dramatic image of Indo-China rent in half by a rampant enemy than by 
Government assurances that the military balance had not been altered." It 
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can also have been no coincidence that the invasion took place just prior 
to the Berlin Conference thus placing B1dault under increased pressure to 
secure a five-power meeting.·' 
Strategically unimportant but valuable propaganda operations continued 
for the duration of the Conference. It was, however, the outcome of the 
battle shaping up at Dien Bien Phu that would decide whether France had 
even a short-term future in Indo-China. In London, Dien Bien Phu was 
coming to be seen as the decisive confrontation of the war such was the 
level of French and Viet-Minh prestige invested in the defence and capture 
respectively of this isolated outpost in north-west Tonking.&O In simple 
military terms the French could survive its loss: only 6 per cent of total 
French Union forces were involved; it had already changed hands several 
times in the war without affecting the strategic situationj and even if 
lost again it would be a serious blow 'but would not necessarily mean 
defeat' according the the British Military Attach' in Saigon. &1 But in 
terms of the morale of the French nation its loss threatened to be 
catastrophic. 
The French had occupied Dien Bien Phu towards the end of November 1953 
in the hope of engaging the Viet-Minh in a 'battle on the grand scale ... 
to inflict a sizeable defeat on the enemy' rather than continue the war on 
a counter-insurgency footing thereby playing to the Viet-Minh's strength in 
guerilla warfare.&Z To begin with Giap refused to respond to this obvious 
ruse (' the goat tethered in the jungle to attract the tiger' &3) and, 
instead, his forces encircled the garrison until, by mid-January, it was 
completely beseiged.&~ Then, possibly discovering the true size of French 
dispositions (some 12,000 men) and calculating that a frontal assault would 
be immensely costly, or, as already suggested, timing his move to coincide 
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with Berlin. Giap suddenly withdrew a third of his force for action in Laos 
and 'easier and more spectacular gains· ... The remaining rebel forces at 
Dian Bien Phu ensured that French troops could not break free to counter 
these activities, while a series of co-ordinated Viet-Minh actions 
elsewhere in Viet-Nam tied down all remaining French reserves.·· When the 
Berlin Conference ended the Viet-Minh. doubtless conscious of the 
importance of embarking on the forthcoming meeting at Geneva from a 
position of overwhelming military strength. devoted its entire attention to 
Dien Bien Phu. For some three weeks there was an uneasy stand-off as Giap 
fully established his position - including a menacing array of artillery -
on the hillside surrounding the fortress. Then. on 13 March. the storm 
broke when the rebels. now with a three-fold advantage in numbers and with 
heavier fire-power. launched a frontal attack.·7 
To British observers the assault seemed calculated to bring the French 
to their knees before Geneva and permit the Viet-Minh to offer terms at the 
Conference which. if accepted by the French. would amount to a communist 
victory throughout Viet-Nam. On 16 March, Harvey informed the Foreign 
Office that the battle was being fought for 'high stakes'. If the fortress 
fell 'the result would be most serious from the military pOint of view and 
politically might be calamatous ... 
I should warn you that the Government are obviously worried. If the 
fortress is carried by assault the effect will not only ~e to weaken 
the French bargaining position at Geneva, but radically to change the 
attitude of the French Government towards the conference. There will 
be such an outcry in Parliament and in the country that the Government 
will probably be faced with the alternatives of either resigning or 
virtually adopting the Left-wing Opposition policy of negotiations 
with Ho Chi-minh at almost any price.·· 
On 19 March Graves reported that the first Viet-Minh attack had been 
repulsed. but that another was expected shortly.·· It came on 30 March. A 
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telegram from Graves the following day recorded: 'Full scale attack is in 
progress and casual ties are large on both sides. Garrison is putting up 
valiant defence and has so far made the enemy pay heavily for minor gains. 
But the bitter struggle will continue and the issue is likely to remain in 
doubt for several days'. 70 
The unhappy realisation that the French might be in danger of a major 
military defeat had a two-fold effect in the Foreign Office. Firstly, it 
encouraged officials to look more positively on the Geneva Conference as a 
means of perhaps preserving by diplomacy some of Indo-China which, if 
military events ran their course, might be lost in its entirity.71 
Secondly, it prompted a new look at partition for, as Eden later wrote, 
this would if nothing else 'ensure an effective barrier as far to the north 
of [Malaya] as possible'. 7Z At the same time, however, doubts persisted 
about about the longevity of such a solution as well as the moral rectitude 
of appeasing the Viet-Minh at the expense of the Bao Dai regime. 
The factor which finally convinced Eden and his officials that 
partition was the solution to work for in Viet-Nam was the reaction of the 
Eisenhower Administration to the situation developing at Dien Bien Phu. 
The consensus in official U. S. circles was that there was no acceptable 
substitute to French victory. On 12 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had 
expressed a widely held view when insisting that the United States should 
on no account be associated with a compromise peace. 73 Unlike Britain, the 
United States had - or thought it had - the power to reverse the downward 
spiral of French fortunes. Since the end of 1953 the possibil1 ty of some 
form of military intervention to encourage or, if need be, prop up the 
French had been debated in Washington. These deliberations obviously 
intensified as the tide of battle at Dien Bien Phu began to turn against 
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the defenders. Until then the general assumption had been that the 
fortress 'could withstand any kind of attack the Vietminh are capable of 
launching'.7. But during February and March, reports began to reach London 
hinting at deep American unease at the mounting crisis as well as far-
reaching plans to avert a French disaster. One might assume that this news 
was welcomed in London. Eden had after all made considerable efforts since 
1951 to encourage deeper American interest and partiCipation in South-East 
Asian defence under, preferably, the aegis of a collective defence 
organisation. It was also only large-scale American intervention that 
could ensure with any certainty a non-communist Viet-Nam which was, by 
extension, the surest means of safeguarding Malaya'S external security, a 
point made by MacDonald on 18 March in a telegram from Singapore. 7. 
In the final analysiS, however, the British attitude was defined almost 
entirely in terms of the risk that overt American military involvement 
might lead Communist China to retaliate setting off a chain-reaction 
culminating in a global conflagration. All potential benefits of American 
intervention paled beside this danger and. in consequence, the Churchill 
Government determined to dampen Washington's military zeal. Importantly, 
at just the moment that American intervention began to look like a reality, 
the British attitude towards Geneva, a negotiated settlement and partition 
began to shift. Enthusiasm for a political solution grew in direct 
relation to the mounting threat of American action in Viet-Nam. Faced with 
a straight choice between a negotiated settlement, even one based on so 
distasteful a compact as partition, or an extension of the war, perhaps 
even a third world war, Eden accepted the former course. Geneva, in other 
words. became a means of preventing American intervention. This conclusion 
paralleled the one reached by Eden 1n November 1952 when, on learning that 
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President-elect Eisenhower was contemplating an intensification of 
operations in Korea, even bombing targets within China, he confided to his 
diary that 'on this basis an armistice was to be preferred & every 
advantage to be gained from seeking one'. 7_ 
Although today it seems doubtful whether China would have risked a 
major war with the United States for the sake of the Viet-Minh, still less 
that the Soviet Union would have become embroiled, at the time British 
fears were real and deeply-held even when the kind of action contemplated 
in Washington was indirect - for example, the use of Chinese Nationalist 
{orces77, or the Administration's insistence that American ground crews 
servicing U.S. aircraft employed by the French should wear U. S. Army 
uniform. 78 But of far greater concern was the possible deployment of 
American air, sea or even ground forces in Viet-Nam. During the first 
months of 1954 mixed signals reached London about the state of American 
thinking in this respect. On 8 February, Walter Bedell Smith, U.S. Under-
Secretary of State, admitted to Makins that he had been appOinted by the 
President to head a select group of officials investigating the options 
open to the Administration. Echoing the conclusion reached in London six 
months earlier, he observed that the French 'were not aiming so much to win 
8 war, 8S to get in a position in which they could negotiate'. The 
Americans were thus 'doing all they could to persuade the French that their 
negotiating position would be pretty hopeless unless they negotiated from 
strength' . Bedell Smith added that there was 'no intention of sending 
American troops to Indo-China' and that the President 'would not do it even 
1f he had the power'. 7' Two days later Eisenhower himself publicly 
declared that he was 'bitterly opposed to ever getting the United States 1n 
a hot war' in South-East Asia. 80 Other sources suggested that there W8S 
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'not the slightest chance of Congressional approval' for military action. e1 
But on 13 February, a senior member of the Washington Embassy staff 
reported that American public opinion, hitherto opposed to intervention, 
would ultimately support the President if he decided deeper involvement was 
necessary. Admiral Radford, the hawkish new Chairman of the U. S. Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, was amongst those 1n the Administration 'convinced that 
deeper involvement is coming' and felt that 'if necessary American troops 
should go in'. The report concluded: 'Deep down in much Republican 
thinking there is the feeling that China was disastrously thrown away: a 
sti tch in time would have saved nine The application of this <partly 
emotional} doctrine to Indochina is clear.' e2 Makins, too, detected a 
'growing conviction that the United States could not idly stand by if the 
threat of a Communist Indo-China became acute'.·3 
These conflicting signals no doubt reflected the fluctuations of the 
inter-agency debate in Washington.·~ In London, though, the at tit ude of 
the Foreign Office was evolving rapidly. On 24 February, Allen wrote to 
R. H. Scott, now First Minister in the Washington Embassy, outlining the 
emerging position. Massive U.S. intervention ... 
would not necessarily help the military situation if its only 
result was to bring about a corresponding increase in the scale 
of Chinese intervention ... [Ulntil the Geneva Conference has met 
this country would be reluctant to see the United States involve 
themselves further in Indochina on a scale which seemed to increase 
the risk of Chinese intervention and thus of extending the war. 
Perhaps without fully appreciating the portentous content of his 'i11-
formed and non-committal thoughts', Allen gave clear notice that the 
Foreign Office attitude towards negotiations was changing. They now began 
to appear as the most effective weapon available if it became necessary to 
restrain the Americans from widening the war. A compromise in present 
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circumstances was still unsatisfactory in that it must perforce leave 
'either a communist share in the Government of [Viet-Naml or complete 
communist control over part of the country'. However, the obvious risk of 
losing all of Indo-China through subversion inherent in such a settlement 
'might have to be accepted if the only alternative seemed to be the 
enlargement of the war through increased intervention from the outside'. 
Parliament, Allen concluded, 'might in the last resort take some convincing 
that the risk was not one that we ought to accept in the interests of 
peace'.·· Suddenly a negotiated settlement assumed a noble quality when 
contrasted with what was shaping up as the alternative, the 
international1sation of the war. - Britain's soundest justification for 
resisting American military action lay in support for a political solution. 
Sri tish concern about the consequences of American 1ntervent ion was 
heightened by a number of wider developments in the realm of American 
foreign policy. Foremost of these was the disturbing glibness of the U.S. 
Administration in viewing its steadUy increasing nuclear capabUity in 
terms of 'conventional' weapons. This had first surfaced at Bermuda in 
December 1953 where, as Eden later noted, the Americans showed themselves 
determined to retaliate 'with the most effective weapons at their 
disposal' , including 'the use of atomic weapons', in the event of a 
communist breach of the Korean armistice. These, Eden said, were now 
'evidently regarded as established weapons of war' and he therefore 
proposed to inform the U.S. Government that the consequences of their use 
'against an enemy in the Far East might be so serious for the United 
Kingdom that we cannot agree to such action in advance and must insist upon 
being consul ted at the time before it is taken'.·7 Eden's open-ended 
reference to 'an enemy in the Far East' was recognition that Korea was not 
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the only area where the Americans might choose to confront communism with 
the ultimate weapon. Indeed it was in Viet-Nam if anywhere that the 
Eisenhower Administration's new doctrine of massive retaliation seemed 
likely to have its first practical application. This doctrine had been 
foreshadowed in Eisenhower's State of the Union address to Congress on 8 
January 1954." Then, four days later, Dulles spoke in New York about the 
deterrent effect of 'massive retaliatory power' and how the Administration 
had taken a 'basic decision' to 'depend primarily upon a great capacity to 
retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing'. The 
rationale was economic necessity: the replacement of an enormous and costly 
standing army with the cheaper alternative of reliance on nuclear weapons, 
the 'maximum deterrent at a bearable cost'.·' 
This blurring of the distinction between atomic and conventional 
weapons, and the Administration's determination to rely predominantly on 
the former, obviously reinforced the resistance of the British Government 
to American intervention in Indo-China. For if China pre-empted or reacted 
to such a move, 'the very nature of the retaliatory power at the Americans' 
disposal is such that any decision to retaliate becomes one of cataclysmic 
potentialities' . .o The British were further unnerved by a letter from 
Eisenhower to Churchill on 9 February. The President's tone was highly 
emotive in its depiction of the struggle between good and evil that was for 
him the Cold War, with references to 'the salvation of liberty', 'the 
stupid and savage individuals in the Kremlin', 'the Russian menace' and the 
need to 'throw back the Russian threat and allow civilization, as we know 
it, to continue its progress'. What alarmed Churchill and Eden most was 
the President's conclusion that it was only when one contemplated the 
picture of an atheistic materialism in complete domination of all 
human life, that he fully appreciates how necessary it is to seek 
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renewed faith and strength from his God, and sharpen up his sword 
for the struggle that cannot possibly be escaped. 
Eden insisted that this remark should not go unchallenged and proposed that 
Churchill reply in the following terms: 'I take it that you are referring 
there to the spiritual struggle. Otherwise your words might suggest that 
you believe war to be inevitable. I certainly do not think so and I am 
sure you do not either'.'l Churchill accepted this advice but before he 
could respond it was revealed that the United States had tested the largest 
thermo-nuclear device yet buH t. This gave rise to public unease in 
Bri tain and elsewhere that the H-Bomb was 'out of control'.·2 In his 
reply to Eisenhower Churchill therefore added a lengthy passage outlining 
his fears in this connection. 'I am told that several million people would 
certainly be obliterated by four or five of these latest H bombs', he 
wrote. • Our smallness and density of population emphasize this danger to 
us, . .a Clearly Eisenhower's earlier assurance that he was only 'testing my 
thoughts against yours' had failed to impress the British Prime Minister.'. 
This, then, was the sombre context in which the crisis over intervention of 
April 1954 was to be played out. By the end of March, the Eisenhower 
Administration, fearful that the French were on the verge of a crushing 
military defeat or that war-weariness in Paris would result in the 
appeasement of the Viet-Minh and China, was seriously considering some form 
of mil1 tary intervention in Viet-Nam. The French had to be 'prevented 
from capitulating either politically at Geneva or militarily in Indo-
China· .•• Two distinct but related forms of action were under discussion. 
First, the formation of a coalition of powers to deter or, failing that, 
halt the further extension of communism in South-East Asia - an expedient 
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to solve the immediate problem in Viet-Nam and thereafter form the nucleus 
of a regional defence pact. Second, because many in Washington were 
worried that defeat at Dien Bien Phu would lead swiftly to defeat for 
France throughout the Whole of Indo-China, consideration was given to an 
air strike by the U.S. Air Force in or around the battle-zone to relieve 
the beleagured garrison and to generally boost flagging French morale.-
The U. S. Administration, despite private French entreaties for action at 
Dien Bien Phu, chose to act on the former basis first. On 29 March, 
Dulles, in a much publicised speech in New York, declared that 
... the imposition on South-East Asia of the political system of 
Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally by whatever 
means would be a grave threat to the whole free community. The 
United States feels that the possibility should not be passively 
accepted but should be met by united action. This might involve 
serious risks but these risks are far less than those that will 
face us a few years from now if we dare not be resolute to-day'.·7 
Two days earlier Dulles had warned Eden through Makins of the content of 
his speech because he was 'not sure that what he was going to say would be 
in complete harmony with your views'. - This was an understatement. The 
following chapter will show how Eden used the prospect of a negotiated 
settlement as a device for resisting American plans for 'united action'. 
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PART V: 1954 ANATOMY OF A CRISIS 
CHAPTER TWELVE 
INTERVENTION OR NEGOTIATION 
Dien Bien Phu, the Geneva Conference and 
Anglo-American relations 
April 1954 
With Dulles's speech of 29 March 1954 the Eisenhower Administration 
appeared to take a firm decision to actively resist communist expansion in 
South-East Asia - provided it had the support of other nations. Action had 
to be truly 'united action' if the experience of Korea (when the U. S. 
assumed by far the greatest burden in what was ostensibly a collective 
, free world' enterprise) was not to be repeated. Despi t e what 
Administration officials would later tell the British, both the Pentagon 
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that action in Viet-Nam could probably 
not be limited to air and sea if substantive results were to be achieved 
and must in the end include the deployment of ground forces. An estimated 
12 divisions might be necessary, but the United States alone could not 
provide them without reducing its contri~1ion to N.A.T.O. and embarking on 
a high level of miH tary and industrial mobilisation. Obviously these 
unwelcome consequences could be offset if the reqUisite action was taken in 
concert with other like-minded powers. Without such a multilateral 
framework there was no guarantee that the U. S. Congress would sanction 
military action. 1 
Of particular importance to the Eisenhower Administration's plans was 
the support of its foremost al1y, Britain. However, at just the moment 
that Dulles was issuing his call for united action, and when a State 
Department analysis was argUing that the British Government was 'disposed 
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to be benevolent towards the idea of local U. S. armed intervention in 
Indochina' a, a major Foreign Office study paper was reaching a rather 
different conclusion. The paper, entitled 'Policy towards Indo-China', had 
been drawn up with Geneva in mind and approved by Eden and the Chiefs of 
Staff. One of its central conclusions was that ... 
[alny direct intervention by the armed forces of any external 
nation [in Viet-Naml would probably result in Chinese intervention, 
with the danger that this might ultimately lead to global war. Our 
influence should therefore be used against these more dangerous 
forms of deeper United States involvement'.3 
Contained in this statement is the essence of the crisis over intervention 
which consumed Anglo-American relations in the spring of 1954. The 
Americans wanted to act, but not without allied agreement in general and 
British support in particular. This the Churchill Administration refused 
to extend. At the same time the British sought to justify their opposition 
lest they be accused in Washington of abrogating their responibility as a 
Great Power or of appeasing communism. This was done by insisting that the 
Geneva Conference be given every possible chance to effect a pOlitical 
solution to the Indo-China problem. In Viet-Nam this meant partition. A 
military solution was only to be contemplated - if at all - if discussions 
at Geneva proved barren.- This constituted a significant shift in British 
thinking which had hitherto emitted little enthusiasm for compromise. 
However, a political solution, even a poor one, had one major attraction 
for the British after 29 March: it was infinitely preferable to the high-
risk military solution which Washington evidently favoured. In the final 
analysis, the sound of falling dominoes in South-East Asia was to be 
preferred to the sound of falling H-Bombs on East Anglia. As Eden put it, 
'we do not want to bring a greater disaster upon our heads by trying to 
avert the immediate one'.-
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The first difficulty facing British pOlicy-makers in formulating a 
response to Dulles's statement was to establish what he meant by 'united 
action'. On 2 April, Nakins called on Dulles and Bedell Smith at the State 
Department. What he had in mind, Dulles said, was a tangi ble act of 
solidarity with the French in order to stiffen their resolve to continue 
the fight in Indo-China even if Dien Bien Phu were lost. In the first 
instance this would entail a warning to Peking to stop aiding the Viet-
Minh. The Americans presupposed that deprived of Chinese support, the 
threat from the Viet-Minh could be quickly nullified by the French - in 
other words the Markos hypothosis based on coercion of, rather than 
concessions to, the Chinese. Dulles admitted, however, that if the warning 
was ignored there should be direct <though not ground) intervention in 
Viet-Nam as well as air and naval action against the Chinese mainland. 
While this involved a risk of general war, the adverse consequences of 
'letting Indo-China go were greater'. Besides which, this risk would be 
'diminished if a group of countries joined the warning'. Bedell Smith 
indicated that this scheme was the product of the Administration's prior 
rejection of any kind of negotiated solution for Viet-Nam. Partition had 
been discussed, he said, but dismissed as a 'temporary palliative' which 
would lead to 'Communist domination of South-East Asia'. All other 
political permutations had been likewise rejected. At this juncture, 
therefore, the American assessment of parU tion mirrored that of the 
British, a Foreign Office paper on 9 April concurring that partition was 
'unlikely to check the further advance of communism' in Indo-China 'and our 
whole strategiC position in the Far East would be gravely imperilled in 
consequence'.-
On 5 April American plans began to fill out. In a personal letter to 
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Churchill, Eisenhower said he wished to see the formation of an IJd hoc 
coalition of nations in South-East Asia to check communist expansion. This 
would comprise the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, 
Siam, the Philippines and the three Associate States of Indo-China. It was 
this grouping which would issue the warning spoken of by Dulles. ' If we 
grasp this one together I believe that we will enormously increase our 
chances of bringing the Chinese to believe that their interests lie in the 
direction of a discreet disengagement', wrote Eisenhower. 'The important 
thing is that the coalition must be strong and it must be willing to jOin 
the fight if necessary'. 7 The next day brought added evidence that the 
counterpoise in Washington to united action was a rejection of any 
negotiated compromise. A memorandum left at the Foreign Office by the U.S. 
Ambassador stated that in view of 'the military and political situation in 
Indo-China, any settlement negotiated in the immediate future could only 
result in ultimate complete control of all Indo-China by the Communists'.-
While the worry that Geneva would produce no acceptable compromise did not 
prevent the British giving the Conference at least a chance, in Washington 
negative public comments by Eisenhower and Dulles tended to confirm the 
Foreign Office in its opinion that the Americans ' have decided that no 
acceptable settlement in Indo-China is possible by negotiation'.· The 
French, too, felt that recent talk of united action had reduced the scope 
for agreement at Geneva. 10 In consequence the idea that American thinking 
was partly motivated by a desire to strengthen the French hand at the 
Conference was never seriously entertained in the Foreign Office. 11 
The dilemma facing the Churchill Government was succinctly expressed by 
Nakins on 4 April when he observed that 'a decision to range ourselves with 
the fundamental American decision or dissociate ourselves from it cannot be 
-246-
long delayed and will have a profound effect over the whole field of Anglo-
American relations'. 12 In the Foreign Office, however, the emphasis placed 
on the Chinese dimension by the Americans was viewed as a distraction. 
There was also scepticism about the effectiveness of a warning to China to 
refrain from activity it had been engaged in for some years, doubts that it 
amounted (as the Americans implied) to overt aggression, and concern that 
the consequence of a warning might be to provoke Peking into taking action 
:it might not otherwise consider. On the other hand, a flat rejection of 
Washington's proposal was made difficult by the mechanism by which a 
warning was to be del i vered. The idea of an anti-communist coalition was 
not far removed from the long-standing British goal of a permanent 
collective defence system for South-East Asia that would remove the 
'anomaly' of Britain's exclusion from A.N.Z.U.S., contribute to the 
external security of Malaya, Singapore and possibly Hong Kong, as well as 
safeguard the region as a whole. 13 It was also, as seen, a means of 
arresting the erosion of Bri t1sh influence at a time of military and 
economiC enervation, and of reducing the scope of American unilateralism in 
Asia. Hitherto Washington had shown a marked reluctance to become involved 
in collective defence. Now, however, it was the Americans themselves who 
were proposing a project which, if successfully launched, might provide the 
basis of a formal defence system. 
Despite these benefits, Eden felt he had no option but to oppose 
American plans in their present form and, in the process, turn his back on 
what he had been working towards for nearly 30 months. Ironically, 
subsequent American behaviour during the intervention crisis was to serve 
as a salutary reminder to Eden and his staff of their failure to tie 
Washington into a formal defence structure for South-East Asia in which 
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decisions on policy could be first discussed on an inter-allied basis and 
not, as was the case in April 1954, unilaterally and publicly announced by 
Washington. This put the other Western allies in the invidious position of 
choosing between supporting the United States in action they might 
disapprove of, or openly divorcing themselves from Washington with obvious 
implications for Western unity. This in fact was the difficulty the 
British Government now found itself in. Forced to choose, it took the 
latter course, irrespective of the damage to Anglo-American relations. 
On 7 April, Eden explained to the Cabinet that it was not the idea of a 
defence coaH Hon which worried him but the likely offensi ve use the 
Americans might put it to. He 'feared' that Washington Was 'less 
interested in the creation of this coalition as a permanent security system 
than in the declaration which they wished to make before the Geneva 
Conference'. Here was a pointer to the future, for the prospect of Geneva 
was now assuming an additional utility in Eden's mind as a means of 
resisting worrying American designs. If China ignored an allied 
declaration and continued to support the Viet-Minh (which Eden thought 
probable), ' the coaH tion would be compelled either to withdraw 
ignominiously or to embark on warlike action against China'. This, he 
judged, would give China 'every excuse for invoking the Sino-SOViet Treaty, 
and might lead to a world war'. Eden accordingly argued against accepting 
Washington's scheme as presently conceived and in favour of persuading the 
Americans to 're-shape their plan so that it could be made to give security 
in South-East Asia in the future without endangering the Geneva 
Conference' . The time to contemplate a warning was after Geneva when it 
might be used to guarantee a settlement. Peking could be told, for 
example, that 'further Communist encroachment 1n Indo-China would entail 
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retaliation. and possibly even war'. 1. 
Eden's position was thus clearly defined as early as 7 April. He 
rejected British or even allied military involvement in Viet-Nam in favour 
of a political solution. He also opposed the American idea of a coalition 
if its primary function <as WaShington intimated) was cover for such 
intervention. At the same time. Eden approved of the concept of a regional 
defence mechanism but felt it should only come into being after Geneva had 
attempted to restore peace in Viet-Nam. A defence grouping might yet be 
the most appropriate and effective method of guaranteeing a political 
settlement. This idea had not been seriously considered in London before 7 
April. but thereafter it was to help remove what doubts Eden may have held 
as to the moral implications of advocating a course which he and his 
advisers privately expected to CUlminate in communist absorption of all of 
Indo-China. For. if underpinned by an international guarantee, partition 
in Viet-Nam might prove to be a lasting contribution to peace and stability 
and not merely a short-term expedient or, worse. conscious appeasement, a 
charge Eden would wish to avoid. 
Working on this premise, by the middle of April many of Eden's qualms 
had been exorcised. When MacDonald telegraphed to express the hope that 
the Foreign Office would not contemplate either partition or Viet-Minh 
participation in a Viet-Namese Government because both solutions 'would 
involve the most serious dangers of Communist domination sooner or later of 
much of South East Asia't Eden reacted angrily to what was an unwitting 
indictment of his now chosen course. Three weeks earlier MacDonald would 
have accurately reflected opinion in London. Now he received only a 
personal rebuke. 'I wish this man would keep quiet', Eden railed. I He 
f I
, 1. only con uses counse . This was harsh on MacDonald who was only 
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reporting the views of the British Defence Co-ordination Committee for the 
Far East. But Eden was now far from convinced that 'no concession could be 
made to the Communists in Indo-China without inevitably leading to 
Communist domination of the whole of South-East Asia; particularly if we 
have the proposed security pact'. u. His enthusiasm for negotiations had 
clearly increased since Berlin, the corollary of which was a modification 
of the British interpretation of the domino theory. 
The success of Eden's strategy obviously depended on making Geneva 
work, for agreement there would deny the Americans a pretext for 
internationalising the conflict. Concern to avoid a wider war was Eden' a 
guiding motive. But considerable groundwork had to be done before the 
Conference opened on 26 April. For one thing, the Americans had to be 
persuaded to drop their idea of a warning to China which, assuming it did 
not spark a major war in Asia, might well cause Peking to boycott the 
negotiations. The Americans would also have to agree to delay forming a 
coalition while Geneva was in seasion. Precipitate progress towards an 
alliance would antagonise the Chinese who might (correctly> perceive it as 
directed against the~ This would do nothing to engender an atmosphere at 
Geneva conducive to fruitful discussion. Most importantly, the Americans 
had to be restrained from becoming actively involved in the present 
fighting in Viet-Nam, either unilaterally or under cover of 'united 
action'. Early consultation with the U.S. Government was therefore 
important. At their meeting on 7 April the Cabinet, while fully supporting 
Eden, decided to reserve final judgment on American plans and took up an 
offer from Eisenhower to send Dulles to London to explain the 
Administration's thinking first-hand. A visit was duly arranged for 11-13 
April. 17 
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While the U.S. Secretary of State was awaited a number of developments 
strengthened Eden's hand. At a meeting on 10 April the British Chiefs of 
Staff demonstrated that they too saw the problem in terms of a choice 
between a potentially unsatisfactory political settlement in Viet-Nam or a 
high-risk military solution. In their opinion, an end to Chinese 
interference would not in itself solve France's difficulties, nor would the 
threat of military retaliation cause them to desist anyway. To retain 
credibili ty the Western powers would have to make good their warning and 
take action against China. Though the Americans maintained that this could 
be limited to air and sea, the British Military demurred, arguing that the 
use of ground forces would be inevitable. Even then it was probably only 
'all-out atomic war' that could produce a decisive result. Unwilling to 
support the American initiative for these reasons, the Service Chiefs 
tentatively raised the possibility of a 'negotiated settlement based on 
partition' even though this would 'gravely weaken our military and 
political situation throughout South East Asia and would gravely increase 
our difficulties in Malaya'. While they hoped it would not come to a 
straight choice, the Military experts hinted that the 'risk of undermining 
our position in South East Asia' was preferable to 'the serious risk of war 
with China'. 1. 
On learning of this miU tary appreciation Eden's determination to 
oppose American plans can only have hardened. The chances of him 
succeeding in this appeared to have increased with Dulles's confession to 
Makins on 4 April that there were 'two indispensible conditiona' to 
progress on united action - the granting by France of full independence for 
the Associate States and, importantly, active British involvement. Both 
provisOS resulted from pressure on Dulles from Congressional leaders 
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concerned that the United States should not be seen to be upholding French 
colonialism and that, unlike the Korean war, the material and physical cost 
of containing communism in Asia would be shared equally by the 'Free 
World'. l' Useful as this knowledge was, however, it is doubtful whether 
Eden ever consciously relied on a British 'veto' over American action, and 
events as they unfolded tended to confirm the correctness of this approach. 
By far the surest method of avoiding an escalation of the Indo-China war 
remained a peace settlement at Geneva for, as Makins was wont to point out, 
the 'determination of the Administration is such that they will go ahead, 
if possible with us, but if necessary without us'.ao. 
There had also been indications in the days leading up to Dulles's 
arrival that although the Administration's 'campaign to create an 
atmosphere in which Congress and the public could be brought to accept 
increased American participation in Indo-China' was making 'considerable 
headway' , official enthusiasm in Washington for a warning to China was 
receding. 21 This was duly confirmed by Dulles himself when Anglo-American 
talks got underway in London on 11-13 April. The British were 8i ven a 
detailed exposition of the now modified American position on Indo-China. 
The French, Dulles said, 'could no longer deal with the Situation, either 
politically or militarily on the present basis and on their own resources'. 
If their position collapsed, the consequences for the rest of South-East 
Asia were grave [four days earlier Eisenhower had publicly enunciated the 
'domino' theory for the first timeZ2]. Therefore, at the end of March and 
with events at Dien Bien Phu going badly, the U. S. Military had recommended 
air and naval intervention in Viet-Nam to prop up the French. On 
reflection, the Administration felt it should not act alone, hence its call 
for united action. Dulles then formally stated the two essential 
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conditions upon which action rested and also urged the swift formation of 
an anti-communist coalition, the mere eXistence of which might bring China 
to drop the Viet-Minh and simultaneously strengthen the French bargaining 
position at Geneva, Dulles took a pessimistic view of the chances of 
Britain holding Malaya if Viet-Nam were lost, and seemed to think that this 
would encourage Eden to support united action, But wi th plans - not yet 
fully disclosed to the Americans - already drawn up for Malayan defence 
based on the Songkhla position, this was not the persuasive argument Dulles 
imagined,a:. 
Eden, in response, drew a clear distinction between the two main 
aspects of the American scheme which Dulles had confusingly and possibly 
deliberately intertwined, On one level he welcomed the prospect of a 
South-East Asian defence grouping, On another, he was opposed to British 
involvement in the current conflict in Viet-Nam, and to internationalising 
the war per se, It was apparent from Dulles's remarks that whatever a 
coaU tion might develop into in the future, in the present the Americans 
saw it primarily as a contrivance to permit direct intervention in Viet-
Na~ Dulles waS 'confident' that provided the conditions for action were 
fulfilled, 'Congress would authorise the President to use United States air 
and naval forces, and possibly even land forces',a. This co-relation met 
with Eden's disapproval. The furthest he would go in support of the 
American proposals was to declare, in a joint communiqu4 issued after the 
talks on 13 April, that Britain was ready to 'consider with the other 
Governments principally concerned, the possibili ty [emphasis addedl of 
establishing a system of collective defence for South-East Asia and the 
Western Pacific',2& When Dulles left London for talks with French 
Ministers in Paris Eden seemed satisfied that British opposition to any 
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plan for widening the Indo-China war had been brought home to the 
Americans. As for an anti-communist coalition, Eden believed that he had 
Dulles's agreement that the tentative examination foreshadowed in the 
communiqu~ should not proceed either before or during the Geneva 
Conference, and certainly not without further Anglo-American consultation. 
Speaking in Parliament on 13 April, Eden declared that the 'effective 
outcome' of any examination of a defence pact 'will be greatly influenced 
by what happens at Geneva'.~ 
Eden had also stressed to Dulles the great importance he attached to 
securing the widest possible Asian support for any defence association. a? 
This was a reaction to the American disposition to bring in only Sia~ the 
Philippines and the Associate States of Indo-China, countries which were 
seen by the rest of Asia as Western client-states. ae Eden therefore hoped 
to avoid any public announcement on the composition of a pact, and was 
undoubtedly correct in regarding as worthless any arrangement in Asia 
lacking the membership or at least the acquiescence of India, Pakistan, 
Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia. To go ahead with only the five 'puppet' 
states would, the British feared, outrage the anti-colonial sentiment of 
non-aligned Asia and ensure its enduring hostility. To prevent this, firm 
decisions about composition had to be avoided. Eden was determined that 
neutral Asian governments should be kept fully informed if progress was 
made in private on the general outline of a pact. This would hopefully 
minimise their scope for criticism and maximise that for approval if a pact 
came into being. Cultivating Indian opinion was thought to be the key: 'No 
defence arrangement in South-East Asia is likely to be fully and 
permanently effective without at least a benevolent Indian attitude towards 
it, if only because Indian opinion has such influence on the other 
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countries in the area'.:Z· The Foreign Office was aware that the Indian 
leader, Nehru, had been incensed by Dulles's recent declarations which he 
regarded as an at tempt to sabotage Geneva. Great care would have to be 
taken to prevent him publicly denouncing a coa11 tion from the outset and 
causing a breach in relations between Britain and the Asian Commonwealth.~ 
During their talks, Dulles appeared to accept Eden's position and to 
understand the other factors which combined to produce a cautious and 
measured British reaction. According to Shuckburgh, Dulles left London 
having settled for a 'much milder statement on S.E. Asia - not committing 
us to fight in Indo-China - than we had feared [Tlhe actual agreement 
is so favourable to us, and so far from what Dulles's speeches before he 
came here led everyone to suppose he would demand , :81 
Eden was therefore astonished to learn on 16 April that Dulles had 
invi ted the Ambassadors of Britain, France. New Zealand, Australia, Siam 
/" the Philippies, Laos, Cambodia and Viet-Nam to a meeting in WaShington on 
20 April to begin discussions on a defence grouping. He indignantly denied 
that he had approved such action, and reiterated that he had only agreed to 
look at the • possibility' of establishing a pact.~:z As well as 
jeopardising the Geneva Conference the American fai t accompli (espeCially 
with regard to composition) threatened to estrange the neutral Asian 
nations, Eden feared that a meeting of the five Western Ambassadors and 
the five 'puppet' Asian goverments would, despite Washington's claim that 
membership could be later extended, crystallise composition in a manner 
that would be 'fatal to the whole plan',:8:8 'Americans may think the time 
past when they need consider the feelings or difficulties of their allies'. 
Eden telegraphed to Makins, more in regret than anger. 'It is the 
conviction that this tendency becomes more pronounced every week that is 
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creating mounting difficulties for anyone in this country who wants to 
maintain close Anglo-American relations'. - Faced with this unexpectedly 
hostile reaction Dulles backed down, agreeing to reconstitute the meeting 
(which had become public knowledge) as a briefing session for Geneva.-
But, privately, he was convinced that Eden had gone back on a clear 
undertaking to begin work on a pact before Geneva. 'Eden has double-
crossed me', Dulles told his sister, 'He lied to mel' - Nakins, basing 
his judgment on a British account of the London talks, was 'almost as taken 
aback ... as the Americans' by Eden's response, an admission which earned 
the Ambassador a strong reprimand from a nettled Foreign Secretary.~7 
It is reasonable to suppose that this 'monumental misunderstanding'3e 
hardened Dulles still further against Geneva and a negotiated solution and, 
by implication, against what Eden hoped to achieve there. Some two months 
later Nakins reported that the incident still 'rankles with Dulles and his 
senior advisers' who were feeling 'sore', A 'smouldering resentment' was 
discernable in Washington.~· Apportioning blame for this unfortunate 
incident has captivated historians in recent years. On balance, Eden has 
emerged as the villain of the piece. Those who adhere to this view cite in 
evidence Nakins's discomfiture and a telling entry in Shuckburgh's diary 
for 3 May: 'According to what Denis (Allen) says, we are getting very near 
having cheated the Americans on this question of starting talks on SEA 
security. Denis [said] ... when Dulles was in London A(nthonyl.E[denl. did 
indicate that we should be willing to start such talks at once, provided we 
were not committed to any action in Indo-China. The American record showed 
that, but ours was obscure on the point and A.E. has always denied it' . .a 
Makins appears to have been granted access to this 'American record' and 
found it 'unequivocal in the sense that it had been agreed that 
-256-
consultation should take place as soon as possible, and in any case before 
the Geneva Conference, in Washington on the question of establishing 
collective defence for South-East Asia'.41 
There are, however, a number of things to be said in Eden's defence. To 
start with, another valid contemporary source to place alongside Shuckburgh 
and Makins is Kirkpatrick who sided with Eden throughout the controversy. 42 
More importantly, the American record (contained in Volume XIII of the 
Foreign Relations of the United States series) is by no means as clear as 
Shuckburgh and Makins suggested and is, at best, ambiguous. Dulles was 
certainly in bouyant mood when he telegraphed Eisenhower on the last day of 
his London visit, 13 April, and talked of 'two days of very satisfactory 
talks' and of moving the British 'away from their original position that 
nothing can be done before Geneva' on united action. 4la Only twenty four 
hours earlier, however, Dulles had informed the President that although 
Eden 'indicated a real willingness to consider defence arrangements in SE 
Asia on the basis of united action', the British Foreign Secretary was 
'obviously against implementat ion of any coali tion prior to Geneva'. 44 
Clearly something happened in the interval between these two messages to 
gi ve Dulles the impression that Eden had altered hi s stance and was now 
ready to enter into immediate pre-Geneva defence negotiations. What had 
happened, of course, was that agreement had been reached on the wording of 
the joint cOllUfluniqu4, in particular the statement that Britain, alongside 
other interested parties, would consider the 'possibility of establishing a 
system of collective defence'. But nothing was said about when or how that 
possibility should be converted into reality. The question of timing waS 
left entirely unresolved. Close scrutiny of the British and American 
records show that Dulles merely assumed that Eden was willing to act 
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immediately. At no stage did Eden actually say this. Yet, on 14 April, 
Dulles told the French in Paris that the British had 'indicated they would 
take part at once in an informal working group in Washington'. 4. When 
Dulles proceeded to act on his understanding and convene a working group, 
Eden, as noted, reacted violently. 
On what had Dulles based his assumption? While even the American 
account of the London talks fails to link Eden to an agreement on a 
'working group', it does show that Denis Allen, the central figure in 
Shuckburgh's critical diary entry, floated this possibility during a 
meeting of Anglo-American officials on 12 April. Allen said that 'one of 
the ways to get along with the like-minded people who wish to save 
Southeast Asia was to establish a working group similar to the old NATO 
group which for over a year worked on the formulation of the Treaty prior 
to its signing in April 1949'. Allen, therefore, appears to have sown the 
idea of a working group in American minds. not Eden. As for timing, while 
Allen said nothing definite, he did not d1spute the American view that the 
situation in South-East Asia did not permit the luxury of year-long 
deliberation.·5 Not for the first time in diplomatic history, silence may 
have been taken as assent. 
One might reasonably assume that the Foreign Secretary was aware of 
what his Assistant Under-Secretary had said in this meeting, but the 
possibil1 ty cannot be discounted that Eden was not properly informed or, 
alternatively, that he failed to appreciate the importance which the 
Americans attached to Allen's remarks. The latter appears the more likely, 
for the American record includes a further telegram from Dulles to 
Eisenhower on 13 April in which Eden is said to have agreed that the 
establishment of 'an informal work1ng group in Washington' was a 'good 
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idea', and added that 'Makins would be available'.·7 Therefore Eden's 
outburst three days later cannot have been the result of shocked ignorence 
about Dulles's plans. It may, rather, have been a reaction against the 
unfortunate timing of the ten-power meeting. Moreover, such a formal high-
profile gathering of Ambassadors in the public spotlight was far removed 
from the 'informal working group' suggested by Dulles, and Eden may have 
been expecting a series of bilateral (and private) exchanges before moving 
on to broader discussion. In general, therefore, the American record of 
the London meeting tends to confuse as much a clarify. 
Speculating further, it seems inconceivable that Eden, given hie 
evolving expectations and objectives for Geneva, would have consciously 
agreed to hasty and destructive action on a defence coalition prior to the 
Conference. In this connection he has been criticised for not 'frankly' 
explaining his position to the Americans 'who were left to discover it for 
themselves in instalments'." If so, then Dulles was guilty of the same 
crime. Rather than Eden indulging in a 'subtle but unmistakeable act of 
sabotage of American plans'·', there is probably a simpler, non-
conspiritorial, explanation assuming, that is, Dulles had not 
deliberately acted to 'sabotage' Eden's plans. The London communiqu. 
emerges as the prime culprit, for it was so imprecise on the question of 
the next move vis-a-vis a coalition that both Eden and Dulles may well have 
interpreted it to suit their individual <and evidently crossed) purposes. ao 
To this may be added the assumption on the part of the Americans that Allen 
spoke for Eden. What is beyond doubt, though, is Dulles's conviction that 
he had been given the green light to proceed and his sense of injustice 
when Eden appeared to backtrack. 
The two men were given an early opportunity to iron out their 
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differences when they met in Paris on 22-24 April for a session of the 
N. A. T. O. Council. In the event little by way of a reconciliation was 
achieved. Eden repeated that a collective defence system in South-East 
S 
Asia was certainly neces'ary but that it should have the widest possible 
Asian support. He had discovered that on the day that Geneva was due to 
open, the Prime Ministers of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia 
were to meet in Colombo and he was anxious to avoid any action which might 
cause them to 'come out publicly against our security proposals' and, to 
this end, to refrain from issuing any list of countries to be invited to 
join a pact 'until we had been able to see more clearly the trend of Asian 
opinion' . Recent reports from New Delhi suggested that Nehru still 
harboured deep doubts about the project, and Eden derived some satisfaction 
from the knowledge that through his efforts to keep in touch with the 
neutral Asian nations 'I had been able to restrain them from any 
unfavourable expression of opinion' ,a. Eden was however prepared to 
discuss 'very secretly' with the Americans the 'form and outline' of a 
security arrangement. Presumably this would enable the Anglo-Americans to 
come forward at the conclusion of the Geneva Conference with a well thought 
out proposal. Dulles, though, 'stUI adhered to his idea of launChing 
S. E. A. T. O. with a small nucleus of members, and of doing this at the 
earliest possible moment', 52 There was thus an Anglo-American stand-off. 
It is worth pausing at this point to reflect on the extent to which 
Eden's insistence on general Asian support was perhaps a device to 
frustrate American plans for action in Viet-Nam. Winning over the non-
aligned Asian nations to the idea of a defence consortium was likely to be 
a delicate and lengthy diplomatic process, a pOint Eden had made in Cabinet 
in November 1953. a3 Little had happened over the following five months to 
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cause the Foreign Office to alter this opinion. On 8 April, Allen noted 
that 'India, Burma and Indonesia are so deeply committed for the time being 
to their policy of neutrality that it is hard to conceive of them agreeing 
to go in (to a coalition] from the outset'. But the Foreign Secretary 
demurred, insisting: 'But we ought to try and get them'.·· Hence, while 
not disputing the genuineness of Eden's desire to proceed with general 
Asian support and his efforts to get Washington to think similarly, he may 
actually have welcomed the difficulty of this task in that it provided an 
additional and legitimate brake on American adventurism.·· 
Before the British and Americans could attempt to narrow their 
differences the crisis over intervention assumed a new, dramatic and more 
specific character. While the N. A. T. O. Council was still sitting reports 
began to reach Paris that the garrison at Dien Bien Phu was close to 
capitulation.-- On 23 April, General Navarre warned the French Government 
that only a 'powerful air strike by the American air force in the next 72 
hours could save the situation'. Eden's first reaction was that air 
intervention at such a late stage could not possibly affect the outcome of 
the batt Ie. While sharing these doubts, Dulles was still worried by the 
possibility of a general French collapse if nothing was done. This would 
extinguish all hope of limiting American and/or allied intervention to air 
and sea. Dulles was therefore inclined to support Navarre and was 
prepared, if Eden 'felt able to stand with him', to recommend that 
Eisenhower should approach Congress for 'war powers'. What this meant was 
unclear although Eden's understanding was that the President would seek 
'power of the widest character to move armed forces'. 'I am fairly 
hardened to crises', he later wrote, 'but I went to bed that night a 
troubled man' .&7 
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The following day brought him 11 ttle relief although Dulles - after 
consultation with Washington - appeared to have second thoughts about a 
symbolic air strike. Yet he was simultaneously convinced that there was 
'no chance' of preventing a total disaster in Indo-China when (rather than 
if) Dien Bien Phu fell unless Britain and the United States entered the 
war. According to conversations Dulles had had with French officials, it 
'would not be enough if we were to assure them that we would join them in 
defending the rest of Indo-China; unless we had partiCipated (by an air 
strike) in the battle for the fortress itself, that would be "their last 
battle"'. This the United States was not ready to do but, irrespective of 
the Laniel Administration's threats, Dulles felt that an Anglo-American 
assurance to help France defend the remainder of Indo-China might in fact 
suffice to keep them in the war. Admiral Radford, who Shuckburgh thought 
'not very intelligent ... obviously raring for a scrap' •• , suggested the 
Churchill Government despatch a number of R.A.F. units from Malaya to Viet-
Nam and, if pOSSible, an aircraft carrier. Eden's reaction was blunt: 'had 
they thought what would be the effect on world opinion and how the Chinese 
would react? I assumed they had not forgotten the Russo-Chinese alliance. 
Was it not possible that if we went into Indo-China we should find 
ourselves fighting Viet Nam [nationalists] as well as Viet Minh, and 
heading in addition for a world war?'·· 
Later in the day, Dulles presented Bidault with a formal note declaring 
his readiness to 'proceed with the machinery necessary to obtain special 
powers for the President to move armed forces into Indo-China'.ao All now 
seemed to hinge on the British reaction. Unlike the earlier dispute 
concerning a coalition when British support, though important, was sought 
in conjunction with that of at least another eight countries, the approval 
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of London for immediate intervention in Viet-Nam was considerably more 
significant given the need for speedy action. By the time a multilateral 
operation could be devised and executed, Dien Bien Phu might already have 
succumbed and the related defeatist malaise so feared by Dulles and his 
advisers taken an unrelinquishable grip on France and Viet-Nam. Eden 
therefore flew back to London on 24 April for an emergency Cabinet meeting 
the next day. Ref lecting on what had occurred, he felt that Dulles was 
'confronting British opinion with as difficult a decision as it would be 
possible to find', and that the Government would have to 'take a decision 
of first-class importance, namely whether to tell the Americans that we are 
prepared to go along with their plan or not',_l 
In reporting to his Ministerial colleagues and the Chiefs of Staff it 
was concern about the unpredictable consequences of widening the war which 
once more dominated Eden's thinking and ultimately impelled him to urge 
rejection of this latest American initiat! ve, Summarising the position, 
Eden said that because Congress was more likely to approve intervention if 
it were on an Anglo-American footing, Dulles wanted to give the French an 
assurance that Britain and the United States 'would join in the defence of 
Indo-China against Communist aggression' and, as earnest of this, there 
should be some 'immediate military aSSistance, including partiCipation by 
token Bri tish forces', Eden, however, shared the Chiefs of Staff's view 
that air and sea action would not be effective in retrieving the military 
situation in Viet-Nam. Nor did he feel it would restore French or Viet-
Namese morale, Moreover, the Cabinet as a whole were convinced that Anglo-
American intervention 'was bound to lead to our committing ground forces in 
this theatre', a prospect which would be anathema to British public opinion 
(an opinion poll in May 1954 showed 73 per cent of those questioned opposed 
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to sending British forces to Viet-Nam6~). There was also a strong 
suspicion that the Americans might use the issue of Indo-China to drag 
Britain into a full-scale war with China. Or, more precisely, that the 
bellicose Radford might do so. It had recently emerged that three week~ 
earlier the French, on Radford's personal encouragement, had asked the U.S. 
Government for air support at Dien Bien Phu. This had been turned down, 
the Administration preferring to act through a coalition, which suggested 
that Radford's opinion was not decisive in Washington. But his threatening 
mien still worried the British, especially his views on checking Chinese 
support for communism in Asia by 'vigorous military action against the 
Chinese mainland', and his conviction that this could be taken 'without 
drawing the Soviet Union into the conflict'. Eden rated 'very much more 
highly' the risks inherent in such an enterprise and argued that 'anything 
like open war with China might well involve the Soviet Union and lead to a 
third world war'. 
Eden thus recommended that the Cabinet 'decline to give any immediate 
undertaking to afford military assistance to the French in Indo-China' and 
to stress to the Americans that the Eden-Dulles communique of 13 April did 
not, as Washington fondly supposed, commit Britain to intervention. 
Importantly, the Geneva Conference was the basic justification for British 
opposition. In a paper submitted simultaneously for Cabinet approval, Eden 
argued against undertaking any commitments with regard to military action 
before Geneva, that France should be given 'all possible diplomatic 
support' to obtain a settlement once the Conference opened, and that 
Britain should give no pledges about what it might or might not do should 
Geneva fail. Yet Eden's sense of realism meant he had no objection to 
joining with the Americans 'now' in 'studying measures to ensure the 
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defence of Siam and the rest of South-East Asia including Malaya in the 
event of all or part of Indo-China being lost'. As for the idea of a 
South-East Asia defence arrangement, Eden continued to see it in the first 
instance as a mechanism by which a Geneva agreement might be guaranteed 
and, in the longer-term, as a platform on which to construct a permanent 
organisation. Everything, however, depended on success at Geneva and a 
vital first step in this direction was to ensure that the Americans did not 
indulge in war-like action in Viet-Nam before the Conference opened. In 
refusing to be drawn into the war and in giving primacy to Geneva Eden 
enjoyed the full support of the Cabinet and the Service Chiefs.-3 
Before this decision could be relayed to the French and American 
Governments, Massigli arrived at the Foreign Office with news which 
prolonged the drama and required the Cabinet to meet for a second time that 
day. According to Massigli, the Laniel Administration still believed that 
Dien Bien Phu could be saved. More importantly (and to the surprise of the 
British) the Americans, too, seemed to have come round to this view. 
Earlier in the day the French Ambassador to Washington had been informed by 
the State Department that an immediate declaration should be issued by the 
United States. Britain. France. the Philippines and the Associate States 
proclaiming their joint determination to resist communist expansion in 
South-East Asia and to use • eventual mUi tary means' to this end. The 
French were instructed to do 'everything in their power' to bring the 
British along. Once assured of London's compliance, Eisenhower was ready 
to go before Congress to request approval for an air strike at Dien Bien 
Phu, possibly on 28 ApriL·· In the Foreign Office, officials were 
'furious at being ... used as whipping-boys in this way' in the sense that 
the Americans had manufactured a situation in which any failure to act 
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could be portrayed as the sole responsibility of their weak and spineless 
British partner. &5 The Cabinet and Service Chiefs were equally unimpressed 
and stuck to their decision to refuse to support or participate in any 
allied intervention in Viet-Nam. Churchill, speaking for all, said ... 
what we were being asked to do was in effect to aid in misleading 
Congress into approving a military operation which would itself 
be ineffective and might well bring the world to the verge of a 
major war. He had no doubts that this request must be rejected.&& 
As soon as the Cabinet ended Eden left for Geneva for the opening of the 
Conference. En route he stopped off in Paris where Bidault was informed of 
the Cabinet's decision. Though disappointed, the French Foreign Minister 
was not altogether surprised. The news from Dien Bien Phu was slightly 
better, he said, and there was 'a feeling that the fortress could be held 
for a little while longer if help were in prospect'. Bidault stUl hoped 
that the Americans would agree to an air strike, but he must privately have 
accepted that the uncompromising position adopted by the British had almost 
destroyed this likelihood. &7 Eden continued his journey to Geneva where, 
as soon as he arrived, there was what Shuckburgh described as a 
'disagreeable session' with the American delegation led by Dulles.&· Eden, 
recapitulating the Cabinet's view, said that 'if an acceptable settlement 
could be arrived at [at Geneva], we were ready to gurantee it. If the 
attempt failed, we were prepared to examine that situation. But we were 
not prepared to intervene now'. For his part Dulles agreed that air action 
could not save Dien Bien Phu but emphasised that the French would probably 
'throw in the sponge' everywhere if there was not some show of Anglo-
American solidarity.&· Thus the question was: would the Americans go ahead 
without the British? Eden thought it possible, commenting on 26 April that 
he was 'beginning to think the Americans qUite ready to supplant French and 
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see themselves in the role of liberators of Viet Nam patriotism and 
expulsors or redeemers of Communist insurgents in Indo-China. 
are in for a painful awakening'. 70 
If so they 
Events in London also suggested that British approval might still be 
decisive. On 26 April, Radford arrived for talks with the British Chiefs 
of Staff. He argued in favour of 'immediate intervention, coupled with the 
rapid formation of a coalition' and, like Dulles, saw an air strike at Dien 
Bien Phu as possessing a psychological rather than military value. Pressed 
by the British, Radford conceded that ground forces would also have to be 
used, but that the United States would not provide the latter - the 
'majority of land forces would come from Asian countries who had plenty of 
manpower' . But which Asian countries? Surely not the Viet-Namese army 
which was woefully deficient in ability and motivation? Irrespective of 
Radford's disclaimer, the British Chiefs of Staff found it hard to escape 
the conclusion that the use of Western ground forces would in the end be 
inevitable if intervention was not to degenerate into a Korean-style 
stalemate. In this connection, Radford played down the danger of China and 
its Soviet ally being stung into retaliative action. But even if he was 
wrong, he said, 'Russia and the Communist bloc are going to get relatively 
stronger, and ... it was in our interests to take a risk now'. Contrary to 
the British understanding of Radford's posHon, but hardly surprisingly, 
the Admiral made no reference to using Viet-Nam as a stepping stone to 
direct action against China. 71 
Radford's mission to persuade the British Government to alter its 
position proved a signal failure. So too did the visit of an emissary from 
the French General Staff72, while a plea from French Premier Laniel to 
Churchill to fall in with the Americans was also given short shrift.7:a 
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Despite this, the prospect of a private Churchill-Radford dinner at 
Cheque~ on the evening of 26 April had filled the Chiefs of Staff and the 
British delegation at Geneva with 'the terrors' lest the Prime Minister, in 
the interest of Anglo-American harmony, agree to Radford's design. 7'4 In 
the event these fears proved groundless. Radford spoke of Dien Bien Phu as 
'a turning point in history' and that now was 'the critical moment at which 
to make a stand against China'. But Churchill was not swayed, countering 
that ... 
The British people would not be easily influenced by what happened 
in the distant jungles of S. E. Asiaj but they did know that there 
was a powerful American base in East Anglia and that war with China, 
who would invoke the Sino-Russian Pact, might mean an assault by 
Hydrogen bombs on these islands. We could not commit ourselves at 
this moment, when all these matters were about to be discussed at 
Geneva, to a policy which might lead by slow stages to a catastrophe. 
'Good', wrote a relieved Eden on the record of this meeting."'· Radford was 
given so little encouragement in London that he returned home 'depressed 
and disappointed' and, in Makins' opinion, likely to advocate 'going ahead 
without us but plUS the South Koreans, the Formosans and hoc ,enus omoe'."'· 
Privately, Eisenhower was even weighing up the advantages of unilateral 
action. If America's allies 'were going to fall away in any case', he 
remarked, 'it might be better for the United States to leap over the small 
obstacles [Viet-Nam] and hit the biggest one [China] with all the power we 
had'. 7'7' Meanwhile, in the House of Commons on 27 April, Churchill stated 
unequi vocally that his Government was 'not prepared to give any 
undertakings about United Kingdom military action in Indo-China in advance 
of the results of Geneva', and in what may have been a reference to the 
Americans, the Prime Minister observed that 'the siege of the French 
fortress of Dien Bien Phu ... creates a Violent tension in many minds at a 
time when calm judgment 1s most needed'. It was important, he said, to 
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keep a 'sense of world proportion'. 78 
However. as April drew to a close it became apparent that Washington 
had been dissuaded from immediate action in Viet-Nam. at least for the time 
being. From the American delegation's early handling of the press at 
Geneva. Makins concluded that 'they are now soft pedalling the possibility 
and prospects of ... intervention in South East Asia as much as possible'. 
In Washington, 'the support which was certainly building up for a policy of 
intervention seems to be ebbing'. 7' How far the British stance was 
responsible for this is a matter for conjecture. 80 One may contend that 
Eisenhower and Dulles. by publicly insisting that no action could be taken 
on a unilateral basis, had made life difficult for themselves once Britain 
refused to participate, especially in terms of Congressional approval. In 
this connection, one British authority has argued strongly that the 'major 
obstacle' to American plans was indeed 'Britain's reluctance to commit 
itself to possible military action before the outcome of the Geneva 
Conference was known'. 81 This view is borne out by a telegram from Dulles 
to the State Department, drafted on his arrival at Geneva on 25 April, in 
which he said that '(ilmmediate intervention without UK concurrence would 
gravely strain relations with both UK and Australia and New Zealand, and 
would make much more difficult future cooperation both Asia and Europe 
[sic]' .• 2 Thus the negative stance of the Churchill Administration would 
appear to have had some bearing on American decision-making. On the other 
hand. Eisenhower emphasised at a press conference on 29 April that 'British 
advice has not affected what the United States should do in any specific 
instance for giving aid to the French'.·· Of course the President was 
unlikely to admit publicly that the attitude of another country had 
determined his policy one way or another. But it seems equally plaUSible 
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that French unwillingness to comply with the condition on unfettered 
independence for the Associate States was what induced the Eisenhower 
Administration to leave Dien Bien Phu to its fate for, as Lloyd C. Gardner 
has observed, this would have been seen in Washington 8S 'a lesser evil 
than risking American prestige in support of a lost fortress of 
colonialism'.84 Eisenhower certainly implied this in a letter to General 
Gruenther on 26 April, pointing out that because France had not yet given 
full and unequivocal independence to the Associate States, any unilateral 
U.S. intervention would be 'to lay ourselves open to the charge of 
imperialism and colonialism or - at the very best - of objectionable 
paternalism·.·· In this context, Radford's later testimony <which must be 
treated with some caution) is interesting in that he agreed that the 
Administration's plans were 'blocked largely by the British' but even if 
this had not been the case the French themselves might still have opposed 
intervention because they had 'this terrific fear that we were trying to 
take Indochina away from them·.·· Conversely, French resistance might well 
have sprung from the widespread public and parliamentary desire to be rid 
of the burden of Indo-China. International1sing the conflict would have 
meant France fighting on albeit under different circumstances and for what 
would have been mainly American objectives. 
All of which assumes that the Eisenhower Administration meant what it 
said about military action. There is, however, a school of thought, 
created initially by Louis J. Halle and developed by Robert F. Randle and 
others, that the Administration was actually opposed to intervention in 
Viet-Nam, but because of its public anti-communist image, it had to give 
firm evidence of its determination to stem the tide of communist 
expansionism in Asia or else lose popularity at home. Theref are, by 
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insisting on 'united action', and in particular on British support which it 
knew would never be forthcoming (that is, by making the conditions for 
intervention deliberately impossible to fulfill), the Eisenhower 
Administration was able to retain its anti-Communist credibility in the 
eyes of domestic opinion by, ultimately, placing responsibility for a 
policy of inaction on London.·7 However, Anthony Short's recent exhaustive 
study of events, based largely on American archival material, has concluded 
that 'there is too much evidence to permit the more comfortable conclusion 
that [talk of intervention and united action] was only intended for 
effect· .•• Nor is there any evidence that the British believed they were 
being cynically manipulated. They certainly felt used in the sense that 
the United States had orchestrated the crisis so that a failure to act in 
Viet-Ham could be blamed on London playing the role of a weak sister. But 
criticism in the United States was a small price to pay for averting a 
major disaster. What there is no evidence to suggest is that the British 
felt they were deterring the Administration from taking action which it 
never planned to take in the first place, a very different matter 
al t oget her. 
In the end the important thing from Eden's standpOint was that the 
prospect of a negotiated settlement, though slim, remained intact as Geneva 
got underway. A pol1 tical solution continued to be the best means of 
ensuring that the issue of intervention did not flare up again in the near 
future. On 26 April, Mak1ns reported that the • Americans seem to have been 
knocked off the idea of immediate intervention at Dien Bien Phu' but added, 
ominously, that it was 'quite on the cards' that they would at some point 
decide to press ahead without Britain and construct a collective defence 
system • with whatever support they can pick up'. This in turn might be 
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used as a vehicle for intervention in Viet-Nam and possibly war with China. 
'Congressional reaction to a request involving American action without the 
participation of the United Kingdom cannot be foreseen with certainty', 
Makins observed. 'But I think it is true that, at the moment, the 
President is likely to have greater volume of Congressional support for 
action to stop the spread of Communism in South East Asia than for 
almost any other measure he could propose'. - Three days later Makins 
reported (accurately according to Eisenhower's diary) that the 
Administration were now 'giving the most serious consideration' to action 
without Britain. so This only reinforced the conviction of Eden and the 
Foreign Office that at Geneva '( 0) ur object should ... be to provide the 
French with sufficient bargaining power to negotiate a partHion 
settlement', something which would not be served 'by actual military 
intervention before negotiation'.·l 
The same went for precipitate progress on a defence pact while Geneva 
was in session. Eden certainly sought a grouping of powers to police any 
partition line which might be drawn in Viet-Nam in order that the 
questionable compact which was partition might, through diplomatic alchemy, 
be transformed into a viable and lasting settlement. But such a grouping 
by the Americans, was very different to the full-blown pact 
al though Eden conceded that the former might, 
desired 
in the future, provide the 
basis for the latter. The success of Eden's Geneva strategy depended on 
reaching agreement with the communists first, addressing the question of a 
guarantee second, and the issue of a regional security pact third. An 
agreement also depended on more than communist compliance: persuading the 
Americans to accept any compromise was destined to be an equally difficult 
proble~ With Washington profoundly unhappy about negotiating from 
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weakness on Viet-Nam and thus prejudiced against Geneva. as well as far 
from convinced that military action could not yet achieve more than 
diplomacy. the early portents were not good. Overhanging Anglo-American 
deliberations at Geneva was a pall of tension caused by divergencies over a 
defence pact, the London c01l1llJunique and an air strike at Dien Bien Phu: 
'our relations are bad', Shuck burgh recorded on 28 April, 'and we shall 
have to be very careful'. 92 'I find it difficult to assess what the 
Americans have in mind', Eden mused as he settled to his task, 'but it is 
certainly not. in the first place. the Geneva Conference. ,-=-
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PART V: 1954 ANATOMY OF A CRISIS 
CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
THE GENEVA CONFERENCE 
April to June 1954 
Eden and the British delegation embarked on the Geneva Conf~rence conscious 
that only a successful political d4nouement could defuse Indo-China's 
potential as a catalyst for war between the major powers. By April 1954, 
the combined facts of Viet-Minh strength and French weakness meant that the 
maintenance of Laos and Cambodia as independent entities and, in Viet-Nam, 
partition, was the very best that could be hoped for. One initial 
difficulty, however, was that partition was virtually a taboo subject on 
the Western side. The British were reticent about raising it lest they be 
accused of appeasement. 1 The French were reluctant to do so because it 
would be a betrayal of the Viet-Namese whose Government resolutely opposed 
dismemberment and whose territorial integrity had been guaranteed by 
France. a Hence Bidault's promise to Bao Dai that 'France has no intention 
of paving the way for two internationally recognised states, at the 
expense of Vietnamese unity'.3 As for the Americans, they had no intention 
of endorsing any compromise which conceded territory to the Communiats.~ 
Dulles saw ... 
no possible negotiated solution ... which did not boil down to: (1) 
a face-saving formula to disguise the surrender of the French Union 
forces and the subsequent loss of the area to the Communistsj or (2) 
a face-saving formula to cover the retreat of the Viet Minh.-
Given the realities of the Viet-Nam problem there was no doubting which 
scenariO Dulles considered the more likely. 
The British were consequently reduced to hoping that the Russians, the 
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Chinese or even the Viet-Minh could be manoeuvred into proposing a 
'Palestine' solution of their own volition.· Communist objectives, 
however, were clouded in uncertainty although the Russians had earlier 
indicated that partition might be acceptable to the~7 The Viet-Minh, by 
issuing the Expressen 'peace' offer and then stepping-up military 
operations in the interval between Berlin and Geneva, signalled that a 
negotiated solution might have some attraction and that it sought to extend 
its military and political grip on Tonking - and hence its bargaining power 
- prior to any armistice talks. As for the Chinese, little was known of 
their thinking or the extent to which they controlled the Viet-Minh 
although the P. R. C. clearly viewed Geneva as an opportunity to stand up 
diplomatically as a de {lJeto Great Power.· Assuming that a partition 
solution could be effected, the second British objective was to have the 
demarcation line guaranteed by the principal Western powers in association 
with the leading states of South-East Asia. This grouping was to have the 
specific task of policing a settlement. Only in time should it be 
developed into a more formal regional defence system with a wider 
relevance. Eden was convinced that this broader design should await the 
outcome of Geneva: earlier action would antagonise the Chinese, estrange 
neutral Asian opinion and probably ensure that there was no agreement worth 
guaranteeing.' 
These were, generally speaking, the goals which British diplomacy had 
evolved for Geneva. However, what was always going to be a difficult 
Conference was rendered doubly so by the unhelpful attitude of Britain' B 
two principal allies. The Laniel Administration, and Foreign Minister 
Bidault in particular, were prone to vaCillation, unable to decide whether 
war or peace was the correct policy. Whether, that is, it was worth 
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holding on in Viet-Nam in the hope of active American involvement or facing 
up to what threatened to be a diplomatic humiliation. The Americans, as a 
result of their ill-concealed antipathy towards all negotiated solutions, 
seemed at times deter-mined to undermine Eden's efforts and to be actually 
working towards the collapse of the Conference by their continued 
fascination with unilateral or collective military action. A British 
diplomat closely involved with Indo-China at the time has categorised 
American behaviour as 'awkward and mischievous throughout'. 10 This if 
anything is an understatement. 'As there was, prima facie, no settlement 
in view which would not mean some loss of territory to communist control 
there was, by the same token, 
writes Anthony Short. , Thus, 
no possibility of an acceptable settlement', 
even though the US would be present at the 
negotiations, it would be essentially in the role of an associated power 
with no responsibility for upholding an agreement nor even for securing one 
in the first place'. ' , The inference drawn by British policy-makers at the 
time was that a dangerous American-inspired escalation of the war would be 
the inevitable consequence of a diplomatic failure at Geneva. This 
underlined the urgency of obtaining some form of workable agreement with 
the communists. But during May and June 1954, this seemed possible only at 
the expense of lasting damage to Anglo-American relations. As Eden 
confessed on 5 May: 'Position at this conference is about as difficult and 
dangerous to Western unity as anything I have ever seen'. 12 
To develop the foregoing, the first two weeks of the Geneva Conference were 
dominated by the question of a Korean pOlitical settlement while, behind 
the scenes, the machinery of negotiation for the Indo-China phase (notably 
participation and chairmanship> was established. These deliberations took 
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place against the backdrop of the continuing battle at Dien Bien Phu and in 
an atmosphere of tension and uncertainty as to whether the United States, 
or a United States-led coalition, might yet intervene in Viet-Nam. 
Although, as already seen, by the end of April the Americans had opted 
against immediate action and in favour of a wait-and-see approach both in 
terms of what Geneva might produce and how the French would react to the 
loss of Dien Bien Phu, the question of intervention was still very much 
alive. Dulles made this clear on 1 May when, during a heated discussion, 
he asked Eden bluntly whether the British were prepared to support action 
in Indo-China under any circUMstances, adding (in a significant shift of 
emphasis) that he was not asking for any 'material assistance' only 'moral 
support' for intervention. Eden agreed that this was 'quite a new 
approach', but because Dulles was unable to spell out exactly what kind of 
action Britain was being asked to condone and because, in whatever form it 
took, 'the Chinese themselves would inevitably step up their partiCipation' 
and 'in all probability' bring about a third world war, the Foreign 
Secretary was again compelled to rebuff the Americans. 13 'I am conscious 
of the effect of our differences over this quest ion upon Anglo-American 
relations', he informed London on 2 May. 
But I am sure our only wise course is to follow a consistent line. 
This means we must refuse, pending the outcome of negotiations here, 
not only to allow ourselves to be drawn into the Indo-China war, but 
also to promise our moral support for measures of which we do not 
yet know the full scope. 
More positively, Eden was keen to assure the Americans 'that we are eager 
to work with them in building a collective defence with the widest po.sible 
Asian support to guarantee and support whatever settlement can be achieved 
in Indo-China and to assure the security of the rest of the area'. I. The 
following day the Cabinet gave its approval to this approach. 1. 
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On 3 May Dulles left the Conference never to return. This wes widely 
regerded as further evidence of Washington's lack of enthusiasm for e 
negotiated settlement. Eden was et first reluctent to see it as such - es 
far beck es Berlin Dulles had said he could only stay at Geneva for a 'few 
days'. 1. Somewhat later, however, Bedell Smith, in cherge of the U. S. 
delegation in the absence of the Secretary of Stete, admitted that Dulles's 
departure was a wrecking tactic and that he had 'confidently expected 
Molotov and Chou En-lai [the Chinese Premier/Foreign Minister] to follow 
suit and he had been considerably disappointed when they had not done 
SO',17 By that time Eden, too, had concluded thet Dulles'S action we& e 
'miscalculation' which had 'failed to produce the effect he anticipated'. 1. 
Although Eden subsequently struck up a far closer working reletionship 
wi th Bedell Smith than he could ever heve done with Dulles, it we& cleer 
thet American policy wes being made in Washington and not at Geneva. 1_ 
This was demonstrated early on in the Conference. Following a meeting with 
Bedell Smith on 3 May designed to esteblish common ground, Eden esserted 
that as fer as intervention was concerned 'we have now got this affeir back 
on to e realistic basis', In contrast to Dulles, Bedell Smith eppeared to 
reject direct American action in Viet-Nam whilst the Conference was in 
session and agreed that a South-East Asien defence grouping should be 
viewed initially es an adjunct of any compromise hammered out et Geneva. 
Impressed with this softening of the American position, Eden presented 
Bedell Smith with a memorandum edvocating that the Five Power Staff Agency 
should begin a study of the implications of ' support for an Indo-Chine 
settlement'. The leading Asien nations were to be kept informed of 
developments, and he suggested issuing e public statement to encourage the 
French end give them something to fight on for. Bedell Smith undertook to 
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'do his best' to secure Washington's acceptance of these proposals. 
Meanwhile, on 5 May, Eden's initiative was endorsed by the Cabinet in 
London and the British Military planners got down to work.ao 
These military talks were, from Eden's viewpoint, quite distinct from 
the American project for a South-East Asian defence pact - a limited 
exercise without commitment 'to assist us in assessing what might be 
involved both militarily and otherwise in guaranteeing any settlement that 
might be reached'. It would also 'be useful in consider1ng 1mpl1cat 10ns if 
after all no settlement could be arrived at'.21 To Eden's surprise, 
however, Bedell Smith, having consulted Washington, ret urned to say that 
his Government was now unhappy about examining measures to 'support I a 
settlement in case this committed them to uphold an agreement they 
disliked. After lengthy discussion (dur1ng which Eden felt he had 'gone as 
far as I can to meet [the Americans] & maybe too far '22) this hurdle was 
overcome and agreement reached that the five-power military talks should be 
a preliminary discussion of 'measures to promote a stable peace in South-
East Asia'.::Z3 
But this still failed to settle the matter. On 11 May it emerged that 
the Americans now wished the military talks to proceed simultaneously with 
formal negotiations between the states interested in constructing a defence 
pact. 24 This news dismayed Eden whose Geneva strategy rested on keep1ng 
this last matter largely under wraps until the Conference was over. 2. As 
ever, it was the need to avoid alienating neutral Asian opinion which 
influenced Eden. Through his efforts to keep India and the other leading 
Asian states informed, the Colombo Conference had concluded with a 
CO/lllDunique which, if 1 t did not portend fulsome support for a South-East 
Asian defence pact, did at least suggest that the five Colombo powers would 
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play their part in guaranteeing any Geneva agreement.~ Now, however, all 
this stood to be destroyed by Washington's insistence on immediate 
negotiations on a defence system involving the five Western powers and the 
five 'suspect' regimes of Siam, the Philippines and Indo-China, 'a white 
man's pact imposed from the outside and robbed of popular support', Eden's 
'strong view' remained that 'it would be fatal at this stage to begin 
discussion with a ten-Power group ". To do this before the results of the 
conference are known would destroy any prospect of bringing along the Asian 
powers who really matter',27 In the end Eden won his point in Washington 
and progress towards a formal defence arrangement was delayed once more,a. 
But the episode was a reminder to the British that Bedell Smith's personal 
views could not always be taken as representative of Administration 
opinion, 
By the same token, an assurance by Bedell Smith that the United Statea 
would not consider intervening militarily in Viet-Naro while the Conference 
was sitting and his insistence that American ground forces would only be 
deployed 'over his dead body', could not be taken as immutable statements 
of intent, 2. Indeed during the first fortnight at Geneva the issue of 
intervention overhung all discussion. Then, on 7 May, came news that the 
garrison at Dien Bien Phu had at last succumbed. 30 This in itself did not 
lead to renewed American demands for military action. The disease of 
defeatism so feared in Washington was never going to grip the French body 
politic overnight. Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the new Ambassador to Paris, observed 
on 8 May that 'the fall of the fortress has had for the moment a salutary 
effect on a considerable section of French public opinion' and that those 
who might have been tempted to advocate peace at any price were deterred by 
'the thought that they might be accused of", betraying the 
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heroic members of the garrison'. But Jebb doubted whether this mood would 
persist. 31 In Washington, Dulles greeted the Viet-Minh victory by publicly 
declaring that 'present conditions' did not provide 'a suitable basis for 
the United States to participate with its armed forces'. 32 Although in 
private Dulles told the New Zealand Ambassador that the use of American 
forces had not been completely rejected, the latter concluded that Dulles 
believed 'the moment for intervention to save Viet-Nam had gone'.30 
Reassuring as this was for the British at Geneva, there was little doubt 
that an apposite 'moment' for intervention might yet occur. 
There were a number of ways in which the issue of intervention might 
resurface. One was the failure of Geneva to produce a political solution 
thereby removing a major obstacle to military action by the United States. 
A second was that the Laniel Administration, under pressure from public 
opinion in France, would agree to terms at Geneva <partition for example) 
which Washington could not accept. 3 • To pre-empt this the Americans might 
seek to keep the war going on an international basis. Finally, there was 
the possibility that the Viet-Minh might tighten its grip on northern and 
central Viet-Nam at the expense of a defeatist native population (a 
'spineless people headed by a flabby octopus' in Graves's barbed 
phraseology3&> , a disintegrating Viet-Namese army and a demoralised French 
Expeditionary Corps. In the event it was this latter scenario which, by 
materialising, rekindled the flames of intervention. 
In the absence of a cease-fire agreement at Geneva which might have 
frozen the post-Dien Bien Phu military configuration, and defying the onset 
of the rains, the Viet-Minh turned its attention to the Tonking Delta and 
Hanoi where the French and Viet-Namese defenders, already struggling to 
combat rebel infiltration and subversion and weakened by the 108S of those 
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men allocated to Dien Bien Phu, now faced 'General Giap's victorious army, 
rather less mangled by its casualties than the French reports had 
suggested, elated by Victory and much better equipped with Chinese aid and 
the captured weapons of the fortress than they had ever been before'.- By 
the beginning of June Giap's forces had reached the periphery of the Delta 
and, by the middle of the month, appeared ready to launch a major assault 
on Hanoi, the administrative capital of Tonking and a prize far exceeding 
that of Dien Bien Phu - the 'Berlin of Southeast Asia' as de Lattre had 
called it. 37 The mounting Viet-Minh threat emphasised to the British at 
Geneva the continued importance of securing some measure of success. A 
negotiated settlement preceded by an cease-fire would stem the Viet-Minh 
tide. It would also deter the Americans from embarking on pre-emptive 
military action and, by extension, reduce the risk of major war with China 
and the Soviet Union. Harold Caccia, a close confid4nte of Eden, thought 
that the Viet-Minh would be 'playing with world war III if they try to take 
too much advantage of their temporary military position 1n Indo-China'. 3. 
Unfortunately for Eden'S strategy, even a modest measure of success at 
Geneva seemed remote in the weeks following the fall of Dien Bien Phu. 
After the commencement of formal discussions on Indo-China on 8 May there 
had been deceptively easy agreement on procedural issues: for example, 
chairmanship (in which capacity Eden and Molotov were to alternate) and 
participation (nine parties were involved - Britain, France, the United 
States, China, the Soviet Union, Laos, Cambodia, Viet-Nam and the Viet-
Minh). :.. But difficulties soon arose concerning the provisions for a 
possible cease-fire and the composition of a body to supervise it. Another 
problem was the principle of separate treatment for Laos and Cambodia. The 
communists wanted blanket agreements covering all three Associate States 
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while the Western powers maintained that the situation in Viet-Nam was the 
sole issue in question: the 'civil war' there was different to the 
situation in Laos and Cambodia, independent states which had been invaded 
by the Viet-Minh which should, in consequence, withdraw its forces . .o 
Deadlock on all these issues perSisted during May and early June. Nothing 
could be done about a final substantive political settlement until 
agreement was reached on these preliminary matters. And what little 
progress was made was often diminished by the spoiling tactics of the 
Americans. For example, at the end of May, Eden, after considerable 
effort, managed to get the French and Viet-Minh Commands to meet each other 
via representatives at Geneva and on the spot in Viet-Nam in order to 
discuss the ground-rules for an armistice. This was a signi ficant if 
unspectacular step forward, yet Bedell Smith, who had supported Eden in 
private, refused to make any comment to the press, a reticence the British 
thought certain to 'reduce the public effect of our agreement'. Eden 
concluded that the • truth seems to be that the Americans are mortally 
afraid of any agreement, however innocuous, reached with the Communists' .• l 
Bri tish unhappiness was accentuated by simultaneous indications that 
Washington was once more attempting to prepare the way for intervention in 
Viet-Nam. On 15 May Makins warned that 'in the Pentagon the army view as 
well as that of Radford now is that American military intervention is 
necessary'.·3 The same day, Eden learnt through a Swiss newspaper report 
that the French and American Governments had been engaged since 10 May in 
secret discussions about the conditions under which the latter might enter 
the war. When confronted by an angry Eden, Bedell Smith denied everything. 
The French, however, were more forthcoming, revealing that the Americans 
had decided upon certain pre-cond1tions for action (the American record 
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suggests that the French asked the U.S. Government to state its terms for 
intervention·a ), If these were met, Eisenhower was ready to go before 
Congress to seek approval for military intervention in the event of Geneva 
coming to nothing or, before then, if the authorities in Paris requested 
immediate assistance. The French said that Eisenhower I clearly hoped' 
there would be an early invitation. Among the American conditions were the 
concurrence - 'if possible' - of the British, full independence for the 
Associate States including the right to secede from the French Union, and a 
French undertaking to maintain its war effort at a set proportion of the 
American effort, thus ensuring that any increase in the latter would not be 
matched by a relative decrease in the former. The French Government was 
considering its response.·· 
Armed with this information, Eden again approached Bedell Smith who 
this time confirmed what the French had said. He was visibly upset that 
Eden had been kept in the dark and, in an attempt to make amends, revealed 
the contents of two confidential telegrams from Washington. These 
underlined the extent of Franco-American collusion and indicated that 'the 
intention was that we should not be informed of [the discussions] until 
they had been concluded'.·· In other words, the British were to be 
presented with a fait accompli with regard to intsrvention. Bedell Smith's 
disclaimer that the form of intervention under discussion was limited to 
holding the position during the time it took the Viet-Hamese army to become 
strong enough to assume the defence of Viet-Nam unaided did not impress 
Eden nor alter the fact that 'this new talk of intervention will have 
weakened what chances remain at this conference'. In the Foreign 
Secretary's opinion, the 'Chinese, and to a lesser extent the Russians, 
have all along suspected that the Americans intend to intervene in Indo-
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China whatever arrangements we try to arrive at here'. The British had been 
assured earlier by Dulles and Bedell Smith that Admiral Radford's strident 
opinions did not ret lect the general view in Washington. Now, however, 
Eden thought that 'the Radford policy has WOn through. Perhaps Dulles has 
been supporting it all the time' ... • Eden wrote to Salisbury in similar 
vein On 16 May. 'You know that Radford's policy has for some time been 
intervention in Indo-China, and in China too. Some aspects of American 
policy are only comprehensible to me if that view is held by others in 
addi tion to Radford'. This conviction was bolstered by the fact that the 
AmericanS had 'never really put their weight behind this conference and 
made an effort to get an agreement'."7 Three days later, unknown to the 
British, Dulles drew up a draft Congressional resolution authorising the 
President to send air and naval forces to Indo-China if invited to do so by 
the French ... • On 21 May, Dulles informed the U. S. Embassy in Paris that 
'we would not exclude sending some marines, if this made military sense' ... • 
Although the Congressional resolution was never tabled, these developments 
suggest that intervention was still a serious option in Washington and that 
Eden's complaints and misgivings were entirely justified. 
With the American Ambassador to Paris due to meet Laniel and in search 
of a 'definitive answer'-.o, the future of Eden's strategy at Geneva, as 
well as the Conference itself, seemed to rest on the French reaction to 
Washington's conditions. The early signs were not encouraging. According 
to the Americans, Laniel approved the intention to proceed with or without 
Britain, and had apparently requested American intervention with M. 1. G. 
fighters, artillery and 'if possible marines': in other words, action of 
the most provocative nature.·' To Eden's relief, however, the sting was 
quickly taken out of this latest crisis when the State Department admitted 
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that even if the French agreed to the conditions, the 'next steps have not 
been thought through' and that it was probable that wider allied support 
would be sought. &2 Eden was further assuaged when Bidaul t asserted that 
there was 'no question' of his Government asking the United States for help 
before the Conference ended. If, that was, it asked at all. The 
conditions relating to Indo-China's status in the French Union and the 
maintenance of the French war effort at a set level were likely to cause 
problems in the National Assembly. The French delegation at Geneva did not 
expect their Government to give WaShington an answer either way for two 
weeks. Eden was sufficiently satisfied by this news and, more generally, 
by 'some relaxation ot Anglo-American tension', to consent to British 
participation in the projected five-power military talks on South-East 
Asian defence which, when this 'disconcerting incident' had first broken, 
he had placed on hold. 53 These - secret - talks were now due to open in 
Washington in June with Chiefs of Staff representation." 
From the British standpoint, welcome as Bidault's assurances were, they 
could not be relied upon, and a breakthrough at Geneva remained the surest 
way of avoiding a wider war. As Eden had earlier warned Molotov 
If the Indo-China situation was not effectively handled here there 
was real danger that the supporters of each side would go on inc-
reasing the degree of their participation until finally there was 
a clash between them, and if that happened it might well be the 
beginning of the third world war. 
Although this was partly a gambit to ensure the Soviet Government'li good 
offices with regard to a diplomatic solution, it still constituted a fairly 
accurate expression of Eden's attitude. Indeed Eden's frankness in his 
dealings with Molotov, as well as his readiness to admit to divisions in 
the Western camp, caused his advisers some disquiet.--
Eden's preoccupation with the worrying American-engendered mUitary 
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consequences of diplomatic failure at Geneva, and the extent to which his 
policy at the Conference reflected this concern, was explicitly stated in a 
letter to his wi fe on 22 May. 'It is still even money we may reach an 
armistice', he wrote. 'I am more than ever convinced of dangers of 3rd 
world war if we don't'.- Two days later he returned briefly to London 
where he explained his fears to the Cabinet. Although the chances ot 
agreement were now only' tair', Eden was still determined to pursue this 
objective because he was 'gravely concerned about the dangers of the 
alternative courses of action which the United States Government were 
likely to favour if a settlement were not now secured by negotiation' and 
because many leading Americans considered that 'this was the moment to 
challenge the ambitions of Communist China, if necessary by force'.·7 This 
concern heightened on his return to Geneva. In a personal letter on 29 
May, Ambassador Makins warned that 'we are approaching another dangerous 
corner' for it now seemed 'likely' that the French would accede to the 
American criteria for intervention. The catalyst was the steadily 
deteriorating position in Tonking. Makins concluded that 'the situation is 
quite likely to get out of hand if some agreement is not reached within ten 
days or a fortnight'.&e The same day, Eden was informed by Jebb that full 
Franco-American agreement had been reached on the 'despatch of American 
marine divisions to Indo-China', a decision which, if true, Eden considered 
'dynalll1te'.b' Although the French and Americans had been discussing this 
behind the backs of the Bri Ush for some time, negotiations were not as 
advanced as Jebb suggested and intervention still depended on French 
acceptance of U. S. conditions, something that was far from certain. ao 
Jebb's report nevertheless contained some truth and contributed to an 
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ascending spiral of rumour and tension. This was added to on 4 June when 
Graves reported from Saigon that the initiative was ... 
firmly held by Viet Minh in all parts of the country. If enemy 
attacks in latter half of June it is extremely doubtful whether 
Hanoi can be held. If Hanoi falls the blow to the prestige of 
the Western Powers will be felt throughout Asia.-' 
Graves was voicing not just a personal opinion but a widely held fear in 
Viet-Ham. Paris and Washington.·2 Navarre had earlier declared that there 
should either be agreement at Geneva by 15 June or the Conference should 
break up thereby freeing the Western powers to take the necessary action to 
save Tonking. 53 All the signs thus pOinted to a fresh crisis in mid-Iune. 
Jebb concluded that if all that American or American-led action did was to 
bring about Chinese intervention, the situation would be one in which the 
• operation could well be successful but the patiant die'. _. Jean Chauvel, 
a leading member of the French delegation, told the Sri tish that latest 
reports from Washington suggested that Dulles was like '0 man who hod been 
bitten by a mosquito' and that he appeared 'determined on action of some 
kind'.- Eden thought the American 'war party' was looking 'very powerful 
It is all grim & disheartening·.·· 
Eden thus found himself working to a time limit. Or, as a French 
official at Geneva depicted it, a 'race between war and peace'.·7 Sut just 
when success at Geneva as an antidote to international1sation was more 
urgent than ever, such success had never appeared more remote with no 
apparent way round the impasse on which negotiations had been stalled for 
nearly a month.5B The Viet-Minh had been inflexible. certainly, but then 
why should it have been anything else when, militarily-speaking. it seemd 
poised to extend control over most of Viet-Nam? Eden was arguably more 
disappointed with the Americans for enveloping the negotiations in a 
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threatening cloud of uncertainty over intervention, for refusing to 
countenence the slightest compromise, and for working surrepticiously to 
undermine the work of the Conference.·· On 1 June, IS troubled Foreign 
SecretlSry sent a telegrlSm to Churchill urging that a planned visit by the 
two men to Washington on 18 June be postponed. His reasoning provides a 
telling indictment of the American attitude ... 
There is only too much evidence here that the main American concern 
is not now, if it has ever been, for the success of the conference, 
but with preparations for intervention ... [TJhe result may be that 
we would arrive in Washington just when the French were in grievous 
trouble and the American desire to intervene at its height. The call 
for us to take part in such an adventure would be intensified and the 
strain on Anglo-American relations, when we had to decline, could be 
all the worse'. 
It was, Eden lamented, 'the most troubled international scene I can ever 
recall'.70 The following day he confided to his wife: 'I am struggling 
with the world's ills'. 71 
On 5 June, Eden, again in London to address the Cabinet, felt that the 
chances of a favourable outcome at Geneva had dwindled. A major hindrance 
continued to be the American delegation which was 'operating under close 
instructions from Washington, where there now seemed to be no deSire to see 
a successful outcome from the negotiations It was evident that 
influential sections of opinion in Washington were now interested only in 
the question of mil1 tary intervention in South-East Asia'. The French, 
too, were causing difficulties, unable to decide what kind of political 
solution, if any, they could accept. Eden nonetheless ended his report in 
upbeat mood, encouraged by indications that the U.S. Government now 
considered • unprovoked military aggression' by China ISS the only 
justification for intervention. Since the British had long since dismissed 
this as a likely scenario, Eden concluded that the Americans 'now seemed to 
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be seeking to relate the political pressures for military intervention in 
Indo-China to a situation which was most unlikely to arise in practice', 73 
In his diary, Eden noted Makins's conclusion that 'Radford ". and other 
interventionists, probably including Dulles, have had a setback'. 7a 
Although Dulles appeared to confirm the new thrust ot American policy 
at a press conference on <3 June 7 ., misgivings about future American 
intentions were banking up again in British circles. On 4 June, Harding, 
in Washington, was told by Radford that the choice still lay between 'full 
scale intervention aimed at defeating the Vietminh forces in the field' and 
a steady deterioration in the situation 'resulting in the loss of the whole 
of Vietnam to the Communists'. When Harding suggested a middle course - a 
political solution, possibly partition Radford was unimpressed, 
maintaining that the effect on French and Viet-Namese morale would make it 
impossible to create a stable independent state in the south. 7. Eden's 
confidence in the new-found sagacity of American thinking also proved 
transitory. By 15 June he was warning the Prime Minister that the U. S. 
delegation at Geneva 'appear to be building up to a situation in which they 
will discuss nothing .,' with the Chinese. This can only lead to war'. 7. 
Despite these concerns, and irrespective of the boost it would give the 
intervention lobby in Washington, from the start of June Eden had begun to 
face the possibility that his efforts at Geneva had been to no avail and to 
turn his attention to how the Conference might be brought to a swift and 
painless end, 77 As seen, deadlock at Geneva had been matched in Viet-Nam 
by Viet-Minh military advances, a situation ~hich Salisbury felt made Eden 
'look ridiculous, talking to Molotov and Chou En-lai while the French are 
being chased out of Indo-China', 78 This had no doubt occurred to the 
Foreign Secretary who must have been keen to avoid any lasting damage to 
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his reputation as an international statesman, particularly in view of his 
need to maintain support within the Conservative Party for his claim to the 
Premiership when Churchill stood down. Dulles personally believed Eden was 
'treading water' at Geneva, and 'playing a cagey game, so as not to upset 
his succeeding Churchill'. 7' Yet Eden was already in 0 hapless position. 
Because Geneva had come to be seen very much as Eden's Conference, both in 
Britain and the United States, its failure must perforce reflect badly on 
him personally. In the United States in particular Eden was aware that he 
would be criticised whatever happened. A negotiated settlement would leave 
him tarred with the brush of appeasement. Failure would leave him open to 
charges that he had used the prospect of an always unreal1sable peace to 
prevent the Americans acting decisively in Viet-Nom in April or, equally, 
that he had allowed an obviously hopeless conference to drag on too long 
and, through his failure to secure an armistice, to permit the Viet-Minh to 
create a position in Tonking from which to seriously endanger Hanoi and 
possibly the whole of Indo-China. eo It was this last factor which 
persuaded the Foreign Office, as well as the Prime Minister, that it might 
be as well to curtail the talks.·' But even this was no simple mat tar 
given the importance of demonstrating to world opinion that it was the 
comunists who were responsible for the breakdown. ea Any hint that the 
West, and Britain in particular, was to blame would, Churchill warned, 
allow the Viet-Minh with greater just ification to I ensure the doom of 
Hanoi'. In which case the Prime Minister feared that 'you [Eden] or we may 
be charged with having been sucked in by very obvious manoeuvres'.·~ 
Eden, however, was already satisfied by 9 June that a point had bean 
reached 'where there are three definite issues on which the conference is 
divided [the means of supervising an armistice agreement, composition of a 
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supervising authority, separate treatment for Laos and Cambodia] '" if we 
have to break, these are clear issues which world opinion will be able to 
understand' .~, The following day Eden made a statement at Geneva to all 
delegations emphasising that 'if the positions remain as they are today, 
then it is our clear duty to say so to the world, and to admit that we have 
failed',-· 'Rather to my surprise', he wrote to his wife on 11 June, 'it 
seems to have shaken the Communists' but, four days later, he was forced to 
admit that the Conference was 'nearer to breakdown than it had ever 
been',-- Worryingly, American intervention also seemed closer than at any 
point since April although Paris had still to give Washington a final 
decision regarding the conditions for action, _7 Bedell Smith spoke of 
reports that the French were actually preparing to evacuate the whole of 
Viet-Ham and that 'only the presence of American ground forces could 
restore the position', Eisenhower had also sent him a telegram urging that 
the Conference be brought to a rapid conclusion so that a line could be 
drawn in South-East Asia and the Communists told 'thus far and no further', 
The President apparently argued that because the British would not agree to 
joint action while Geneva was in session, this was an added incentive to 
wind things down,--
Ed~n read the worst into these developments, telling Churchill again 
that it was 'perfectly clear that we shall be asked, when in Wash1ngton, to 
discUSS the possibility of intervention in Viet-Nam' and implying that the 
visit should be postponed,·· In fact it had already been put back a week 
to 25 June and Churchill, keen to talk to Eisenhower about dtHente with 
Moscow, problems in Egypt and the Hydrogen bomb, would brook no further 
delay,gO Besides, if things were as bleak as Eden said, Churchill was 
• aure a meeting between us and the President could not occur at a more 
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opportune and even vital moment'.'l The Prime Minister was much troubled 
by Anglo-American disagreements over Indo-China and feared that they might 
cause permanent ill-feeling. Hence he relished the chance to restore 
relations. -=z 
But then, suddenly and dramatically, a combination of developments 
transformed the atmosphere at Geneva, converting British gloom into 
cautious optimism. On 15 June, Molotov came to Eden with some minor 
concessions on the issue of an armistice supervisory cOmmission which 'at 
least indicated that he still had an interest 1n reaching agreement'.-
The following day, a more substantive concession was made when, for the 
first time, Chou En-lai intimated that Laos and Cambodia were indeed 
separate issues and should be treated accordingly. As long as there were 
no American military bases in either country, and some accommodation could 
be reached with the indigenous communist resistance movements, China might 
be prepared to recognise the existing royal governments. Eden gained the 
strong impression that 'the man spoke and acted as though he wanted 
agreement'.·~ On the evidence of this meeting and a subsequent one between 
Bidault and Chou, Eden decided to delay his departure from Geneva although 
a protracted stay was still out of the question.'· Arrangements were made 
for the Conference to continue on an inter-delegation basis in the absence 
of the Foreign Ministers. If the new communist attitude did indeed herald 
a breakthrough it could be fully tested at this lower level and, after 
perhaps a fortnight, the Foreign Ministers could assess whether it was 
worth their while returning. The Franco-Viet Minh military talks on Viet-
Nam were subsequently widened to examine 'questions relating to the 
cessation of hostilities in Laos and Cambodia' despite a last minute 
attempt by the American delegation to hinder progress by what Eden 
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described as a 'clumsy and abrupt wrecking speech'. The Foreign 
secretary was congratulated by Churchill on having 'turned war into jaw'.'. 
In Washington, meanwhile, the Five Power Staff talks on South-East Asia had 
finally opened (3-11 June). The terms of reference under which the 
Military experts worked were far removed from those which Eden had 
originally envisaged, namely to discuss the means by which an Indo-China 
settlement might be guaranteed. Instead, because of American concern to 
avoid a situation in which they might be committed to upholding a political 
solution which they disliked, the focus was on planning to 'recommend 
possible courses of (military] action to enable an effective Une of 
resistance to further Communist aggression or infU tration in South-East 
Asia to be established'.'7 Three possible courses of action emerged: 
French reinforcement of the Tonking Delta, intervention by alUed forces 
with a view to defeating the Viet-Minh (this was expected to run a 'grave 
risk of war with China'), or French evacuation of the Delta. If nothing 
were done the British Chiefs of Staff felt it was 'almost certain that the 
French will be faced with a major disaster in the Tonkging Delta in 
September or early October'." 
So far as Eden was concerned, these talks had been unsatisfactory in 
that they concentrated on planning for continued war rather than peace 
although he clearly saw the value of making contingency plans should Geneva 
fail. But there was one compensation in the shape of the reasoning offered 
by the British Service Chiefs for giving serious conSideration to 
evacuating the Delta. 'Although the retention of the Tongking Delta is of 
the greatest importance to the defence of South-East Asia as a whole', they 
argued, 'its loss should not automatically result in the loss of South-East 
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Asia to Communism'. This was an important refinement of the British version 
of the domino theory which hitherto had not only regarded Indo-China as the 
strategic key to South-East Asia, but Tonking as the key to the defence of 
Indo-China. What the Chiefs of Staff did, therefore, was to lend further 
implicit support to the pursuit of a compromise at Geneva based on 
partition." They also reflected what Eden himself had come to think. As 
he wrote to Selwyn Lloyd on 21 May, 'I do not personally agree with the 
people who suggest that if Indo-China were to go, Sia~ Malaya etc., must 
be indefensible. They would obviously be much more difficult to defend, 
but that is not in itself a reason for intervening in Indo-China'. 100 How 
genuinely Eden believed this is difficult to tell. The domino theory had, 
after all, gone unquestioned until the spring of 1954. Perhaps to have 
admitted that its precepts still held good would have cast doubt on the 
wisdom and propriety of compromise in Viet-Nam. By rejecting some of the 
hitherto sacrosanct tenets of the domino theory, however, the British could 
pursue a compromise in Viet-Nam without leaving themselves open to charges 
- from Washington in particular - of moral cowardice. For, in truth, the 
Churchill Administration had taken a firm decision that Indo-China, and 
South-East Asia, important though they were, were not worth risking a world 
war to preserve. 
Significant 8S these developments were in reviving the prospect of a 
settlement at Geneva, the most important advance of all occurred in Paris. 
On 12 June the Laniel Administration had fallen. 101 It had been living on 
borrowed time since the loss of Dien Bien Phu. Although Laniel had been 
the first French Premier to 'recognise the inevitable and admit willingness 
to make a negotiated peace on specified terms' 102, the actions of his 
Government since April, particularly its efforts to secure American 
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intervention, cast doubt on the sincerity of its commitment to peace. It 
is probably fair to say that Laniel and his Ministers were genuine in 
their desire for peace, but quite incapable of accepting a humilation for 
France at the conference table. Thus they procrastinated at Geneva. 
Bidault being the personification of this uncertainty. In the meantime the 
war had to continue on a French and French Union basis. This was clearly 
not good enough for public or parliamentary opinion and Laniel's coalition 
was defeated on a motion of no confidence. 103 Ironically, as recently as 
May, Dulles had spoken of U.S. intervention in Viet-Nam as a means of 
sustaining the life of Laniel's Administration. 10. 
On 18 June a new French Government was formed by the Radical Deputy, 
Pierre Mendes-France. 'This is on the whole encouraging news', Eden wrote 
in his dairy, 'for Bidault had really dithered long enough, and for a month 
or two at any rate a new government would be willing to take decisions'. 108 
One of the Laniel Cabinet's sternest critics, and a long-time advocate of a 
negotiated solution, Mendes-France, in securing a majority in the National 
Assembly, told the French nation what it wanted to hear: he would seek a 
cease-fire in Indo-China wi thin four weeks or reSign. In pursuit of this 
objective he would personally lead the French delegation at Geneva. loa No 
political grouping capable of forming a government had previously had the 
courage to commit itself unequivocally to peace and accept the 'disgrace' 
of having to negotiate what amounted to surrender terms in Viet-Nam. Such 
an undertaking, despite initial popular appeal, might be later used as a 
weapon by parliamentary opponents. Mendes-France, very much a pol1 tical 
loner with no firm party alleigance, laboured under no such constraints. 
As Eden recollected, Mendes-France 'was the man for the short lap', 107 
Bidault's desultory approach at Geneva had given rise to the suspicion 
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that he was 'consciously playing for a failure ... in the beUef that, 
confronted with such a failure, the Americans will arrive in force [in 
Viet-Nam], in which case he could be representated as the saviour of the 
country' . 10e At the end of May, some members of the French delegation 
admitted that Bidault was 'convinced with his mind' that a negotiated 
settlement was necessary but found it 'temperamentally distasteful'. Edan 
was I somewhat reassured' by this that the Frenchman 'still has an aill at 
this Conference', but in truth Bidualt was a major hindrance to Eden's 
objectives. 10. This was all the more apparent when, in mid-June, the Viet-
Minh, possibly under pressure from the Chinese and the Soviets and unknown 
to the Viet-Namese delegation, hinted during secret back-channel military 
talks with the French that some form of partition of Viet-Nam might be 
acceptable to them. 110 
officially aired this 
Relieved that it was the communists who first 
idea, a number of eminent French military and 
diplomatic figures at Geneva were quick to indicate their enthuSiasm. One 
such was Chauvel although he admitted that he was 'still having great 
difficulty in persuading K Bidault to face the prospect'. 111 
The emergence of Mendes-France in the dual role of French Premier and 
Foreign Minister was thus welcomed by Eden, the more so since it followed 
so closely on signals from the Soviet, Chinese and Viet-Minh camps that 
progress might at last be made on the issues which, just a few days 
earlier, seemed certain to condemn the Conference to failure. Eden wasted 
no time in meeting Mendes-France. Leaving the Geneva Conference on 20 June 
to operate as arranged on an inter-delegation level, Eden stopped off for 
talks in Paris on his way back to London. The two men immediately 
established a personal and professional rapport which, by the end of their 
meeting, had produced a firm Anglo-French front in favour of peace at 
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Geneva and, by implication, directed against the U. S. Government and its 
penchant for spoiling tactics. Mendes-France stressed that he was no 
neutralist (a widespread allegation made by his opponents) and that he had 
no wish to endanger the Western Alliance, but it had to be made clear to 
Washington that France was not willing to continue the war and was 
committed to negotiating peace. To this end, he wished to meet with Chou 
En-lai but confided that he was 'nervous about the reactions of the 
Americans' . Eden agreed that such a meeting was a vital pre-requisite to 
progress, adding that if it were 'made conditional on American consent it 
would never take place since the Americans were bound to advise against 
it'. Eden therefore argued against giving Washington any say in the 
matter. Mendes-France was also encouraged to think in terms of a direct 
meeting with a representative of the Viet-Minh, something which Bidault had 
stud:l.ously avoided during his time at Geneva. On the subject of a final 
pol1tical settlement, Eden suggested that partition of V1et-Nam might be 
the best solution although - and here he was still wary of admitting to the 
fatherhood of part i tion despite recent Viet-Minh overtures - it was 'not 
for him to advise the French'112 
Peace was back on the agenda and Eden's return to Geneva assured. Before 
then, however, there was a visit to the United States to be undertaken. 
This threatened to be an unpleasant mission. Differences concerning Indo-
China since the end of March had fused with continUing tension over atomic 
pol:l.cy, Europe and Egypt to produce 'greater Anglo-American friction than 
for years' and Churchill welcomed the trip as an opportunity to rebuild 
relations. 113 How successful it would be in this respect was another 
matter. A wide gap existed over the timing, membership and purpose _of a 





defence pact for South-East Asia. There was also great uncertainty about 
American intentions in the event of a Viet-Minh offensive in Tonking, 
Finally, there was the issue of the American attitude to an agreement with 
the communists at Geneva. This was all the more relevant now that 
partition was being discussed by both sides. However, the signs were that 
this, too, would be a source of Anglo-American disunity. Bedell Smith, in 
taking leave of Eden at Geneva, had said that 'if the French bargained away 
the [Tonking] Delta and agreed to straight partition the United States 
Government would not give such a settlement their support'. Bedell Smith 
accepted that Hanoi might well have to be evacuated, but dismissed the 
arguments of France's 'intellectual generals' that the rest of the Delta 
would have to be relinquished as well. 1,. 
Eden found it hard to decide whether the American was encouraging the 
French to drive a hard bargain or whether it was a firm statement of 
American policy. 'If the latter then the position might be serious', he 
reflected. Bedell Smith seemed to be 'clinging to the hope that Haiphong 
[the main port of Tonking] might be held as a bridgehead for an eventual 
attempt to recover northern Indo-China'. ". This issue arose again in 
Eden's meeting with ~ndes-France on 20 June, by which time the British 
Foreign Secretary thought it was 'quite clear' that 'the Americans would be 
opposed to any arrangement which could be come to with the other side as 
regards Indo-China generally. The best that could be hoped for was that 
they would do nothing to prevent it or to cause it to break down onca it 
had been achieved', ". Given this, Eden might be forgiven for wishing that 
the removal of an obstructionist French Foreign Minister had been matched 
by the departure of a similar impediment in Washington. 
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PART V: 1954 ANATOMY OF A CRISIS 
CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
EDEN AND THE SETTLEMENT OF THE 
INDO-CHINA WAR 
June to July 195( 
Eden returned directly to London following his meeting with Mendts-France 
and. on 22 June, told the Cabinet that the belated softening of the 
communist position at Geneva had encouraged him to believe that a 
negotiated settlement 'was not beyond reach'. Much depended, however, on 
the attitude of the Americans who were expected to argue during the 
forthcoming talks in Washington for early and open (as distinct from 
preliminary and secret) Anglo-American action to establish a South-Eaat 
Asia defence organisation. If Britain acquiesced in such an exercise the 
prospect of agreement at Geneva would be 'seriously damaged' and neutral 
Asian opinion alienated. As for the exact form a settlement might take, 
the views of the Eisenhower Administration on partition in Viet-Nam would 
be high on the agenda. The Sri Ush sought a solution on the basis of 
'excluding from Communist control the southern region of Viet Nam, 
including Saigon, as well as Laos and Cambodia'. To mitigate the danger 
that partition would be only a temporary hiatus in the communist conquest 
of Viet-Na~ Eden also sought 'an international guarantee of any settlement 
that may emerge ... ' By the time that the Conference went into partial 
recess on 20 June the Americans, along with the Viet-Namese, were the only 
hardened opponents of this kind of settlement. 1 
One of Eden's major aims during his visit to Washington was thu8 to 
'sell' partition to a U.S. Government averse to conceding any territory 
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whatsoever to the communists. Although their wholehearted approval was too 
much to expect, Eden hoped to at least deter the Americans from blocking an 
agreement on this basis or, later, working towards its destruction. 
Success also depended on persuading the Eisenhower Administration to 
renounce military intervention in Viet-Nam as an answer to the present 
problem. for an escalation of the fighting would destroy any chance of a 
negotiated settlement. At the same tiDe such a settlement was, 
paradoxically, the best insurance against an American-led escalation in the 
future. Speaking of Indo-China in the House of Commons on the eve of his 
departure, Eden said he had 'seldom known a situation in which the risks of 
a wider conflagration should be more apparent'. 2 
Eden's Geneva strategy and his Washington desider~t~ - rapidly becoming 
indistinguishable - were encapsulated in a memorandum endorsed by the 
Cabinet at their meeting on 22 June ... 
(8) We must persuade the Americans to give the French at least a 
chance of reaching a settlement in the next few weeks. 
(b) We must continue to make it clear that we cannot consider 
intervening in Indo-China and we must do our best to restrain 
the Americans from doing so. 
(c) We must again make it plain that we can accept no further 
commitments in regard to "united action" in South-East Asia 
until the outcome of Geneva is known. 
(d) But we can express willingness to examine at once and in secret 
how best we can proceed to strengthen our common defences. 
(e) We should discuss how the principal Asian powers ... can best 
be associated with this work. 
(f) But we should not agree, before Geneva is over, to any wider 
and more publicised meeting, at which Siam and the Philippines 
would be the only Asian countries present, to plan and 
proclaim an anti-Communist alliance. 3 
In addition to being a blueprint for the future, this memorandum was also a 
remarkable demonstration of how consistent Bri Ush poliCY had be.n aince 
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the onset of the intervention crisis in late March. 
Indo-China was obviously amongst the most urgent items on the 
Washington agenda for, in addition to its intrinsic importance, it was also 
responsible for a general souring of Anglo-American relations - indeed in 
September 1954 the U.S. Congress was to halve Special Aircraft Assistance 
to Britain on the grounds that there had been 'adverse reactions as a 
result of divergencies in policy on South-East Asia'.· This was a matter 
of especial concern to Churchill who was never happy when events in Asia, 
an area of low value in his world-view, unsettled the 'special 
relationship' . Contemplating events at Geneva during May he had been 
'depressed by the general bloodiness of things'.- Accordingly, as Colville 
noted in his diary on 24 June, 'owing to Anglo-American disagreement over 
S.E. Asia, reflected very noticeably at the Geneva Conference, the 
[Washington] meeting has become in the eyes of the world (and the Foreign 
Secretary> an occasion for clearing the air and re-creating good feeling',-
Important as this was, however, Eden was not prepared to compromise the 
British line on Viet-Nam in order to achieve it although, from past 
experience, he may have been concerned that Churchill, acting on his own 
initiative, might be tempted to do so. '7 But in fairnsss to the Prime 
Minister, he had given Eden strong support in opposing American designs 
during and subsequent to the April crisis. - This did not indicate that, 
late in the day, Indo-China had assumed priority-status in the Prime 
Minister's mind, rather it was another example of an Asian issue assuming 
significance only through its adverse impact on matters of more vital 
import.' 
Churchill was particularly alert to Viet-Nam's potential as a source of 
general war in Asia, a war which could only be waged if essential manpower 
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and material resources were diverted from Europe and the Middle East. 
Moreover, should the Soviet Union become lnvol ved this risked unleashing 
what Churchill called the 'nuclear monster' and he was well aware that 
Britain, unlike the United States, was vulnerable to air attack from Soviet 
bombers. 10 If these concerns prompted support for Eden, Churchill was 
less than happy about the solution to the problem in Viet-Nam pursued by 
his Foreign Secretary, namely compromise with the communists and 'Anthony's 
appeasement' which he liked 'up to a pOint, but only up to e point'. 11 
Ultimately, however, Churchill - like Eden - was forced to accept that a 
poor peace was better than a major war. When Eisenhower enquired of him on 
18 June whether he saw the 'elevetion of Mend~s-France and the pledges he 
has made as evidence of a readiness on his pert to surrender completely in 
Southeast Asia', Churchill replied in the affirmative: 'personally I think 
Mend~s-France ... has made up his mind to clear out on the best terms 
available. If that is so, I think he is right'. Moreover,' [i] n no 
feasible circumstances except possibly a local rescue could British troops 
be used in Indo-China and if we were asked our opinion we should advise 
against United States local intervention except for rescue'. Eden could 
therefore contemplate the Washington vis! t reasonably confident that the 
Prime Minister would not consciously undermine his Geneva strategy. la 
The talks eventually got underway on 25 June and, contrary to most 
expectations, produced a considerable meeting of Anglo-American minds on 
many outstanding issues. Colville observed on the opening dey that 'first 
1mpressions were surprisingly and 1mmediately satisfactory while the world 
1n general believes that there is at this moment greater Anglo-American 
friction than ever in history and that these talks are fraught with every 
poss1ble complication and difficulty'. Churchill was 'elated by auecess 
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and in a state of excited good humour' and. by the close of the conference, 
his objective of dissipating tension had been substantially achieved. 'I 
have never had a more agreeable or fruitful visit than on this occasion', 
he told the House of Commons on 12 July. 1:' Of help in this respect was 
what appeared to be a reconcilation of previously divergent positions on 
Indo-China and South-East Asian defence. Importantly, this had come about, 
not as a result of any real British concessions, but because of a novel 
readiness on the part of the Americans to modify their outlook. Dullea, 
moreover, proved to be anything but the 'awkward old buster' with 
'pachydermatous qualities' that Makins had earlier depicted. ,. 
The first of several lengthy Eden-Dulles exchanges on Indo-China took 
place at the State Department on 26 June. Dulles, without prompting, 
immediately met a number of Eden'S pre-Washington desidereta. Firstly, he 
hinted that armed intervention in Viet-Nam was virtually extinct as a 
serious option. Secondly, having weighed up the merits of partition and 
nationwide elections in Viet-Nam, Dulles 'agreed that the former was 
preferable'. ,. As Geoffrey Warner has noted, this was 'the first time an 
authoritative American spokesperson had been prepared to comment favourably 
on either alternative in conversation with the British'. 1. Dulles's 
remarks implied that the Administration was at last ready to view the Indo-
China problem realistically, to accept that the retention of northern Viet-
Nam waS a lost cause. and to seek the most favourable negotiated settlement 
at Geneva based on a divided Viet-Nam and, thereafter, to prepare the 
defence of the remainder <and still the greater part) of non-communist 
South-East Asia. 'I believe it is not going too badly, though I am not 
enjoying it', Eden wrote to his wife at the close of this first s8.aion.'7 
There had in fact been hints in recent weeks that alongside the bluster 
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about intervention the Eisenhower Administration had privately conceded 
that a partition solution was inevitable though for domestic political 
reasons this could not be openly admitted. Officials did however attempt 
to condition public opinion. At a press conference as early a8 11 May, 
Dulles asserted that 'the loss of some or all of [Viet-Naml would not 
necessarily bring the loss of all South-East Asia', which suggested that, 
11ke the British, the Americans were in the process of modifying the 
domino-theory to justify the abandonment of northern Viet-Nam. What was 
now being sought, said Dulles, 'was a unifying influence so that the row of 
dominoes could withstand the fall of one, if one had to fall'. 1. But by 
far the frankest revelation was provided by Bedell Smith who, in a 
conversation with the Australian Foreign Minister at Geneva on 18 June, 
admi t ted that there had been 'no real clear-cut American policy on Indo-
China until quite recently' 
They had swung from one extreme to the other. Widely varying 
public statements had been made in consequence which had no 
doubt confused their friends as much as the enemy. However, 
their minds had gradually crystallised on the need to salvage 
Laos and Cambodia from the wreck with as much as possible of 
Vietnam. Intervention with American forces was "out", although 
they did not want the Chinese to realise this too clearly ... 
[Tlhe mystery about "partition" [was] that the Americans 
objected only to the ~ partition. They fully recognised 
that the ~ of partition was inevitable, but they wanted it 
called "division of authority" or some such phrase. 1. 
Given the past tendency of Bedell Smith's utterances to be amended after 
consultation with Washington it must have been with some satisfaction that 
Eden noted Dulles's tentative sanctioning of partition at their meeting on 
26 June. Even then. however, Eden remained suspicious: 'Dulles outwardly 
quite correct & almost friendly, but I suspect otherwise within - I cannot 
tell'.20 The modification of the American position which. to judge from 
Sedell Smith. had been under consideration for some weeks. was lent 
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momentum by the emergence in France of a leader unequivocal in his 
commitment to peace and, shortly afterwards, a message from the new French 
Government to its American counterpart that 'as no French Parliament would 
approve the conditions which the US laid down for intervention, France had 
no choice but to make the best deal [at Geneva] she could'.21 This left 
the U.S. Administration facing the dilemma it had all along hoped to avoid 
- intervention with little or no allied support and, because of the 
deterioration in the military situation, a 'great pouring in of U.S. ground 
forces. 22 Partition consequently assumed relevance as a pis aller. 
During his time in Washington Eden talked a great deal about how an Indo-
China set tlement might be guaranteed and, 
thinking had developed since early April. 
in the process, showed how his 
In a speech in the House of 
Commons on the eve of his departure he had raised the possibility of 'a 
reciprocal arrangement in which both sides take part, such as Locarno'. By 
this method, 'if the settlement were broken, guarantors could act without 
waiting for unanimity'. 23 Eden waS doubtless conscious that India and the 
neutral Asian powers, whose association with a gurantee would be important, 
would be unwilling to renounce non-alignment by entering into an 
arrangement which either excluded or was obviously directed against the 
Chinese Communists and the Viet-Minh. Hence Eden's evocation of the 
Locarno precedent. But in the United States Eden's statement caused a 
furore and he was charged with wanting to guarantee the fruits of communist 
aggression and, as the original Locarno treaty had led to Germany's 
admission to the League of Nations, of working to bring Communist China 
into the United Nations. Eden, believing that it was his terminology 
rather than the idea behind it which caused this reaction, declared at one 
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pOint: '[ C] hange the name Locarno if it stinks in the United States'. a. 
This, however, is too simplistic an assessment. The Eisenhower 
Administration's principal objection was to participation on an equal 
footing with the P. R. C. in an arrangement it disapproved of. a. Writing 
some years later, Eden thought that by the end of his Washington visit the 
Americans 'not only understood what it [the Locarno guarantee] meant, but 
seemed to like the idea'. In this he was badly mistaken. At their meeting 
on 26 June Dulles stated the problem clearly: it would be 'difficult', he 
said, 'to persuade Congress to guarantee, in effect, the communist 
domination of North Vietnam'.26 
With Dulles having seemingly renounced a military solution to the 
problem in Viet-Nam, and having accepted in principle the need for 
partition, Eden felt beholden to offer something in return. Therefore, in 
re-stating his view that there should be a 'collective defence agreement, 
which would be limited to those powers willing to undertake spec1fic 
commitments for military action, in the event of renewed Communist 
aggression', Eden added that he was now ready to examine this matter at 
once. 27 Dulles was clearly pleased, having complained earlier that ... 
the Stalinist policy of securing control of the colonial areas of 
the world was, in the absence of a clear policy on the part of the 
West, only too likely to succeed, first in South East Asia then in 
Africa and later perhaps in South America ... We in the West were 
like mourners at a funeral who were laying the wreaths while someone 
else was grabbing the inheritance.2e 
The meeting concluded with agreement to establish an Anglo-American Study 
Group to examine in detail the question of a regional defence mechanism. a. 
The two Foreign Ministers also thought it would be useful to supply Mendts-
France with an outline of the type of settlement for Indo-China which their 
respective Governments would consider acceptable. ao 
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By 29 June British and American officials had completed a seven-point 
memorandum. The Anglo-Americans would 'respect' a settlement that: 
1. Preserves the integrity and independence of Laos and Cambodia 
and assures the withdrawal of Vietminh forces therefrom. 
2. Preserves at least the southern half of Vietnam, and if possible 
an enclave in the delta ... 
3. Does not impose on Laos, Cambodia, or retained Vietnam any 
restrictions materially impairing their capacity to maintain 
stable non-communist regimes: and especially restrictions 
impairing their right to maintain adequate forces for internal 
security, to import arms and to employ foreign adviser •. 
4. Does not contain political provisions which would risk loss 
of the retained area to communist control. 
5. Does not exclude the possibility of the ultimate reunification 
of Vietnam by peaceful means. 
6. Provides for the peaceful and humane transfer, under internatonal 
supervision, of those people desiring to be moved from one zone 
to another in Vietnam. 
7. Provides effective machinery for international supervision of 
the agreement. 31 
This statement was to be relayed to Mendes-France via the British and 
American Ambassadors in Paris. However, it was apparent that the Americana 
still harboured misgivings about any such settlement despite their intimate 
invol vement in draft ing the document. While Eden undertook to instruct 
Jebb to add an oral, eighth, point about Britain's willingness to give 
diplomatic support to France at Geneva to obtain a settlement based on this 
cri terie, Dulles felt unable to do likewise. The U. S. Government 'could 
accept a settlement which passed the agreed tests', he said, but they 
'would not wish to be associated as one of its promoters'.- In other 
words, having laid down what they considered to be an acceptable 
compromise, the Americans refused to help the French obtain it. What this 
would portend for the Geneva Conference was, according to Deni. Allen, 
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'that on the day the Americans will be looking for reasons to disapprove 
the agreement whereas our inclination will be to find good grounds for 
approving it'.33 Eden's suspicion that Dulles's more forthcoming approach 
concealed more than it revealed was largely confirmed." 
At the close of the talks on 29 June, Churchill accepted an earlier 
suggestion of Eisenhower's that the two leaders issue a declaration on the 
lines of the Atlantic Charter (the 'Potomac Charter') setting out the 
common aims their two Governments were pursuing in world affair •. a. Thi. 
was testimony to the unease with which both men viewed the strain iropoaed 
on the 'special relationship' as a result of recent events in and to do 
with South-East Asia. The communique itself was an anodyne document though 
it did include a noteworthy concession by Eden - a public announcement that 
the Anglo-Americans were to 'press forward with plans for collective 
defence' in South-East Asia to meet the situation arising either through 
success or failure at Geneva. This contrasted with the 'aecret' 
examination foreshadowed in his Cabinet memorandum of 22 June. a. Eden, 
however, was conscious that the opportunity to secure a firm American 
commitment to regional defence (his goal since October 1951> might be 
receding as a result of his perSistent insistence that a pact must await 
the outcome of Geneva. In this connection, Makins had written on 21 June 
imploring Eden to begin negotiations immediately. The Ambassador spoke of 
Washington's 'historic decision to accept far reaching commitments on the 
mainland of Asia' but warned that this ... 
particular wave broke before it reached the shore and spent its 
force on the reefs of internal indecision and real or fancied diff 
-erences with the Allies ... Now a strong undertow has set in; the 
trend is reversed; the "reappraisal" is beginning. 
A reversion to total isolation was unlikely, rather the emphaaia would be 
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on 'peripheral defence'. Britain might find itself 'having to deal with a 
powerful, nationalistic and frustrated America', answerable only to itself 
for its actions. 'To take a concrete example', Makins cont inued, 'what I 
fear is that when we come to the point of wanting to organise security 
arrangements in South East Asia, the Americans will have lost interest'. 
Eden's initial reaction was 'I don't mind!', but this instinctive release 
of frustration should not be taken too seriously, for Eden fully accepted 
that, difficult as they sometimes were to work with, American participation 
in any regional defence arrangement was essential.S7 
It is not possible to teU whether it was Makins's arguments that 
caused Eden to relent in Washington on 'public' announcements although it 
is fair to say that the Foreign Secretary would have been receptive to the 
Ambassador's warning. At Bermuda in December 1953 the Americans had 
plainly lost patience with France over E.D.C. ratification, and Dulles's 
subsequent reference to an 'agonizing reappraisal' had greatly alarmed Eden 
who re-doubled British efforts to persuade the French to ratify. ae Now, 
with Makins talking of a reappraisal with regard to Asia, Eden may have 
reasoned that American interest in regional defence was indeed waning. 
Hence his readiness to offer them some evidence of British willingness to 
get things moving. On another reading, however, Eden may have judged that 
the Study Group could not possibly report before the make-or-break deadline 
of 20 July, and that the Washington communiqu~ only signalled an intention 
to proceed. In reality nothing concrete regarding composition or purpose 
would develop before the Geneva Conference ended, a point which could be 
made to the neutral Asian nations. Also in the cOlJlDun:Lqu~ was a veiled 
threat that if France was presented with unacceptable demands at Geneva 
(the communists seeking perhaps to exploit what they might perceive as a 
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weak and defeatist Government in Paris) 'the international situation will 
be seriously aggravated'.39 Mendes-France had requested such a statement, 
believing that a satisfactory solution depended to some extent on 'the 
menace of American, and indeed wider, military intervention should the ... 
conversations break down'. However, 'no immediate threat should appear to 
issue from Washington' for this would jeopardise a settlement. What should 
be made clear, the French Premier urged, was that failure at Geneva 'would 
leave everyone free to take other decisions which might be extremely 
unpalatable to the Communists'.·o 
Judged against the objectives laid down in his Cabinet memorandum of 22 
June, Eden must have left Washington with mixed feelings and still doubtful 
about the exact nature of American intentions. The U. S. Administration 
accepted partition in principle, but would do nothing to help the French 
achieve a settlement on that basis. Nor would it associate itself with an 
agreement if one was reached. This also ruled out any hope of the United 
States joining in an international guarantee of partition, something the 
British had all along perceived as the key to a lasting solution. Even 
Dulles's assurances about non-intervention could not be taken as inviolate 
and, were the Viet-Minh to launch their anticipated assault on HanOi, it 
was impossible to say with any certainty that the United States would stand 
aside and accept the situation. On 8 July, Churchill wrote to Eisenhower 
of his 'fear that grave military events impend in the Tonkin Delta and 
indeed throughout Indo-China ... I well understand [that] the sense of 
disaster and defeat may produce a profound effect in the United States 
. tt', by which he presumably meant a renewal of calls for military action. 
'I find no reason for taking a brighter view of the Tonkin Delta 
situation', Eisenhower replied the same day. 41 In the State Department, 
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meanwhile, there was growing unanimity on the need fo U. S. intervention, 
• with or without the French', to stop the rot.z . 
Interestingly, the fact that the Viet-Minh had 60 far held their hand 
in the Delta seems to have been due in part at least to Eden's influence on 
Chou En-lai through Nehru. Eden had learnt on 22 June that Chou planned to 
stop off in New Delhi on his way back to China from Geneva.·:' The 
following day Eden contacted Nehru asking him to, firstly, obtain from Chou 
an assurance that Laos and Cambodia would indeed be recognised by Peking as 
independent entities and, secondly, to stress that 'our whole effort will 
be imperilled if new large scale attacks are launched in Indo-China while 
the [Franco-Viet Minh] military committees (at Geneva] are trying to work 
out the terms of a cease fire·.·· Nehru did as Eden asked, and although 
Chou retorted that 'the main reason for any increase in Viet Minh activity 
had been the increase in French bombing', the point may well have 
registered. •• Mend~s-France was certainly convinced that, by mid-July, 
only 'Anglo-French diplomatic efforts backed by Nehru had prevented an 
attack on Hanoi. If it took place it must succeed in a matter of days and 
the only hope of averting it was a cease-fire'.·· 
As Eden prepared to return to Geneva the Americans again, through a 
series of negatively interpretable actions, endangered the prospect of 
peace and demonstrated that the Anglo-American r~pprochement on Indo-China 
was more apparent than real. In the first place, the Eisenhower 
Administration refused to send Bedell Smith or any high-ranking official 
back to Geneva. Doubtful whether Mendes-France would be able or willing to 
adhere to the 'seven points', the Americans felt it would be wiser if they 
refrained from placing themselves in a position whereby they might have to 
publicly dissociate themselves from their allies. On a cynical reading one 
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might suggest that the Administration sought to manoeuvre Britain and 
France into obtaining the kind of solution which it now privately favoured 
while, by standing aloof in public, it could defend itself from charges 
that it had knowingly acquiesced in appeasement. The fact that the mid-
term Congressional elections were only four months away may help account 
for the Administration's behaviour in this respect, for the Democrats, 
recalling Republican jibes in 1952 of 'who lost China', might respond with 
'who lost Indo-China' in 1954. Secondly, and less surprisingly, the U.S. 
Government still refused to alter its position with regard to participating 
1n any guarantee of a Geneva agreement. The most that was contemplated was 
a unilateral declaration taking note of what transpired. This was a blow 
to Eden. The chances of any agreement proving durable would be seriously 
diminished by the non-participation of the United States in a guarantee: on 
one level this might discourage the other Geneva conferees, communist or 
otherwise, from involvement thereby rendering any partition line in Viet-
Nam hopelessly porous; on another, the British would be most reluctant to 
assume defence obligations with regard to Indo-China via a guarantee which 
the United States did not share. Eden, one may aSsume wearily, undertook 
to try and make the Americans change their minds.·7 On a more optimistic 
note, on 8 July Chou En-lai had informed Eden that he had 'reached 
agreement with Ho chi Minh on the way in which the Indo Chinese question 
could be settled, and that this would make it easier to get agreement 
at Geneva'.·· Once more it was the Americans rather than the communists 
who were making life difficult for Eden. 
When Eden arrived at Geneva on 12 July he found Mendes-France already 
installed. In marked contrast to the U. S. authorities, the Mendes-France 
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Administration had worked energetically in pursuit of a negotiated 
settlement during the recess. On 20 June, the French Premier had sounded 
out Bedell Smith on his Government's attitude to a meeting with Chou En-
lai. The American, while admitting it would be 'headline news' in the 
United States, could raise no formal objection.~· Three days later Mend.s-
France travelled to Berne for talks with the Chinese Prime Minister during 
which Chou's 'comparative moderation' helped confirm the Frenchman in his 
view that 'it may just be possible to get an honourable settlement within a 
lIonth'.80 Shortly after this meeting, the French delegation at Geneva was 
instructed to commence direct and highly secret 'political' talks with the 
Viet-Minh (as distinct from the official military dialogue currently in 
progress in Franco-Viet Minh committees) on a post-armistice pOlitical 
settlement. Here the most contentious issue proved to be the line of 
partition in Viet-Nam: the French wanted it as far north as pOSSible, the 
Viet-Minh as far south.81 Meanwhile, on 1 July, the French public had 
been 'shocked but scarcely surprised' when the entire southern portion of 
the Tonking Delta was evacuated, conceding an area inhabited by about two 
million people to the Viet-Minh.·2 The withdrawal was also deplored by 
Viet-Namese nationalists.-3 However, Mendes-France took Simultaneous 
action which demonstrated that he Was not prepared to simply surrender. On 
30 June, the French Cabinet issued a communique stating that steps would 
soon be taken to reinforce the Expedi Honary Corps in Viet-Nam and, the 
following day, the Foreign Office learnt that the French Government was 
contemplating going before the National Assembly to seek approval for the 
despatch of conscripts for non-combative duties in the War zone.~ 
Paradoxically, it was probably Mend.s-France's firm commitment to peace 
which allowed him to even consider these extensive measures of war. 
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Whereas the Laniel Administration might have been seen as favouring 
reinforcement as an alternative to negotiation, it was hard to doubt 
Mend's-France's motives 'in taking steps to reinforce ... in case the 
negotiations failed'.·· 
One of Mendes-France's early priorities at Geneva was to try and secure 
high-level American representation for the final phase of the talks. Apart 
from the need to present the communists with a united Western front, this 
would also discourage disaffected Viet-Hamese nationalists from resisting 
an agreement, an important consideration since, ostenSibly, it was on their 
behalf that the Conference was deliberating. American aloofness might be 
used by the Saigon Government to justify its own disapproval. Eden, as 
seen, agreed with Mendes-France: 'It seems to me most important that in the 
difficult concluding stages of the negotiations we should go out of our way 
to show a united front to the Communists'.·· On 11 July Dulles had sent 
Mendes-France a detailed exposition of the American position which argued 
that it was precisely the absence of a united front, and doubts as to 
whether France (or Britain> were ready to stand by the seven pOints, that 
accounted for the American decision on non-participation.·7 As Makins put 
it, Dulles did not want to be confronted with 'the choice of "doing 
something dramatic" e. g. walking out of the conference or, by remaining, 
giving the impression that the United States in some way accepts, or at 
least is associated with, a disastrous settlement'.·· The following day, 
12 July, Dulles suddenly declared himsel f willing to travel to Paris (but 
not Geneva) to explain his Government's thinking in person to Mendes-France 
and Eden. The latter was reluctant to leave the Conference so soon after 
returning (' the work has to be done here and time is short') but, after 
entreaties from Mendes-France, he eventually agreed to a meeting on 13-14 
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July. 'I clearly had no opt ion but to fall in with these arrangements'. 
Eden told Churchill. 'Indeed some good may come out of them. We may even 
be able to persuade Mr. Dulles to follow us back to Geneva'. Equally. Eden 
accepted that Dulles's purpose might be 'to persuade the French to stand 
out for conditions they cannot hope to get'.·' 
In Paris on 13 July Dulles was presented with a well-reasoned Anglo-
French critique of American aloofness. Eden thought that Mendils-France 
'fought his corner brilliantly'. while Dulles 'cut a sorry figure ... in 
his at tempts to explain why the Americans could not face the 
responsibilities of any Geneva decisions'. Dulles merely restated his 
concern that France would deviate from the Wa8hington memorandum on minimum 
terms. He also made clear that his Government would never guarantee a 
settlement, even one based on the seven pOints, since American pUblic 
opinion would not tolerate 'the subjugation of millions of Viet Namese to 
CODlDunist rule'. At the same time he offered the French little hope of 
American military assistance if a settlement either failed to materialise 
or was wholly unacceptable. The military problem had altered fundamentally 
since April, Dulles said. and now 'nothing but a large scale intervention 
of ground troops could hope to succeed'. In this connection Dulles did not 
think that it would be to the 'strategic advantage' of the Western world 
for the United States to become thus committed in Viet-Nam: 'After all 
Russia was enemy No.1. China was enemy No.2. and Viet Minh were only a 
bad third'.-o 
This was a new argument reflecting a new outlook in WaShington. With 
the benefit of hindsight it is not difficult to discern the direction in 
which Administration policy was mOVing. Military involvement in the 
present struggle had all but been rejected now that the United States 
-323-
looked like having little support from its principal allies and since the 
use of ground troops was regarded as inevitable. This left no alternative 
but to accept whatever emerged from Geneva. Indeed privately American 
policy-makers may well have 'welcomed the return of stability to Indochina' 
offered by the division of Viet-Nam although, publicly, they would be 
obliged to deplore the 'loss' of any terri tory to communism.· 1 In other 
words, Washington could reap the benefits of Anglo-French efforts at Geneva 
without itself being seen to compromise with communism. Thereafter it 
could protest that it had been presented with a fait accompli by its allies 
and concentrate on establishing a regional defence pact to cover the 
remainder of South-East Asia. At the same time it could work to strengthen 
the area of Viet-Nam south of a partition line, possibly with a view to the 
reconquest of the northern sector using the native anti-communist armed 
forces but, initially, to prevent Viet-Minh encroachment. 
There were already signs that Washington had found a willing 
accomplice in Viet-Nam in the shape of the ultra-nationalist Catholic Ngo 
Dinh Diem, appOinted by Bao Dai as Prime Minister on 18 June. Even if the 
Russians, the Chinese and the Viet-Minh, together with Britain, reached 
agreement at Geneva, there was still the problem of Diem, 'a passionate and 
uncompromising nationalist whose violent dislike of the French was exceeded 
only by the intensity of his opposition to communism'.-z Diem was utterly 
opposed to partition, Tonking being the source of much of his - Catholic -
support. At Eden's first meeting with Mendes-France on 20 June, the 
latter had spoken of his desire to negotiate directly with the Viet-Minh 
but that if he did so 'the position might become quite impossible for the 
French in the French-occupied districts of Indo-China' 1n terms of local 
animosity and possibly violence against French officials. Concessions to 
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the Viet-Minh might also lead to wide-scale desertions from the Viet-Namese 
army thereby weakening the ability of southern Viet-Nam to defend itself. 
In this context, Mendes-France said that 'the new Vietnam Prime Minister 
was a fanatical Catholic and not at all well-disposed towards the 
French. If things went wrong in the army the Americans might well be 
tempted to do some deal with this gentleman over the heads of the French 
themselves'.63 This, generally speaking, is what Washington was preparing 
to do. Within ten days of Diem assuming the Premiership the French began 
to sense that he was being primed by the Americans, an off1cial from their 
London Embassy informing the Fore1gn Office that without the Diem 
Government's acquiescence there could be no successful outcome to the 
Geneva Conference and that the Americans might therefore 'encourage Vietnam 
to take an unduly rigid attitude'.·· Fear1ng a 'violent and irrational 
reaction on the part of Vietnamese patriots' to a partition solution, the 
Mendes-France Administration sought an assurance that the Americans would 
do nothing 'which might even implicitly encourage such a reaction'. This 
could only destroy 'all hope of seeing Vietnam consolidate itself in such a 
way as to create in the face of the Viet Minh an authentically national Ilnd 
independent force'.·· For its part, the Eisenhower Administration made 
clear that its attitude to any Indo-China settlement was now contingent 
upon its acceptance by Diem. 66 
Washington's cultivation of Diem was a safety-net. Were he to disown a 
Geneva settlement it would be all the easier for the United States to do so 
without being seen to break with the British and French, the principal 
architects on the Western side of such an agreement. At the time, however, 
and in spite of French unease, the British failed to appreciate the import 
of Diem's rise to power for Washington's future Viet-Nam policy. Instead 
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of viewing its interest in Diem as a disingenuous means of vetoing a Geneva 
settlement, the British continued to press for high-level American 
representation during the latter stages of the Conference to boost the 
chances of attaining that very end. Anglo-French entreaties met with 
success when, on 14 July, Dulles finally relented and agreed that Bedell 
Smith should return to Geneva provided he would not be 'asked or expected 
by the French to respect terms which in [his] opinion differ materially 
from [the 'seven points'] and ... may publicly disassociate [himself] from 
such differing terms'.·7 Mendes-France evidently convinced Dulles that he 
would not capitulate to the communists simply to achieve a success before 
the expiry of his self-imposed deadline. Viewed from the American side, if 
the presence of Bedell Smith could help bring about a solution based on the 
seven points, including a partition line as far north as possible, then so 
much the better for Washington's evolving Diem-oriented policy for Viet-
Nam. Dulles, however, was 'not optimistic'." 
With the presence, if not the active participation, of Bedell Smith 
assured for the remainder of the Conference, Eden was at last able to 
concentrate on matters in hand. During the absence of the principal 
players the Franco-Viet Minh talks, official or otherwise, had failed to 
make much progress.·· This came as no great surprise to Eden who never 
expected the communists 'to play any cards, even a small one, before the 
final round'. 70 There were three main areas of dispute. The first was 
where to draw a partition line in Viet-Nam. Next was the question of the 
form, composition and functions of an international supervisory body to 
oversee cease-fire arrangements. Should there be, for example, three 
separate bodies for the three Associate States or one all-embracing 
commission? On composition, Eden personally favoured the five Colombo 
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Powers while the communists followed the Korean precedent and pressed for a 
commission comprising two communist and two non-communist states. The rest 
of the Conference preferred a body capable of avoiding deadlock by taking 
majority decisions. Finally, there was the matter of elections in Viet-Nam 
designed to unite the country. However unattractive this prospect was 
given the strong likelihood of a Viet-Minh triumph, the earlier insistence 
of the Western powers on nation-wide elections in Korea with a view to 
creating a united and democratic state in that country had set a precedent 
which could not be resisted in the context of Viet-Nam and which the 
communists were not slow to exploit. The British and French, in a damage-
limitation exercise, sought to defer the elections for at least two years 
during which time the authorities in southern Viet-Nam could work to 
increase their popular appeal. The Viet-Minh for obvious reasons pressed 
for a date in early 1955. 71 An important Chinese concsrn was aired by Chou 
En-lai during a meeting with Eden on 17 July. Referring to the Anglo-
Franco-American discussions in Paris three days earlier and the communiqu4 
declaring the intention to press ahead with plans for a South-East Asian 
defence pact, Chou wished to know if the three Associate States were to be 
members. If so, Chou warned, 'the outlook for a peaceful settlement would 
not be good'. Eden replied that to the best of his knowledge this was not 
in contemplation, nor did he believe the Americans had any plans to 
establish military bases in Laos or Cambodia, another well-chronicled 
Chinese worry. 72 Eden subsequently sought and obtained Bedell Smith's 
confirmation of this and, when relayed to the Chinese delegation, they 
reciprocated by promising that the Associate States would be debarred from 
membership of a military pact with China. 73 
One should not assume from this that Anglo-American differences 
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concerning a defence organisation had been overcome. On the contrary, they 
dogged Eden's efforts at Geneva to the very end. The special Anglo-
American Study Group engendered at a pOint of superficial reconciliation 
during the Washington talks in June turned out in practice to be a forum 
for continued dispute. The British wished to undertake a provisional study 
of the problems relating to a pact and make some interim recommendations. 
The Americans sought something far more binding - an actual draft treaty 
and, to bridge the gap until this could be negotiated, a joint declaration 
by the prospective members of their intention to work together in the 
defence of South-East Asia. 7 • Eden complained that this went 'far beyond 
the understanding which we reached in Washington' while, on 18 July, Makins 
concluded that 'it is abundantly clear that we still face, as we have faced 
since April, the prospect of a serious rift with the Americans over Asian 
policy' . By then the Study Group had completed its work, but Makins did 
not exclude the possibility 'that on July 21 we may be faced with an 
invitation to send a representative to a multilateral Working Party to be 
set up in Washington to draft the treaty and declaration whatever happens 
at Geneva ... The trouble as always with the Americans is that they want to 
act at once primarily for the sake of doing something and they will not 
[sic] longer brook delay in this case'. 7. 
Reacting to this news, on 20 July Eden gave the American delegation at 
Geneva a memorandum outlining a programme of action to be followed if 
agreement was reached at the Conference. This stressed that every effort 
should be made to persuade all the countries of South-East Asia to 
associate themselves in some way with the Geneva accords. However, 
irrespective of the eventual response, invitations should be addressed to 
the Governments of France, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, 
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Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines and Siam no later than 7 August to attend 
a conference no later than 1 September to prepare the way for a South-East 
Asia Treaty Organisation (5. E. A. T. O. ). Eden's thinking was to allow time 
for the Colombo Powers to associate themselves with a Geneva settlement 
before moving on to a Pact. 7. Parallel action was to be avoided. The 
Colombo Powers were more likely to acknowledge a Geneva agreement than join 
a defence pact, thus if the two issues were seen to be somehow linked, even 
1n timing, they might reject both the Geneva compromise and S.E.A.T.O. The 
Americans grudgingly accepted Eden's memorandum subject to minor 
amendment. 77 
The two days leading up to the 20 July deadline witnessed frenetic activity 
at Geneva as, one by one, the outstanding problems were resolved. ' The 
first indication that the Conference might be on the verge of success', 
Eden later wrote, 'came on the afternoon of July 18th when Chou En-lai 
proposed to me that the supervisory commission [one for each of the three 
Associate States) should consist of India, Canada and Poland'. 7. Bedell 
Smith, Molotov and Mendes-France quickly gave their assent and the odds on 
a successful conclusion, which Eden had earlier in the day estimated at 'no 
better than a fifty-fifty chance', had shortened somewhat.?'· He noted in 
his diary that at one stage it looked as though the communists were 'going 
to give us all the presents from the Christmas tree'.·o On the afternoon 
of 20 July the French and Viet-Minh agreed that the demarcation line in 
Viet-Nam should be 'fixed on a river just before the 17th Parallel'. 
Elections were to be held in July 1956. The armistice agreements for Viet-
Nam and Laos were signed early on the morning of 21 July. 
for Cambodia followed at noon. &1 
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The armist ice 
In the event these were the only documents actually signed at Geneva. 
Several unilateral declarations were made, notably by France respecting the 
independence of the Associate States and promising withdrawal of its armed 
forces on request, and by the United States which, consistent with its 
stated position, merely took note of the agreements reached and consented 
to 'refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them', and 
stated that it would view any renewal of aggression in Indo-China 'with 
grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and 
security' . Arguably the most important product of the Conference, the 
'Final Declaration', was not initialled. This document recapitulated the 
military agreements arrived at and went on to outline Indo-China's 
political future. Importantly,' the military demarcation line (in Viet-
Na~ is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as 
constituting a political or territorial boundary'. It also expressed the 
hope that the nation-wide elections would be held as agreed in July 1956 
and, thereafter, Viet-Nam would be re-unified.·2 But the refusal of the 
U.S. delegation (as well as the Viet-Namese) to sign this declaration meant 
that the Chinese and the Soviets also sought to limit their obligations. 
In the end Eden and Molotov agreed that the declaration should be prefaced 
by 'a heading in which all the participating countries would be listed', a 
solution later accepted by the rest of the Conference. 83 The unfortunate 
result of this compromise was that, juridically, no party was bound to 
fulfill the provisions of the Final Declaration. In short, the Geneva 
Conference did not settle the Inde-China war, it simply arranged a cease-
fire. There was no binding agreement to reach a political settlement. 
At 3pm on 21 July, Eden chaired the final plenary session of the 
Conference. 'The result was not completely sat isfactory', he conceded, 
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'but we had stopped an eight year war and reduced international tension at 
a point of instant danger to world peace. This achievement was well worth 
while. All now depended on the spirit in which the agreements were carried 
out'.·· This was a clear allusion to the potential for evading a political 
settlement inherent in the unSigned Final Declaration. Eden might have 
addressed this last comment specifically to the United States which was 
already preparing to circumvent the accords. On 22 July, Premier Diem, 
with full American support, denounced the arrangements for Viet-Nam. This 
boded 111 for the 1956 elections.·· The private relief of the U. S. 
Government that so much of Indo-China had been preserved from communism was 
implicit in its public reactions to the results of Geneva. On 23 July, 
Bedell Smith made his celebrated remark that 'diplomacy is rarely able to 
gain at the conference table what cannot be gained or held on the 
battlefield' . Two days earlier, Eisenhower had refrained from label! ing 
the British and French as appeasers on the grounds that 'if I have no 
better plan I am not going to criticize what they have done' . But it was 
left to Dulles to point the way ahead: 'The important thing from now is not 
to mourn the past but to seize the future opportunity to prevent the loss 
of Northern Viet Nam from leading to the extension of Communism throughout 
South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific'." 
In practice, this meant ignoring the fact that 'in terms of 
international law southern Viet-Nam was not a legitimate State, building up 
Diem as a Viet-Namese version of Syngman Rhee, and ensuring the permanent 
postponement of the nation-wide elections thereby rendering the division of 
Viet-Nam permanent. To provide the South Viet-Namese with the necessary 
motivation to play a strong and effective role in the containment of 
communism, the Americans sought to 'liberate the country from colonialism' 
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by dealing direct with the Diem Government over the heads of the hapless 
French who had hoped to retain some influence and prestige.·'7 'We shall 
stay in the Far East', Mendes-France had declared in the National Assembly 
on 17 June, 'let our allies and our opponents make no mistake about it'." 
In reality, though, the French, tainted by colonialism, had no part in the 
U.S. design for South Viet-Nam's future. 
The process of by-passing the French gained momentum from 25 October 
1954 with a letter from Eisenhower to Diem promising 'an intelligent 
programme of American aid' direct to his Government in Saigon.·' The 
following month the so-called Collins mission culminated in French 
agreement to transfer full responsibility for the training of the South 
Viet-Namese army to U.S. advisers in January 1955.'0 A little over a year 
later the last French troops left South Viet-Nam.'1 A 'few months had been 
sufficient to dissipate the hopes built up at Geneva of injecting new life 
into the French Union in Indo-China', writes a leading French scholar. 
France had withdrawn 'completely and without honour'.'2 
Given this sequence of events, it is interesting to note Shuckburgh's 
diary entry for 2 May 1954 recording Eden's 'conviction ... that all the 
Americans want to do is to replace the French and run Indo-China 
themselves' . Eden also thought they wanted to replace Britain in Egypt -
'They want to run the world!"3 While Eden's interpretation of American 
motives is open to debate. it is certainly true to say that the eventual 
refusal of the Diem regime to hold elections in Viet-Nam in 1956 was due, 
in the first instance, to the nebulous, non-committal, Final Declaration of 
the Geneva Conference and, secondly. to the alacrity with which the United 
States encouraged Saigon to exploit this fact. To draw on Marshal Foch's 
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response to the Versailles Treaty in 1919, this was not an armistice, it 
was a cease-fire for six years. 
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If judged solely in terms of its actions in the Indo-China arena in 1954, 
the Churchill Administration, and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in 
particular, have been justifiably ft§ted. I The British did indeed follow a 
'more statesmanlike course than the Americans' in resisting the attractions 
of a m111 tary solution to the problem in Viet-Nam and, at the Geneva 
Conference, striving for a peaceful, negotiated, settlement. 2 However, if 
it is accepted that the real art of crisis management is to avoid the 
crisis in the first place, then one must begin to quaUfy such praise. 
British policy between October 1951 and March 1954 was, according to its 
self-defined objectives, a catalogue of indecision and failure. This is 
the compelling conclusion obtained through a medium-term analytical 
approach. But the reasons for this failure only become apparent when 
Indo-China is placed within the wider framework of British foreign policy 
as a whole. In eft ect, the Churchill Administration possBssed two Indo-
China policies, one pursued down to March 1954 with scant succes., and one 
thereafter which merits approval. The question is whether the earlier 
failure should detract from the later success. Whether, that ie, the 
convening of the Geneva Conference marked the failure of British Indo-China 
policy. 
• 
Historians often focus on 'lost' opportunities which if grasped by the 
object of their study - governments or individuals - might have altered the 
future course of events. Often, however, it was not as clear to 
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contemporary decision-makers as to future writers that important choices 
were confront ing them. Unfortunately, this was not so in the case of 
British Indo-China policy between 1951 and mid-1953. During that time an 
opportunity to help shift the military balance in Viet-Nam in favour of 
France was clearly discerned by policy-makers in London and, after due 
deliberation, rejected. At the root of this decision was the 
incompatability of Britain's desired objective in Viet-Nam, French Victory, 
and the European imperative of making German rearmament operative. 
There is little doubt that Eden was genuinely concerned to see the 
E. D. C. come to fruition and, within the limitations of BritiBh association 
rather than membership, he made considerable efforts to ensure this.=-
After May 1952, these efforts were directed almost exclusively at allaying 
French misgivings about 8 rearmed Germany. As Sir Patrick Reilly, chars' 
d' affaires at the Paris Embassy in 1954, has recently recalled, Eden 
'certainly wanted the French to ratify [the E.D.C. Treaty)' and, at 
Ambassador Harvey's farewell meeting with Foreign Minister Bidault in March 
1954 ('which should have been a happy occasion'), the Frenchman was .oundly 
'lectured' about the E. D. C. 4 As already seen, this did not indicate any 
great liking for the concept on the part of the British. Eden was far from 
happy about the supranational aspect of the plan and preferred a looser 
system for controlling German rearmament. He also questioned the military 
efficacy of a multinationel force or, as Churchill put it, a 'sludgy 
amalgam' . • British support instead stemmed from concern that the United 
States would revise its commitment to Western European security if the 
E.D.C. collapsed, possibly even withdrawing U.S. armed forces to a position 
of 'peripheral' defence. The implications of this for Br1thh security 
were self-evident. 
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British anxiety increased after January 1953 when the new Eisenhower 
Administration made clear that the choice for its European partners lay 
between the E.O.C. or an 'agonizing reappraisal' of American policy towards 
the Continent. The Europeans had to make greater progress towards 
politico-economic unity, and take on a larger share of responsibility for 
the defence of their homelands, if U. S. mil! tary - and even economic -
support was to continue at existing levels. Aid, as Eisenhower remarked, 
was 'bound to be weakened unless they [the Europeans] move definitely in 
the direction of greater unification'.- The successful functioning of the 
E.O.C. was regarded as an important test-case 1n this respect. The British 
were surprised and alarmed when, at the Berlluda Conference at the end of 
1953, Eisenhower and Dulles rejected the idea of direct West German entry 
into N.A.T.O. if the E.O.C. collapsed. It was the European Army or 
nothing. 7 Nor did the British think the Americans were necessarily 
bluffing. The assessment of one British historian that the 'need for 
German military integration within NATO was not in question', and that if 
it did not come about through the E. O. C. some other way of solving the 
problem would be found, would have been rejected by Churchill and Eden as 
far too sanguine.· In August 1954, Churchill, anticipating the E. O. C. '8 
rejection in France, confided to Cabinet colleagues his unease about the 
future ... 
The danger which I fear most is Mr. Dulles's 'agonised [sic] 
reappraisal'. Peripheral defence may well be doom-laden. Its 
possibility has not receded.-
Eden, when the French Parliament finally threw out the E.O.C. on 30 August 
1954, feared that the Americans were on the brink of 'losing faith' not 
just in any alternative path to German rearmament but in N.A.T.O. 
generally. 10 
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The principal stumbling block to bringing the E. D. C. into being had 
always been French prevarication over ratification. In this connect ion 
events in Viet-Nam were regularly cited by French Ministers and officials 
to excuse or justify a policy of inaction in Europe. While the war 
continued to drain their military resources, the argument ran, E.D.C. 
ratification (tantamount to sanctioning German mil! tary predominance in 
Europe) was impossible and, 1n consequence, should be deferred until French 
forces could return from Indo-China. This might have been less 
unacceptable to the Churchill Government if the French had displayed any 
sign of coming to terms with the second element in the equation, their 
struggle against Ho Chi Minh's rebel forces. Ironically, the absence of a 
forward strategy in Viet-Nam was excused by the fact that France could not 
further diminish its military capacity in Europe at a time when the Germans 
were about to be rearmed. Therefore, from the moment that the E. D. C. 
treaty was signed in May 1952 it was Indo-China rather than Korea which 
truly linked the Cold War in Europe with the Cold War in Asia. Though this 
connection was recognised in London, the E.D.C. enjoyed greater importance 
in foreign Office thinking than Indo-China if only because the former was 
an immediate problem and the latter a latent one. This judgement perSisted 
up to and during the Berlin Conference where, interestingly, the decision 
to include Indo-China on the Geneva agenda was based on concern to ensure 
the continuation in power in Paris of what appeared to be the last pro-
E. D. C. Government. Nor was this a purely Sri tish preoccupation. The 
Americans, too, regarded the preservation of Laniel's majority aa a 
priority for, as Dulles predicted the future, its downfall would probably 
lead to a ... 
capitulation in Indochina and greater hostility to the EDC 
with the distinct possibility of a French Government which would 
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collaborate with the Soviets just as the French Government of the 
summer of 1940 collaborated with the Germans. 'I 
Despite the fact that Geneva ultimately succeeded in terminating 
hostilities, the Berlin Conference demonstrated yet again that Brit ish 
policy towards Indo-China was in thrall to the requirements of European 
policy and, as a result, effectively disabled. 
This, it may be argued, is as it should have been given Britain's 
geographical position and the reqUirements of national security. However, 
it is still ironic that the consequences of the final collapse of the 
E.D.C. in August 1954 were negligible compared to those arising out of the 
subsequent and gradual destruction of the agreements reached at Geneva the 
previous month. For, as James Cable vividly observes in the context of 
continuing problems in Cambodia, war in Indo-China 'has lasted longer, 
involved more nations, had wider repercussions and perhaps reshuffled more 
coaU tions than the Thirty Years War in seventeenth-century Europe ... 
Distant governments fell from power, remote peoples were agitated, the 
quivering kaleidascope of international relations early acquired and still 
in part retains a distinctively Indochinese rhythm to complicate its 
shifting patterns'. 12 It would of course have been asking the impossible 
of British policy-makers in the early 1950s to have foreseen the full 
extent of the Viet-Nam tragedy of the 1960s and 1970s. Yet there was one 
point in 1952-1953 when the British Government contemplated reverSing its 
Euro-Asian priorities. A point at which France might have been persuaded 
to despatch the level of reinforcements from Europe to Viet-Nam which the 
British Military, supported by powerful pOlitical and diplomatic voices, 
believed capable of decisively defeating the Viet-Minh. The British Chiefa 
of Staff called on the Foreign Office to persuade the French Government to 
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adopt the reinforcement thesis: officials deliberated: European priorities 
prevailed: the Foreign Office rejected the thesis. This was the 
consciously squandered 'opportunity' referred to earlier. 
It is worth pausing to reflect on the factors which produced this 
outcome. Eden and his officials calculated that the French Government 
would demand a price for acting on British advice to strengthen its 
Expedi tionary Force. They also calculated (without, it should be noted, 
ever discussing the issue with the French) that this price was 
unaffordable. Only a British guarantee against German military predominace 
in Europe in the absence of French forces in South-East Asia and backed up 
either by membership of the E.D.C. or the stationing of additional troops 
on the continent was thought capable of persuading the French Government to 
intensify its effort in Viet-Nam. For Eden, the complicating effact which 
French reinforcement would have on his E.D.C. policy seems to have been the 
decisive factor in the rejection of the arguments of the Chiefs of Staff, 
of Graves in Saigon. MacDonald in Singapore. the British Defence Co-
ordination Committee (Far East) and the Paris Embassy. In the final 
analysis. a modification of E.D.C. policy was too high a price to pay for 
French Victory in Viet-Nam in 1952-1953 just as in 1954 a possible world 
war was too high a price to pay for avoiding a French defeat. 
If the British position on the E.D.C. reduced the scope and flexibility 
of its Indo-China policy there is some irony. as we have seen. in the fact 
that the E.D.C. came to nothing while Viet-Nam drifted towards its bloody 
apogee over the next two decades. The decision by the French National 
Assembly to turn its back on the E.D.C. in August 1954 (a 'deplorable vote' 
1n Eden's opinion' a) plunged the Western Alliance into confusion and 
crisis. ,. Eden. after a month of frenetic diplomatic activity. skilfully 
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secured allied agreement on West Germany's direct entry into N.A.T.O. 
However, to ensure French approval it was considered necessary to expand 
the 1948 Brussels Treaty with its in-built commitment for members to regard 
an aggression against one of their number as an aggression against all. 
West Germany and Italy were to join the original members, Britain, France 
and the Benelux countries, in what became known as the Western European 
Union (W. E. U. ). This would in theory insure against the possibility of 
West Germany using its restored military capacity to threaten any of its 
ostensible European allies. 1 • But this was still not quite enough for the 
French and, at a major conference in London at the end of September, 
Mendis-France appeared set to create further d:1 fficul ties. Eden, 
anticipating this, had proposed to the Cabinet on 27 September that Britain 
offer 'some striking quid pro qud in the event of deadlock. This should 
take the form of a commitment to retain henceforth its forces on the 
Continent at their existing levels <four divisons and the Tactical Air 
Force) for as long as a majority of the members of the W.E.U. so deSired. 
The Foreign Secretary admitted that this was an 'unprecedented commitment', 
but the 'hard fact is that it is impossible to organise an effective 
defence system in Western Europe, which in turn is essential for the 
security of the United Kingdom, without a major British contribution'. 1. 
On 29 September, Eden, with full Cabinet support, played what Churchill 
called '[o]ur only trump card'. 17 The concession on troop levels, sought 
for so long by the French in the context of the E. D. C. I proved decisive. 
'It was absolutely essential in saving the whole thing', a leading figure 
in the negotiations, Sir Frank Roberts, has recalled. 1. In December 1954. 
the French National Assembly - still somewhat heSitantly - approved the new 
arrangement and, the following May, West Germany was admitted to N.A.T,O. 1. 
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The question which this raises in terms of Indo-China is. crudely 
speaking. could Eden not have made a similar concession to the French two 
years earlier and. as well as possibly saving the E.D.C. and avoiding the 
crisis of August-September 1954. provided the psychological crutch 
necessary for France to reinforce in Viet-Ham? After all. the concessions 
of September 1954 were. in reality. extremely limited. For example. the 
proviso about maintaining forces or their 'equivalent fighting ability'. 
and another which cited 'balance of payment difficulties' as just cause for 
limiting military commitments in Europe, permitted the withdrawal of some 
22,000 troops from the British Army on the Rhine in 1957-58 and their 
replacement, in line with the cost-cutting Sandys White Paper on Defence, 
by tactical nuclear weapons. ao Bri Ush forces were also entitled to be 
withdrawn in the event of an 'acute emergency' Overseas about which Britain 
was to be the sole judge and without requiring a majority in favour in the 
W. E. U. 21 This caveat, when first discussed in London, puzzled Churchill 
who observed, correctly, that it 'seems to take away with one hand what has 
been given with the other'.22 On 1 October, following the success of the 
London conference, he reflected that the pledge ... 
can be cancelled at any time ... It does not mean anything ... 
No one in their senses thought we could bring our troops home 
from the Continent. Ho one imagined that if Russia decided to 
march to the West we could sit still and do nothing ... Never 
was the leadership of Europe so cheaply won. 2. 
While Churchill was wrong about the leadership of Europe, and although it 
was the Germans more than the Russians who concerned the French, this still 
tends to confirm the psychological value of the British commitment. Why 
then could the same guarantee have not been made in the autumn of 1952 or 
early in 1953 with regard to the E.O.C. and with similar provisos about the 
removal of British forces? Had the existing state of affairs b.en 
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formalised it might have smoothed the path to French ratification of the 
E.D.C. and, in addition, provided the French with just the kind of concrete 
show of support necessary if they were to contemplate a further weakening 
of their forces on the continent through reinforcement of Viet-Nam. Nor 
was it dissimilar to the anticipated French 'price' in the latter respect. 
Could not 8 commitment to the E.D.C. have been packaged in such a way as to 
double-up as an encouragement to the French in Indo-China given the 
intimate co-relation between the two issues? 
There are of course a number of reasons why this scenario did not 
materialise. One was a basic shortage of manpower: in 1954, as opposed to 
1952-53, Britain could look forward to a reduction of its commitment in 
Korea and Egypt. More fundamentally, Eden, as much as Margaret Thatcher in 
later years, drew the line at British entanglement in supranational 
European organisations. It is surely no coincidence that concessions were 
made in the context of the W.E. U., a looser inter-governmental arrangement, 
than to the E.D.C. When the French first requested a guarantee on British 
troop levels in 1952-53, Eden reacted like a 'kicking mule', and when the 
proposal was resurrected during the death-throes of the E.D.C. he condemned 
it as 'shop-soiled'.z. Another answer is that Eden simply did not make the 
connection between investing mil1 tarlly in Europe in the present to reap 
rewards both there and in South-East Asia in the future. This required 
long-term vision and a penchant for 'grand deSigns', neither of which Eden 
really possessed, preferring instead to pursue the Kitchener creed: 'One 
cannot conduct foreign policy as one would but only 8S one can'. 2. In 
consequence, French reinforcement neither took place early enough or - when 
it did under the Navarre Plan - in sufficient numbers or calibre. 
Whether the additional three or four European division. pressed for by 
-344-
the British Chiefs of Staff would have altered the downward spiral of 
French fortunes must be open to doubt. However, two contentions still 
stand. Firstly, Eden and the Foreign Office were repeatedly told by the 
military experts that more French troops would make a difference. It is in 
this context that the failure to act must be judged and the inclination to 
temper criticism of British diplomacy resisted. Secondly, reinforcement 
could hardly have made things worse. If the French could have commenced 
negotiations from something resembling a position of strength and achieved 
the same result as they did at Geneva from weakness (a result which was 'by 
any standard the least unfavourable' =-) the Americans might have felt 
better disposed to respect the agreements. Although this is a study of the 
Indo-China war from the British perspective, and extrapolations about 
American thinking are therefore based on poor foundations, one important 
question remains: if, like the Korean armistice, the Geneva agreements had 
had the appearance of being dictated by France and her allies rather than 
by the communists - and could be looked on as a tactical victory - would 
the subsequent course of American policy have been altered? The answer is 
probably not, for this would have implied U. S. support for the political 
provisions of the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, and it is 
difficult to envisage the Eisenhower Administration agreeing to nationwide 
elections in Viet-Nam in 1956 under any circumstances. 
If the Churchill Government's Indo-China policy was often constructed, and 
at times placed on hold, in accordance with the requirements of E. D. C. 
policy, what then influenced the British approach once the situation in 
Viet-Nam assumed priority status in April 1954? Once more the longer-term 
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and contextual method of enquiry is instructive in providing an answer. 
The evidence examined leaves little room for doubt that Eden sought a 
political settlement at Geneva in order to deny the United States the 
pretext (continuing hostilities in Viet-Nam) for internationalising the war 
and attellpting a high-risk military solution. The preceding three years 
had provided the British with enough experience of the strident nature of 
American policy in Asia, and towards the P.R.C. in particular, for them to 
take the issue of intervention in Viet-Nam with the utmost seriousness. 
Dulles spoke no less than the truth when telling the National Security 
Council on 29 April 1954 that 'fear of atomic attack has badly frightened 
them [the British]', and when asserting a few days later that the British 
were 'scared to death by the spector of nuclear bombs in the hands of the 
Russians' . 37 It is certainly not true, as Victor Rothwell has recently 
suggested, that there was 'some complacency' on the part of the British in 
1954 in viewing nuclear weapons as so 'terrible that they had mad. war 
between the great powers unlikely'.z. In October 1953, the British Chief. 
of Staff had concluded that Soviet policy, at least for the for •••• abl. 
future, was designed to minimise the risk of a general war. But they 
warned that such a conflict might result 'unintentionally from some 
situation that obliged the Western Powers to take military action against 
the Soviet Union or China'. 2' In the Foreign Office, though this analy.i8 
was accepted, an additional factor was being weighed up: that through ill-
advised and unilateral action the United States would precipitate a show-
down in Asia with the P. R. C. which would embroil Britain and the Soviet 
Union and culminate in a third world war. 
From 1951, Eden had sought to involve the United States in a collective 
defence grouping for South-Ea.t Asia alongside Britain, France, Australia 
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and New Zeal and. The ideal of an Asian N. A. T. O. with the inclusion of 
India and the other leading regional powers was unattainable while so many 
of the latter were wedded to non-al1gnment, retained sympathy for the 
P. R. C. or, as in the case of India and Pakistan, were engaged in rivalry 
bordering on actual war. The effective security of South-East Asia thus 
rested with the five Western Powers. The objective of defence co-
ordination was, initially, the containment of Communist China. Gradually, 
however, as the threat of Chinese aggression receded, a defence grouping 
came to be seen in London as a means of controlling the excesses of 
American policy. This concern had been highlighted during 1952 by the on-
going Anglo-American dispute about how best to respond to a Chinese 
invasion of Tonking, a dispute which was a symptom of wider disagreements 
over poliCY towards the P. R. C. per se. The British deSire for a modus 
vi.dendi. and its adherence to a dual policy of conta1nment and compromise 
came into collision with the unaccommodating and confront at ional attitude 
of the United States. The worry in London was that a local crisis in ASia 
would be used in Washington as an excuse for all-out War in and aga1nst 
China. While Eisenhower's Republican Administration, and to a slightly 
lesser degree itS Democratic predecessor, framed their Ch1na policy to 
accord with the agitated, s1nophobe, state of public and Congress10nal 
opinion, and although 1n private Administration officials might show 
themselves less strident in their attitude, this did not alter the fact 
that the policy which emerged - and that with which the British had to deal 
- was often profoundly disturbing. 30 As Ambassador Franks had observed in 
1952, ' [a] s things are at present, if Chinese aggreSSion occurred the 
Americans would very likely rush into action which we would feel 111-
advised'. 31 Or, alternatively, in the words of a Foreign Office official, 
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'hanging over all our heads [isl the danger that the Americans may, by 
unilateral action, drag the western world into a full-scale war with China 
- or worse'. 32 
By the spring of 1954 the preferred method of insuring against this, a 
collective defence mechanism. had faUed to materialise. Also by then it 
was no longer Chinese aggression that was the issue but American action in 
Viet-Na~ the idea that Chinese aid to the Viet-Minh constituted 
'aggression', as the Americans sometimes argued, was utterly rejected in 
London. The intervention crisis of April-June involved the possibility of 
the U.S., or a U.S.-led coalition, taking action in Viet-Nam which Peking 
might itself consider aggression and a threat to its southern frontier.~ 
Krishna Menon, confidante of the Indian leader Nehru, got to the heart of 
the matter when justifying India's subsequent non-participation 1n 
S.E.A.T.O. 'No country wants aggression against itself or its friends', he 
said. 'And yet the steps they take in the name of prevent ing aggression 
i tsel f encourages aggression' . 3. The danger of Chinese counter-
intervention was thus ever-present in British appreciations. So too was 
the possible activation of the Sino-Soviet alliance and the prospect of a 
third, nuclear, world war in which the British stood to suffer far more 
than the Americans. This concern was exacerbated by the Eisenhower 
Administration's insistence that nuclear weapons, having assumed the status 
of conventional arms, would be utilised accordingly. Therefore, as the 
British viewed matters in the spring of 1954, if the situation in Viet-Nam 
was to escalate into a major East-West confrontation - if the accidental 
world war mooted by the Chiefs of Staff were to occur - it was more likely 
to be the Americans than the communists who would trigger it. The Soviets 
had no desire for such a war, while the Chinese had no reason to intervene 
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in Viet-Nam while the Viet-Minh were doing so well on their own. But 
American or Western intervention might turn such calculations upside down. 
It appears to be no coincidence that British thinking on a negotiated 
settlement, partition in Viet-Nam and the Geneva Conference began to assume 
a more favourable complexion in direct relation to the increasing danger of 
American l1i11 tary action. Although Malaya was a major Sri tish 
preoccupation. it is interesting that - contrary to Eden's memoirs - the 
security of the colony did not impinge greatly on British calculations 
during and after the April crisis. This may be because of confidence in 
the effectiveness of the Songkhla strategy in insulating the colony from 
infiltration. A direct military threat, however, was a different matter 
and, while plans existed to counter this contingency as well, the prospects 
for successful defence must have been considerably less. Ultimately, the 
external security of Malaya depended on avoiding a general war with China 
across the whole of Asia. Eden did not promote partition in Viet-Nam 
solely to ensure a non-communist buffer as far to the north of Malaya as 
possible but, primarily, as the only acceptable expedient by which the 
immediate crisis could be defused and the threat of a wider war averted. 
While Malaya would 'obviously be much more difficult to defend' if Indo-
China fell to communis~ Eden conceded, this was 'not in itself a reason 
for intervening in Indo-China even if we could do so effectively 'aa 
From early April, Eden, hitherto far more ambivalent about a negotiated 
settlement than his memoirs suggest, made a virtue out of the unwelcome 
prospect of Geneva. The dangers of quoting out of context accepted, there 
are three key statements which, when juxtaposed, convey the essence of 
Eden's motives. Firstly, as he explained to Selwyn Lloyd, 'we do not want 
to bring a greater disaster upon our heads by trying to avert the immediate 
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one'."· This was impl1ct acceptance that important as Viet-Ham was, it 
was not worth saving at the price of major war. Secondly, as Eden confided 
in 8 letter to his wife from Geneva on 22 May, '(ilt is still even money we 
may reach an armistice. I am more than ever convinced of dangers of 3rd 
world war if we don't'."7 Two days later he made clear in Cabinet that it 
was not the Soviets or the Chinese that worried him in this respect. He 
was, rather, 'gravely concerned about the dangers of the alternative 
courses of action which the United States Government were likely to favour 
if a settlement were not now secured by negotiation'."· As far as the 
British were concerned, American intervention remained a real danger almost 
to the end of the Conference and was for Eden the strongest possible 
motivation for pushing the claims of a diplomatic settlement. 
However, if one is to argue that Eden sought a pOlitical solution 
primarily to deny the Americans a pretext for applying a military 
alternative, there are a number of counter-arguments to be addressed. 
Firstly, an entry in Shuckburgh's Geneva diary for 14 May: Eden said 
he had never been to so difficult a conference, and that he felt 
the situation was very dangerousj but when I said that r could not 
get the feeling [emphasis in original) of acute danger, he agreed. 
He thinks the Russians do not want war, and will have to prevent 
the Chinese from bringing one upon their heads.~ 
This, though, is an exception to the otherwise consistent view held by Eden 
between April and July that it was the Americans who had to b. reatrained 
from bringing war upon British heads. Equally, it contradicts the maxim 
that a good diplomat leaves little to chance: relying on Soviet influence 
over the Chinese, and Chinese influence over the Viet-Minh, wag a risky 
strategy and Eden was a very good diplomat. No doubt hie hopes and 
expectations, as well as his fears, oscillated during the COUrse of a 
lengthy conference, and Shuckburgh's record, while probably an accurate 
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record of his master's thoughts at a given moment, should be viewed in 
relation to the overwhelming weight of evidence testifying to Eden's deep 
concern about American intentions. Also, only a week after Shuck burgh' s 
notes were compiled, Eden made his unequivocal confession to his wife about 
his fear of a third world war. One IIay assume that in doing so he was 
being nothing but frank. 
A related counter-argument is that it was only American threats about 
intervention in Viet-Nam and action against China which forced the 
communists to cOIlpromise at Geneva. According to this argument, the 
Soviets in particular feared a major conflict and so placed pressure on the 
Chinese to in turn urge moderation on the Viet-Minh. Paradoxically, 
therefore, only the threat of an American-engendered war made it possible 
for Eden to achieve a result at Geneva which 1n his mind was designed to 
prevent just that scenario. It would be wrong to suggest that there is no 
validity in this argument. However, while Eden undoubtedly recognised the 
value of American 'noises off' in keeping the communists guessing as to 
Western intentions, there was a very fine line between bluff and having to 
make good that bluff in order to retain credibility. If, as Dulles later 
suggested, the Americans were indulging in brinksmanhip in 1954, it was not 
to Eden's liking. 40 The risk was simply too high and at no stage was Eden 
convinced that the Americans did not mean what they said. As noted in the 
narrative, there is a school of thought which suggests that the Eisenhower 
Administration was never serious about intervention. 41 This has yet to be 
proved conclusively, but even if it were it does not alter the fact that 
Eden reacted to a situation as he then perceived it, not as hindsight now 
paints it. In his memoirs Eden conceded the importance of not overplaying 
his hand about the dangers of world war. 'If I were to cry 'Wolf I Wolf I , 
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too frequently, I would suffer the fate of alarmists in diplomacy and not 
be believed'.42 This was no doubt true, but here Eden was talking of his 
dealings with the Soviets and Chinese. The bulk of the evidence cited in 
this thesis was, at the time, the preserve of closed British circles where 
the need to cry 'Wolf!' was unnecessary. Rather, when the dangers of world 
war were talked of, they were those likely to be generated by United States 
policy. Lord Salisbury's later reflection that in 1954 the Americans posed 
a greater threat to world peace than the Soviet Union was more than a 
personal subjective assessment.4~ 
A third point is Eden's contention, also in his memoirs, that if it had 
not been for the deterrent power of the Hydrogen bomb, 'I do not believe 
that we should have got through the Geneva Conference and avoided a major 
war ... ' 44 Eden's recollections have already been shown to be a faulty 
guide to the evolution of British thinking between 1951 and 1954. So it is 
with this statement. For the question must be asked, who was deterred by 
the Hydrogen Bomb? The real issue with regard to deterrence rested on 
preventing the Americans rather than the Soviets from escalating the war. 
Yet Eden, in a confusing and contradictory aside in Full Circle, admits 
that the effect of the H-Bomb 'was least on United States policy ... since 
America could not at that time be reached by bombs from Soviet Russia'.4. 
As for the idea that the Chinese were either persuaded against intervening 
in Viet-Nam or that they compromised their agenda at Geneva rather than 
face the risk of American nuclear retaliation, this too may be questioned. 
For one thing, China had no reason to intervene - unless in response to 
American or Western intervention. For another, neither Eden or Eisenhower 
seem to have believed that the spectre of the H-Bomb carried great weight 
in Peking. In June 1954, Eden argued with Churchill that 'China is 
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a more formidable power than you will admit ... Unlike the Russians the 
Chinese do not seem to be frightened by the hydrogen bomb'.4. Eisenhower 
wrote to Churchill at the end of 1954 in the context of the Quemoy and 
Matsu crisis that Chine could 'pay any price in manpower, with complete 
indifference to the emount' in pursuit of its regional objectives. 47 
One might go further end suggest that because the final settlement at 
Geneva merried closely with what Peking appears to have sought from the 
Conference from the start, Arnericen threats were less than decisive. In a 
despetch to Eden on 31 August 1954, Trevelyan, observing the reaction in 
Peking, concluded that on Indo-China 'the Chinese obtained what one may 
guess to have been their minimum demands, with the prospect of something 
more' . A communist buffer-state had been established on their southern 
border adding to the regime's security; in the all-Vietnam elections of 
1956 there was a strong likelihood of extending that buffer-state through a 
sweeping Viet-Minh Victory; the armistice freed Peking from supplying 'ever 
increasing military and civil supplies' to Ho Chi Minh and from the 'danger 
of American intervention with all its possible consequences'; the cause of 
communism in South-East Asia had suffered 'no set-back'; and China could 
now enjoy a respite from external problems to concentrate on internal 
industrielisation end socialisation. Equally importantly, the manner in 
which Chou En-lei and his delegation conducted themselves at Geneva went a 
long way towards the P.R.C. gaining universal acceptance (the United States 
excepted) as the 'only real Chinese Government'. 4. Trevelyan's analysi., 
backed up by a number of historians, makes it difficult to accept that Chou 
En-lai was frightened or bullied by American nuclear power into embracing 
such a favourable settlement. 4. 
As for the SOViets, they may also have assumed that China had a mora 
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extensive agenda for Geneva and so urged Chou to press the Viet-Minh to 
accept the final compromise for fear of being drawn into a general war 
should Chinese diplomacy prove inflexible. Yet Molotov himself admitted at 
Geneva that China was 'very much her own master'. ·0::.0 And, to repeat, how 
much pressurising did it take for Chou to accept what was eventually 
offered? Cause and effect in this context became hopelessly muddled on the 
Western side. The point therefore stands that Eden's analysis of the 
deterrent power of the H-Bomb is not without its flaws. Writing as he was 
in 1960, Eden may have applied a later conversion to the concept of 
mutually assured destruction to the earlier events he was describing. 
There is, importantly, no clear contemporary evidence that he ever wholly 
and deliberately relied on the American nuclear arsenal to assist him in 
his disucssions with the communists. On one level, threats from the 
Americans might serve some purpose in making the communist side more 
receptive to Western proposals, on another this benefit was cancelled out 
by the danger was that such threats, if ignored, might have to be 
activated. By for the safest method of preserving world peace was to end 
the fighting in Viet-Nom by old-fashioned negotiation rather than the newer 
nuclear diplomacy. 
Even then Eden needed the help of Mendes-France, 'the one man with the 
strength of purpose to effect a drastic surgical operation', as Jebb 
reflected in the woke of Geneva, and without whom France would 'probably be 
engaged in [the war] still and for many months to come'. This wos 
subsequently acknowledged by Eden.· 1 Nor should the willingness of the 
Viet-Minh to compromise be underestimated. Bouyed up by the triumph of 
Dien Bien Phu, to have retroceded 20 per cent of territory under its 
control and nearly a mlll1on-and-a-hal f people was a considerable act of 
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sel f denial.·z Was it the result of Chinese pressure - of Viet-Minh 
objectives compromised in the interests of its powerful northern supporter? 
Possi bly. On the other hand, the 1956 elections offered the prospect of 
complete victory by peaceful means, something which must have been 
attractive to the Viet-Minh after eight years of exhausting and destructive 
war. One may surmise that later accusations by Hanoi of a Chinese and 
Soviet 'betrayal' had as much to do with their failure to fully protest the 
abandonment of all-Vietnam elections 1n 1955-56 as with the decision to 
hold them in the first place for, by then, neither Peking or Moscow wished 
to re-open the Viet-Nam problem. Only time was to prove that the Viet-Minh 
were the real losers at Geneva.·:11 Therefore, according to this reading, 
Eden's r61e at Geneva was that of a facilitator rather than problem-solver. 
His efforts to keep the Conference alive over a period of two months meant 
that when the principal parties concerned finally accepted that a peaceful 
settlement was in all their interests there was a ready-made forum in which 
to discuss terms. 
• 
On 21 May 1954, Eden wrote to Selwyn Lloyd from Geneva that it was 'the 
cessation of hostilities in Indo-China which I regard as my primary 
objective'... This objective was limited and specific, designed to 
eradicate the Indo-China problem as a source of Sino-American, even general 
East-West, friction and conflict. Beyond this, his thinking was impreCise. 
As Anthony Short has written, the lesson slowly gleaned from the conflicts 
of the 20th century is that 'wars tend to arise out of preceding peace 
settlements'... Eden ignored this lesson in 1954. Making peace in Indo-
China in its fullest sense came a poor second to ending the fighting. The 
blame for the conflict which engulfed Viet-Nam in the 1960's cannot be laid 
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at the feet of anyone individual, including Eden. Nevertheless, as Short 
also observes, the accuracy of the notion that poor peace settlements 
produce renewed conflict was never more 'obvious than in respect to the 
Geneva Conference of 1954'.·· Eden, as co-chairman of that Conference, was 
in a position to press for a more intensive study by all concerned of the 
post-war pol1 tical settlement, or even to call for a new - pol1 tical -
conference as had been written into the Korean armistice agreements. This 
did not happen. Instead Eden, his 'primary objective' secured on 21 July, 
made a speedy and no doubt welcome exit from Geneva. The post-hostilities 
arrangements were hastily contrived and, for that reason, imprecise and 
open to all manner of evasions. 
There was, admittedly, more to this than Eden's reluctance to look too 
far into the future. A member of the British delegation at Geneva has 
recalled that another reason was the' decay of traditional diplomacy ... 
This had once allowed diplomats, sometimes qUite junior diplomats, 
to cooperate in working out the minor details while their super-
iors were still deadlocked on the major issues. At Geneva - only 
the second East-West ministerial conference since the death of 
Stalin and the first to include China - there was little readiness 
to delegate. What the Foreign Ministers had no time for was often 
left undone. a7 
Yet even this assessment brings one back to Eden's lack of long-term vision 
for, as stated, one of the principal matters left 'undone' was a carefully 
worked-out blueprint for Viet-Nam's political future. 
Similarly, in the circumstances prevailing in the spring of 1954, 
Eden's estimate of the value of a South-East Asia defence grouping was alao 
narrowly based. He saw such a grouping complementing or acting as an 
adjunct of his 'primary objective'. It was, in short, to guarantee any 
armistice agreement emerging from Geneva and 60 hopefully insure against a 
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recrudescence of Viet-Nam as a catalyst for general war in the future. But 
this was the limit of his vision. There was no broad sophisticated 
strategy Of, if there was, it rested with Eden's cherished ideal of an 
Asian N. A. T. 0., something which, in the form he wished it to take, was 
still a long way off in 1954. 
It followed that if the aim of a coalition was simply to police an 
Indo-China settlement, its formation had to await agreement at Geneva. 
Such hesitancy. however. brought Eden into conflict with the American 
desire for an instantaneous, all-embracing and wide-ranging alliance. This 
disturbed him for thrse reasons: first, it would jeopardise the prospect. 
for peace at Geneva rather than enhance them as the Americans argued; 
second, he could not be sure if the Eisenhower Administration meant it to 
be anything more than cover, or legitimisation, for American intervention 
in Viet-Na~ and third, in terms of involving the neutral Asian powers and 
establishing a future alliance on the lines of N. A. T. 0., it was premature. 
Moreover, the context in which it was being discussed would give the 
impression that it was an offensive grouping directed against China and, as 
such, alienate those Asian powers determined to retain their non-aligned 
status. 
Eden rightly regarded any South-East Asian security pact a. worthless 
and devoid of credibility without the parUcipetion of ell the important 
Asian states. He therefore respondsd to American pressure for immediate 
action in such e way as to appease Washington's impetience while at the 
same time preserving his Asian N.A.T.O.-ideel for the time when conditions 
would permit fuller Asian adherence. He sought, for example, to resist the 
American predilection for bringing in as founder members the Phi Uppin •• , 
Siam and the Associate States thereby aggravating the enti-colonial 
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sensibilities of the other Asian powers; he tried to ensure that the aim of 
an alliance was initially restricted to upholding a settlement for Indo-
China; and in the latter connection, and again to avoid sending unfortunate 
signals to the rest of Asia, he sought in Washington in June 195' to dilute 
the anti-communist character of such an alliance by involving the Soviets 
and Chinese in a Locarno-type guarantee. But as Eden resisted American 
pressure to go further and faster than he wanted, considerable tensions 
were released within the 'special relationship'. On balance, however, 
Eden's more restrained approach triumphed. At the end of the Geneva 
Conference he succeeded in persuading the U.S. Government to separate the 
planned invitation to all Asian countries to recognise and respect the 
agreements on Indo-China from the invitation to those same nat ions to 
commence imraediate talks on a det'ence pact. Linking the two in the minds 
of men like Nehru might have resulted in rejection of both, not just the 
latter as proved the case." 
The S. E. A. T. 0 Treaty that was finally signed in ManUa in September 
1954 had enough advantages from Eden's viewpoint to make it rather more 
than 'the price paid by the British for American acquiescence at Geneva'.·· 
On the debit side, however, was composition. This was so heavily weighted 
towards the white Western powers and their satellite Asian partners that 
four out of five of the so-called Colombo Powers ~Pakistan was the 
exception} were effectively excluded from future involvement. Conversely, 
and assuming that they would ever have consented to partiCipate, to have 
included countries like India and Indonesia while excluding Siam and the 
Philippines would have led to American disassociation. Or, if not, 
Washington would probably have pressed (as it did from time to time) for 
the inclusion of Japan, South Korea and Formosa to counterbalance A.ian 
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Commonwealth membership. These countries, more even than Siam or the 
Philippines, would have inflamed neutral Asian opinion. In other words, 
the kind of Asian membership desired in London was incompatible with that 
desired in Washington and vice versa. A further problem was the Eisenhower 
Administration's disdain for India, its equation of neutralism with pro-
communism, and mistrust of Nehru. As an American scholar notes, 'many US 
officials believed that the fastest way to send information to Peking was 
to whisper it confidentially in New Delhi'.ao 
If Eden reflected that S.E.A.T.O. was nothing like the Asian N.A.T.O. 
he had originally envisaged, certainly 1n terms of membership, he did 
approve of the special protocol extending protection to Laos, Cambodia and 
South Viet-Nam and which, in effect, guaranteed the partition line in the 
latter. This, however, technically flouted the undertaking he had given 
the Chinese at Geneva, namely that the Indo-Chinese states would be 
debarred from joining any milli tary alliance whether pro-Chinese or pro-
Western. Yet even as he gave this promise Eden was in the process of 
breaking it. 'Although we naturally said nothing to the Chinese', he 
informed London on 19 July 1954, 'General Bedell-Smith and I recognized 
that the territory of Laos, Cambodia and Southern Viet-Nam might be covered 
by the South-East Asia Pact even if the Associated States could not 
themselves be members'. a, On 21 July, Chou En-lei again sought Eden's 
assurance that the 'United States would not seek to upset the 
understandings' reached at Geneva, particularly concerning the 
establishment of American military bases in Indo-China. This the Chines. 
Premier obtained, though privately Eden, in line with what he had said two 
days earlier, was still contemplating ways in which Laos, Cambodia and 
retained Viet-Nam might be covered by S. E. A. T. O. without them formally 
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joining the organisation. Their direct membership, he conceded, would be 
'contrary to the spirit of these [Geneva] agreements as well as being 
political folly'.62 
A month later, as S.E.A.T.O. planning reached a climax, Eden accepted 
an American draft Treaty which extended protection to the Associate 
States. S3 Thus his undertaking to the Chinese had been neatly sidestepped, 
a manoeuvre Eden presumably felt was within the letter as well as the 
'spirt t' of Geneva for he later implied that South Viet-Nam, Laos and 
Cambodia had been genuinely neutralised. SA Nor, as is sometimes 
suggesteds ., was the S. E. A. T. O. protocol an entirely American initiative. 
Eden actually pressed for the widening of the protocol to include 
S. E. A. T. O. protection for the Associates States if they were endangered 
through 'subversion' or 'threats to territorial integrity otherwise than by 
armed at tack' . Just how such protection could be extended was not 
specified.- Was Eden perhaps suggesting that in the event of an electoral 
victory for the Viet-Minh in 1956 (something he fully expectede ?'), the 
S.E.A.T.O. powers should refuse to recognise the result? 
Eden's insistence that the security of the Associate States be 
bolstered from internal danger can be seen as an admission that, so far as 
Viet-Nam was concerned, partition had never been anything but an unsavoury 
expedient to ensure that the greater danger of American-led escalation Was 
averted. Having achieved that end Eden seems to have viewed S.E.A.T.O. as 
a means by which partition might prove something more than a staging-post 
on the road to an all-communist Indo-China. British support for the Manila 
protocol may even be viewed as tacit support for the abandonment of the 
1956 elections in Viet-Nam. The Diem regime did not take much prompting, 
while Washington was provided with ample justification for its SUbsequent 
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actions by the looseness of the - unsigned - Final Declarat ion of the 
Geneva Conference. Eden's attitude. whether he intended it or not. may 
have been a further factor. The evidence would suggest conscious intent. 
In January 1955, a Foreign Office memorandum warned that British interests 
in South-East Asia would not be served by a Viet-Minh electoral triumph. 
With the Hanoi and Saigon authorities due to meet on 20 July to make 
arrangements for the election. the paper argued that' it might be best' if 
these negotiations were to 'drift into deadlock and if deadlock were in 
turn to lead gradually to acceptance by both sides of the idea of a semi-
permanent division of Vietnam', This, though, 'would need very discreet 
handling indeed to avoid the charge of violating Geneva', Eden fully 
endorsed this proposal which therefore implicates one of the principal 
architects of the Geneva Agreements and, along with the Soviet Union, one 
of the powers responsible for overseeing their implementation. in their 
ultimate destruct10n. 6 • 
A further noteworthy feature of the events of 1954, at least from April, 
was that British Indo-China policy was very much Eden's policy. There is 
thus good reason for talking specifically of Eden rather than Brit ish 
diplomacy in general when discussing the Geneva Conference. The pace of 
events and seriousness of the situation demanded instant decisions from the 
Foreign Secretary. Confident of his own judgement, Eden was happy to 
operate in this uncomplicated manner. One consequence, however, was a 
tendency to ride rough-shod over the opinions of those advisers who, for 
the previous two-and-a-half years, had been far more closely involved with 
South-East Asian affairs. This meant, for example, ignoring the repeated 
entreaties of Makins to fall in with American plans for immediate progress 
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on a regional defence pact, a view endorsed by other senior figure. like 
Salisbury, Nutting, Shuck burgh, Caccia and Allen. Eden' 8 officials also 
frowned on his frankness when deaHng with Molotov at Geneva. On other 
occasions he ignored Foreign Office doubts about the point and likelihood 
of bringing India and the other neutral Asian nations into the decision-
making process, and differed with Shuck burgh over the value of the 'very 
nasty faces the Americans are making' with regard to nuclear weapon •. •• 
Many of Eden's key decisions were thus the product of personal 
intuition rather than collective diplomatic wisdom. They were also to some 
extent a reflection of his personally limited objectives competing with the 
Foreign Office's more long-range ambitions, particularly with regard to 
S. E. A. T. O. His advisers, led by the unreservedly Atlanticist Makin., 
argued from the start in favour of moving ahead on S.E.A.T.O. planning in 
tandem with the Americans on the grounds that, though premature and likely 
to go down badly amongst the Asian Commonwealth, the danger of a pact being 
formed without Britain was greater. Within an alliance, Makins protested, 
Britain could exert some influence over American policy; on the other hand, 
for Britain to deliberately sideline itself could be disastrous and 'affect 
our relations with the United States everywhere'. 70 Salisbury, one of 
Eden'S few close friends in politics, also warned that '[w]e shall have no 
control over them [the Americans) '" They might drop the H-Bomb', 71 Such 
arguments must have appealed to Eden who, since 1952, had accepted that a 
regional defence mechanism was necessary to curtail the excesses of 
American policy as much as to contain China, However, the Makin. thesis 
cut across Eden's personal agenda for Geneva on two levels: first, Eden was 
never convinced that the Americans would not use a pact as a device for 
immediate intervention in Viet-Ham thus bringing about a dangerous 
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escalation of the problem; second, it would have threatened his 'primary 
objective' if, as might well have heppened, the Chinese walked out of 
Geneva in protest. It was not that Eden and his officials were divided on 
aims at the Conference, merely methods and the extent to which Sri Ush 
policy in South-East Asia should be subordinated to that of the United 
States in the interest of harmonious Anglo-American relations in their 
widest sense. Britain, Eden maintained, was 'no less aware of the dangers 
of Communist expansion in South-East Asia' than the United States, but when 
it came to dealing with this danger, 'we have, and are entitled to have, 
our own ideas on how it can best be done'. 7Z 
Eden, it is argued in some quarters, lacked the broad vision and 
imagination which characterise a 'great' Foreign Secretary. He was. 
rather. a thoroughly efficient professional diplomat adept at the day-to-
day running of British diplomacy. 73 Though Eden's official biographer 
refutes the charge that he was • a potentially great civil servant or 
ambassador'7., his performance during the Indo-China crisis of 1954 
suggests otherwise. In his first address to the Commons after his return 
to office in 1951, Eden described the approach he would adopt in 
international affairs. He planned to take 'a number of deUni te, but 
lim! ted, problems' and, by solving them one by one, contribute to an 
improvement in the atmosphere of East-West relations and 'frOm this small 
beginning move into a wider and more hopeful field'. 7. On another occasion 
he spoke of a ... 
step-by-step' approach to foreign affairs. Preparation, conference 
and agreement: starting from small issues and working to the great. 
A steady pursuit, with a fixed determination and a real good will. 7. 
Indo-China in 1954 was certainly a 'definite' problem and Eden approached 
it in a 'limited' manner. Unfortunately, Indo-China was a bigger problem 
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than Eden realised and his approach, effective in the short-term, did 
little to ease matters in the future . 
• 
The day after the Geneva Conference ended, a special Cabinet Committee, 
appointed earlier in the year to review British defence policy in the light 
of developments in nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons,- presented its 
findings in a Cabinet memorandum. It concluded as follows: 
Our primary aim must be to prevent a major war. To that end we 
must strengthen our position and influence as a world Power and 
maintain and consolidate our alliance with the United States. 77 
This was a succinct summary of the central conclusion of Eden's Cabinet 
memorandum of June 1952 on 'Overseas Obligations' and from which the 
concept of power-by-proxy emerged. 78 However, as a design for offsetting 
Britain's postwar decline - as a means by which American power could be 
channeled towards the at tainment of British foreign policy goals· - this 
concept proved to be based on two false premises: that American aims were 
compatible with those of Britain; and, if not. that American policy could 
be brought into line through exposure to British political and diplomatiC 
opinion. These misconceptions were exposed in the context of the Indo-
China problem between 1951 and 1954. Anglo-American attitudes differed 
considerably and, with the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations lukewarm 
about close liaison and 'ganging up' with Britain, opportunities to 
influence official opinion in WaShington were rare. The central conclusion 
of the Cabinet's 1954 defence review was similarly flawed. Events in Indo-
China and at the Geneva Conference had demonstrated this even before it was 
presented to Ministers. The contradictions were glaring. While it was 
Britain's 'primary aim' to avoid a major war, and while the key to success 
in this respect lay in consolidating the Anglo-American partnership, what 
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was to be done when it was the United States itself which appeared the most 
likely cause of a widespread conflict? What happened when Britain resisted 
the more disturbing aspects of American policy thus causing Anglo-American 
tension and mistrust? How would that 'maintain and consolidate' relations 
between the two? And, since the key to strengthening Britain's 'position 
and influence as a world Power' also rested, according to Eden's earlier 
analysis, on a close working relationship with WaShington, what did this 
say for power-by-proxy? 
Ultimately, it said that there was no substitute for real power. This 
would be brutally revealed in Egypt 1n 1956 when, ironically, the means by 
which Eden in 1952-54- saw Britain continuing to wield power, the United 
States, proved to be the means by which Britain's want of power was 
exposed. An element of hyperbole notwithstanding, there may be something 
in Lord Boothby's retrospect1ve assessment of the 1951-56 period that 'with 
the best intention in the world, Eden brought about the worst relationship 
between Britain and the United States this century'. 7' 
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